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ABSTRACT 
 
Marc Alan Hardy 
 
DEFINING COMMUNITY NEED THROUGH THE LENS OF THE ELITE: 
A HISTORY OF THE INDIANAPOLIS FOUNDATION AND ITS 
FUNDING OF THE INDIANAPOLIS SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA, 1893-1984 
 
This history investigates the beginnings of community foundations in general and 
the creation of the Indianapolis Foundation specifically and its eventual funding of the 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra. My findings reveal that, contrary to previous histories 
that have been written, the creation of community foundations was not driven by 
benevolence but by changes in federal and state banking laws starting in 1913 that 
allowed banks to have trust departments that broke the monopoly that trust companies 
had long enjoyed. In response, trust company executives chartered community trusts to 
publicly position themselves as benevolent, community-minded businessmen. This 
distinguished them as trustworthy compared to the greedy bankers of the day, which 
helped trust companies gain trust customers. Community trusts were responsible for 
identifying and disbursing funds to deserving beneficiaries, thereby relieving trust 
companies of a costly and time consuming burden. Even more important, the trust 
companies retained control over the community trusts by appointing surrogate board 
members. In addition, none of the trust companies that chartered the Indianapolis 
Foundation donated their own money, yet appeared charitable. All of these factors made 
community foundations a very lucrative arrangement. 
 ix 
Funding the areas of arts and culture was not designated in the Indianapolis 
Foundation‟s original purpose statement, yet the Indiana State Symphony Society was 
funded at the height of the Great Depression while many Indianapolis citizens went 
hungry. The love of music played a very small part in efforts by the wealthy elite to 
garner support from the Indianapolis Foundation for the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra. The public justifications for funding the symphony began with giving 
psychological relief to the citizens of Indianapolis from the pressures of the Great 
Depression, to the need of employment for musicians, then the importance of musical 
education of children, expanding to the importance of the symphony to the city‟s 
reputation, and finally, in the 1980s, the symphony as a community asset that helped 
rejuvenate downtown Indianapolis. However, the real reason for funding was that the 
wealthy elite wanted the symphony to use as a flattering cultural institution that would 
elevate their social status and attract fellow elites and businesses to Indianapolis.  
 
Kevin C. Robbins, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
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Chapter 1: Why Only Trust Companies? 
 
Unlike the wealthy elite of Ancient Greece, several wealthy elite inhabitants of 
early twentieth-
 
century Indianapolis used the Indianapolis Foundation to engage in a 
form of pseudo-eurgetism. Eurgetism was an ancient Greek form of philanthropy that 
was described by Paul Veyne essentially as giving by the wealthy from their own 
resources to obtain honor and public acclaim.1 As part of an implicit social contract with 
the citizenry, great Greek benefactors funded religious festivals, choruses, and dramatic 
contests. Sometimes they contributed to the point of financial exhaustion, in return for the 
honor that was bestowed upon them by grateful citizens. These ancient donors did this, in 
part, to fulfill expectations of what elite city governors must do while in office. The 
modern wealthy who fill the pages of this dissertation used only other people‟s money in 
their attempts to appear munificent in the eyes of the citizenry in Indianapolis. Even more 
intriguing is the fact that the creators of the Indianapolis Foundation made money serving 
the needs of the city. Typically, the trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation, most of 
whom were closely bound to the creators of the organization, funded only projects they 
deemed acceptable according to the narrow convention and public decorum of the 
Midwestern upper-middle class, a group dominated by older white, mostly Protestant 
bankers, lawyers and businessmen. 
This historical dissertation began with the desire to find out how and why the 
Indianapolis Foundation considered the arts a fundable community need, given that 
support of the arts or culture was not part of its original purpose statement. Early in my 
                                                          
1
 Paul Veyne, Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism, ed. Oswyn 
Murray (UK: Penguin, 1992). 
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research, I stumbled upon a puzzling discovery: only trust companies and banks with 
trust departments were involved in the creation and development of community 
foundations for the first 50 years of their existence in the United States. This fact led me 
to an equally intriguing question: why was it that only trust companies created 
community foundations? Apparently, no community foundations were originally created 
by lawyers who administered trusts, or by wealthy individuals, or by private foundations, 
or by banks with trust departments. Why not? What were the circumstances that led to 
this exclusivity and what were the motivations for the heads of trust companies to create 
such allegedly benevolent civic institutions? Were their intentions in any way 
community-oriented and charitable? Or is it more clearly the case that narrow, self-
serving, and pro-business motives impelled trust company bankers to create community 
foundations?  
It is important to discover answers to these questions in order fully to understand 
why the Indianapolis Foundation ventured far outside of its original 1916 mission 
statement to fund the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra at the height of the Great 
Depression in 1933. The foundation trustees did so even though the organization 
originally eschewed any financial support to arts organizations. My research reveals that 
the answers to these questions will significantly alter the historically traditional view of 
the motivations of wealthy trust company bankers for creating community trusts and 
foundations. Far from reasons of benevolence or community building, the Indianapolis 
Foundation was formed by three trust companies in Indianapolis for blatantly selfish 
reasons: improved public relations for the trust business, more privately lucrative 
marketing of trust services to the wealthy, reduced business expenses in legal fees, 
 3 
reduced expenses to identify and locate charitable beneficiaries, and increased profit 
through additional and growing administrative fees.  
My research will also show the connections between funding decisions by the 
Indianapolis Foundation trustees for various programs in the first few years and their later 
decision to fund the arts. As we will see, that decision had little to do with promoting the 
aesthetic value of the arts, but very much more to do with enriching the social, political 
and business relationships among a powerful civic elite in Indianapolis. The “lens of the 
elite” which I refer to in the title of this dissertation is not limited to only the elite trustees 
of the Indianapolis Foundation, but also includes the elite who represented the wealthiest 
businessmen as well as the elite and the “Blue Book” society members who created, 
supported and advocated on behalf of the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 The meaning of the term “community need,” in the context of this dissertation, 
will be based on Abraham Maslow‟s theory of the Hierarchy of Need.2 Need, whether it 
be of the individual or the community, can be defined at several different levels. The way 
we as individuals define what we perceive as need is highly dependent on our 
understanding of this hierarchy as well as where the needs others, including our 
community, might be positioned in this hierarchy. The first two basic and foundational 
levels of this hierarchy are physiological and safety needs. The basic physiological needs 
include food, water, clothing, shelter, and sleep, while the safety needs include the need 
for security from physical harm, protection of our employment, of our family, our health 
and our possessions. Once these needs are met, we can then ascend to the more 
                                                          
2
 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (J. Wiley & Sons, 1999). 
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sophisticated needs of love and belonging, self-esteem and confidence, and finally self-
actualization (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Need 
 
Source: Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (J. Wiley & Sons, 1999). 
This dissertation attempts to reveal the definition of community need as viewed 
by the elite of Indianapolis who were closely associated with the Indianapolis 
Foundation. While much of the Indianapolis citizenry struggled to attain even a minimum 
of the first two of Maslow‟s levels, that of physiological and safety needs, the elites of 
Indianapolis were focused on the top levels of esteem and self-actualization. Even though 
those on the bottom of the needs hierarchy were struggling for survival and experienced 
little of the higher needs of self-actualization and esteem in their lives, the wealthy elite 
5 
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consistently ignored these more basic, foundational needs and persisted in insisting that 
high culture and charitable organizations that were acceptable to the those in their upper 
social circle were what the community most needed. 
The terms charity, philanthropy and benevolence are used interchangeably here 
because their definitions are also fluid in our society. The fact that the nonprofit sector 
does not like to be defined as the “nonprofit sector,” but cannot agree on other 
descriptions such as “philanthropic sector,” “charitable sector,” “civic sector,” and so on 
shows that even within the nonprofit world there is no agreement on definitions. As my 
research will show, this was also true 100 years ago, as organizations and individuals 
changed their definitions of what it meant to be charitable, philanthropic or benevolent. 
For this dissertation, the terms benevolence, charity and philanthropy will be defined as 
the donation of time, talent, money or material goods for the greater good of society 
without the consideration of or potential for personal gain. However, it is the definitions 
of these terms as demonstrated through the actions of the elite that are of most interest to 
this research. My research will show that while the elite used varied justifications to 
claim benevolence and charity toward the community, their efforts were usually, first and 
foremost, self-serving. 
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Other Histories of Community Foundations 
 
After reading the limited secondary literature on the creation and history of 
community foundations, I found that the important questions posed here have never been 
asked before. The few histories previously published about community trusts and 
foundations have been created and printed by those same organizations, frequently to 
enhance their own repute. Some prior histories have also come from corporate groups 
with a vested interest in the success of such foundations. Such works can hardly be 
expected to give unvarnished accounts of the real motives impelling trust bankers to 
create community foundations. As a result, these accounts often outline only the original 
official charters and lack any critical historical context and evaluation of the foundation 
or its creation. Usually, these in-house histories extol the selflessness, even the nobility, 
of the foundation‟s creators. Such incomplete and inherently untrustworthy “histories” 
uniformly assert the many benefits “benevolent” community trusts bring to the local 
population.  
An early booklet on the creation of the Chicago Community Trust was published 
by the Harris Trust and Savings Bank in 1915. This document is little more than a 
publicity tool to impress the public and drum up new business for the bank. It even has a 
page providing the wording of a bequest that a reader might employ for posthumous 
donations to the Harris Bank for eventual use by the community trust. 3 An early history 
of the Chicago Community Trust was published internally by the trust and written by its 
former secretary, Frank Loomis. This is really nothing more than a glowing report on all 
of its accomplishments, void of any critique of the community trust or the motives of its 
                                                          
3
 The Harris Trust and Savings Bank, The Chicago Community Trust: a Fund for Local Charity 
(Chicago: The Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 1915) The University of Chicago Library. 
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trustees.4 As discussed later in my research, a more scathing and insightful assessment of 
community foundations by Loomis would be written after his retirement. 
In 1931, the Vermont Commission on Country Life distributed its own sixteen-
page booklet about the Vermont Foundation. Readers got the message that “Persons 
interested in the welfare of Vermont, its people or any of its communities, may now 
utilize this philanthropic enterprise.”5 This booklet not only laid out the charter and 
bylaws of the foundation, but like the booklet by Harris Bank, it also suggested wording 
for one‟s bequest to the organization under the heading “Phraseology Employed in Wills 
Using the Vermont Foundation.”6 
Modern scholars have been slow to scrutinize in detail the creation of American 
community foundations. In 1981, Peter Dobkin Hall published a working paper titled The 
Community Foundation and the Foundations of Community. The title is misleading, 
because it covers only the history of the creation of the Trexler Foundation in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania from 1830 through the 1960s. What Trexler created was not a community 
foundation, which is by definition a public charity, but rather a private foundation whose 
founder was committed to serving his local community. This is not unlike many other 
private foundations which limit their giving to specific geographic locations, often to 
only the city or county in which the foundation resides.  
                                                          
4
 Frank Denman Loomis, The Chicago Community Trust: a History of Its Development, 1915-
1962 (Chicago: The Chicago Community Trust, 1962). 
  
5
 The Vermont Foundation: A State-wide Community Trust (Burlington: Vermont Commission on 
Country Life, 1931)Booklet Middlebury College Library, 3. 
 
6
 The Vermont Foundation: A State-wide Community Trust,16. 
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David Hammack‟s chapter “Community Foundations: The Delicate Question of 
Purpose,” helps explain the creation and original purpose of community foundations.7 
This is a broad yet brief history of the role of trust companies in the formation of 
community foundations. It gives a very general history of community foundations 
through 1987, and is simply a survey based on financial records and internally generated 
reports of community foundations. It provides little detail about the motivations of trust 
company officers or the decision making process of the trustees of community 
foundations over time. 
Yet there are two points Hammack makes that my research directly questions and 
contradicts. Hammack first contends that the trust companies were benevolent and run by 
officers who had the needs of the community in mind. Second, Hammack asserts that the 
trustees or distribution committees consisted of people chosen for their knowledge of the 
needs of the community, “not for their leadership in any particular religious group or 
profession or for their acceptability to previous members of the committee.”8 In fact, 
these trustees were entirely white, wealthy, and comparatively isolated fixtures of the 
community‟s elite. Although many of these trustees served on boards of social service 
and welfare agencies and associations, they themselves often admitted their own 
ignorance as to what the community‟s needs really were. They usually had to commission 
surveys so that they could find out just exactly what those community “needs” might be. 
To compound this inbred ignorance of real community need, many trustees passed their 
seats on to immediate family members, particularly from father to son. This was 
                                                          
7
 David C. Hammack, “Community Foundations: the Delicate Question of Purpose,” in An Agile 
Servant: Community Leadership by Community Foundations, ed. Richard Magat (Washington, DC: 
Foundation Center, 1989). 
 
8
 Hammack, “Community Foundations: the Delicate Question of Purpose,” 24. 
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acceptable because of the public‟s deference to the supposed philanthropic wisdom of 
those who had done well in business or had become icons in the religious congregations 
of the community. Very few community foundation trustees ever came from the ranks of 
those who were actually engaged in front lines of social services or those who directly 
served the needs of the community such as physicians, public health specialists, or 
community organizers at the grass-roots level. 
While there are few publications that focus on the early history of community 
foundations, there are even fewer on the early history of funding of the arts by 
community foundations. The scant studies of community foundation arts funding are 
focused mostly on the oldest community foundation, the Cleveland Foundation. There is 
an excellent article on the history of arts funding by the Cleveland Community 
Foundation titled “Cleveland: Arts Renaissance,” by Bill Doll in An Agile Servant. 
Unfortunately, it only chronicles in a general way the funding of the arts starting in 1975 
after the arrival of a new executive director, Homer Wadsworth. It does not cover arts 
funding before that time except to say it was fairly insignificant and that many people 
were opposed to expanding the funding to other arts organizations. One of these 
dissenters was the head of the Cleveland Orchestra‟s trustees who “feared that new 
groups would drain off potential support for the orchestra, which was facing a $1 million 
deficit.”9 As repeatedly revealed in the chapters that follow covering the relationship 
between the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra and the Indianapolis Foundation, these 
large annual deficits constantly plagued symphonies across the United States, no matter 
how much money they raised. 
                                                          
9
 Bill Doll, “Cleveland: Arts Renaissance,” in An Agile Servant: Community Leadership by 
Community Foundations, ed. Richard Magat (Washington, DC: Foundation Center, 1989), 254. 
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 Rebuilding Cleveland, by Diana Tittle (1992), is one of the very few recent 
studies to address community foundations and arts funding. This resource cites the 
decision of the Cleveland Foundation to rebuild the downtown arts district in the mid 
1980‟s. Like Doll‟s chapter, this book does not cover arts funding before 1980. It also 
jumps around in subject matter and chronology as well, making it difficult to use as a 
comparison for my own research.  
Another book on the history of the pioneering Cleveland Foundation, A Trust for 
All Time, by Nathaniel Howard (1963), was commissioned and published by the 
Cleveland Foundation itself, making it inherently suspect of distortion about the real 
impetus behind the organization‟s founding and the funding motivations of its earliest 
officers. This 50-year history is not reliable as an independent scholarly source since its 
author, a retired editor of the Cleveland News, was paid by the foundation to write it. He 
makes only a passing comment about arts funding by stating that arts and cultural 
organizations have received funding over time from the foundation. In 1989, there 
appeared a short pamphlet titled “The Cleveland Foundation at Seventy-Five.” Its author, 
Richard Pogue, was at the time chairman of the Cleveland Foundation. This short piece 
only briefly discusses the Playhouse Square Development Committee and its investment 
in downtown Cleveland, and was of no contributing value to my study. 
There are still a few resources that deal with contemporary arts funding by 
community foundations, one of which is Community Foundations at 75 (1989), edited by 
Eugene Scanlan for the Council on Foundations. This has useful arts funding 
comparisons for 1975, 1984 and 1987, but has no historical perspective on modern 
funding trends. 
 12 
Returning again to the research of Peter Dobkin Hall, I use his writings to 
reintroduce the main thrust of this chapter. Hall states that part of the reason for the 
creation of community foundations or trusts was that in the early 1900s, community 
leaders “were historically rooted in the intimacy of the small-town and village.”10 He also 
points out that two-thirds of the twenty-six community foundations that were established 
from 1914 to 1924 were created in the Midwest, while only one-third was from the 
Northeast. Hall‟s explanation for the difference pointed toward two different kinds of 
community “elites.” In the Midwest, elites were more trusting of the “public to use 
community charitable resources intelligently” than were the elites of the Northeast. He 
cites examples of this trust in the large number of public versus private universities as 
well as Community Chests (the forerunner to the United Way) in the Midwestern states 
compared to the Northeast.11  
While these explanations seem credible, they are also incomplete and do not 
answer the questions I posed at the opening of this chapter. In order to understand more 
fully the reasons for the establishment of community foundations, we first need to 
investigate the rise and history of for-profit trust companies in the United States in 
general and in Indiana in particular. The outcome of this investigation will reveal that, 
either through premeditation or coincidence, trust companies benefitted greatly from 
community foundations. The intentions of the principal officers of the trust companies 
were not wholly munificent in pioneering these new forms of ostensible charitable action 
for community benefit. However, it will also become evident that the three men who 
                                                          
10
 Peter Dobkin Hall, “The Community Foundation in America, 1914-1918,” in Philanthropic 
Giving: Studies in Varieties and Goals, ed. Richard Magat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
183. 
 
11
 Hall, “The Community Foundation in America, 1914-1918,” 188. 
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created the Indianapolis Foundation were avid arts supporters and viewed the arts as 
important to the community. 
The beginning of the community foundation movement came in 1914 with the 
creation of the Cleveland Foundation. Judge Frederick Goff, President of the Cleveland 
Trust Company, became instrumental in the creation of the Cleveland Foundation. His 
pioneering venture into community benevolence has been touted as a great philanthropic 
advance that has benefitted many local communities. As one former secretary of the 
Chicago Community Trust claimed: 
Mr. Goff, great banker and promoter as he was, must have been 
attracted to, interested in, and fascinated by the possibility of the 
modern foundation in American life, foundations devoted to noble 
purposes and having power within their own structure to modify or 
change their purpose to meet changing conditions and needs. He 
must have sensed the possibilities for public service by the banks 
of America in the larger cities, promoting the welfare of their 
communities and thus of America at large and indeed of the whole 
world.12 
 
This passage is representative of the noble stories written about men of finance 
and commerce who were hailed as unselfishly laboring for the good of the community 
when they could have easily ignored its needs. However, these tributes are incomplete 
half-truths at best that ignore the vested, self-interested motives of trust company bankers 
in creating community foundations. True, it would make sense that a group of concerned 
and charitably minded citizens, some of considerable means, would be motivated to form 
an organization that could put a deceased local person‟s potent wealth to good use long 
after his or her death. It would make sense that a wealthy person, who is approaching his 
or her senior years, would think long-term about the health and welfare of a community 
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that helped create his or her own wealth. It would certainly be plausible that a major 
philanthropist, such as a Rockefeller, Carnegie or Ford, would understand the value of an 
institution that could pool the resources of smaller donors into one large fund that would 
be administered by a board of trustees, and would initiate such an organization. Yet in the 
case of community foundations, none of that occurred.  
The facts are that early community foundations were chartered by trust 
companies, and usually by only one. Many had close relationships with, or were owned 
by, banks, those agents of capitalism lucratively lending money to business and industry. 
In fact, American banks of the late 1800s and early 1900s were more financial 
instruments of the railroad, coal, steel and oil cartels than they were resources for the 
common man, and rarely were they devoted to benevolent community development. 
Banks, like Indiana National Bank, were primarily commercial banks that lent money 
only to businesses and were places where businesses deposited their profits. Loans to 
individuals for cars and mortgages were essentially nonexistent, except to businesses and 
a few wealthy customers.13 It was thought by some at this time that the U.S. banking 
system was “the worst in the world,” and certainly not on par with other world banking 
systems.14 American financial “trusts” of the time more often engendered deep public 
suspicion and criticism, especially in the mass-circulation daily papers and in the seething 
cartoons they published. One scholar of these events notes: 
National banks themselves, along with larger state banks and trust 
companies, were combining trusts and trust like arrangements of 
various kinds. […] Financial institutions might combine tightly in 
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true corporate mergers; one financial institution might control all 
the stock of others; a small group of stockholders might own large 
blocks of the stock of various institutions; or “interlocking 
directorates,” in which a small group of people appoint one another 
to the boards of directors of several institutions, might be formed. 
The suspicion grew that a small number of huge financial 
combinations controlled the allocation of credit in the United 
States, that is, that a giant “money trust” had emerged and operated 
from Wall Street.15 
 
The first community foundations were charted by only one trust company 
exclusively, but the Indianapolis Foundation broke ground as the first to be chartered by 
multiple trust companies. By 1931, only seventeen years after the establishment of the 
Cleveland Foundation, seventy-four community foundations had been created in the U.S., 
all by trust companies or banks with trust departments. Of those, half were created by 
only one bank while the other half were created by multiple banks.16 Sometimes the 
banks chose the trustees of the foundation, sometimes they supposedly allowed judges 
and politicians to appoint the trustees. In truth, the vast majority of the trustees were 
handpicked by the trust companies and their appointments given rubber-stamped 
approval by such political and legal dignitaries as a façade of impartiality. As my 
research will show, this explosion of community trusts had little to do with benevolence 
and everything to do with rapidly changing state and federal banking laws, starting in 
1913 in Ohio. 
It was against this backdrop that Frederick Goff developed a way to insure that 
the beneficent objective of a trust would never become obsolete. Obsolescence was 
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touted as a big problem among those who administered trusts and charitable endowments. 
Bankers claimed that a good de 
al of money was simply laying idle, and had become part of the “Dead Hand” of 
untouchable funds that could not be administered or disbursed because the purpose or 
recipient of the trusts no longer existed. Due to this inactivity, administrative and service 
fees could not be charged on the moribund accounts to the financial detriment of the trust 
companies. The issue of the wretched “Dead Hand” had its roots in England where, at the 
beginning of the 1900s, it was estimated that more than 40,000 fixed purpose, “Dead 
Hand” trusts had been created during the previous two centuries.17 It was widely 
suspected that these encumbered monies served no real public benefit and had become 
detrimental to the national and local economy, starving the country of productive 
investments. One commentator noted: 
Practically none of them accomplished for any considerable time 
the objects the donors had in mind, and a large number became 
useless or positively harmful in their effects, necessitating action 
by Parliament in many cases, under the cy pres doctrine, to divert 
the funds to useful charitable purposes.18 
 
Some of the outdated purposes of these trusts included the funding to redeem 
captives from pirates, to support leprosy hospitals, and to aid those in debtor‟s prison. 
Each cause had become hopelessly obsolete. In addition, some trusts had been created to 
enhance the donor‟s vain claims to fame, or reflected his or her own vindictiveness or  
even insanity, especially by requiring trustees or beneficiaries to perform eccentric or 
humiliating acts. For example, one English trust specified that a church annually sing an 
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anthem that was written by a donor‟s relative, and yet another required that a certain 
group of poor people should be given a grey suit once a year. One even required that a 
specific group of poor women be given green waistcoats every December.19 It was this 
history of short sighted or misdirected philanthropy, so debilitating to the Mother country 
(England), that trust companies publically blamed as being an alarming plague that could 
spread to the U.S. To combat this threat to a productive economy, trust companies 
offered the antidote of the actively administered and changeable community trust.  
If burdened with a “Dead Hand” fund, trust companies at the time had only two 
choices: either do nothing or go to court and attempt to invoke the cy pres doctrine to 
change the focus of the income from the trust.20 To distribute the old encumbered funds to 
a better or more pressing cause than that specified in the will of the deceased would have 
been illegal without intervention of the courts. Frederick Goff claimed that these new 
community foundations had the potential to offer “some degree of relief from the 
withering, paralyzing blight of the Dead Hand, through the years when no intellect 
remains to apply reason and sympathy and discretion to the terms of antiquated fiats.” 21 
Note how the trust officers flatter themselves here as actors simultaneously intelligent, 
compassionate, and discrete. The reality of the self-dealing and social ignorance among 
community foundation trustees, as revealed in this dissertation, flatly contradicts Goff‟s 
statement above. 
Although these assertions appear noble on the part of banks, they do not seem to 
make sense in light of their avowed purpose to excel as profitable businesses. Banks and 
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trust companies existed to make money for their clients and themselves, and always at a 
decent rate of return. Although these “Dead Hand” trusts could not be administered, trust 
companies could still profit modestly and steadily from the interest that accumulated on 
these trusts. Banks also became commonly known more for their financing of big money 
projects than for their knowledge or support of charitable concerns in the community. 
Why, then, would they be so concerned with creating a foundation that was dedicated to 
giving the money in their clients‟ trusts away? One highly motivating reason is that 
creating a community foundation was profitable for the trust companies to create 
community foundations. 
Studying the histories that have been written about community foundations, no 
one has asked some of these fundamental questions regarding the initial motivations 
behind this movement, one of the central questions being: what was in it for the trust 
companies? Most have cited the trust companies‟ contempt for the number of “Dead 
Hand” trusts that were collecting both interest and dust. If they were truly concerned 
about the loss of community benefit from these impotent trusts they could have used their 
own financial resources to hire lawyers, break the old trusts via the cy pres doctrine, and 
unleash these funds for the common good. They could have developed departments in 
their companies dedicated to ensuring that these funds be put to effective use in current 
charitable needs or causes. However, both solutions would have increased expenses for 
legal services and specialized personnel, indicating a simple but overlooked reason for 
trust companies to champion the creation of an instrument such as a community trust or 
foundation that could substantially reduce the number of obsolete trusts: to reduce 
expenses and make more money. But how?  
 19 
A Brief History of Trust and Banking Law in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
Centuries 
The answer to that question is rooted in the history of trusts and the laws that 
govern them. Trust law has a long evolution starting in England in the sixteenth century. 
One use of trusts was to pass on land and wealth to wives and daughters, since women 
could not own land. If a father wanted to protect his daughter from dependency on a 
husband, he would set up a trust for her own use. These trusts were often challenged by 
creditors to whom the husband or father owed money and, in some cases, the women 
were left with nothing after the claims were settled. The law was eventually changed to 
protect the integrity of the trust and the wealth and property that had been placed in trust 
for the beneficiaries‟ use. 22 Up until the late 1800s, trusts had been primarily managed by 
well-respected individuals, especially lawyers. However, the creation of the trust 
company would change much of that tradition. The rise of trust companies is best 
understood by looking briefly at the evolution of banking in the United States. 
The first bank in the United States was the Bank of North America and its charter 
was approved by the Continental Congress in 1781. Although several banks that were 
established early on would be later converted to trust companies, the first trust company 
on record to be established was on March 10, 1812 in Pennsylvania. This institution was 
named The Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities. 
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Although trust powers were not immediately given to it, it was one of the first institutions 
to become a trust company.23 
New York, however, was the birthplace of the first bona fide trust company in the 
country. Chartered in 1822, it was titled the Farmers Fire Insurance and Loan Company 
and was the first corporation to have the power to execute trusts.24 Although the company 
already had the right to administer trusts, it did not use the word “trust” in its name, 
perhaps to avoid a political battle. It seems that when a group of prominent businessmen 
sought to charter the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company, the first to use “trust” 
in its name, it caused a political firestorm “involving the pros and cons of so unusual an 
enterprise.”25 It was eventually approved for a New York State charter in 1830.  
The growth of trust companies from the late 1800s onward was explosive, mostly 
because the regulations controlling trust companies in some states, such as Indiana, were 
much more lax than those for state or national banks. Nationally, trust companies grew 
from 34 in 1882 to 1,079 in 1909, a 3,000 % increase in only 17 years. This was 
especially true in the New England states, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. This is 
evidence not only of the immense profitability of trust companies, but of the fierce 
competition among bankers for the trust business of the wealthy. Using the credibility of 
a community foundation to gain the edge over other trust companies would certainly have 
made good business sense while also increasing the prestige and favorable publicity of 
the trust company or companies that created such community foundations.  
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This could also be the reason why in the beginning only single trust companies 
founded community foundations. Even later, when multiple trust companies were 
involved, it was usually only a few. It would seem that if trust companies truly wanted to 
see the “Dead Hand” done away with and the power of these funds unleashed to solve the 
problems of their communities, then all trust companies would have been invited to take 
part. However, that did not happen. A huge incentive for such exclusivity was for trust 
companies to set themselves apart from the competition, because such companies were 
believed by many to be so in name only, operating as thinly veiled state banks.26 After the 
depression of the 1930s decimated many financial institutions, most of the banking and 
trust company laws dating from 1873 forward were repealed, with new laws written in 
1933.27 
In 1894, the trust company that led the way in creating community foundations, 
the Cleveland Trust Company, became chartered. During its first two decades, it bought 
out or consolidated with several banks and trust companies and by 1916 its assets totaled 
above $49,000,000, approximately $846,000,000 in 2004 Constant Dollars (CD), and it 
employed more than 400 people.28 In 1908, Frederick Goff became its president and he 
was widely credited for much of the growth of the company. The Cleveland Trust 
Company innovated new ways to create profit by expanding to branches, creating the first 
women‟s banking department in Cleveland, and being the first to adopt advertising as its 
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primary marketing tool. This last point is important to the understanding of the Cleveland 
Trust‟s belief in the profitable power of advertising, marketing and public relations, all 
three of which would be well served by the establishment of a community foundation. It 
was also one of the first trust companies to champion the establishment of the “living 
trust,” which could be written and legally take effect during the donor‟s lifetime versus a 
testament that took effect after the donor‟s death. This enabled the wealthy to set up 
charitable trusts while they were still alive and able to exert some control over their 
disbursements. The Cleveland Trust Company created the Cleveland Foundation in 1914, 
an act that inspired other trust companies to establish community foundations in at least 
13 other cities within a few short years, Indianapolis being one of first.29  
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Chapter 2: The Role of Trust Companies in the Creation of Community 
Foundations 
 
The early banking business in Indiana has a spotty history that includes frequent 
failures, mismanagement and embezzlement, especially between 1814-1834. The first 
state chartered bank in Indianapolis was the State Bank of Indiana in 1834. One of its 
first directors was Calvin Fletcher, whose brother, Stoughton A. Fletcher, started the first 
private bank in Indiana, the Fletcher-American National Bank in 1839. Stoughton‟s 
grandson, Stoughton A. Fletcher II, played a prominent role in the Fletcher Trust and 
Savings Company which helped start the Indianapolis Foundation through the efforts of 
its vice-president and counsel, Evans Woollen. Another person who figured prominently 
in the early years of the community foundation was William E. English.1 Upon his death 
in 1932, he donated the English Opera House and Hotel, which had been built on 
Monument Circle by his father, Indianapolis banker William H. English, to the 
Indianapolis Foundation. That property was sold, and the proceeds were used to establish 
the English Foundation in the 1950s which built the building at 615 North Alabama 
Street where the Indianapolis Foundation currently resides. 
The Indiana National Bank was established in 1865 and had as one of its first 
board members John H. Holliday. Holliday was a historian and newspaper man, and as 
such understood the power of both marketing and public relations. That same year the 
Merchants National Bank of Indianapolis was established and was run for the most part 
by officers and a board of directors dominated the Frenzel family: O. N. Frenzel, 
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president; J. P. Frenzel, first vice-president; O. F. Frenzel, cashier; and J. P. Frenzel, Jr., 
junior cashier. Both John H. Holliday and J. P. Frenzel played pivotal roles in the 
creation of Indiana trust companies and the Indianapolis Foundation.2 
Trust companies in Indiana were not created until 1893, several years after banks 
were born. As a result, in the early 1900s the management of personal trusts by trust 
companies was a fairly new business and was regulated by a separate set of state laws. 
It‟s significant that John H. Holliday and John P. Frenzel, who headed two of the three 
trust companies that started the Indianapolis Foundation, were also part of a group who 
lobbied the Indiana General Assembly in 1893 to pass the Trust Act. They did this 
primarily for business opportunity and potential profit, not concern for the community. 
Frenzel was first vice-president of Merchants National Bank and Holliday was a board 
director of Indiana National Bank. As Weintraut and Nolan state: 
Trust companies engaged in a much wider range of activities than 
did banks, including the administration of trusts, the handling of 
safe deposit boxes, and the establishment of travel departments. 
Shortly thereafter, Holliday formed the Union Trust Company. 
Union Trust and Indiana National Bank worked closely for the 
next fifty years until they formalized their relationship with a 
merger in the twentieth century.3 
 
The introduction of the idea of trust companies was not at first embraced by many 
in the Indiana House of Representatives. First, the legislature by its nature was rife with 
lawyers whose profession administered most of the personal trusts of the wealthy at that 
time. Approval of trust companies would encroach on the profitability of the legal 
profession, and, as we will see, some lawyers had a very low regard for trust companies 
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even after they were approved. In addition, the concept of trusts at that time was severely 
tainted by the mergers of large railroads in the 1880s followed by consolidations of large 
trusts of other industries up to 1904. These corporate trusts also involved the use of 
investment bankers, and the U.S. Congress was very suspicious of their motives as well 
as their claims that consolidation made them more “efficient.” Many resented the 
resources that went into these mergers as well as the profits that the stockholders were 
making, leaving the impression that Wall Street was animated by greed and that trusts 
cheated the public and its welfare.4  
Trust companies were first established for use by corporations to “transact 
business of a fiduciary character out of the line of ordinary commercial banking, and to 
deal with real estate and collaterals and securities.”5 This seemingly solved “the ancient 
and difficult problem of utilizing land values as a basis for credit in a safe way.”6 In 1901 
they were allowed to be used as a place where people could deposit their cash in savings 
accounts and other valuables in safe deposit boxes. Until the establishment of savings and 
trust companies there was no place where people could deposit their money. Part of this 
was due to resistance against banks of any sort by those who believed in the agrarian 
custom of barter and solid gold coin exchange. 7 Stanley L. Jones summarizes the conflict 
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that contributed to the suppression of banking in predominantly rural communities by 
stating that these farmers: 
[…] believed that paper money by stimulating commercial and 
industrial development was a threat to their political and economic 
freedom. Paper money, they believed, was the cause for inflation, 
depression, and all the financial stability with which they had been 
so harassed in previous years. They looked upon paper money as 
the special tool by which monopolists achieved their privileged 
positions. Thus, these men believed that in fighting paper money 
banking they were helping to preserve a stable economy in which 
the small farm and the small town would prevail. On the other side, 
the advocates of paper money were those who were first of all 
interested in expanding business enterprise. They believed that 
paper money was necessary if their business and their town were to 
grow and prosper.8  
 
The measure to approve of the establishment of Indiana trust companies had 
failed several times in previous attempts, the last failure, also backed by Frenzel, 
Holliday and Judge J. E. Inglehart, being in 1891.9 A major reason for this was that many 
legislators would not approve the bill because of the term “trust.” It took two years to 
educate the representatives and state senators that this was a different kind of trust.10 It 
was introduced again by Representative Collins on January 27, 1893 as Engrossed House 
Bill No. 362 which read: 
A bill for an act to provide for the incorporation, organization and 
dissolution of Trust, Fidelity and Title Guaranty Companies, 
defining their purposes and powers, regulating their concerns and 
declaring an emergency.11  
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Note the use of the words “fidelity” and “guaranty” in combination with “trust,” 
words that seem designed to bolster the credibility of trust companies to the legislators 
and the public. It was then referred to the Committee on Judiciary, whose head, Chairman 
McMullen, recommended the following amendment: 
Before any corporations, created under this act, shall engage in any 
business for which the same is organized, it shall deposit with the 
Auditor of the State of Indiana bonds of the State of Indiana of the 
par value of fifty thousand dollars, or bonds of equal value, to 
secure the performance of all its obligations; and said company 
might from time to time make substitution of others for such 
bonds, but shall maintain the aggregate value of such deposit as 
long as it continues in business,” and when so amended that the 
bill do pass.12 
 
It was again entered into the official record. It was later read a third time with the 
amendment and put to a vote, but even Representative Collins, who had originally 
introduced it, voted against it and it failed 39-37. 13 It was introduced a fourth time by 
Collins once again, and this time was passed 61-15.14 It was introduced into the Indiana 
State Senate on February 21, and was made law under Chapter CLXI on March 4, 1893. 15 
Although there are seventeen sections to the act, section ten and sections fourteen through 
sixteen are most relevant to the law‟s role in creating community foundations. 
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The fourth power that was authorized to trust companies under section ten was: 
To act as trustee, assignee or receiver in all cases where it shall be 
lawful for any court of record, officer, corporation, person or firm 
to appoint a trustee, assignee, or receiver, and to be commissioned 
and act as administrator of any estate, executor of any last will and 
testament of any deceased person, and as guardian of the person or 
estate of any minor or minors, or of the estate of any lunatic, 
imbecile, spendthrift, habitual drunkard or others person 
disqualified or unable from any cause to manage their estate […] 16 
 
The crucial eighth power laid out under section ten specified the charges that a 
trust company was allowed to levy against any trust for services and fees, stating that: 
For the faithful performance and discharge of any such trust, duty, 
obligation or service so imposed upon, conferred and accepted by 
any such corporation, it shall be entitled to ask, demand and 
receive such reasonable compensation therefor as the same shall 
be worth, or such compensation as may have been or may be fixed 
by the contract or agreement of the parties, as well as any 
advances necessarily paid out and expended in the discharge and 
performance thereof, and to charge legal interest on such advances 
unless otherwise agreed upon; and any compensation or 
commission paid or agreed to be paid for the negotiation or 
security of any loan or the execution of any trust by any such loan 
and trust and safe deposit company shall not be deemed interest 
within the meaning of any law of this State, nor shall any excess 
thereof over any rate of interest permitted by the laws of this State 
be decreed or held in any court of law or equity to be usury, and 
such compensation may embrace the employment of legal services 
when necessary for the protection of trusts [emphasis added].17 
 
Trust companies gained the right to charge fees for their administrative services 
that were reasonable, but the definition of reasonable was never clarified. Nonetheless, 
the law also specified that the charges must be in alignment with the original contract, if 
                                                          
16
 “Laws of the State of Indiana passed at the Fifty-Eighth Regular Session of the General 
Assembly begun on the Fifth Day of January, A.D., 1983,”349. 
 
17
 “Laws of the State of Indiana passed at the Fifty-Eighth Regular Session of the General 
Assembly begun on the Fifth Day of January, A.D., 1983,” 351, [spelling errors in original document, 
italics added for emphasis]. 
 29 
any, between the testator and the trust company. This may very well be a key reason, if 
not the main reason, that so many trust companies were anxious to help establish 
community foundations. If a trust could not be executed according to the wishes of the 
testator because the cause, person or organization designated as beneficiary no longer 
existed, then the estate could not be executed as originally agreed and management fees 
for payouts would not be allowed to be charged against the trust. This made “Dead Hand” 
trusts especially pernicious in the eyes of more profit-driven bankers. Moribund trusts 
caused a reduction in the amount of income a trust company could glean from such a 
trust. To give bankers even more motivation to find a way to avoid these “Dead Hand” 
situations, oversight from state regulators was extremely stringent: 
It shall be the duty of such Public Examiner, once every six 
months, to make an examination of the books, property, affects 
[effects] and liabilities of said corporation, […] If it shall appear to 
the said Auditor of State, from any examination made, […] that 
said corporation has committed a violation of this act, or the law, 
or that it is conducting businesses in an unsafe or unauthorized 
manner [if the corporation does not respond satisfactorily to the 
charges] he shall communicate the facts to the Prosecuting 
Attorney […]. 18 
 
J. P. Frenzel and John H. Holliday wasted no time capitalizing on their successful 
lobbying efforts to get legislative approval for the establishment of trust companies in 
Indiana. Frenzel started the Indiana Trust Company on April 1, 1893, less than four 
weeks after the law was put into place. Although all of the board of the Merchants 
National Bank, of which J. P. Frenzel was president, comprised Frenzel family members, 
John P. Frenzel was the lone Frenzel associated with the newly established trust 
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company. Holliday, who was a director of the Indiana National Bank, incorporated the 
Union Trust Company two months later on May 31, 1893, and became its president. 19  
The utility of such a service to the average person caught on quickly. When the 
Indiana Trust Company started on April 4, it had a capital stock certificate issued for 
$750,000 and less than a month later it was raised to $1 million. By 1907, its deposits 
were more than $7.5 million and exceeded the deposits of all other Indianapolis trust 
companies combined. However, J. P. Frenzel at least wished to appear to be community-
minded even as a businessman. According to a book that was sponsored by the 
Merchants National Bank (the descendant of the Indiana Trust Company), two of the 
Frenzel brothers who were involved in banking, Otto N. and Oscar F., were always 
thrifty, worked hard, and always looked to the future for opportunities. J. P. Frenzel, 
however, differed from the other two in that, while his brothers were devoted family men 
and shied away from community involvement, John was presented as “the civic-minded, 
community leader in the family, free to travel and devote unlimited time to his varied 
interests.”20 It is important to remember, however, that these were sanitized versions of 
the history of these banks and those associated with them as they were published and/or 
sponsored by the banks themselves. In fact, most of the early “histories” of banks, trust 
companies and community trusts were paid for by the institutions themselves and must be 
viewed as extremely biased and premature efforts at positive public relations and 
institutional promotion.  
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From the beginning, Holliday‟s Union Trust Company was an “affiliate” of 
Indiana National Bank, and its self-published brief on its 80-year history stated: 
Two strong affiliates…Each one strong and useful in its own right, 
the combined resources and services of The Indiana National Bank 
and The Union Trust Company offer their customers exceptional 
advantages in our City and State. These two institutions have 
combined resources of more than $300,000,000. Whatever services 
common to the banking and trust company field one does not have 
the other does, so that together they are equipped to handle any 
banking or trust problem that could arise.21 
 
Evidently using the word “trust” in the name of your business was a good 
marketing tool, so other financial enterprises started using it regardless of whether they 
had been chartered as a trust or not. This became such an issue - probably more for the 
legitimate trust companies - that an amendment to the act was made in 1899, which stated 
that it was unlawful for an unchartered entity to call itself a “trust.” Violators were 
charged $50 per day for each day of the offense by the attorney general.22 By 1908, trust 
companies were doing so well that the state government decided that they should pay for 
their own regulation and they were assessed bank examiner fees on a sliding scale 
according to their level of assets. The amendments of 1911 reveal that the trust 
businesses grew considerably in just a few years. The power of the bank examiners was 
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reduced, as well as their numbers, and it was made clear to them that they could be 
replaced at the anytime.23 
In 1915 huge changes in competition for Indiana trust companies were made 
when the state laws were amended so that all Indiana banks could engage in the trust 
businesses. The law was changed to read that any bank or savings institution operating in 
Indiana “shall be empowered by this act to accept and execute trusts of any and every 
description which may be committed or transferred to them, under the same rules and 
regulations as now govern like powers in loan and trust companies.”24 This legislation 
ended the monopoly that trust companies had controlled for over 20 years, forcing them 
to compete with all banks for trust customers. This gave trust bankers and their powerful 
affiliated attorneys a major reason to make common cause in an effort to jointly and 
profitably dominate the trust business in Indianapolis. Trusts being such a lucrative 
business, in order to survive it would be imperative that competitive financial institutions 
would have to devise a way to market themselves as the more trustworthy choice among 
many. This could be an important reason why trust companies decided to help charter 
community foundations. Being closely associated with such a philanthropic institution, 
such as a community trust or foundation, projected a trustworthy image to potential trust 
costumers. In fact, in other cities rival trust companies saw the importance of this 
advantage and expressed their dissatisfaction. For instance, several Chicago trust 
companies voiced their disapproval that the Harris Trust was the only trust company 
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allowed to be associated with the Chicago Community Trust. As a result of their 
insistence that they be included in such a public institution, several other Chicago trust 
companies gained admittance to an “Advisory Council,” but this did not occur until 1949, 
more than 30 years after the creation of the community trust.25 In contrast, the original 
three trust companies chartering the Indianapolis Foundation never instituted any similar 
accommodations. By 1925, more than 50 community trusts had been established, but 
about 40 of them had been chartered by only one trust company. This clearly shows that 
from the very beginning of the community foundation movement trust bankers wanted to 
maintain monopolistic control over these foundations. Profit was their primary motive. 
Logic dictates that if they were truly concerned about expanding the potential power of 
philanthropic trusts and of ending the scourge of the dreaded “Dead Hand” trust through 
the creation of community foundations, then these trust companies executives should 
have invited as many trust companies as possible to join in the effort in order to help 
uplift their treasured local communities. Trust companies that were left out in the cold in 
other cities also saw the duplicity of this arrangement and pressured the original founders 
to open up the membership of this exclusive club. Support grew for the multiple trust 
approach because it was “more apt to enlist the active support of all qualified banks and 
trust companies of a community.”26  
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Fees Charged by Trust Companies for Trust Administration and Distribution 
 
For this study, the most important parts of trust company fee schedules are the 
charges for the distribution of funds from trusts, such as payments to beneficiaries. No 
other scholarly research has scrutinized the profit motive for forming community 
foundations. By 1925, there were laws and regulations in many states concerning limits 
on how much a trust company could charge its trusts for administrative and legal fees. 
However, Indiana had no such limit. If the fees charged in other Midwestern states are an 
indicator of the fees that Indiana trust companies charged for trusts created by wills or 
court created trusts, the trust business was indeed highly lucrative. These fees range from 
10 percent of the first $1,000 handled to 1 percent of funds over $5,000. The maximum 
fees for the states closest to Indiana were as follows: 
Michigan … 5 per cent on first $1,000, 2 ½ per cent on next 
$4,000, 1 per cent on balance. 
Ohio … 6 per cent on first $1,000, 4 percent on next $4,000, 2 per 
cent on balance. 
Illinois … Not over 6 per cent on personal estate and 3 per cent on 
proceeds of sale of real estate. 
Kentucky … Not over 5 percent on all amounts received and 
disbursed [spelling in original document]. 27  
 
 From these outlined Midwestern fee schedules, we can reasonably assume that 
Indiana trust companies were charging 4 or 5 percent on the smaller amounts and around 
2 percent on the larger balances just for handling those amounts, whether from the 
original acceptance or disbursement. Some even argued that the problem was not that 
trust companies charged too much but that they charged too little, which caused problems 
for the companies and the trust business in general. Even states‟ legislation included 
specific language concerning the right of the trust company to charge such fees. Part of 
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this language stemmed from the fear that financial institutions were unstable at this time 
in history and failure was not unusual. One law book of the era even had a section titled 
“Necessity That Trust Company Should Receive Compensation,” which stated that trust 
companies were corporate fiduciaries and thus it should follow that: 
[…] as a corporate fiduciary is given particular power as a business 
agency it naturally would be deemed not only in accordance with, 
but in strict requirement of, public policy, that it should earn in the 
exercise of that power such compensation as will maintain its 
solvency. Like the compensation to which a common carrier or an 
insurance company, it not only is entitled to charge, but may be 
required to charge reasonable compensation for its services and the 
risk involved.28 
 
 In fact, the main responsibility of regulators was not to protect the trust account of 
the individual from pillage, but to insure that the bank itself remained solvent. 
Furthermore, a bank examiner could insist that a trust company charge more for fees, 
reasoning that “naturally [he] would not permit such a company to serve without 
compensation and thus imperil its solvency. By like token [he] could demand that it 
charge reasonable compensation.”29 This pressure from regulators to push trust 
companies to collect sufficient fees assuredly caused concern among trust company 
executives about their inability to charge administration fees to mortmain trusts that could 
not be administrated. This too drove trust companies to create community foundations to 
avoid this regulatory problem and to increase their profits with the state‟s blessing.  
 It was also a matter of professional appearance to charge less than a reasonable 
fee for services. Although fee limits were set by law or contract, trust companies often 
lower their fees to attract new customers or impress current ones. The result of this 
                                                          
28
 John H. Sears, A Treatise on Trust Company Law (Chicago: T. H. Flood & Company, 1917), 27.  
 
29
 Sears, A Treatise on Trust Company Law, 28. 
 36 
“unrestricted competition” was thought to cheapen the quality of service to the customer. 
The preference of some was to keep the fees at required consistent levels so that trust 
companies would have to compete on the quality of service instead of the disreputable 
cutting of fees below the federal rates. One of the justifications for this asserted that trust 
departments needed to employ specialized personnel to function well, requiring “a certain 
kind of expert and trained clerical force, security analysts and also definite material 
facilities.”30  
 In 1925, Clay Herrick, vice-president of the Guardian Trust Company of 
Cleveland voiced this concern that the trust companies did not charge enough for their 
services, stating that: 
As a matter of fact, there have been few instances in which trust 
companies have erred on the side of charging too much for their 
services. The tendency has been the other way. It is pretty well 
understood among trust department officials that the earning value 
of the department to its company lies in the steady and dependable 
income which it provides and in the growth of earnings as volume 
increases, and not in relatively large profits. […] the value to 
clients of the services of an experienced trust department is usually 
well above the charges made.31 
 
 Trust company officers believed that the fees they charged were a bargain 
compared to the expertise and advice offered to the client. The preservation of a 
profitable fee level was of such importance that, during the 1920 Trust Company 
Division meeting of the American Bankers‟ Association, it emerged as the main topic of 
discussion.32 The Committee on Standardization of Charges was formed in 1918. At the 
                                                          
30
 James G. Smith, The Development of Trust Companies in the United States (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1928), 363. 
 
31
 Herrick, Trust Departments in Banks and Trust Companies, 316. 
 
32
 Smith, The Development of Trust Companies in the United States, 364-365. 
 37 
1920 meeting, a schedule of fees was introduced and adopted. The committee stated that 
the reasons for this suggested schedule included: 
(a) That a standard schedule must be fixed upon a basis that the 
average duties involved and responsibilities assumed are those 
usual in the average trust of its kind, as administered in the 
average community, with sufficient service rendered and 
adequate skill employed.  
(b) That the compensation must be fair and reasonable for the 
service rendered, and advantageous to the patron as well as 
remunerative to the trust company. 
(c) That exorbitant charges retard or prevent the growth of the trust 
business, while inadequate charges eventually result in the 
deterioration of the quality of service rendered, which in turn 
reacts unfavorably upon the expansion of the trust business 
[emphasis added]. 
(d) That a uniform or standard method of charging throughout the 
country should tend to stabilize the trust business and create a 
better public opinion of the value of trust services. 
(e) That as a guide or indication of general trust costs the 
schedules should serve as a deterrent to that evil now prevalent 
in many communities, namely “injurious cutting,” which 
practice inevitably results in inefficient trust service.33 
 
This passage shows that these trust company giants of capitalism did not truly 
embrace the capitalist concept of Adam Smith‟s “Invisible Hand” of free trade and 
competition that acts as the great equalizer, which would naturally intervene in the affairs 
of business to insure better products and services at lower prices. These trust bankers felt 
that they were above the crassness of competition based on price, that it was somehow 
dishonorable to offer trust patrons or their heirs a better return on their money. The 
committee created twelve schedules of how the fees of different kinds of trusts should be 
handled. Schedule XI deals with court trusts, or trusts that are created by “Wills, 
Appointment or Court Decree.” It states that administration fees are not addressed and 
trusts should follow state guidelines. This is probably because trusts of this nature are 
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very different from each other and therefore require a variety of administrative tasks that 
cannot be standardized. However, it does state recommended rates for both an annual fee 
and for closing or distribution fees. The annual fees recommended are three-fifths of one 
percent of the value for real estate with a minimum of $15, and one-half of one percent of 
cash and securities with a minimum of $10.34 
Even more important are the suggested fees for the distribution of funds, which 
include the cost of attorney fees plus one-half of one percent of the value of the 
disbursement with a minimum charge of $25. The schedule also suggests that the charge 
to charities could be free “if desired.”35 Yet the trust companies creating the Indianapolis 
Foundation ignored that passage, as they always charged fees for their administration of 
the foundation‟s trusts. The crucial point here is that if the trust companies could not 
disburse the funds, they could not charge an additional fee for disbursement. In the case 
of “Dead Hand” trusts, or trusts that were difficult to administer to a beneficiary, this 
negatively affected the profitability of the trust company.  
These proclamations show that trust companies wanted to maintain profitability 
and avoid competition at all costs, even if it bordered on price fixing. Price fixing was 
precisely the accusation levied against the railroad and oil trusts of the late 1800s and 
early 1900s which gave trusts a bad reputation in the first place. Conversely, the trust 
companies were also very concerned with gaining the trust of the patron as well as 
improving public opinions about trust companies on the whole. As a result, they wanted 
to avoid any controversy over egregious price gouging by their peer institutions.  
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Using Advertising and Marketing to Promote Community Trusts 
 To expand their trust business, most trust companies created booklets and 
pamphlets to distribute to law offices, bank offices, and to civic and charitable leaders in 
the community. Some newspaper advertising was also done with mixed reviews. For 
example, at great expense the banks sponsoring the Chicago Community Trust took out a 
series of quarter-page ads in major newspapers. Although a few small gifts resulted, “the 
Distribution Committee came to the strong opinion that this campaign was a mistake. The 
general community seemed to get the idea that the Community Trust was some kind of 
commercial enterprise, trying to cash in on charity. It took several years to live that 
down.”36 The fact that the trust company went to such great expense to advertise its desire 
to hold these perpetual trusts is even further evidence that profit, not benevolence or real 
community service, motivated its leaders. As competition for trust clients grew, 
opposition to trust companies arose from a very formidable group -- the lawyers.  
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The Lawyers vs. the Bankers: Titans of Wealth Clash 
Not everyone was as concerned about the well-being of trust companies, least of 
all the jealous lawyers who, until trust companies were created, had the largest share of 
the trust business and served as trust administrators. One lawyer who vehemently 
opposed trust companies was A. K. Montrose. He wrote in the Virginia Law Register in 
1911 about “Some Defects in Trust Companies.” Extensive direct quotations from his 
paper are included here only because he covers a good many issues that are not addressed 
by other historical documents and because he wrote sentiments imbued with the colorful 
language of the legal profession at the time. Montrose claimed that the administration of 
a trust should be left to a capable individual rather than a company because the pressure 
of individual responsibility was the single most important insurance for the proper 
execution of such a trust. He accused trust companies of soliciting clients using 
unprofessional tactics. He blamed this, in part, on the growing number of corporations 
encroaching on traditional ways of doing business. He detested their undesirable 
practices, writing: 
One of these is the “drumming” for business. Many of them are as 
despicable in their methods of obtaining business as “ambulance 
lawyers,” the only difference being the difference in the kind of 
business they seek. Not infrequently the body of the deceased is no 
more under the sod until an officer of a trust company is ringing 
the door bell of his late residence and presenting to the widow and 
the heirs the advantages of an administration by his company. 
Even friends of the deceased are sought to obtain their influence 
with those interested in the estate. This is a complete reversal of 
the old order of affairs, and a course of conduct that no lawyer of 
any delicacy, and few of any sense of fitness and propriety of 
things, is willing to pursue. It is distinctly a violation of a lawyer‟s 
code of ethics as expounded by all writers on that subject.37 
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He stated that trust companies often assigned poorly paid employees to do the 
actual work and that no one person was held personally accountable for any problems 
that might arise. As many state and federal legislatures are dominated by lawyers, 
Montrose‟s arguments may also reveal some of the key reasons it was so difficult to get 
legislation passed to allow trust companies to operate: 
Trust companies are formed for the purpose of making money for 
their stockholders. This is the sole motive for their formation. They 
are not benevolent institutions, but are thoroughly commercial. The 
larger their dividends the more valuable will be their stock, the 
more satisfied will be the stockholders, and the more likely will 
their managers be able to retain their positions. 
 
The income of the trust companies in the handling of trusts or 
estates depends on the fees they receive as administrators, 
guardians, assignees, and receivers. If the income from these 
resources can be increased and the expenses of administration 
diminished, the larger will be the next dividend; or the value of 
their stock in the market will be enhanced thereby, because of the 
undivided profits remaining in the treasury.  
 
In the very beginning the monetary interests of the trust companies 
are antagonistic to those of the trusts they are appointed to 
administer; and it is an antagonism with which it is difficult to 
cope. No court can be expected, in making them allowances, to 
know all the “ins and outs” of the business, nor always the exact 
value of the services rendered. To some extent the trusts, over 
which these Trust Companies are put, are at their mercy.  
 
But at this point another factor enters, which is a far more serious 
one than the one just mentioned, and this is the cost to the trust 
companies in handling the business pertaining to estates and trusts. 
The less the company has to pay its employees, the less the cost of 
administration will be to the company, and, consequently, the 
greater the profits. But in the use of a cheap man there is a loss of 
efficiency. The handling of the property of an estate, of a 
guardianship, of an assignment, of a receivership of a trust, 
requires judgment and business capacity to secure the best results; 
and these cannot be secured in a cheap man.  
 
It is the practice of trust companies to secure as cheap assistants as 
is compatible with the dispatch of business, although they are 
 42 
quick to deny this charge. A fifteen-dollar-a-week clerk is often 
placed in the actual charge of a difficult business, or in the winding 
up of an involved estate or trust, which requires the insight and 
experience of a trained business man -- such a man as usually was 
secured before the trust companies came into the field. The best 
results cannot be thus attained; the best interests of the estate or 
trust cannot be thus served. Indeed, there is occasionally a manifest 
inclination to settle up an estate as quickly as possible, if thereby 
the cost to the company in handling the estate is lessened and the 
fees to it are the same as if the administration were longer drawn 
out; thus, to some extent, making a sacrifice of the estate for the 
benefit of the trust company.38 
 
The last two paragraphs of this passage directly address the fees that trust 
companies charged and the real incentive: the less their expenses, the greater their profit. 
This aggrieved lawyer also pointed out that those with little knowledge of the trust 
business do not have the professional knowledge to judge when fees are unreasonable or 
affairs are not handled correctly. He attacked the trust companies‟ claim that they paid 
interest on the trusts, stating that it was “usually three or four percent, and that by no 
means running over the entire period that the funds have been in their custody.”39 He also 
accused the trust companies of using the assets of estates “for their own private 
businesses and never account for the profits. It is the law, as we all know, that if an 
administrator uses the funds of a trust in his own business or in an investment for himself, 
he must account for all profits he receives, and the courts will hold him to strict 
accounting. Yet trust companies do not have to account for such profits.”40 The reason for 
this was that trust companies paid interest on the trust and therefore had a right to invest 
the assets as they chose, but Montrose complained that the interest they paid was very 
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low compared to the actual profits and was something “a court would not tolerate for an 
instant in an individual.”41  
 The combative Montrose Further attacked the trust companies as untrustworthy 
stewards, emphasizing their relationship with banks, especially national banks. It must be 
remembered that banks at this time still did not have the security of a Federal Reserve 
System and were always looked upon suspiciously by government authorities and the 
general populace due to their questionable financial entanglements with big business. 
Montrose pulled no punches in his assessment of the seediness of this arrangement, 
claiming that: 
Nearly every trust company has an invisible connection with a 
bank --- usually a national bank. Officers of these national banks 
are often on the directorate of the trust companies, or are heavy 
individual stockholders therein. As is well known, national banks 
cannot loan their funds on real estate security, but it is very easy to 
loan the bank‟s funds to a favorite trust company which can loan 
them on real estate security. Thus, there is almost an evasion by the 
bank, through the convenience of a trust company, of the national 
banking act. 42  
 
 Montrose put the finishing touches on his thrashing of trust companies by 
pointing out that these trust companies were involved in politics and used their influence 
to support legislators and judges who, once in office, caused the stock of the trust 
company supporting them to rise because the company “owned” such actors. Such 
charges caused delays in getting legislation passed to legalize the establishment of trust 
companies in several states. Lawyers also attempted to strip established trust companies 
of their ability to administer trusts. This could well explain the failed attempts to get trust 
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companies legalized in Indiana in the early 1890s. As one author states, “In some of the 
mid-western and western states the progress of trust companies has been retarded by the 
fact that the legal profession prevented legislation looking to the formation of trust 
companies.”43  
 The California Bar Association also weighed in on the issue. It felt that not only 
were the trust companies attempting to practice law, which the association believed was 
prohibited by state trust company law, but that they were giving away legal services for 
free. To make matters worse, they hired lawyers as employees to write up wills and take 
care of the legal processes, which many attorneys felt was a conflict of interest because 
the lawyers were not representing the client, only the interests of the trust company. A 
“Brief Submitted to the Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association of Unlawful 
Practice of Law” proposed a new law specifically prohibiting trust companies from 
practicing law. It cited a brochure from a trust company and charged that: 
[…] on page 17 thereof, under the heading entitled, “Have you 
made your Will?”, appears the following: “This institution will 
draw your will, deposit it in its strong vaults for safe keeping, and, 
at your death, deliver it to the Clerk of the Court for probate. Your 
property will be properly collected, cared for and distributed by 
officers who are selected because of their legal attainments and 
business judgment” [punctuation in original document]. 
 
The companies referred to above solicit free consultations 
respecting the preparation of Wills, advising clients by attorneys 
employed by them (and who are generally paid employees of such 
companies, such attorneys in many cases being designated as trust 
officers) respecting laws governing distribution of property in 
estates of descendents. […] The attorney trust officer that conducts 
the law practice for the corporation does not represent the 
customer, but represents the corporation, and is not directly 
responsible to the customer, but is directly responsible to the 
corporation. The corporation is not qualified to practice law, yet by 
reason of the aid of such attorney trust officer, the corporation is 
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practicing law which the proposed legislation is designed to 
prohibit.44 
  
The unlawful practice of law by trust companies and the resulting perceived 
conflicts of interest became a national concern among lawyers. On the east coast, lawyer 
Julius Henry Cohen from New York City wrote that a “trust company lawyer cannot act 
both for the trust company and the maker of the will without violating fiduciary principle. 
No man can serve two masters. It is precisely at this point that the differentiation between 
business and profession occurs” [italics in original document].45 It remains a curiosity as 
to why these lawyers and other trust administrators during the decades and centuries 
before 1914 had not developed the concept of the community trust. Surely they 
encountered the same problems in charitable administration that trust companies 
encountered.  
The attitudes of lawyers began to change slowly, mostly because lawyers were 
still needed by trust companies to draw up and defend wills and trusts. The lawyers and 
bankers were realizing the many mutual advantages in this profitable endeavor and began 
to make common cause. In 1910, several years after trust company laws were enacted in 
Indiana, the vice-president of the Indiana Bar Association, E.R. Keith, addressed the 
Indiana Bankers Association on the apparent conflict. He reported that, “The lawyer 
looked upon the Trust Company with as much suspicion as does the small boy upon the 
advent of his baby brother – he knew his status up to that time, but was not at all assured 
as to the hereafter.[..] there was a decided feeling of opposition, on the theory that the 
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Trust Company was going to usurp the field of the lawyer in probate matters – briefly, 
that the trust company was going to practice law.”46 He admitted that, before trust 
companies, reliance on lawyers alone led to:  
[…] a laxness in the handling of estates and guardianships at least 
in the more populous counties, that will never be repeated in the 
history of the state. […] And when you reflect that the maker of a 
will who selected a prosperous business man to act as his executor 
had no assurance that the prosperous business man would still be 
prosperous, or even be in existence when will became effective, it 
is small wonder that people were ready for something more 
permanent than personal executors.[…] In the beginning, and to 
some extent it still exists, lawyers were afraid to have their clients 
get into communication with Trust Companies, for the very vital 
reason that they were not assured of the future control of the 
client’s business [emphasis added]. 47 
  
During the same convention,  the president of the Trust Company Section, James 
L. Randel, attempted to bridge the divide between bankers and trust companies by stating 
their common interests. Addressing the trust company officers, he urged them to 
understand that: 
The lawyer stands at the threshold of your existence into the 
administration of trusts, for the public comes first to him with their 
troubles, therefore it becomes your duty to educate him to 
understand and feel that you are not his enemy; that your interests 
and his are identical, and to show him by frank and honest 
treatment that he has nothing to fear from you. You will find him 
skeptical. He fears that when you establish your reputation the 
public will come to you first, and that instead of him naming you 
as administrator, you are to name him as attorney. But you must 
have attorneys, and why not be frank and fair to all? The young 
attorney who has not yet firmly established his own reputation, 
takes more kindly to your interests than the older ones. Then when 
you fail to impress the lawyer you must go directly to the public 
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and show them, in fact, show them both at the same time, for the 
information you give to the public will do the lawyer no harm. 48 
 
 Among those in the legal profession, the trust companies were not well thought of 
and were being portrayed as business-stealing, money-hungry, devious institutions that 
preyed on the bereaved. As Montrose pointed out, these were not benevolent institutions, 
but first and foremost, profit-making corporations. I believe that combating this attitude 
was a large part of the motivation of trust companies to establish community foundations. 
Not only would such foundations enhance the reputation of trust companies by advancing 
corporatized, but spurious, philanthropy within the community, they would also give 
them a competitive edge in credibility over other trust companies and eventually all 
banks. “Philanthropic” bankers could then crowd out individual lawyers from trust 
administration, engrossing the fees that lawyers once collected for trust services. The 
desire for this competitive edge can also explain why community foundations were 
started by only one trust company in the early years. In this context, the Indianapolis 
Foundation was a rarity as a foundation with multiple trust companies involved, although 
only three were invited to participate. The role of the foundation became to relieve trust 
companies of the burden of charitable administration, while lessening the cost to the trust 
companies of administering the terms of any charitable trust.  
For several years after the creation of the Cleveland Foundation, many authorities 
on the subject continued to insist that it was the issue of the “Dead Hand” trust that 
caused the creation of the community trust. As James G. Smith, of Princeton University, 
wrote in 1928: 
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It has long been a problem in the proper administration of 
charitable gifts to apply the funds in accordance with the specified 
purpose of the gift after conditions have so changed that the 
specified purpose is no longer practicable, if indeed possible at all. 
A charitable trust fund left in 1835 to help poor immigrants make a 
start in what was then the far west and now is called the Ohio 
valley, is not practicable under modern conditions. Funds left for 
specified purposes for the benefit of students often outlive the 
purpose named when customs change. Yet, under the law of trusts, 
the trustee is bound to observe the terms of the deed of trust, will, 
or indentured creating the trust; but the law has recognized these 
difficulties and for many generations has solved them or attempted 
to solve them by the application of the doctrine known as cy pres. 
Under this doctrine of the law, when it becomes impossible or 
impracticable to apply the funds of a charitable trust in exact 
accord with the terms of the deed, the courts will allow the trustee 
to use the funds for some charitable purpose closely related to the 
one named by the grantor. […] In order to overcome these 
difficulties and to promote philanthropic work of a highly 
beneficial character, the trust companies of many cities in recent 
years have devised the community trust plan.49 
 
Some may argue that benevolence, not profit, was the motivation for creating 
community foundations and trusts, but the fact remains that the cy pres legal procedure 
was available to sever the “dead hand” that impeded outdated trusts and free them from 
their donor‟s original intent. However, the use of cy pres litigation meant expensive and 
protracted legal action in the courts, as well as the expenditure of valuable time that could 
be better utilized in making money. Many people considered philanthropic trusts as 
available only to the wealthy and did not consider leaving their small amount of funds 
with a trust company. Therefore, encouraging donors of moderate means to pool their 
money into a community trust was yet another way to increase business and grow the 
trust company‟s assets. 
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The Clash between Banks and Trust Companies 
 
 
 Even among their banking brethren there was animosity toward trust companies. 
Most of this was driven by what bankers thought were unfair levels of oversight of banks 
compared to the lax oversight of trust companies. Clearly, trust companies were cutting 
into the banking businesses and it was not appreciated by competing bankers. As 
Alexander Noyes concluded, “The simple truth of the matter is, that either the state and 
national banks are unreasonably restricted, or else the precautions surrounding trust 
companies are too loose. […] The banking law, in my judgment, ought unquestionably be 
amended so that institutions doing a simple deposit banking business under another name 
shall be required to erect the safeguards demanded of the banks.”50 Although Noyes 
claimed to be concerned about the failure of trust companies in the event of a financial 
calamity such as those in 1857, 1873 and 1893, he also commented on the enormous 
growth of trust companies in a short period of time. He cautioned that this growth was 
because the trust companies had the benefit of “several years of great prosperity” and had 
not yet been tested by a major financial downturn.  
 The State Superintendant of Banks of New York also commented on the state of 
trust company regulation in 1904. He cited several states and the differences in their trust 
company regulations and laws, and voiced his frustration with the lack of standardized 
controls. He also railed against the ability of trust companies to accept deposits from 
businesses because they were doing things that only banks should be allowed to do. In 
addition, he also felt that trust companies should not be allowed to invest in untried and 
untested securities, another arena of banks. In closing, he states that, “It would be well if 
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the name „Trust Company‟ could have a uniform meaning throughout the land, always 
implying strict compliance with wise laws, adequate state supervision and control and 
conservative and safe management.”51 
 It seems that these critics‟ concerns were amply warranted, whatever their 
motivations, when the great financial panic of 1907 took its toll on all banking 
institutions, with trust companies seeming to fare worse. According to one source, “Trust 
companies in New York City suffered a tremendous contraction in deposits and loans as a 
result of depositor withdrawals during the Panic of 1907, while state and national banks 
experienced no comparable contraction.”52 
 
The Proof is in the Assets 
 
The test of whether or not the creation of the Indianapolis Foundation became 
especially profitable to the three trust companies that chartered it may be seen in a 
comparison of the trio‟s growth in assets versus other trust companies not involved with 
the foundation. In economic language, this comparison is called the “difference in 
differences.” In order to determine if there was such a pattern, the same comparison is 
made of trust companies in Chicago and Cleveland, cities in which community trusts 
were started about the same time in the Midwest. For comparison, I chose only trust 
companies that were in business during the same periods of time before and after the 
community trusts were established, with the exception of the Fletcher Trust and Savings, 
because it was not established until 1912 and was one of the trusts that started the 
Indianapolis Foundation. As shown in Table 1, in the nine years between 1905 and 1914, 
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before the Indianapolis Foundation was created, the assets of the Union Trust Company 
and the Fletcher Trust and Savings Company increased 110%. This is a substantial 
increase, but not as large as the other trust companies in existence during the same 
period. They had a total asset increase of 229%. However, this changes dramatically from 
1914, two years before the foundation was created, until 1921, five years after it was 
established. The three banks associated with the Indianapolis Foundation posted a 148% 
increase, while the others had only 60% growth as a group. 
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Assets 1905 
Assets 
1914 
1914 
Increase 
over 1905  
1914 % 
Increase 
Over 1905 
Assets 
1921 
1921 
Increase 
over 1914  
1921 % 
Increase 
Over 
1914  
Trust Company Assets 
Connected to 
Community 
Foundations or Trusts in 
Indianapolis 
       Fletcher Trust and 
Savings Company, 
Indianapolis 0 9,633,000 0 
 
16,638,000 7,005,000 72.72% 
Indiana Trust Company 7,269,000 9,510,000 2,241,000 30.83% 17,586,000 8,076,000 84.92% 
Union Trust, 
Indianapolis 3,678,000 3,898,000 220,000 5.98% 22,930,000 19,032,000 488.25% 
Total Assets 10,947,000 23,041,000 12,094,000 110.48% 57,154,000 34,113,000 148.05% 
Trust Company Assets 
NOT Connected to 
Community 
Foundations or Trusts 
       
Farmers Trust 
Company, Indianapolis 122,000 1,263,000 1,141,000 935.25% 1,859,000 596,000 47.19% 
Security Trust 
Company, Indianapolis 752,000 1,615,000 863,000 114.76% 2,746,000 1,131,000 70.03% 
Total Assets 874,000 2,878,000 2,004,000 229.29% 4,605,000 1,727,000 60.01% 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Trust Company Assets in Indianapolis, 1905-1921.
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Similar results were found when looking at a comparison of the Cleveland 
Trust Company (the only trust company involved in the creation of the Cleveland 
Foundation) with those who were not so involved. I compared its assets against 
the only three trust companies that were in existence between 1906 and 1922. 
According to Table 2, from 1906 to 1914, the Cleveland Trust increased its assets 
by $7,978,679, or 26 percent. During that same period, the other three trust 
companies had increased assets of $20,053,413, or 97 percent, far outpacing the 
Cleveland Trust Company. Keeping in mind that the Cleveland Foundation was 
established in 1914, the tables turn from 1914 to 1922, with the Cleveland Trust 
increasing by $124,717,564, resulting in a 322 percent increase, while the other 
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three banks record an increase of $87,172,457, only a 214 percent increase. In 
addition, by 1922, the Cleveland Trust had more assets than the three other trust 
companies combined.  
 
 
Cleveland 
Assets 
1906 Assets 1914 
1914 
Increase 
over 1906 
1914 % 
Increase 
Over 
1906 Assets 1922 
1922 
Increase 
over 1914  
1922 % 
Increase 
Over 
1914  
Trust Company 
Assets Connected to 
Community 
Foundations or 
Trusts in Cleveland 
       Cleveland Trust 
Company 30,759,722 38,738,401 7,978,679 25.94% 163,455,965 124,717,564 321.95% 
Total Assets 30,759,722 38,738,401 7,978,679 25.94% 163,455,965 124,717,564 321.95% 
Trust Company 
Assets NOT 
Connected to 
Community 
Foundations or 
Trusts 
       Guardian Trust 
Savings & Trust 
Company 14,660,240 31,275,273 16,615,033 113.33% 93,649,312 62,374,039 199.44% 
The Pearl Street 
Savings & Trust Co. 2,895,176 5,994,732 3,099,556 107.06% 22,417,688 16,422,956 273.96% 
The State Banking & 
Trust Co. 3,048,676 3,387,500 338,824 11.11% 11,762,962 8,375,462 247.25% 
Total Assets 20,604,092 40,657,505 20,053,413 97.33% 127,829,962 87,172,457 214.41% 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Trust Company Assets in Cleveland, 1906-1922.
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To see if this pattern of comparative increased profit was common among 
trust companies that chartered community trusts and foundations, I also looked at 
the Harris Trust Company and its relationship with the Chicago Community 
Trust. Like the Cleveland Trust Company, it was the solo trust for the foundation 
in the beginning. However, the Harris Trust & Savings was not founded until 
1907, so the data was collected for all trust companies in that year for comparison. 
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The data for comparison was taken from the same 1914 and 1922 resources as the 
Cleveland comparison. In Table 3, we see that from 1907 to 1914 the Harris Trust 
had a tremendous increase in assets compared to the other trust companies, up 330 
percent compared to an increase of 44 percent. It must be taken into account that 
the Harris Trust had just started in 1907, and during the years before 1914 it had 
merged with several other trust companies, absorbing their assets. This could be 
the direct result of the Panic of 1907, which depleted the resources of several trust 
companies and made them vulnerable to takeovers. The Harris family, who were 
already in the banking business, had the financial acumen to execute such moves. 
So buy-outs and mergers, rather than increased reputation and customer 
confidence, deserves the major credit for its increased assets during this time. 
Even so, after the creation of the Chicago Community Trust, the Harris Trust still 
bested the average increase of all the others with an improvement of 99 percent 
versus 75 percent. 
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Chicago Assets 1907 Assets 1914 
1914 
Increase 
over 1907  
1914 % 
Increase 
Over 1907 Assets 1922 
1922 
Increase 
over 1914  
1922 % 
Increase 
Over 
1914  
Trust Company Assets 
Connected to Community 
Foundations or Trusts in 
Chicago               
Harris Trust and Savings 5,890,234 25,338,544 19,448,310 330.18% 50,525,598 25,187,054 99.40% 
Total Assets 5,890,234 25,338,544 19,448,310 330.18% 50,525,598 25,187,054 99.40% 
Trust Company Assets NOT 
Connected to Community 
Foundations or Trusts               
                
Central Trust Co. of Illinois 16,596,086 51,056,911 34,460,825 207.64% 85,295,015 34,238,104 67.06% 
Chicago Title & Trust Co. 12,739,910 21,941,794 9,201,884 72.23% 19,082,540 -2,859,254 -13.03% 
Drovers Trust & Savings Bank 2,428,314 4,688,984 2,260,670 93.10% 7,097,872 2,408,888 51.37% 
First Trust & Savings Bank 30,854,781 71,416,383 40,561,602 131.46% 117,328,933 45,912,550 64.29% 
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank 108,029,209 109,633,797 1,604,588 1.49% 168,219,836 58,586,039 53.44% 
Merchants' Loan & Trust 
Company 56,603,041 64,521,308 7,918,267 13.99% 151,075,197 86,553,889 134.15% 
The Northern Trust Company 31,358,182 35,691,034 4,332,852 13.82% 59,033,944 23,342,910 65.40% 
North-Western Trust & 
Savings Bank 1,208,905 5,282,003 4,073,098 336.92% 18,542,255 13,260,252 251.05% 
The Peoples Trust & Savings 
Bank of Chicago 1,179,023 7,765,093 6,586,070 558.60% 15,977,026 8,211,933 105.75% 
The Pullman Trust & Savings 
Bank 4,301,621 4,940,664 639,043 14.86% 6,531,833 1,591,169 32.21% 
State Bank of Chicago 19,850,258 30,333,373 10,483,115 52.81% 51,903,357 21,569,984 71.11% 
Union Trust Company 14,528,358 24,614,826 10,086,468 69.43% 57,700,297 33,085,471 134.41% 
Total Assets 299,677,688 431,886,170 132,208,482 44.12% 757,788,105 325,901,935 75.46% 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Trust Company Assets in Chicago, 1907-1922 
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The comparative financial information in Table 3 shows an important 
correlation between the increased assets of the trust companies and their role in 
creating community trusts and foundations. Not only did community trusts help 
increase trust company assets, they also relieved trust companies of a 
responsibility that most were quite ill-prepared to perform and that was the 
antithesis of their main charge to create wealth -- the responsibility of giving 
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money away. In 1927 Evans Woollen stated frankly to the New York Community 
Trust that as a banker he believed the “community foundation deserves to be 
regarded as an asset of primary importance.”56 Notice that he referred to it as an 
“asset” relative to the bank and not to the community in any way. The community 
foundation took on the task of locating a beneficiary and handling the 
philanthropic decisions and exchanges, a time-consuming job that increasingly 
required specialized skills and information. As a result, “the financial trustee is 
freed from duties other than the purely fiscal ones which it is best equipped and 
organized to perform.”57 This sentiment was reiterated almost 50 years later by 
Daniel J. Koshland, the first chairman of the Distribution Committee of the San 
Francisco Foundation, established in 1948. In an interview for an oral history of 
the foundation, he recalled that “we heard from banks whose trust departments 
came into funds to go to charitable organizations, that they had no way of 
knowing where those funds should go. Bank officers are not particularly 
cognizant of the various needs of the community.”58  
 
Conclusion 
 
This research shows that trust companies came into being and flourished 
because they filled a gap in public need. There was no place for middle-class 
people to have savings accounts and safety deposit boxes for their valuables, 
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including wills, because only the wealthy elite and corporations were given access 
to the banks of the day. Even if they had been accessible, they would have been 
seriously mistrusted by the general public. It is no accident that these new entities 
decided to call themselves “trust” companies, as trust was what they were selling 
to a very skeptical clientele.  
Lawyers, many of whom were serving as state legislators and who were 
self-interestedly impeding the creation of trust companies, looked upon them and 
their founders as parasites of the bereaved, scoundrels who lacked ethics and 
charlatans who practiced law without a license. These beliefs were especially held 
by lawyers who specialized in wills and administered estates. They saw the trust 
company as a devious competitor, neglectful of their clients‟ needs in pursuit of 
profit. Even lawyers who were employed by trust companies were held in 
contempt by other lawyers. Unable to convince the old guard of the legal 
establishment that trust companies meant them no harm, trust company officers 
targeted young lawyers for recruitment who had little experience and no 
established legal practice. Eventually, as bankers and lawyers saw the mutual 
financial benefit of working together, these claims of a lack of ethics and 
character faded away. These professionalizing business elites had found common 
ground, and now they increasingly controlled estate philanthropic giving as a 
profitable partnership. 
Even bankers themselves did not like the concept of trust companies 
because they saw them as threats. Eventually, as trust companies gained assets, 
bankers became envious of their success and wanted in on the profits. As a result, 
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in the early 1900s banks were given the legal right to establish their own trust 
departments. This in turn forced the trust companies to market themselves more 
aggressively to the public. One of those marketing schemes was to become 
attached to community trusts such as the Indianapolis Foundation in order to 
increase their public repute and win the confidence of new clients who would in 
turn entrust them with their fortunes and wills.  
The genius of this arrangement was that neither the trust companies nor 
their leaders were required to invest one philanthropic dime into the foundation, 
save for a few that did so voluntarily, such as the Harris Trust in Chicago. We will 
see in the following chapters the utter lack of financial commitment made by the 
trust companies and the founders of the Indianapolis Foundation. These were the 
very people who touted what a great philanthropic boon this would be to the 
community, claiming how important the community‟s welfare was to them and 
their trust companies. In reality, this was a great and inexpensive public relations 
ploy benefitting the reputations of the trust companies, enriching them and 
making their presidents look generous while sparing them from any deep, 
personal charitable investment in their communities.  
Additional profit motives existed as well beyond the obvious increase in trust 
customers due to this exclusive association with the community trust. First, unlike “Dead 
Hand” trusts that could no longer be administered, trust company agents could charge 
fees every time the funds were handled within, or dispersed from, an active trust. Second, 
the officers would no longer need to embroil themselves in the costly and time 
consuming legal proceedings of cy pres in order to change the philanthropic intent or 
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beneficiary of a private trust. Third, trust companies were relieved of the difficult task of 
locating a beneficiary or deciding the best use of the funds in the community, which 
again cut their costs and increased profits. Finally, it satisfied the state examiners who not 
only inquired what they were doing with the trust funds, but whether they were 
financially solvent. In other words, they made certain they were charging adequate fees to 
ensure they would survive economic upheaval. These influences lead us to a new 
understanding of the motivations that led trust companies to exclusively create 
community foundations, rather than be established by individual donors, lawyers in 
charge of trusts, private foundations, banks, or any other entity. All of the factors above 
not only ensured that trust companies would survive, but that they would thrive beyond 
expectation. I suggest that the combination of a loss of fees for distribution, the legal 
expenses of invoking cy pres, the strictness of state regulators, increased competition 
from banks and other trust companies in 1915, and the concern over how trust companies 
were perceived by the public were much stronger incentives for creating community 
foundations than the reason most cited: corporate benevolence initiated by community-
minded wealthy businessmen. To begin to fully understand the relationship between trust 
companies and community foundations, it is imperative that we become better acquainted 
with these powerful, wealthy elite white men who started them and their motives for 
doing so, which prove to be both self-serving and benevolent.  
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Chapter 3: The Formative Years: An Introduction and Overview of the 
Indianapolis Foundation’s Early Years of Inactivity, 1915-1923 
 
According to the Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, Evans Woollen, Sr., president of 
the Fletcher Savings and Trust Company, developed the Indianapolis Foundation. 
Woollen was a friend of Judge Frederick A. Goff, the banker who started the first 
community foundation in Cleveland in 1914. Woollen and Attorney Henry H. Hornbrook 
together generated the impetus to start the Indianapolis Foundation.1 The “Resolution 
Establishing the Indianapolis Foundation” is dated January 5, 1916. It was chartered by 
three Indianapolis financial institutions and their board secretaries: Fred K. Shepard of 
the Fletcher Savings and Trust, C.H. Adams of the Indiana Trust Company of 
Indianapolis, and Ross H. Wallace of the Union Trust Company of Indianapolis. The 
resolution stated that all three banks were to “accept and administer gifts and bequests 
which shall constitute the Indianapolis Foundation.”2 This meant that the trust companies 
would retain control of the trust funds in their respective banks while the foundation 
administered the income from each fund. In essence, the foundation held no assets at all 
and was merely an instrument of the for-profit trust companies. The income channeled to 
the foundation was to be disbursed on the written orders of the six-person board of 
trustees. No more than two trustees could be affiliated with the same “religious body.” In 
theory, two trustees each were appointed by the mayor of Indianapolis, the Judge of the 
Marion County Circuit Court and the Judge from the United States District Court. 
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However, the trust companies themselves continually suggested the trustees, and the 
mayor and judges rubber-stamped these suggestions. This cozy arrangement allowed the 
for-profit trust companies even more control over the functions of the foundation largely 
created for the companies‟ own economic benefit. 
 
Biographical Information on Presidents of the Three Original Trust Companies 
 In addition to Woollen, the other driving forces behind the establishment of the 
Indianapolis Foundation were the presidents of two additional trust companies. Woollen 
convinced John P. Frenzel, president of the Indiana Trust Company, and John H. 
Holliday, president of the Union Trust Company, to join him in establishing the first 
community foundation to be chartered by multiple, profit-taking trust companies. 
Woollen‟s trust company was the result of the merger of several other trust companies, 
but, as revealed in the previous chapter, the movers and shakers in the trust business were 
Holliday and Frenzel. It would stand to reason that Woollen would enlist their 
participation because they led the two largest trust companies in Indianapolis and their 
stamp of approval would carry more weight with potential donors. To judge whether the 
motives for establishing the Indianapolis Foundation came out of bankers‟ self-interest 
and self-dealing, or from their real sense of community service, a careful look at these 
men is helpful. Their actions indicate a primary concern for their own profiteering and 
competitive status seeking among a fractious Indianapolis business elite. Not only were 
these three among the business elite, they were also listed among the social elite in the 
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Indianapolis “Blue Book” of 1913.3 Like the charitable benefactors of the rising elite of 
Turin, Italy during the eighteenth century, “Involvement in charities became a symbolic 
statement of the social success and mobility which one had achieved – a vehicle for 
social competition between families and between individuals.”4 
 
J. P. Frenzel, President of the Indiana Trust Company 
 
 
Figure 2: Photo of John P. and Phillipine H. Frenzel on a grand European holiday in Vienna, 1928 
Source: Courtesy of the Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI Library, Indianapolis 
                                                          
3
 The Indianapolis Blue Book: Containing the Names and Address of Prominent Residents, 
Arranged Alphabetically and Numerically by Streets; also Ladies' Maiden Names, Receiving Days and 
Other Valuable Social Information, 1913 (New York: Dau Publishing Company, 1913). 
 
4
 Sandra Cavallo, Charity and power in early modern Italy : benefactors and their motives in 
Turin, 1541-1789, Cambridge history of medicine (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 129. 
 63 
John P. Frenzel II (1855-1933), president of the Indiana Trust Company, was born 
in the prosperous commercial and port town of Madison, Indiana on December 21, 1855. 
He lived most of his life in Indianapolis. It is clear that he had above average intelligence, 
because after studying at the Indianapolis German-English School, at the age of 11 he 
matriculated to Northwestern Christian University (currently Butler University) as its 
youngest student.5 One of his earliest jobs was as a shoe clerk in downtown Indianapolis 
and at the age of twelve he became a messenger boy for the Merchants National Bank. 
He remained there for several years, moving up through the ranks. At the age of 28 he 
became the president of the bank, replacing Volney T. Malott, his long time mentor and 
boss. Frenzel also served as treasurer of Marion County and was appointed a member of 
the Indianapolis School Board.  
He later served as treasurer of both the North American Saengerbund, a singing 
group, and the Indianapolis Anti-Prohibition League. His reason for opposition to 
prohibition was explained by his seat on the board of directors of the Indianapolis 
Brewing Company, serving as its secretary.6 This position put him at odds with the more 
progressive and community-minded prohibitionists, such as his future community trust 
collaborator Evans Woollen, who used notions of higher moral ground to influence 
others. He was deeply involved in politics with the Democratic Party and was referred to 
as “an undisputed leader of the Indiana Democracy.”7 He was one of the founders of what 
is now the Citizen Gas Company, of which both John H. Holiday and Eli Lilly sat as 
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board directors. He also served on the boards of several other companies including the 
Indianapolis Railway Company and the Union Traction Company.8  
A friend of the arts and music, Frenzel became both a patron of and participant in 
the Indianapolis Maennerchor (trans. German men‟s choir). He was the main contributor 
to the erection of the new Maennerchor Hall, built in 1907, and as an accomplished 
musician he and his wife performed several operas there. One account claims that “His 
interest in music and the arts was as vigorous as his business pursuits and activities of the 
Maennerchor often were referred to as „his children‟ [and] he occasionally referred to his 
fellow singers as „his boys‟.”9 This account of Frenzel‟s relationship with the 
beneficiaries of his patronage is reflective of the paternalistic attitudes that many 
philanthropists displayed during this time. Note especially his reference to the 
Maennerchor‟s activities as his “off-spring.” There is no doubt that Frenzel was the 
Maennerchor‟s “angel,” especially since he was the main supporter of a new building for 
the choir. Like many philanthropic acts, these gifts came with strings, such as Frenzel‟s 
desire to dominate and control the operations of his beneficiary. In exchange for his 
financial support he personally demanded and was granted control over membership to 
the society. 10 This firmly establishes his use of self-serving philanthropy to influence not 
only the work of an organization, but who could or could not be a party to its benefits. 
His power extended to partial control of the Metropolitan police department as one of its 
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three commissioners.11 Frenzel was clearly a well-connected man who grasped for, 
gained and asserted his own power.  
Recall that Frenzel was one of the people who persistently lobbied the Indiana 
State Legislature to allow the charter of trust companies. He succeeded in 1893, and less 
than a month later wasted no time in becoming president of the Indiana Trust Company, 
the first trust company in Indiana. He remained president until his retirement in 1925, 
when he became chairman. A prominent Democrat, he was offered the national office as 
Controller of Currency by President Grover Cleveland, but he declined. Frenzel was 
described as “plain spoken, often blunt in his remarks, but widely admired for his 
qualities. Friends paid him the tribute of having been a bitter antagonist to his foes and a 
loyal friend to legions of those whose confidence he held.”12 An example of one of those 
foes was a man named Herman Lieber, a fellow German. Frenzel and Lieber, who was a 
prominent businessman and leader of the German Turnverein clubs, had an on-going 
conflict that was reflected in Frenzel‟s refusal to allow the Maennerchor to join or 
perform at the Turnverein, which after the German defeat in WWI quickly changed its 
name to the American Turners. As one author stated, “their clash of personalities resulted 
in a rancor toward one another which might be compared to a Tennessee feud.”13 
In 1884 Frenzel was a foe of the police department only to later become one of its 
commissioners in 1913. He testified at a hearing in front of the U.S. Congress that three 
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Republicans on the police force prohibited German Democrats from voting during the 
congressional race of 1882 between William E. English and Stanton J. Peelle. This was 
evidence of a close relationship between Frenzel and English, who was a Democrat and 
who would eventually will a large amount of his estate to the Indianapolis Foundation. 
Frenzel testified that because there was such a difference in appearance between 
Republican and Democrat voting tickets, the three Republican policemen overseeing the 
voting box could identify the Democrats before they voted, harassing them to keep them 
from casting their vote. In one exchange, the lawyer for Peelle asked Frenzel in an 
accusatory way if he was so much an expert in paper that he could tell a noticeable 
difference between Republican and Democratic voting tickets. To this Frenzel replied, 
“Only the knowledge that the handling of a great deal of paper in the kind of business I 
am engaged in would give me.”14 Because Frenzel was a well known and respected 
businessman in Indianapolis, no doubt his testimony carried great weight with the elite 
members of Congress, so much so that the disputed congressional election was reversed.15  
In 1891 a movement ensued to establish a new city charter which included an 
Indianapolis Board of Public Works to enforce city statutes. Opponents and supporters of 
the bill quickly formed. One organization that supported this move was the Commercial 
Club of Indianapolis. Its president, J. K. Lilly, appointed Frenzel the chairman of a 
committee of twenty-one influential leaders “to cooperate with the members of the 
General Assembly representing Indianapolis in urging the enactment of bills in the 
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interest of the city.”16 In essence, to lobby with strength in numbers in order to increase 
the magnitude of this business influence. In this instance, however, Frenzel was now 
pitted against William E. English, who did not like the power that such an agency would 
wield. This may well have been Frenzel‟s training ground for his successful lobbying to 
convince the legislature to establish trust laws in 1893. In addition, this is an example of 
Frenzel‟s relationship with the Lilly family, which played an important role in the 
establishment of the Indianapolis Foundation.  
When the measure was introduced in the Indiana House, English was called upon 
to state his opposition, but he replied that “there had not been sufficient notice, nor 
sufficient opportunity to examine the charter.”17 Frenzel rebutted his excuse, stating that 
the charter or its synopses had been published in several Indianapolis newspapers.  
Republicans were determined to make this a political failure for Democrats, or at 
least to get them to make changes and concessions. While some Democrats, like English, 
had serious concerns, Frenzel must have known the Democrats did not want to suffer the 
defeat of a bill that was supported by many in the party, now a majority in the State 
house. Exerting his power and influence, Frenzel declared that if there was any 
compromise, then he would resign from the committee. He held his ground, insisting that 
the Democrats would have to “put it through as is or lose it altogether.”18 After more 
debate it passed and the Board of Public Works was created. This again underlines 
Frenzel‟s strategic engagement in power-politics.  
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Being of German heritage, Frenzel‟s prestige and power diminished significantly 
after 1917. World War I became a tragic, crucial turning point for much of the German 
population of Indianapolis. Before the war, J. P. Frenzel was one of the prominent 
businessmen who signed a letter to Senator John W. Kern protesting that Woodrow 
Wilson was threatening to end diplomatic relations with Germany. They reasoned that 
Germany had not broken any international laws and that it would not intentionally 
“commit any avoidable act that would bring ill will in America.”19 These correspondents 
felt that Germany had not done anything that “could be construed as an attack upon our 
national honor.”20 At the same time, the 800-member German Democratic Club of 
Indianapolis urged that the U.S. avoid severing “the peaceful and neighborly relations” 
that existed between the two countries.21 It should be noted that the U.S. entered the war 
against Germany in April of 1917, only 14 months after the creation of the Indianapolis 
Foundation. The aftermath of the war had a devastating effect on German groups and 
citizens in America, so much so that in Indianapolis: 
The name of “Das Deutsche Haus” was dropped and changed to 
“Athenaeum.” The Maennerchor temporarily dubbed itself “The 
Academy of Music,” and the German lettering on the front of 
Trinity Lutheran was changed to English. These efforts to placate 
the rest of the community paid dividends, for there were no public 
demonstrations against the Germans in Indianapolis as there were 
in other cities.22 
 
Given the atmosphere after 1917, it would be reasonable to assume that the 
influence and power that J. P. Frenzel once wielded as a proud American of German 
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ancestry declined to some degree. As he was a founder of the Indianapolis Foundation, 
this could also be one reason why no trusts were committed to it until 1920. He died on 
May 29, 1933, at the age of 77, in the depths of the Great Depression. The friendship and 
admiration of Evans Woollen was evident when he spoke of Frenzel‟s actions as a banker 
during the early months of that that crucial Great Depression year:  
Mr. Frenzel was the most notable figure in Indiana banking. His 
remarkable qualities were seen at their best during the troubled 
months of February and March. The condition of his own banks 
then being such that a smaller man might well have been 
indifferent, he unhesitatingly concerned himself for the welfare of 
banking throughout the city and the state. It was a handsome 
performance in leadership and will be remembered as the crown of 
his admirable career.23 
 
At his death, Frenzel‟s estate was valued at $790,000 [CD $11,449,275].* The 
Maennerchor received a posthumous gift from Frenzel of $10,000 [CD $144,927]. He 
also left money to three orphans‟ homes. After giving several of his relatives varying 
amounts, he bequeathed his home, its contents and a trust of $500,000 [CD $7,245,376] 
to his wife, Phillipine. From this trust each year she could draw $24,000 [CD $387,826]. 
Under these terms, she could dispose of two-fifths of the trust, but the rest would be held 
in trust by John P. Frenzel Jr., the testator‟s nephew, and the Indiana Trust Company to 
be used to support male chorus singing in Indianapolis. This remainder would have 
amounted to $300,000 [CD $4,347,826] to be used to support such organizations as the 
Maennerchor. However, it was not specified that this money be disbursed through the 
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Indianapolis Foundation.24 His will was legally challenged by his family and eventually 
broken, causing financial problems for the Maennerchor, which was counting on a 
substantial share of his estate. The organization eventually lost its building, which 
eventually became a nightclub, the location of which was sold to Indiana University 1946 
to house the IU Law School. With J. P. Frenzel no longer calling the shots, the 
Maennerchor formed an association with the American Turners Athenaeum in 1936.25 
Most important to this study is the fact that Frenzel left absolutely nothing to the 
Indianapolis Foundation, which he helped create. Despite his generosity to other 
organizations Frenzel did not make a personal donation, even posthumously, to the 
community foundation he helped create to improve the collective welfare of the city and 
the citizens who made him rich. 
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John Hampden Holliday, Founder and President of the Union Trust Company 
 
 
Figure 3: Photo of John Hampden Holliday in his office  
Source: Courtesy, the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 
 
 
John Hampden Holliday was born in Indiana on May 31, 1846. His father was a 
theologian and Presbyterian pastor. John Holliday attended Butler University for four 
years, but left and received a BA in Liberal Arts and a Masters in Liberal Arts from 
Hanover College. He subsequently received an Honorary Doctor of Law Degree from 
Wabash College.26 He became a member of the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity on May 13, 
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1864 and graduated in June of that year at the age of 18.27 Holliday also served on the 
Hanover Board of Trustees from 1876 until his death in 1921.28 After graduation in 1864 
Holliday enlisted in the 137
th
 Indiana Infantry during the Civil War. Upon returning from 
the war he became a reporter for the Indianapolis Sentinel, and in 1869 at the age of 23 
Holliday founded the Indianapolis News. He ran it until he retired in 1892, shortly before 
he founded the Union Trust Company in 1893. He married Evaline M. Rieman in 1875 
and they had five daughters and two sons, one of whom, John H., Jr., was killed in World 
War I. Using his talents as a newspaper man several years later, Holliday authored 
Indianapolis and the Civil War, published by the Indiana Historical Society in 1911. 29  
Of significance to this study are the number of charitable and civic organizations 
Holliday helped found and where he also served as a leader and board member. He was 
an organizer for, and eventually the president of, the Immigrants Aid Society and the 
Society of Indiana Pioneers, a member of the State Board of Charities and the 
Indianapolis Literary Society, served as the president of the Indianapolis Charity 
Organizations Society for more than 20 years and was an elder of the First Presbyterian 
Church.30  
It is clear that Holliday was committed to philanthropic causes and believed in 
public service and civic engagement. In fact, his generous character was emphasized by a 
tribute in his obituary by the Union Trust Company which expounded on his honest 
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character and unquestionable integrity, adding that “such mistakes as he made, if 
mistakes they were, grew out of his generosity of nature, his sympathy with the 
unfortunate, his desire to help those who were not always financially responsible, and 
who through disappointment in their expectations were unable to keep their promises.”31 
However, he also took advantage of business opportunities when they arose and did not 
hesitate to use the Indianapolis News to his financial advantage. For instance, since 
utilities were municipally owned there was public resistance to the creation of a private 
corporation to supply gas to the city of Indianapolis. Many powerful people were against 
it, but Holliday used his considerable reputation and clout to champion the idea and it 
was accepted. Not surprisingly, Holliday, John Frenzel and Eli Lilly were all appointed to 
the board of this new gas company owned by 4,000 citizens who invested as 
stockholders.32 
Being a devout Presbyterian, John Holliday was a high-ranking elder of the 
church and this association strongly informed his views on philanthropy. The First 
Presbyterian Church of Indianapolis was filled with members of the wealthy elite, such as 
President Benjamin Harrison and Vice President Thomas R. Marshall.
33
 Speaking to this 
distinguished and wealthy congregation in 1911, Holliday‟s words gives us some insight 
into his religious thoughts on wealth, giving and charity: 
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One of the plainest teachings of the Word of God is the obligation 
of stewardship. Over and over again it is enjoined upon man as a 
duty under all circumstances. We are to give not only our 
substance, but our time, our talents. God claims all. They are His 
gifts to us. What He entrusts to us is to be used for His Kingdom, 
His glory. With these commandments go promises of rich rewards 
that are received by those who obey, as myriads here and above 
can attest. The systematic giving that the tithe compels is full of 
blessings. It gives one the ability to have something always for a 
deserving object. It cuts out the roots of selfishness. It nourishes 
the virtues of brotherly love and helpfulness. It realizes the 
privilege of being a co-worker with God, and it creates that 
cheerfulness in the giver that makes God love him. How wonderful 
that we can endear ourselves to the great God in such a simple 
way. How wicked and foolish if we do not [emphasis added].34 
 
 Holliday‟s charitable beliefs that the wealthy should assist those who were less 
deserving did not extend to the idea of the wealthy paying taxes to the government in 
order to help the less fortunate. Holliday did not like taxes, but if he had to pay them he 
wanted to make sure that he and other elites were not paying more than those with less 
income. In 1913, for example, he complained that the exemption from federal income tax 
was placed at $4,000 per family, meaning that those who made $4,000 [$77,000 CD] or 
less per year would not be required to pay. He considered “the high exemption a menace 
to the country and the beginning of class legislation worse than protection.”35 He felt that 
the exemption should be $800 [$15,000 CD] for single men and $1,200 [23,000 CD] for 
those who were married. Like the wealthy of today, Holliday was vigilant in his belief 
that the middle and lower middle classes should not get any financial relief at the expense 
of wealthy elites like himself.  
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 Holliday was so resistant to the redistribution of wealth through taxes, especially 
those that reduced the amount of money that could be put into trust, that he challenged 
the Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners‟ attempt to legislate a tax on life 
insurance policies. The case went all the way to the Indiana Supreme Court, where it was 
ruled that current law did not allow for such taxation. Holliday had won, but the governor 
of Indiana disagreed with the decision, stating that men who held life insurance policies 
were not poor men, but elites who often used these policies as business tools and 
investments. Once again, Holliday railed against the taxing of the wealthy elites in order 
to distribute their riches to services that would improve the lives of other Hoosiers.36 
 Holiday was also a committed Free Mason for most of his life, ascending to the 
33
rd
 Degree of the Scottish Rite. In a rare glimpse of his views on the Masons and their 
role in helping their fellowman, he addressed his Masonic brothers and compared their 
organization with the Christian Church. The address was given in 1917, at the beginning 
of World War I. Part of his speech is quoted at length because it represents Holliday‟s 
deepest thoughts about a variety of subjects pertinent to this study, such as Christianity, 
the treatment of others, charity, good will and the responsibility of the individual: 
I have been a Scottish Rite Mason for forty-six years, with fair 
opportunities for observation and comparison, and I have no 
hesitation in saying that, in my opinion, Masonry has made as 
great an advance in its real life and spiritual as in its material 
aspects. These are the two sides of life, the spiritual and material. 
We share the latter with the beasts that perish, but the former is 
solely the attribute of man, made in the image of God. Masonry is 
a spiritual system whose teaching is veiled in the symbolism of 
material objects, in the study of which men may go from lower to 
higher things in the development of their characters and their 
relations to their fellow men. Some have done this in all ages, but 
they have been the few and not the many. You know and I know 
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that many Masons do not take an intelligent, comprehensive view 
of the principles of our order. They find pleasure in its 
companionship and social relations, but they do not get down to 
the heart of its teachings and translate then into life.  
 
It is the same in the Church. When the war came we heard about 
the failure of Christianity and the impossibility of its being true if 
Christian nations could act thus. Not a few persons lost their faith 
on this assumption. Christianity is not a failure and Masonry is not 
a failure despite such shallow reasoning. Both mean the same 
thing, the building up of character, the establishment of peace on 
earth and good will among men, the universal belief in the 
Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. But both must 
work and attain their object through our difficult human nature, 
and results have come slowly. There never has been such a thing as 
a Christian nation, a nation controlled in thought, purpose and 
action by the principles of Christianity and applied in all its 
relations to humanity. When that comes, as it surely will, envy, 
jealousy, racial prejudice, war and poverty among nations will 
cease, and peace and righteousness will prevail. The Brotherhood 
of Man will be confessed and professed by all. Within forty years 
there has come a great change in the thoughts and dispositions of 
men. It looks as if the lessons of the past are beginning to bear 
fruit, fruit that is rich and heavy.  
  
The New Spirit of Masonry 
 
A new spirit is more prevalent, not coming from new knowledge, 
but clearer discernment of old truths and a close application of it to 
life. This is the spirit of service, the conviction that we should be 
helpful and self-sacrificing, for in that direction lies peace and 
happiness. There is more feeling that men are brothers and that 
they must live as brothers, casting out indifference and selfishness. 
It may be the fancy of an old man, but I see evidence of this 
through our nation‟s life and nowhere more than among Masons. 
[…] We have fallen upon serious times. Without our fault or 
desire, our nation has been called on to take part in the most 
gigantic and terrible conflict in the world‟s history. […] We 
believe that our principles are to be the salvation of the world and 
we will stop at no sacrifices to support them and overthrow 
opposing forces. […] Life without our freedom would not be worth  
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living. This is the doctrine of Masonry and from all quarters comes 
stern adherence to it. Loyalty to the death.37 
 
Holiday‟s words give us some insight into how he viewed life, his fellow man, 
and the world in general. He states that most men do not ascend from the lowest to the 
highest in their pursuits, claiming that the number of men who do so are few. He also 
believed that in time the United Sates would become a Christian nation, all human folly 
would cease to exist, and a new age of the Brotherhood of Man would rise up. While the 
ultra-patriotic tone of his speech should be interpreted against the backdrop of the start of 
WWI, it is clear that he feels that the both the church and the Masons not only have the 
power to bring about this new society, but also the divine charge from God. 
However, it seems that not everyone viewed Holliday‟s image as a humble 
servant of the Lord or great giver of gifts to the less fortunate. Note the editorial cartoon 
from 1904 shown in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Newspaper editorial cartoon of John H. Holliday, 1904 
Source: Indianapolitans “As We See „Em,” a collection of newspaper cartoons (1904) 
 
This depiction of Holliday as a corpulent businessman is typical of the era. His 
back turned to a needy little boy while he sits among a pile of coins in front a bulging 
safe, smoking a cigar made of cash, while wearing a crown of the Union Trust bank on 
his head.This was a satirical jab at a philanthropist and civic figure about whom others 
waxed eloquent. The editors of Indianapolitans “As We See „Em,” explain that the 
cartoonists looked at their public subjects “with a penetrating yet friendly eye” and that 
they view “ „Indianapolitans‟ not as their wives and sweethearts see them, nor as they see 
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themselves, but as they appear to the Little Gods of the Ink Pots – sometimes miscalled 
„Devils‟ – the Cartoonists and Caricaturists of the Daily Press.”38 Given this satirical 
caricature of the larger-than-life, wealthy Holliday contrasted with the begging working 
class “little man,” it makes sense that he would want to soften his image as a cold-hearted 
banker, either real or imagined, by engaging in philanthropic organizations to appear 
benevolent. This could also partially explain his involvement in the creation of the 
Indianapolis Foundation in 1916. 
Holliday established the Union Trust Company in 1893. He served as its president 
until 1899 when he resigned to join William J. Richards in establishing the Indianapolis 
Press. It was Holliday, not Frenzel or Woollen, who was one of the founders of the Trust 
Company Section of the American Bankers Association in 1886. He was the only 
representative of an Indiana trust company who signed a letter that went out to all of the 
trust companies in the country suggesting such a section. It began with 114 members in 
late 1886 and increased to more that 1,400 by 1916, which shows the tremendous growth 
of trust companies within a 20 year period. Frederick Goff was president of the Trust 
Company Section in 1914, the same year that his company started the Cleveland 
Foundation. 39 As Holliday, Frenzel and Woollen were also members of the section, it is 
plausible that the idea was first floated for a community foundation in Indianapolis 
through this association during Goff‟s presidency. Holliday continued as a director of the 
Union Trust and returned as its president in 1901. He later became chairman of the board 
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and served until 1921.40 Despite all of his proselytizing of devotion to his fellowman and 
the common good, John H. Holliday, like John P. Frenzel, left no money to the 
Indianapolis Foundation.  
 
Evans Woollen, President of Fletcher Savings and Trust 
 
 
Figure 5: Photo of Evans Woollen 
Source: Courtesy of the Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI, Indianapolis 
 
Evans Woollen was the driving force behind the Indianapolis Foundation during 
its formation. His attitude toward and beliefs about philanthropy were evident very early 
in his life. He was born in Indianapolis on November 28, 1864 to a well-to-do lawyer, 
William Watson Woollen.41 The first indication of Evans Woollen‟s views on 
philanthropy surfaced during the commencement speech he gave when he was voted 
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class orator of his graduating class at Yale College. The speech was given on June 28, 
1886, and the title that the young Woollen used was “The Dignity of the Mediocre Man.” 
In his speech he challenged the great writers of his day such as Carlyle, Swift and Galton, 
calling into question their notions that history is shaped only by a few exceptional men of 
immense influence. He trumpeted the efforts and impacts of the common man, stating 
that “there must be great comfort in thinking that however small our influence may be, it 
cannot be inappreciable. There must be comfort too in thinking that we are part of the 
past and of the future, part of one great family […] - a family that struggles arduously as 
a whole towards a fuller and higher life.”42 
Yet Woollen also adopted the more scientific approach to charity that was 
prevalent during that time period, which relied on Darwin‟s theory of the “Origin of 
Species” to advance the notion of superiority achieved by the necessity of the survival of 
the fittest, even in human society. Woollen supported this notion by criticizing man‟s 
philanthropic efforts to help the weak and less fortunate: 
[…] that we live in an age of peculiar resistance to progress 
is easy to be seen. No species is so little amenable to the 
improving and progressive law of natural selection as man. 
He laboriously obstructs nature‟s efforts to purge out the 
dross. Indeed, much of the earnest work of to-day is to 
secure the survival of the unfittest. All the philanthropies of 
history are rightly called makeshifts – very necessary and 
worthy makeshifts to be sure, but none the less makeshift in 
that they do not give us materially higher quality men.43 
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He goes on to enforce the importance of physical and social genetics in 
creating a better society: 
A higher endowment of the race at birth is evidently the 
imperative prerequisite. […] and it is pitiable that an 
alliance of equal talents, but unequal social conditions is so 
abhorred by the same spendthrifts of talent who squander 
valuable hereditary gifts by marrying a lower natural 
stamp. If misalliances of this kind were fewer and 
philanthropy were for the superior rather than for the 
inferior the typical center of our civilization would soon be 
shifted a notch higher [emphasis added].44 
 
Woollen drew a significant line between scientific philanthropy and charity, and clearly 
preferred investing in the strong rather than prolonging the lives of the weak and socially 
disadvantaged. 
 When Woollen ran as a Democrat for president of the United States in 1927, one 
of his former classmates, Arthur L. Shipman, a Republican, described him as an 
accomplished speaker and writer, someone who was respected by his classmates and 
modest in his accomplishments. He was “firm and positive in his character, but he was 
always kind and sympathetic. He was always thinking of others and not of himself.”45 
However, when it came to his talents for writing and oratory, his modesty gave way to his 
competitive spirit. After his Yale classmates had voted him class orator, he told Shipman 
that he was not going to compete for the either the Townsend Award for literature or the 
Deforest Medal for the highest writing and speaking honors because he felt he had been 
honored enough. After some prodding from Shipman, and in spite of the fact that his 
classmates had a head start and had been preparing for the competitions for months, he 
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buried himself in his room for a week before the contest. Woollen emerged the winner of 
both awards. Yet this account and others indicate that Woollen was more of an 
informative speaker than an inspiring one, which could explain why he was well 
respected by his peers but failed in his bids to run for both senator of Indiana and 
president of the United States. As Shipman succinctly put it, his addresses “aimed rather 
to convince his audience than to take them off their feet.”46 His writing also secured him a 
job after college with the Indianapolis Sentinel, which is significant because both J. P. 
Frenzel and John Holliday also wrote for Indianapolis newspapers. 47 This meant that all 
three men understood the power of the newspaper and media to form public opinion, and 
this knowledge greatly influenced the motivations for the creation of the Indianapolis 
Foundation, as well as the funding decisions made during its operation.  
Woollen went on to also receive a Master of Arts from Yale in 1888, then lived in 
Wabash, Indiana for a year where he became secretary of one of the natural gas 
companies. He returned to Indianapolis where he studied law and expanded his business 
experience. He worked as legal counsel to the Big Four Railroad and also served as an 
officer of the Commercial Club. In 1896, he married into a well respected political 
family, choosing as his bride Nancy Baker, the daughter of former Indiana Governor 
Conrad Baker (1867-1873). Woollen eventually served as legal counsel to the American 
National Bank and in 1910 became vice-president of the Fletcher American National 
Bank. It wasn‟t until 1912 that his career as a trust company president began with the 
merger of the German American Trust Company and the Marion Trust Company into the 
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new Fletcher Savings and Trust Company. Like Holliday, he was also a Presbyterian who 
served as an elder in his church48 
Woollen proved to be civic minded during WWI, volunteering to sit on the 
Indiana State Council of Defense, as well as serving in federal governmental positions, 
and as the Indiana chairman of the War Finance Corporation. It is Woollen‟s volunteer 
efforts on behalf of charitable organizations, especially arts organizations, that are most 
pertinent to this study. One source reported that he was president of the Art Association 
of Indianapolis, president of the Board of Children‟s Guardians, president of the Charity 
Organization Society, vice-president of the Community Chest, and a director or member 
if several other organizations or civic clubs, including the Indianapolis Literary Society 
and the Dramatic Club.49 It is clear from these volunteer affiliations with visual art, 
literature and drama that he personally valued the arts as a community asset and invested 
his time to further their prominence in the Indianapolis community.  
According to several accounts, Woollen came from a long line of staunch 
Republicans, but became a staunch Democrat.50 He appeared to hold his own counsel 
when it came to the issues of the day, and even received plaudits from the Associate 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union who thanked him for the frankness of one 
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of his speeches, stating “All of those who cherish the principle of free speech will, I am 
sure, feel grateful to you for this service in these difficult days.”51 
He was obviously well respected on the national political level, as President 
Wilson once offered Woollen a place on the Federal Reserve Board. Woollen served as 
chairman of the Economic Policy Committee of the American Bankers' Association; was 
a “chairman, president or director of a railway, a life insurance company, any number of 
charitable and welfare associations, a college, an historical society, an art association, a 
fuel administration and memorials ranging from Benjamin Harrison to James Whitcomb 
Riley.” As a Democrat, Woollen once ran for Congress in 1896 on the Gold Democratic 
ticket, and he also accepted nomination to run for Senator of Indiana in 1925.52  
Woollen was a social progressive, especially when it came to denouncing 
“bourbondism,” which was the apartheid of the antebellum period.53 After the Civil War, 
Democrats in the South rallied against “negro rule” and northern influence, and these 
Democrats were viewed as heroes by those threatened by the changes wrought after 1865. 
Bourbondism led to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, which was particularly active in 
Indiana politics in the 1920s.54 Woollen‟s position was less racial and centered on class, 
addressing specifically the often violent struggle between the owners of companies, 
which the banks served and financed, and unions, which were on the rise. Both the New 
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York Times and the Christian Science Monitor quoted one of his speeches on the subject 
when he warned his peers at a 1924 American Bankers Association meeting: 
More than anything else, we need understanding. We need 
understanding between those who have and those who have 
not; those who employ and those who are employed; those 
who work with their brains and those who work with their 
hands. […] Our contrition is the avoidance of 
Bourbondism.55  
 
He went on to say that bourbondism created conflict between classes and that the bankers 
needed to be open to free speech and radical ideas, stating that the present institutions 
could not withstand words spoken against them and that they were indeed in a “bad way.”  
Woollen became actively involved in politics, backed by the Democratic Party 
boss, Thomas Taggart. Taggart supported Woollen for the Senate in 1925, a bid for 
which he was unsuccessful.56 He was also backed by Taggart to run for the president of 
the United States in 1927, but again was unsuccessful.57 Some of these failures could be 
due to the fact that he was a supporter of prohibition and was known at the time as “a 
dry.” He was also a man with very high, unbending principles, stating them boldly 
regardless of their popularity. In addition, he was at odds with the leadership of New 
York‟s Tammany Hall as was evident in a story about his visit with its leader George W. 
Olvany. It was suspected that Woollen was expressing his belief to the Tammany power 
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brokers that only a Democrat who supported prohibition would be electable in the 
Midwest. Olvany quipped that Woollen was defeated by 22,000 votes in his run as 
Senator and that “his friends in the Hoosier State think so much of him that they want 
him to run for President in 1928. He just dropped in to pay a social call. Perhaps he 
wanted to see whether I wore horns or not.”58 It is obvious that Woollen had made his 
unfavorable opinion of Olvany known to all who would listen, insinuating that Olvany 
was the devil himself. 
 These elite actors in the creation of the Indianapolis Foundation were not one-
dimensional men. Although they were philanthropic in many areas in their life, none of 
these men left any money to the foundation they initiated and helped create. It seems 
callous to suggest that their dominant objective was to make money while appearing to be 
magnanimous and socially sensitive to the public. However, the fact remains that while 
they and their surrogates were singing the praises of the good that the Indianapolis 
Foundation could do for the community, they did not chose to create a trust for the 
foundation after their deaths. Looking at the backgrounds of all three, Evans Woollen 
appears to have been the most socially progressive, taking stands against bourbondism, 
advocating for the ability of women to bank, and being a staunch Democrat in a family of 
Republicans. He also stood for certain principles, such as prohibition, and would not 
compromise his position for political reasons, no matter what office he sought. Whether 
or not one agrees with his vision of philanthropy and charity, it has to be acknowledged 
that he gave the subjects serious thought. His demeanor was stoic and impressive, and he 
was well respected for his forthright and honest character. However, we must also 
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remember that he was a lawyer and banker, and his first loyalty was to making a profit 
and dutifully serving corporate interests.  
 When it came to creating the Indianapolis Foundation however, Woollen‟s trust 
company was not significant enough to create the kind of substantial foundation to which 
the larger Cleveland Trust Company had given birth. Strategically he knew that he 
needed the credibility of the two biggest trust companies, the Union Trust and the Indiana 
Trust Company. Although both Frenzel and Holliday had philanthropic interests and 
served on charity organizations boards, when it came to the establishment of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, profit was a much stronger incentive than community concern. 
Of course, the positive philanthropic image that a community foundation could generate 
in the public‟s mind would have deeply appealed to all three men anxious to stand out 
honorably in their community. These were powerful men in a small city where reputation 
was surely important to securing an elevated social status. Like the wealthy of ancient 
Greece, they understood the unwritten social contract between the elite and the ordinary 
citizenry to ameliorate the disparity between the haves and the have-nots through 
perceived acts of giving to the community. The most important point of these brief 
biographies is that even though these creators of the Indianapolis Foundation were 
charitable in other areas of their life, they did not see fit to leave any funds to the 
charitable organization to which they gave birth. This fact alone lends credibility to the 
assertion that they never considered the foundation an important philanthropic endeavor, 
and rather used it as a vehicle to create additional business for their trust companies. 
 The deep personal and professional relationships they shared were also important 
to the foundation‟s creation. In addition to all three being part of the “Blue Book” 
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society, they also sat on the boards of corporations together, such as the railroad and the 
gas company. Woollen and Holliday were both Masons and both Presbyterian Church 
elders. All three sat on the boards various charitable organizations, often at the same 
time, and all three had their favorite charities and causes. All three were active Democrats 
and no doubt spent many a political fundraiser together. All three had associations with 
the newspaper business and understood the power of the press and its impact on public 
opinion since it was one of the few mass communications instruments of the time. These 
men hand-picked the trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation in order to maintain control 
over its operation and it is no coincidence that a good deal of attention was paid to 
ensuring that the foundation‟s actions were always reported positively by the press during 
its early years. 
 
The Appointment of the Foundation’s First Trustees 
The Indianapolis Foundation was established by resolution rather than as a 
separate corporation by the three trust companies that created it so that they could retain 
control of the foundation‟s assets. This also allowed them to act as puppeteers over a cast 
of “impartially” selected citizens who would comprise the first board of trustees of the 
Indianapolis Foundation. Supposedly appointed by public officials, these trustees were 
actually close personal friends and business associates of the presidents of the three trust 
companies, some of them even serving on the boards of the trust companies. All of these 
men were members of the elite Indianapolis Blue Book society and as such associated 
and identified with the wealthy elite rather than the lower classes and their plights. All 
subscribed to the tenets of Charity Organization Society concepts of charity and 
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philanthropy as being nothing more than tools to reform what they considered to be the 
morally, spiritually and intellectually deficient poor.  
Although many of the foundation‟s trustees sat on the boards of numerous state 
and local charitable organizations, none of them had a realistic understanding as to what 
community needs were urgent enough to deserve the foundation‟s funding. Even worse, 
their support of important local causes was secondary to ensuring that the local press 
would report favorably on each and every charitable action. This fear of negative public 
relations coupled with a lack of knowledge about and a sense of urgency toward the 
community‟s pressing social problems, were major reasons that the foundation funded 
nothing for the first eight years of its existence. These cozy relationships among the 
wealthy elite creators and trustees shaped the early philanthropic actions – or lack thereof 
– of the Indianapolis Foundation. 
To put the first years of the Indianapolis Foundation into the context of its time, it 
is helpful to understand the creation and growth of community foundations as a whole 
from 1914 to just before the Great Depression of the 1930s. The philanthropic trend that 
Frederick Goff pioneered with the creation of the Cleveland Foundation spread rapidly, 
and within two years twelve other community foundations were formed, including the 
Indianapolis Foundation. By 1920 there were thirty-eight foundations in existence, a 
number that grew to seventy-four by the 1931. In less than 25 year, the number of 
community foundations had increased six-fold.  
By 1931 many community foundations were still in their infant stages and little 
more than half had any trusts to manage at all, let alone funds to distribute. The trust 
funds committed to these foundations had also increased substantially, from a total of 
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$7,000,000 [CD $73,684,210] in 1921 to $32,000,000 [CD $400,000,000] ten years later. 
This was a very substantial amount of money upon which the trust companies could 
charge handling and administration fees, as well as earn profits from the trusts‟ interest. 
With no investment on their part trust companies had all the advantages, incurring no risk 
and a constant flow of profit for eternity. Of those foundations with funds in 1930, only 
thirty of them made cash distributions for charity for a total of $994,382 [CD 
$11,299,795]. Although that is an impressive sum committed to charity during a 
depressed economy, trust companies didn‟t do badly either. If they only charged 2 
percent for all fees and their cut of the interest, which is probably a low estimate, they 
would have made $640,000 [CD $8,000,000] even during the Great Depression.59 
The beginnings of the Indianapolis Foundation followed this same pattern of 
delay in obtaining trust funds for philanthropic use, a necessity to allow those funds time 
to create enough revenue to be distributed, and the learning curve of what to do with the 
funds once they were received. In the case of the Indianapolis Foundation, as well as the 
others that were created between 1914-1919, they also had to weather the protracted, 
bloody and financially costly World War I.  
  
                                                          
59
 Community Trusts in the United States and Canada: A Survey of Existing Trusts, with 
Suggestions for Organizing and Developing New Foundations, (New York: Trust Company Division, 
American Bankers Association, 1931). 
 92 
The Resolution Establishing the Indianapolis Foundation 
 The resolution to establish the Indianapolis Foundation was dated 5 January 1916. 
There are three significant points to make about both the resolution and the date. First, 
the foundation was not created as a separate corporation, which would have given the 
foundation autonomy. It was created as a resolution between the three trust companies. 
This meant that the three for-profit companies controlled the assets of the foundation. As 
the resolution stated, the three of them would “undertake each for itself that as trustee it 
will within the scope of this resolution accept and administer gifts and bequests which 
shall constitute the Indianapolis Foundation.”60  
Second, the six members of a “board of trustees” charged with distributing any 
funds were to be appointed by local power-brokers, including the mayor of Indianapolis, 
the judge of Marion County Superior Court, and the judge of the United States District 
Court for the State of Indiana. Each appointed two trustees, with the condition that not 
more than two could be appointed from the same religious body. The charter did not 
specify whether the term “religious body” meant different Protestant organizations or 
different religions, such as Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. Nonetheless, at least one 
board trustee was Jewish and one was Catholic. It is not a coincidence that this is one of 
the few conditions on trustee membership when you consider that two of the founders 
were members of the Masons, an organization that has historically been one of religious 
tolerance and open to free thought and democratic decision-making. It is also revealing 
that no bankers were chosen as Indianapolis Foundation Trustees, no doubt the result of 
the rancor that existed between trust companies and banks. This also indicates a 
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substantial level of influence by the trust companies over the selection of the trustees in 
spite of the illusion that officially the appointments were the choice of Indianapolis 
political and legal Indianapolis heavy-weights.  
The third significant aspect of the foundation‟s establishment was that the charter 
was crafted in 1915, the same year that the Indiana State Legislature changed the laws so 
that all banks could have trust departments. By the time its creation was announced, the 
trustees had long been chosen and asked to serve. This indicates that the discussion 
between the three trust companies about creating a foundation had to occur in late 1914 
or early 1915, at about the time that Frederick Goff was singing the praises of the 
Cleveland Trust. Goff‟s motivation was surely spurred by legislative pressures and 
apprehension over the changes in Ohio State Law in 1913 that equalized all banks and 
trust companies and made them subject to the same legal oversight.61 The Ohio Trust 
Section of the National Bankers Association was not in place before the law was changed 
and therefore was not able to organize trust company bankers to lobby against such 
changes. As a 1913 report by the Trust Section stated, “It is surely not too much to say 
that if at the outset of that legislation the combined and united thought and action of the 
trust companies of the country had been made to center upon it, there would certainly 
have resulted a clearer and more satisfactory piece of legislation.”62 The changes in these 
laws that ended the monopoly that trust companies held on the lucrative trust business 
created a level playing field, and threatened the trust companies‟ profitably. The trust 
companies needed a new, competitive edge over banks in order to retain and gain trust 
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business. What better way to compete against the despised bankers of the day than for 
trust companies to create benevolent institutions that would not only bring additional trust 
business, but would portray themselves as concerned business people as opposed to 
greedy bankers? As a bonus to the trust companies, the foundations were handed over 
functions that cost the trust companies time and money, such as administering the trust 
funds to the beneficiaries. Better still, these foundations could be easily controlled by 
trust company appointed insider trustees. If we compare the timing of these legal changes 
with the creation of both the Cleveland Foundation and the Indianapolis Foundation, it is 
no stretch of the imagination to see that the inevitable competitive threat from banks was 
one of the major drivers that encouraged trust companies to create community 
foundations in the early years.  
 
The Appointments of the First Board of Trustees 
The three founders of the Indianapolis Foundation and all of the first trustees were 
listed in the “Blue Book” of local high society in 1913 – even Father Francis Gavisk, a 
Catholic priest.63 The Democrat mayor of Indianapolis, Joseph E. Bell, appointed Father 
Gavisk for one year and Henry H. Hornbrook for four years. Marion Circuit Court Judge 
Louis B. Ewbank appointed Charles Fairbanks for two years and Josiah K. Lilly to five 
years. Albert B. Anderson, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the District 
of Indiana, made the last appointments. Anderson chose Louis H. Levey for three years 
and Henry W. Bennett for six years. A caveat to this process was that if the mayor or a 
judge failed to make an appointment within 30 days, the three banks would agree on a 
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trustee and make the appointment. This, again, was another strategy of control engineered 
by the founders.64  
 
Biographical Information on the Trustees 
 
Father Francis H. Gavisk 
 
 
Figure 6: Photo of Father Francis H. Gavisk 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
Monsignor Francis H. Gavisk was assigned to St. John Catholic Church in 
Indianapolis and eventually became the vicar general and chancellor of the Diocese of 
Indianapolis. He was closely associated with both Evans Woollen and John Holliday as 
they all served on the boards of the Indianapolis Red Cross and the Indiana State 
Conference of Charities and Correction.65 The social thinking of the religious and wealthy 
elites in the early 1900s was to lump together those who were impoverished with those 
who were imprisoned. Many of these leading citizens believed in eugenics, the theory 
that both poverty and criminality stemmed from failures of character and mental defects 
that existed amongst the lowly, defects which they believed could be identified by 
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appearance. It would follow then that the elite believed they were wealthy, fine 
upstanding citizens not because of being born into social status or because they were 
recipients of exceptional opportunities and excellent educations, but because they were 
genetically superior in character and mental faculties.  
Gavisk was one of these leading citizens, serving as the Chairman of the 
Committee on Mental Defectives (CDM), formed in 1915 by order of Governor Samuel 
Ralston. This committee was under the umbrella of the State Board of Charities and 
adhered to eugenics principles and sought to control mental illness in Indiana through 
sterilization of the afflicted. As usual with charitable and philanthropic enterprises, one 
must discern founders‟ greatest fears or anxieties before really comprehending their 
“benevolent” building of institutions. In the case of the CDM, its creators feared 
contemporary reports that mental illness and degeneracy plagued the Hoosier state, 
especially in rural areas. Thus, they believed that eugenics had to be enforced to stop 
Indiana‟s slide into feeblemindedness. CDM agents held conferences and presented 
papers that eventually led to the building of the Indiana Farm Colony for the 
Feebleminded at Butlerville. The CDM also inspired legislators to institute sterilization 
legislation in 1927 for the second time in Indiana‟s history.66 Father Gavisk championed 
these efforts of social-scientific control of the mentally handicapped. Similar 
preoccupations with policing degeneracy by respectable members of society certainly 
informed his work at the Indianapolis Foundation.   
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Henry H. Hornbrook 
 
Figure 7: Photo of Henry H. Hornbrook 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
 
Henry Hallam Hornbrook (February 15, 1870-September 20, 1935) was an 
attorney and civic leader born in Evansville, Indiana. A graduate of DePauw University, 
Hornbrook also went on to graduate from Harvard Law School. He became an expert in 
two areas of legal practice: the organization of gas companies (he served on the board of 
directors of Citizens Gas and Coke Utility for several years) and the constitutionality of 
government bond issues. He also served as a trustee for Crown Hill Cemetery, Tudor Hall 
School and DePauw University, and was a long-time board member of the YMCA. 
Hornbrook served as the president of the Indianapolis Foundation from 1926 until his 
death in 1935. 67 But it was his seat on the board of the John Holliday‟s Union Trust 
Company that guaranteed Hornbrook a deliberative voice as an Indianapolis Foundation 
trustee. 
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Charles Warren Fairbanks 
 
Figure 8: Photo of Charles Warren Fairbanks 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
 
The Indianapolis Foundation is never mentioned in the papers of Charles Warren 
Fairbanks. This could be because Fairbanks died in 1919, three years after his 
appointment as a foundation trustee. He was quickly replaced by Gustave A. Efroymson 
and hence had little impact on the foundation‟s direction or its funding decisions. Like 
the other appointed trustees, Fairbanks was a member of the social elite of Indianapolis 
and a well known political figure, even nationally. Born in 1852 near Unionville, Ohio, 
he moved to Indianapolis to start a legal career representing railroads. This lucrative 
service soon led to active investment, and Fairbanks became very wealthy at an early 
age.
68
  
Fairbanks also was interested in newspapers, taking an early job with the 
Associated Press and later acquiring a controlling interest in the Indianapolis News, 
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which was owned by John Holliday. This, again, emphasizes the close business 
relationships between the creators of the Indianapolis Foundation and its trustees, who 
were supposedly chosen by impartial community leaders of unquestionable integrity. 
Fairbanks became deeply involved in Republican politics and made the keynote speech at 
the McKinley convention in 1896. In 1897 Fairbanks won election as a senator from 
Indiana. In 1905 Fairbanks served as vice president to President Theodore Roosevelt. 
This was, no doubt, a political maneuver on the part of the more liberal thinking 
Roosevelt to satisfy the staunch conservatives in the Republican party, because Fairbanks 
represented the more conservative wing. Roosevelt was pressured by Old Guard 
Republicans who “were insisting that lanky, awful Charles (“Icicle”) Fairbanks be 
nominated for Vice President.”69 Fairbanks disagreed with most of the views and policies 
of the socially progressive Roosevelt, especially when Roosevelt was campaigning for his 
“Square Deal” government programs aimed at advancing social justice for all Americans, 
especially the poorest in the country. The tenuousness of this partnership became obvious 
when Fairbanks flexed his national political muscle when he supported Taft instead of 
Roosevelt in the 1912 election, which Taft won. The ultra-conservative Republican bent 
that Fairbanks exhibited gives us an insight into the kinds of trustees the creators of the 
Indianapolis Foundation sought. These were not men who were known for their social 
conscience, but were business and political powerbrokers who reflected the beliefs, 
desires and concerns of the conservative and wealthy Indianapolis elite.  
In 1909-1910, after his term in Washington, Fairbanks embarked on a world tour. 
He lauded the progressive development in Japan and while in Rome, his staunch 
                                                          
69
 Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: Random House, 2001), 317. 
 100 
Methodism cost him an audience with the Pope.70 The photo in Figure 9 shows a 
gathering at the home of Charles Fairbanks. It is a snapshot of the relationships between 
the political and philanthropic elites of the day, especially as they are associated with the 
Indianapolis Foundation. Here, Fairbanks sits front and center with President Roosevelt. 
Also in the picture is William E. English, who later donated the resources to purchase the 
building in which the Indianapolis Foundation now resides, and Louis Levey, who was 
also one of the first Indianapolis Foundation appointed trustees.  
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Figure 9: Photo of President Theodore Roosevelt, Vice President Charles W. Fairbanks, Louis H. Levey, 
and a large group at Fairbank‟s Residence, May 30, 190771 
Source: Courtesy of the Indiana Historical Society 
 
The group is seated on the lawn. Back row - left to right: Wm. E. English, Lucius B. Swift, Wm. H. 
Armstrong, Henry Riesenberg, Meredith Nicholson, Roscoe O. Hawkins, Chas. A. Bookwalter, Frank D. 
Stalnaker, John W. Kern, Charles Remster, Rev. Daniel R. Lucas, Franklin Vonnegut, Dr. P.M. Rixey, 
Thomas Taggert, Moses G. McLain, Harry S. New, Jeremiah E. Kinney, John J. Twiname, Wm. H. H. 
Miller, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Chauncey A. Manning, Jesse Overstreet, Joseph A. Minturn, Albert B. Anderson, 
Addison C. Harris, Louis H. Levey, Ferdinand L. Mayer. Front row left to right: Mrs. John N. Carey, Dr. 
Mary A. Spink, James Whitcomb Riley, Hon. Albert J. Beveridge, Gov. J. Frank Hanly, Vice President 
Charles W. Fairbanks, President Theodore Roosevelt, Mrs. Cornelia Cole Fairbanks, James A. Hemenway, 
R. Adm. Geo. Brown. 
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Louis H. Levey 
 
 
Figure 10: Photo of Louis H. Levey 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
 
Louis H. Levey was a publisher, printer and lithographer who published several 
books during the late 1800s and early 1900s. From the campaign button below it was 
obvious that he was a Republican, and from the pictures of his business and mansion, he 
was also very wealthy. In addition to book printing, the company also printed documents 
for the government. One particularly large printing contract with the Indiana State 
government in 1895 was backed with financing from John Holliday‟s Union Trust 
Company.72 This clearly demonstrates that Levey and Holliday enjoyed a business 
relationship that existed for at least 20 years before Levey was appointed an Indianapolis 
Foundation trustee. Again, Holliday‟s effort to control the decision-making body of the 
Indianapolis Foundation is evident by placing one of his best customers among the 
trustees. What better proxy to have at one‟s disposal than a person who is reliant on you 
for financial backing of his business ventures? Further strengthening the relationships 
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between the creators of the Indianapolis Foundation and the appointed trustees, it is 
important to note that Levey became a prominent member of the Scottish Rite Masonic 
Order in Indianapolis, just as Woollen and Holliday.73  
Unlike most of his fellow trustees, Louis Levey did make a gift to the 
Indianapolis Foundation, contributing more than $5,000 to the Alfonso Pettis Fund, a 
fund named after the first donor to the foundation. However, his charity and supposed 
concern for his community clearly did not extend to his own workers, even those who 
were injured. In 1893, court documents reveal that Levey and his brother, William, were 
sued by a sixteen year old employee who had been injured while working on one of the 
printing presses. The plaintiff claimed that he was not properly trained and was awarded 
a verdict in his favor. Levey‟s lawyers appealed the judgment and it was reversed 
because the judge felt that the employee had enough instruction on the machine and was 
negligent.74 As can be seen by the photos included here, Levey and his brother were not 
poor businessmen and could have well afforded to assist this injured worker. They were 
the official printers of the Republican Party and lived in grand Indianapolis mansions. To 
give a more graphic understanding Levey‟s high standing within the socio-economic elite 
that created and ran the Indianapolis Foundation, the following pages display images of 
Levey‟s businesses, home, and close association with the Republican Party.  
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Source: Photos in Figures 11 through 14 are courtesy of the Indiana Historical Society and the 
Ruth Lilly Special Collections and Archives at the IUPUI Library.
 
Figure 11: Photo of Levey Bros. & Company Building, 1916 on the corner of Senate and Ohio, where the 
Offices of the State of Indiana now reside.
 75
 
  
                                                          
75
 Levy Bros. & Company, Bass Photo, Indiana Historical Society Digital Collection. 
 105 
 
Figure 12: Photo of Levey Bros. & Company Building, interior of printing presses, 1916.
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Figure 13: Photo of Louis Levey Mansion at 2902 N. Meridian St.
77
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Figure 14: Photo of Republican State Convention Button promoting Levey Bros. as “The Republican  
       Printers.”78 
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Josiah K. Lilly  
 
Figure 15: Photo of Josiah K. Lilly 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
 
Josiah K. Lilly became a philanthropist long before becoming a trustee of the 
Indianapolis Foundation. After being elected president of the Indianapolis YMCA in 
1907, he announced the efforts to build a new $250,000 [$4,800,000 CD] facility. At the 
same time, he personally committed $10,000 [$192,000 CD] of his own money, as well 
as $2,000 [$38,500 CD] from Eli Lilly & Company, where he served as President and 
CEO after the death of the his father and founder of the company, Colonel Eli Lilly. In 
addition, the company‟s employees, no doubt “encouraged” by J. K. Lilly, donated 
another $1,250 [$24,000 CD]. This caught the attention of one of Lilly‟s rival companies, 
the Daniel Stewart Drug Company, which set off a typical philanthropic competition 
among elites. The rival‟s president stated “we can‟t allow him to build the new YMCA 
all by himself. He might think he owns it.”79 Such challenges are typical of American 
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“benevolent” elites who regularly indulge in philanthropy. Using the high-profile 
philanthropic initiatives as arenas of fierce status competitions, they naturally suspect 
rivals who use gifts to co-opt power. 
 The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (1994) presents a bio of  J. K. Lilly. In a piece 
written by an employee of Eli Lilly & Company, it states: 
 J. K. Lilly‟s way of business and his way of life reflected a creed 
of civic involvement and charity. “Every man should, in addition 
to his endeavors for personal and family gain and comfort, 
unselfishly perform some duties as a citizen for the community in 
which he and others live, move and have their beings,” he once 
wrote. He was active in the Indianapolis Commercial Club, the 
YMCA, Red Cross, the Indianapolis Foundation, Crown Hill 
Cemetery, James Whitcomb Riley Memorial Association, and 
Christ Church Cathedral. He also served as a trustee for Purdue 
University and the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy.80 
  
Lilly‟s civic and philanthropic engagements cannot be doubted. In February of 
1917, responding to the threat of possible war in Europe, he made a commitment of 
$25,000 [$368,000 CD] to establish a volunteer Red Cross hospital that would function if 
war were declared. He made it clear that his commitment would only take effect if war 
was declared. After the war was declared in April, Lilly and his wife committed another 
$15,000 [$220,000 CD] to the effort.81 Considering the largesse he demonstrated while 
serving as a trustee of the Indianapolis Foundation, his lack of financial donation or 
posthumous bequest to the foundation is even more curious. While wealthy trustees like 
J. K. Lilly did, by their involvement, encourage other wealthy individuals to create trust 
funds that would be dedicated to the good works of the Indianapolis Foundation, most of 
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the trustees, including Lilly, did not deem the community good promised by the 
foundation important enough or credible enough to receive their own support. 
 There may be a more self-interested reason why J. K. Lilly was appointed a 
trustee of the foundation. Lilly, like another trustee, Henry Hornbrook, was also a 
director of the Union Trust Company of which John Holliday was president.82 Having 
your directors as trustees of the foundation certainly guarantees decisive control over the 
foundation‟s activities and decisions. In 1937, Lilly, along with his sons  J. K. Jr. and Eli, 
created the Lilly Endowment with donated company stock.83 So once again, it is even 
more perplexing that  J. K. Lilly did not create a trust fund dedicated to the Indianapolis 
Foundation.  
  
                                                          
82
 Trust Companies of the United States: 1921 Edition, (New York: United States Mortgage & 
Trust Company, 1921). 
 
83
 The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, Robert G. Barrows and David G. Vanderstel, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), s.v. “Philanthropy,” 158. 
 111 
Henry W. Bennett 
 
 
Figure 16: Photo of Henry W. Bennett 
Source: Courtesy of Ruth Lilly Special Collections, IUPUI 
 
Henry Bennett was born into the elite of Indianapolis society and business. He 
was a direct descendant of a Mayflower passenger, Francis Cooke.84 Born in Indianapolis 
in 1858, he practiced law in Ohio until returning to Indianapolis to work with in his 
father‟s business, the D. Root Stove Company. He became president of both the Indiana 
Stove Company in 1877 and the State Life Insurance Company in 1907. He “had the 
mind and manner that would win him respect as being sound and wholesome in any body 
of men.”85 Starting in 1890, he was active in the local Republican Party and served as the 
treasurer of the State Republican Committee. From 1905 to 1908, he was appointed and 
served as Postmaster of Indianapolis and this enhanced his status among the citizenry. As 
financier Volney T. Mallot stated, “He combines rare executive ability with a judicial 
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mind. He [has a] quick grasp of a complex problem, and facility of expression […]. He is 
a man of unquestioned integrity”86 Men like Bennet enriched themselves by selling vital 
consumer commodities, like stoves, to a burgeoning Midwestern middle class. Stolidly 
bourgeois, figures like Bennett came to play increasingly important roles in the funding 
and distribution of U.S. philanthropy. 
 
Gustave Efroymson 
 
Figure 17: Photo of Gustave Efroymson 
Source: Courtesy of Indianapolis Monthly Magazine 
 
Gustave Efroymson was not one of the first trustees of the Indianapolis 
Foundation, being appointed upon the death of Charles Fairbanks in 1919. However, he 
did have a significant impact on the decision making from the time funding commenced 
in 1924 onward. He began a family dynasty at the foundation which continues to this day, 
passing his trustee position on to his son, Robert Efroymson, who then passed it on to his 
son, Daniel Efroymson, who then passed it on to his widow, Laurie Efroymson. Although 
Gustave Efroymson died a wealthy man, he didn‟t start out as one.  
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Originally from Evansville, Indiana, Gustave Efroymson started working in retail 
at the age of 14 for an Indianapolis dry goods store. At the age of 18, he opened the Star 
Store with his brother-in-law, Louis P. Wolf. By 1912, he was the president of another 
retail store, H. P. Wasson & Company. In 1932, Efroymson became president of Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills. Although Real Silk Hosiery primarily made women‟s undergarments, 
it also manufactured parachutes for the military during WWII. Efroymson became quite 
active in Jewish organizations, such as the Jewish Federation of Indianapolis and the 
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.87  
In addition, Efroymson served on charitable boards such as the Red Cross and the 
Indianapolis Public Welfare Association, which he organized. 88 However, there was 
another a public welfare organization of which Efroymson was president, the 
Indianapolis Public Welfare Loan Association, which stated a purpose that reflected the 
business of a bank more than the mission of a charity. Its purpose was to “loan money, 
buying and selling promissory notes, bills of exchange, accounts, fees and all other 
indebtedness and the buying, holding, owning, mortgaging, leasing and selling of real 
estate and personal property.”89 In fact, this was not a charity that gave money away to 
improve the public welfare, but a corporation with stockholders that lent small amounts 
of money at reasonable rates to people who might otherwise fall prey to loan sharks. 
Most banks lent money only to businesses, therefore loan sharking was one of the few 
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avenues for individuals to obtain loans.90 Stock was offered for sale in the new 
organization, and it appears that this was a precursor to the credit union movement. In 
essence, Efroymson became a banker to the lower classes of Indianapolis. Like the 
creators of the Indianapolis Foundation, Efroymson‟s philanthropic efforts to improve the 
welfare of the Indianapolis citizenry also resulted in personal gain, increasing his 
personal wealth and public stature.  
Public stature was very important to Gustave Efroymson. He was not only listed 
in the Blue Book of Indianapolis Society, he was also listed in the National Jewish Blue 
Book. 91 Not surprisingly, like several of the other trustees, he also had complicated 
professional connections to the trust companies, and to the banks that had interests in the 
trust companies, serving on the boards of both the Union Trust Company and the Indiana 
National Bank.92 This is further evidence of the dense ties of commercial activity, 
personal favors, and friendships among the elite and wealthy players who employed such 
overlapping contacts to control charitable organizations and philanthropic activity in 
Indianapolis. To Gustave Efroymson‟s credit, upon his death in 1946 the Gustave 
Efroymson Fund was established, the only early Indianapolis Foundation trustee to do so. 
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The Bylaws and Beginnings of the Indianapolis Foundation 
Four of the six board members were required to be present to request funds for 
disbursement. The trustees alone had the power to decide where these funds would be 
awarded unless the donor limited the funds to certain uses or a judge decided otherwise. 
However, charitable disbursements could only be made in three areas:  
[…] a third for the relief of the needy poor and the improvement of 
living conditions in Indianapolis, a third for the sick and aged in 
said city and a third for educational and philanthropic research in 
said city.93 
 
Nowhere in this original statement of purpose does it say anything specifically about 
funding arts and culture. The fact that the Indianapolis Foundation violated its own 
purpose statement and started funding the arts in 1933 provided the impetus for my 
original research inquiry about how they justified such a departure from their bylaws at a 
time when the basic needs of the impoverished and unemployed throughout the 
community went unmet.  
The first meeting of the Indianapolis Foundation trustees convened at 5:00 P.M., 
January 5, 1916, at the Union Trust Company. Those present were all of the newly 
appointed trustees, plus Mr. Woollen, president of the Fletcher Savings & Trust, and Mr. 
Holliday, president of the Union Trust Company. Henry Bennett chaired the meeting and, 
as its first order of business, the board elected Charles Fairbanks as its first chairman and 
Henry Hornbeck its first secretary. It was further decided that no less than four trustees 
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would form a quorum, and that meetings would be called by either the chairman or by 
two trustees through the secretary. 94 
In theory, with board terms set at 1, 2,3,4,5, and 6 year intervals, one trustee was 
to be reappointed or replaced each year. Gavisk was reappointed for one year in 1917 and 
Fairbanks was reappointed to two years in 1918, but died in June of that year and was 
replaced by Gustave A. Efroymson. Louis Levey‟s original term of three years was 
extended to a new 6 year term in 1919.95 This staggered system of appointments no doubt 
allowed for an uninterrupted flow of like-minded decision-making. It also meant that as 
each new trustee was appointed, he could be “guided” by the other five remaining 
trustees. It also allowed for a continuum of control by the three trust companies as it 
made it easier to hand-pick one trustee at a time from their small but powerful group of 
wealthy elites than to try to fill all six of the trustee positions at once.  
The death of Charles Fairbanks also meant that the chairman‟s position needed to 
be filled, and at the 19 November 1919 board meeting, J. K. Lilly was elected chairman 
until another successor could be elected. The more important business of the meeting was 
the lack of progress at promoting the foundation and its purpose to the public and to 
potential donors. The secretary suggested that the trustees call upon the representatives of 
the three banks “to make some more aggressive effort to revive interest in the 
Indianapolis Foundation and to stimulate the thought of the community with reference to 
the foundation and its purpose.”96 Representatives of the three banks were evidently in 
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attendance because a discussion between them and the trustees was referred to and it was 
agreed that efforts to promote the foundation was to be executed in the near future.97 
The trustee terms of shorter years expanded to six-year appointments. Henry 
Hornbrook‟s four year term ended in 1920 and he gained a new six year term from an 
appointment by the new Indianapolis mayor, Charles W. Jewell. In 1921, Judge Harry O. 
Chamberlin appointed J. K. Lilly to a six year term as well, and in 1922 Henry Bennett 
was reappointed to a six year term by Judge Anderson. 98 Once these trustee appointments 
were extended to six years each, the trust companies‟ control of the Indianapolis 
Foundation was firmly entrenched, and it was not until the 1990s that control of the 
foundation‟s assets were wrestled from their grip.  
 
The Early Inactivity of the Foundation 
 
From 1916 through most of 1920, the foundation was dormant. There was so little 
activity that it was not even recognized as a functioning foundation by the Chicago Trust. 
The secretary of the Chicago Trust board, Frank D. Loomis, stated that when he took 
office in 1919 “there was only one other community foundation in the United States – the 
Cleveland Foundation, founded in 1914 – and between them they had just a few hundred 
thousand dollars.”99 The reality was that, in 1919, the Indianapolis Foundation had no 
funds. This is partially attributed to the fact that no one had yet designated his or her trust 
to the Indianapolis Foundation, and the three trust companies that created the foundation 
opted not to donate money from their own coffers. Some may argue that the point of a 
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community trust was to be a charitable vehicle for bequests from trust customers in order 
to help their legacy avoid the dreaded “Dead Hand.” However, other early trust 
companies of the same period did not wait passively for the trust customers to establish 
charitable trusts for their respective community foundations. For instance, the Harris 
family of the Harris Trust and Savings Bank in Chicago, donated $600,000 [$10.3 million 
CD] between 1915-1917.100 The fact is that all three of these “charitably minded” 
Indianapolis trust companies and their executives could have made a similar donation to 
the Indianapolis Trust company, but failed to do so.  
In their defense, it must be taken into consideration that the Indianapolis 
Foundation was established in early 1916, during a financially and politically tumultuous 
time in U.S. and world history. World War I started in Europe in 1914 and raged fiercely 
through 1916, and by April of 1917, the United States was officially a full combatant. 
Most contributions to the few community trusts that did exist slowed to a trickle as funds 
were needed for the war effort, and this economic reality extended well into 1919. Rather 
than actively pursuing charitable trust customers, the trust companies and banks of 
Indianapolis and throughout the country became heavily involved in raising money for 
the war effort. The Merchants National Bank and the Indiana Trust combined to raise $1 
million [$14.7 million CD] in war bonds – on the first day of sale. By the time Indiana‟s 
National Guardsmen marched to war in October 1917, a half dozen Indianapolis trust 
companies and banks had sold more than $2 million in war bonds [$29 million CD], 
$200,000 [$2.9 million CD] of which was bought by the Indiana Trust Company. During 
the same time the Indiana National Trust and the Union Trust Company sold $2 million 
[$29 million CD] in bonds during the first offering and then underwrote another $500,000 
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[$7.4 million CD].101 The trust companies and banks increased their efforts during the 
next two years until the war ended in 1918.102 This kind of militarized financial effort on 
the part of the trust companies that originally chartered the Indianapolis Foundation in 
1916 helps explain why funds for domestic philanthropic purposes did not materialize 
during the first three years of the foundation‟s existence. 
Most of the early foundation activity focused on trustee collection of newspaper 
articles about the tornado disasters that occurred throughout Indiana in March of 1917 
and how they were dealt with by various relief agencies such as the Red Cross and the 
various Chambers of Commerce. More than 58 people died, 3,500 were homeless, and it 
was estimated that in one town alone more than $200,000 [$2.9 million CD] was needed 
to bring about adequate relief. Indianapolis collected more than $15,000 [$221,000 CD] 
dollars, but none of these funds came from the Indianapolis Foundation. Many more 
natural disasters were documented throughout the Midwestern states but there is no 
evidence that these articles helped inform the decisions or policies of the Indianapolis 
Foundation or spurred actual donations of any kind during its early days. 103  
As the war wound down in 1919, the foundation‟s trustees focused on the 
resuscitation of the Indianapolis Foundation, as the meeting minutes of 14 November 
1919 reveal: 
The secretary stated the purpose of the meeting was to consider the 
propriety of the Trustees in calling upon representatives of the 
Indiana Trust Company, The Union Trust Company and the 
Fletcher Savings & Trust Company, to make some more 
aggressive effort to revive interest in the Indianapolis Foundation 
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and to stimulate the thought of the community with reference to 
the Foundation and its purposes.104 
 
Thereupon Mr. John H. Holliday of the Union Trust Company, Mr. 
Frenzel of the Indiana Trust Company and Mr. Woollen of the 
Fletcher Savings & Trust Company, entered into a discussion of 
the situation with the Trustees and agreed in the near future to take 
some concerted action looking to a program of publicity which 
would bring before the community the purpose of the Foundation 
and the opportunities offered through it for meeting the future 
problems connected with charitable needs of the city of 
Indianapolis.105 
 
With the war over, the founders and their hand-picked trustees returned to their 
efforts to promote the Indianapolis Foundation as a vehicle for donors to entrust their 
largesse to be used to meet the needs of the Indianapolis community. Their renewed 
determination must have worked, because on 5 May 1920 a former Indianapolis 
businessman, Alphonso P. Pettis, who now lived in France, designated the Indianapolis 
Foundation as a recipient of the balance of his estate upon his death. Pettis came to 
Indianapolis shortly after the Civil War to start over after losing a fortune in New York. 
He invested in a dry goods store and real estate, selling his interest in 1890, when we was 
60 years old. He also married at 60, but never had any children, and his wife died within 
a few years of their marriage. However, he never forgot that his fortune was regained in 
Indianapolis and had contemplated making a contribution to the Indianapolis Foundation 
starting in 1916. 106 In a trust established at the Indiana Trust Company, Pettis designated 
$15,000 [$141,509 CD] per year to himself in gold coin until his death; Mrs. Emergene 
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A. Roberts of Springfield, Massachusetts would receive $2,000 [$18,867 CD] per year 
until her death; and the remainder was bequeathed to the Indianapolis Foundation. At the 
time, Pettis‟ assets were recorded as $112,000 [$1,056,603 CD] in bonds, and $455,000 
[$4,292,452 CD] in stock, for a total of $567,000 [$5,349,056 CD].107 The trust was 
signed by J. P. Frenzel, President, and C. H. Adam, Secretary of the Indiana Trust 
Company. This document was also endorsed by William Dulany Hunter, U.S. Consulate 
in France. It seems that Pettis lived for several years in the south of France in the city of 
Nice, begging the question; why did he leave his estate to this new, obscure foundation in 
Indianapolis? One can only presume that he felt compelled to give back to a city and 
citizenry that had given so much wealth to him. 
The profit that the Indiana Trust Company was to derive from the Pettis trust was 
defined in the trust‟s provision for the administrative fees to be paid. The trust deed states 
that 1 percent of the value of the trust estate would be paid to Indiana Trust Company, 
with half of the 1 percent upon transfer of the funds and the other half of the 1 percent at 
the end of ten years. Therefore, the bank eventually would profit by $5,670 [$53,500 
CD]. In addition, the bank would receive 2 ½ percent of the interest and income derived 
from the trust. A conservative 5% return on the remaining $564,147 would have brought 
in $28,207 and 2 ½ percent of that would have been $705 [$6,652 CD].108 Therefore, over 
a ten-year period the Indiana Trust Company profited by at least $12,000 [$113,000 CD] 
even before administrative fees were included. At an estimated 5% interest returned per 
year, the assets of the trust would also grow at a healthy rate. With a payout of $17,000 
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[$160,000 CD] per year to Alfonso Pettis and Emergene Roberts, the estate would still 
stand to increase by $10,000 [$94,000 CD] or more per year in 1920 dollars.  
The trustees became aware of this generous gift at their meeting on December 8, 
1921. A nephew of Alfonso Pettis, Charles W. Bressler-Pettis, had written a letter to the 
board about the accrual of several thousand dollars that could be put to use by the 
foundation. Yet the trustees did nothing with the funds available for charitable 
distribution. Instead, they decided to publicize the receipt of the gift “at Christmas time 
and thus take advantage of the general attitude of mind of the public at that time, to give 
the most effective and helpful publicity to the interests of The Foundation” [emphasis 
added].109 Effective public relations became a personal concern of the trustees, and this is 
a theme that arises continuously in the early years of the foundation. 
In appreciation for Alphonso Pettis‟ gift, the trustees adopted a resolution: 
WHEREAS, there has just been brought to the attention of the 
Trustees of The Indianapolis Foundation, the munificent gift of 
Alphonso P. Pettis, by which in perpetuity and subject to the 
annuities to Mr. Pettis and Mrs. Roberts, there will be available for 
the works of The Foundation a very substantial income, thus 
assuring it of performing valuable service to the community of 
Indianapolis; and, 
 
WHEREAS, without awaiting the death of the donor, as is true in 
other gifts made to the Foundation, Mr. Pettis has seen fit to make 
his gift during his life, thus particularly recognizing the place of 
The Indianapolis Foundation in the life of the community and so 
strengthening the hands of the Trustees for their future work; 
 
BE IT RESOLVED, that the Trustees if the Indianapolis 
Foundation do hereby make a formal record of their deep sense of 
appreciation of the splendid gift made by Mr. Pettis and of the 
opportunity for service to the community which this gift affords; 
and, 
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BE IT RESOLVED, that the Secretary of the Board be authorized 
to convey to Mr. Pettis a copy of these resolutions with assurances 
of personal esteem of the individual Trustees.110 
 
A few weeks after the resolutions were created and a copy sent to Alphonso 
Pettis, Charles W. Bressler-Pettis, wrote a another letter sent from the Grand Hotel 
O‟Conor, Nice, France, to H. H. Hornbrook, then secretary of the Indianapolis 
Foundation. Bressler-Pettis responded to the resolutions that the board had made as a 
result of the Pettis gift received by the foundation. He stated that although Alphonso 
Pettis was 91 and his eyesight was failing, his uncle had read the resolutions out loud in 
his home in France. Bressler-Pettis stated that he understood that it takes a while to get a 
community trust “well rooted,” but that he would like to see an annual statement as soon 
as it is completed. This is because “Dear uncle is unable to understand why a statement 
has not been published and will be anxious to see one.”111 An annual statement would 
have given Pettis gratification on two levels. First, he could see what the Indianapolis 
Foundation was doing with his money. Second, it would certainly have listed Alphonso 
Pettis as the first contributor to the foundation, providing him recognition among the 
Indianapolis community as a generous and magnanimous philanthropist.  
No accounting or acknowledgement of Pettis‟ gift and its resulting philanthropic 
work was given as evidenced in another letter sent to Hornbrook in October of 1921: 
On behalf of my dear Uncle Alphonso P. Pettis, who is now an 
elderly man and who, more than a year and a half ago, made a 
substantial donation to the Indianapolis Foundation, I am writing 
you in regard to the annual statement of the Board of Trustees.  
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According to the booklet before me an annual statement is to be 
published showing the amount of property held from each donor or 
testator and in detail the disbursement of the income. I assume 
such a statement has been published, but as we are always 
sojourning in Europe we have not seen the statement, and will you 
therefore please kindly send me a copy at your earliest 
convenience? Would you also kindly tell me if this statement is to 
be published in pamphlet form or in the newspaper, or both.112 
 
A little over a month later, Bressler-Pettis sent another letter to Hornbrook in care of the 
Indiana trust Company, quoting word-for-word his previous letter, and stating:  
On October 2
nd
, 1921, I wrote you a few lines on behalf of my dear 
Uncle Alphonso P. Pettis and presuming that letter did not reach 
you I hand you herewith the following copy of the letter: […] In 
this connection my dear Uncle Mr. Alphonso P. Pettis asks me to 
tell you that he has no objection to the publication of what he gave 
to the Indianapolis Foundation. On the contrary, he would like to 
see the statement published each year and to know how the 
foundation is getting on in its great work.  
 
Awaiting your early reply, I beg to remain, Mr. Hornbrook,  
 
Very respectfully yours.113 
 
 It is obvious from these letters that the aging Alphonso Pettis wanted to witness 
his immortality secured as a benevolent man before he died. He not only wanted his 
recognition as a philanthropist, he wanted that recognition to be published in pamphlets 
that would be distributed to the public, as well as announcements of his good deeds in the 
local newspapers. It is equally obvious that the trustees had little regard for their 
benefactor or their responsibilities as trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation to use the 
funds Pettis has provided for the common good of the citizens of Indianapolis. 
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Pettis‟ frustrating experience was probably shared by many contributors to early 
community foundations, because most donors had little idea how their gifts were being 
used. The early Indianapolis Foundation trustees showed little inclination or motivation 
to keep their own donors informed about such matters. What a contrast this makes to 
modern methods of constant donor cultivation and information sharing. These early 
foundations were so new an entity that few trustees had any idea how to run one, 
therefore poor communication with donors was common. Moreover, the wealthy and 
privileged white men who conspired to run these organizations had little or no sense of 
accountability to others and would have resented external assertion of the necessity for 
such consideration. This blatant neglect of Pettis is typical of this elite attitude.  
 
The Commissioning of Social Surveys 
 
Since the birth of “scientific philanthropy” in later 17th-century England, the most 
modern benefactors preferred to study social problems closely so as to maximize the 
utility of all funds applied to their solution. This procedure became common among early 
U.S. community foundations. For example, the first action that the Cleveland Foundation 
took was to underwrite the Cleveland Education Survey. This was headed up by Leonard 
P. Ayres, who was not only the director of the Education and Research Education 
Department at the Russell Sage Foundation, but who also worked for Frederick Goff and 
the Cleveland Trust Company as its vice-president and economist. Goff and Ayres were 
good friends and associates, and “worked together for many years as the chief promoters 
of the community trust idea.”114 It is no coincidence that Ayres, a life-long economist who 
was representative of the charity organization society mentality of the Sage foundation, 
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and Goff, a wealthy banker would have such an intense, and supposedly altruistic, 
commitment to create such a foundation. But this commitment had everything to do with 
reforming the undeserving poor in order to make them more accepting of low wages and 
poor working conditions offered by many companies run by wealthy businessmen. It also 
created more confidence in the minds of potential wealthy Cleveland Trust Company 
customers that their charitable funds would be put to productive use and not wasted on 
the lazy and irresponsible of the lower-classes. This veiled attempt to use philanthropy as 
camouflage for commercial gain is once again evident in their relation and in their 
actions.  
This practice of extending charity only after careful investigation was not 
confined to a small circle of elites in Cleveland. It was much more widespread and 
common as community foundations grew throughout the Midwest. However, the 
problems that were considered worthy of investigation were hardly the urgent plights of 
the under-class. The fact that the trustees of the Chicago Community Trust decided to do 
a study on the pressing problem on the lack of housing for single, professional white 
women in Chicago instead of poverty, healthcare, or social services is yet another glaring 
indictment of the foundation elite‟s detachment from reality and a blatant catering to the 
employment needs of the tycoons of business and commerce. The opening page of this 
study states the desperate plight of the young, naïve, white girl who arrives in the big 
city: 
But where is the young girl, just come from the country in search 
of the opportunity to earn a living, to find a room? The question is 
important and exceedingly difficult. If she is inexperienced, two 
very practical difficulties confront her; first, is her inability to earn 
a living wage; and second her inability to find a safe and suitable 
home within means which she can afford. The problem, however, 
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is not alone her problem, for if the girl remains in Chicago, if there 
is a place for her in business or industry, then there is the problem 
of efficiency and respectability for her employer and her 
immediate associates, and the social problem for the entire 
community. If the girl is to remain in Chicago, then employers and 
employees and the entire community, purely in self interest, must 
help to solve this problem which for convenience we shall call 
hers.115 
 
Surely there were more pressing social concerns at that time than the reputation 
and welfare of young white women who voluntarily came to the cities to seek work as 
secretaries, assistants and store clerks. Yet these other social ills were ignored in response 
to this supposed urgent community need. Again, the concern here is to retain young 
women in Chicago for use in the work force and to make them “respectable” members of 
their workplace and community. The concern is not primarily for the welfare of the 
young women themselves, but for the benefit of the businesses that exploited these girls 
in their desperation.  
Another method of manipulation by the wealthy who governed early community 
foundations was to use their resources, bolstered by social surveys, to supposedly protect 
their fellow Americans from the threat of foreign cultural influences. After WWI, 
immigrants flooded all Midwestern cities, and many social elites and politicians were 
alarmed that their insular Anglo communities were being over-run by non-English 
speaking populations. Reminiscent of the current intolerance regarding Latino, Hispanic 
and Muslim immigrants in America, public and political pressure was building to 
“Americanize” these immigrants by forcing them to learn English.  
                                                          
115
 Ann Elizabeth Trotter, Housing of Non-Family Women in Chicago (Chicago: The Chicago 
Community Trust, 1921), 1. 
 128 
For instance, in 1919 the Chairman of the Chicago Community Trust, Clifford W. 
Barnes, ordered an “Americanization” survey that reported that of the nearly 2.5 million 
residents of Chicago, “56 percent were of foreign language groups.” The survey listed 
several organizations that offered “Americanization” services to these populations. Every 
effort was made to insure that these new immigrants learned to speak English and 
adopted proper American cultural mores and practiced proper etiquette to quickly 
eliminate all their barbaric and offensive foreign ways, becoming rapidly 
“Americanized.” This survey-driven assimilation practice became very popular and even 
resulted in the creation of an “Americanization Council” to promote these “good-will 
services.” 116  
Similar to efforts by these foundation leaders to coerce the wretched poor to 
become more amenable to accepting the hard and dangerous manual labor offered by 
businesses, the “Americanization” movement was not created to meet the needs of 
immigrants. Its real purpose was to fuel companies with cheap laborers who understood 
English and would “fit in” with other factory workers. Invoking the use of “American” in 
the titles of these organizations and their publications helped gain wide support from the 
citizenry by appealing to middle-class patriotism, allowing the true intent of these efforts 
to be hidden. This is a strategy that still continues to this day to promote intolerance in 
the guise of nationalism. 
Chicago wasn‟t alone in this effort. The New York Community Trust became 
directly involved in the “Americanization” movement, creating a booklet titled To a 
Citizen of the United States. As an example of how far the community trust went to 
impress how patriotic their cause was, the front of the booklet was imprinted with an 
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image of the American bald eagle surfboard-riding a shield decorated in stars and stripes. 
Among the items in the booklet were brief summaries of the Declaration of 
Independence, the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, lyrics to the songs America and 
Battle Hymn of the Republic, quotes from famous Americans, the Pledge of Allegiance, 
and, of course, a listing of all the U.S. presidents.  
These kinds of campaigns and programs camouflaged the truth that community 
foundation boards of trustees had little experience in identifying pressing community 
needs. Certainly none of the wealthy trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation had personal 
knowledge of the true impact of poverty, race prejudice, poor health issues, or lack of 
education. They had been raised in affluence and continued to bolster their status further 
as pseudo-philanthropists. As a result, they spent a great deal of time, years in some 
cases, commissioning studies and surveys about the conditions of their cities from men 
they considered to be experts. This was done partly because they struggled to grasp the 
urgent needs of a lower-class so far below their station, and partly because it at least 
looked like they were doing something useful with their funds. It bought them time to try 
to figure out how to best operate this new creation and the best way to serve the public – 
or at least to appear to do so.  
 The Indianapolis Foundation trustees preferred to meet at the Columbia Club, a 
bastion of the city‟s governing elite. On July 8, 1922 they met there to try to decide how 
to distribute $12,000 [$135,000 CD] in dividends from the Pettis Trust. They followed 
the model of other community trusts and decided that “at least for the time being the 
policy of the trustees of The Foundation should be to use the funds in investigation of 
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social conditions in the community, and through proper publicity, aid in the correction or 
amelioration of harmful conditions rather than in providing relief for specific matters.”117  
The trustees decided that an investigation of the work that other foundations 
throughout the country were doing was in order. Rather than look at other community 
foundations, they decided to look to the Russell Sage and Rockefeller foundations to 
discover “the best means to be used in conducting a survey of conditions in the city of 
Indianapolis.”118 The Russell Sage model fit quite well with the philanthropic 
philosophies of the elite Indianapolis trustees, as its own trustees were elites who were all 
closely associated with Charity Organization Societies, especially in New York.119 The 
Sage foundation has been sharply criticized for its capitalist approach to solving social 
problems and accused of conspiring with business elites to demolish any support of the 
poor in order to create a more submissive labor pool. Researcher and author Stephen 
Pimpare charges that business elites in the Victorian age targeted poor relief: 
[…] because in addition to it being anathema to them, they found 
that it allowed workers the ability to decline their offers of what 
was often very low-wage and dangerous work. They sought to 
influence public opinion and public policy, and one of the ways in 
which they did so was through what they called Charity 
Organization Societies, a very early kind of think tank. The 
arguments elites used about the dangers of poor relief and the harm 
it caused the poor as well as the working and middle classes 
effectively portrayed their narrow class concern as matters for the 
public good.120The ideology of these Charity Organization 
Societies permeated the Russell Sage board of trustees, and the 
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surveys and publications the foundation produced supported these 
reforms to push the “undeserving poor” off of the charity dole and 
into low-paying, labor-intense jobs. Following in the footsteps of 
the Sage foundation to engage in social surveys, the Indianapolis 
Foundation trustees made a formal resolution to work with a 
committee appointed by the Indianapolis Social Workers‟ Club to 
look into developing a health and housing survey to understand the 
conditions of the destitute citizens of Indianapolis. 
  
The trustees also acknowledged that the foundation would soon be the recipient of 
a second trust, this one by James E. Roberts. The Roberts‟ estate had several real estate 
holdings that needed to be sold. The trustees decided that Lilly, Hornbrook and Levey 
should be given the authority to represent the foundation trustees in any real estate sales 
transactions. However, Gustave Efroymson expressed interest in one of the properties 
and “asked to be excused from voting on the matter.”121 In the same meeting, Father 
Frank Gavisk was asked to visit Alphonso Pettis during his pending trip to Europe. 
Only a few weeks after the 8 July meeting, the Indianapolis Foundation trustees 
met again and accepted an agreement that had been in negotiation with the widow of 
James E. Roberts in connection with his will. She suggested that if she were allowed to 
hold on to a piece of property at the corner of Washington and Meridian streets until her 
death, she would bequeath the $375,000 [$4,213,000 CD] she inherited from her husband 
to the Indianapolis Foundation. Louis Levey accepted the offer on behalf of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, and, once again, Gustave Efroymson declined from voting on 
the matter because of his interest in real estate that was part of the Roberts will.  
The Roberts trust was held by the Union Trust Company, the Pettis trust was held 
by the Indiana Trust Company, making the combination of the two estates at the 
Indianapolis foundation to yield the equivalent of nearly $10 million CD in cash assets. 
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This total did not include any sale of real estate from the Roberts trust. Even with these 
vast assets, the foundation trustees took no action to alleviate social problems in 
Indianapolis. This was partly due to the trustees‟ ignorance about how to run a 
foundation, and partly because the trust companies were making money from the 
“charitable” trusts via administration fees and by claiming a percentage of the interest on 
the sitting cash assets. There was certainly no urgency on the part of the trust companies 
to disburse these funds into the hands of others, no matter how needy.  
By conducting surveys, the trustees delayed the disbursement process while 
making it appear that the foundation was achieving some public good, however 
imaginary. The trustees appointed Walter S. Greenough to visit several foundations and 
report back to them on his findings about what they were doing in their communities. 
Greenough had already visited the community foundation in Buffalo, NY, and Cleveland, 
OH, but his report on those visits was not entered into the minutes. However, a report by 
the Buffalo Foundation in 1921 confirms my claim that the structure and governance of 
these community foundations were created in such as way to be controlled by the trust 
companies. The Buffalo Foundation did not even attempt to hide this fact, listing 
executives from six trust companies as the foundation‟s trustees. Again exhibiting the 
fact that these wealthy elites had little interest in actually funding community 
organizations, the Buffalo Foundation trustees followed the charity organization society 
model of acting as an information clearing house. Their most important activity at that 
time was the compilation and publication of a directory of area social agencies. The 
director of the foundation admitted in his introduction to the directory that the selections 
were made “without the least attempt having been made to indicate whether or not it is of 
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high type.”122 This was a weak attempt to appear as though the Buffalo Foundation 
trustees were doing something useful for the community without really doing much of 
anything. Some organizations were omitted from the directory because it was determined 
by the trustees that they were not dispensing social services or were fraudulent. However, 
the agencies the foundation trustees felt did pass the social welfare test of credibility 
included the all too prevalent Americanization programs for immigrants and programs for 
poor young girls to train them in the vocations of “laundry work and domestic science [in 
order to] preserve and restore to society poor and unfortunate women.” 123 This again 
shows the goal of many charities to reform and exploit these social pariahs for 
employment by businessmen in both their companies and homes. The directory‟s 
approved list also included the politically charged Anti-Saloon League, and the Buffalo 
Baptist Union‟s mission to “promote the development and ideals of Baptist Churches.”124 
The fact that these last two organizations were allowed to be listed demonstrates that the 
trustees had no qualms about supporting political or religious indoctrination as legitimate 
remedies for the ills of society. Although it is not known if Greenough reported any of 
these or any other facts about the Buffalo Foundation after his visit there, he was asked to 
also visit community trusts in Providence, RI, Boston, and New York, then submit a 
report of his recommendations to the board.125 
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At the December meeting of 1922, the position of vice-chairman was created, to 
which Fr. Francis Gavisk was appointed. At that time, Gavisk‟s appointment as a trustee 
was to expire in a month. Thus, Henry Hornbrook asked the mayor of Indianapolis to 
either reappoint Gavisk or select another appointee. This was just a formality because 
none of the trustees were ever replaced except by resignation or death. A resolution was 
also adopted that outlined how disbursements should be handled from the trust 
companies, and it was agreed that the “All trust funds held by the [trust companies] and 
available for distribution by the Trustees, shall be disbursed under order of the 
Trustees[…].126 This resolution definitively outlined who had control over the available 
funds and made it clear to the banks that the interest and dividends that resulted from the 
trust could not be held until the trust company felt obliged to release them. The fact that 
this resolution had to be made indicates that there had already been conflict between the 
trustees and the trust companies regarding control of the interest from the foundation‟s 
assets. Reluctance on the part of the trust companies to release funds for distribution 
could also explain the delayed use of funds by the Indianapolis Foundation for the 
public‟s benefit. 
Walter Greenough made a second report about his the activities of the last 
foundations he had visited, although the content of that report is unknown. We can 
assume that he made a strong case for the use of the charity organization society model of 
using surveys to identify legitimate recipients for support, because the trustees decided to 
create a committee to create a plan for a health survey of Indianapolis, requesting a report 
on its findings by the end of January. We also discover that Greenough was not a social 
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scientist nor connected with any kind of charity work experience, as he worked for Evans 
Woollen at the Fletcher Savings & Loan, so his expertise at solving social problems was 
probably limited. However, his travel expenses were not paid by the trust company, but 
from the Pettis‟ funds held by the Indiana Trust Company.127 This demonstrates a 
complete lack of financial philanthropic support from the trust companies themselves for 
any of the works performed by the Indianapolis Foundation. 
At this same December meeting it was announced that the late Delavan Smith, 
owner of the Indianapolis News, had bequeathed a substantial part of his estate to the 
Indianapolis Foundation. Delavan Smith‟s relationship with two of the people involved 
with the foundation undoubtedly played a part in his decision. John H. Holliday sold the 
Indianapolis News to Smith in the early 1900s, and Charles Fairbanks, one of the original 
trustees of the foundation, was Smith‟s cousin. 128 Although the amount of Smith‟s 
bequest had not been determined, he designated that the trust would be held by the 
Fletcher Savings & Trust Company. With this latest donation to the Indianapolis 
Foundation, all three founding trust companies now held one of the three trusts that had 
been bequeathed to the Indianapolis Foundation, each generating lucrative long-term 
revenues for the trust companies in exchange for very little effort on their part.129 
J. K. Lilly and Henry Hornbrook submitted the report recommendations for a 
health survey of Indiana at the January, 1923 trustee meeting. They had consulted with 
experts across the country on the subject, but instead of recommending an action or 
direction, they stated that “we are convinced that it will require much investigation, 
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reflection and discussion to arrive at any proper conclusions as to the scope of any 
Survey that should be undertaken.”130 In essence, they were saying that much more 
research had to be done before they could do more research, before any action to solve 
the community‟s problems could be taken. Here again, these elite city “benefactors” 
merely delayed using any funds at the foundation‟s disposal as they continued to view the 
community through an elite lens that obscured the view of its pressing needs. Not so 
surprisingly, this meticulous and impotent approach to making funding decisions was 
consistently abandoned and replaced by the influence of powerful business concerns and 
the personal agendas of the trustees, such as the support of the Indiana Symphony 
Orchestra Society a decade later. This elite cultural institution, as well as projects 
proposed by the chamber of commerce, often commanded the trustees‟ funding 
consideration, but other worthy causes were to be exhaustively researched before any 
support was given.  
The trustees suggested that rather than have a health survey done by an outside 
agency, the project should be done by a new agency created by the Indianapolis 
Foundation. This agency would then work with all of the other social welfare agencies in 
the city to help solve the yet to be discovered problems of the citizenry. The committee 
also strongly advised that the new organization should focus on the prevention of poverty 
and poor health rather than addressing the symptoms of suffering. Again, this reflects the 
charity organization society philosophy of “scientific philanthropy,” the imperative of 
doing no “charitable” acts impulsively and without serious, prolonged study of the 
“objects” of such proposed assistance. The recommended names for this new surveillant 
agency included “The Indianapolis Foundation, Institution of Prevention,” and “The 
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Foundation Institute of Investigation and Prevention.” They also recommended that a 
director be hired to run the organization, and that he should take several months to 
“devote himself to a study of existing conditions; of the present social agencies; and bring 
himself into close personal contact with local conditions and present social agencies.”131 
After this new agency director had thoroughly immersed himself in the city‟s social 
problems and the agencies that dealt with them, he was then supposed to recommend to 
the board the kind of “real” philanthropic work needed. Once a plan of action was agreed 
upon, more employees would be added “who could conduct the detail work on any 
investigation that may be undertaken.”132 In other words, the committee that designed and 
developed a plan of action would then design another organization that would then 
further investigate the problems. The committee was then to make their recommendations 
known to the trustees who would decide what to do, which would delay any philanthropic 
action by many months, if not years.  
The trustees‟ avoidance of engaging in meaningful philanthropy through the 
endless commissioning and conducting of lengthy surveys was not the only tool that was 
used to defer action. The board members coveted uniformly favorable publicity for their 
rationalized, deliberate philanthropy and postponed any such acts until they could be 
stage-managed properly though the concerted cultivation of a favorable press. Shaping a 
positive public image of the Indianapolis Foundation and its elite trustees was just as 
important as discovering the “right” problems to be solved. The committee believed that 
“the public, through the press, should be taken into our confidence from the very 
beginning, and that any plan or survey that is announced should come as the 
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recommendation of our own organization, after it had studied the situation, had secured 
the cooperation of existing social agencies in connection therewith, and had the full 
cooperation of the public press in promoting the objects to be obtained” [emphasis 
added].133 From this acute sensitivity to publicity‟s value in “selling” effective 
philanthropy, one sees in the Indianapolis context how the working methods of 
businessmen permeated the operations and ethos of early community foundations. 
The trustees did not immediately accept all of the recommendations, but did 
decide that a director for the Indianapolis Foundation should be hired who could 
“familiarize himself with local conditions” in order to carry out any recommended work. 
A motion was made and carried to form a committee to “secure the proper man as 
Director,” and J. K. Lilly promised to appoint such a committee within a few days.134 
Keeping with the trustees‟ penchant for procrastination and lack of a sense of urgency to 
address the community‟s ills, Lilly embarked on a trip around the world shortly after and 
did not appoint the committee until five months later at the June meeting of the trustees. 
The committee consisted of himself, Fr. Gavisk and Henry Hornbrook. A number of 
candidates for the director‟s position were discussed, but no decision was made. Another 
six months passed before a director was agreed upon and hired.135 The fact that sufficient 
funds were available for distribution and yet the trustees casually took a full year to take 
action on what was supposedly such an important undertaking to identify the charitable 
needs of the community is nothing short of neglect of their duties and disregard for the 
plight of the poor by the Indianapolis Foundation trustees.  
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The significant business of the June 1923 meeting was the estate of Delavan 
Smith. Oddly enough, like Alphonso Pettis and James Roberts, Delavan Smith no longer 
lived in Indianapolis when his bequest was made. The reason three men, who no longer 
had ties to Indianapolis, would give to a foundation that merely professed to serve the 
needs of the city remains a mystery. Delavan Smith‟s bequest rivaled the donations of the 
other two benefactors, with over $285,000 [$3,131,000 CD] in stocks and $200,000 
[$2,197,000 CD] in real estate, for a total of more than $485,000 [$5,330,000 CD] in 
assets. In constant 2004 dollars, the foundation had accumulated bequests worth more 
than $15 million in just a few short years. Yet the assets were really the property of the 
trust companies that had founded the Indianapolis Foundation, with each adding a 
substantial amount to their deposits as a result of its creation. In addition, trust company 
executives and the foundation trustees were receiving financial and public relations 
benefits at no cost to themselves.136 
The creators of the foundation came to realize the potential business benefit of 
being the only three trust companies with control over the foundation. All had gained 
significant assets to be used in the service of the Indianapolis Foundation and were 
making profits on the interest with absolutely no investment on their part, and no 
responsibility for the distribution of such funds. Distribution was supposedly the role of 
the trustees, most of whom were disinterested, preoccupied, or simply ignorant as to how 
and when to fund needy local organizations. These wealthy businessmen, who made 
major decisions every day involving vast sums of money and assets, could not seem to 
bring themselves to take even the smallest philanthropic action without consulting with a 
myriad of “expert” individuals and committees. Quite simply, they did not know what 
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they were doing. They were not appointed trustees because of their compassion for the 
poor or their astute views of the challenging social issues of the day. Although most of 
them were either philanthropists or were associated with other charitable organizations, 
their lack of belief in the legitimacy of the foundation is evident in the fact none of them 
gifted any of their personal wealth to the foundation except for Louis Levey, who 
donated $5,000 to the Alphonso P. Pettis Fund, and Gustave Efroymson, who established 
a fund in his own name. They were appointed mostly because of their fraternal, social 
and business relationships with the “Blue Book” elites that created the Indianapolis 
Foundation. While they were all very good at making money, they were utterly 
incompetent at giving it away. As we will see, they came up with a daring and innovative 
initiative to address their shortcomings by doing what every wise businessman does: they 
hired someone smarter than themselves to run the foundation. 
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Chapter 4: Foundation Firsts - A New Director and the Start of Philanthropic 
Action 
 
It was not until 1924 that the Indianapolis Foundation made its first grants, eight 
years after its charter. The decisions regarding the recipients of those funds were 
influenced by several factors. First, by the social and business relationships between the 
trustees and the Indianapolis wealthy elite. Second, by the prevailing thinking of charity 
to the poor as a futile and wasteful exercise, preferring instead a well-planned, deliberate 
philanthropy aimed not at relieving the suffering of the underclass, but at teaching them a 
proper way to live and work. Third, the trustees were driven by an obsessive desire to 
avoid bad press and improve the foundation trustees‟ reputations as wise benefactors. 
Fourth, because of the trustees‟ lack of experience with the leadership of a charitable 
foundation, the parameters of the scope of what the Indianapolis Foundation could or 
should fund changed constantly, depending on the other factors stated previously. Fifth, 
donors and their families began to insist on accountability for the funds that they and 
their departed loved ones had left to the foundation. Sixth, the person the trustees hired as 
the foundation‟s new director was a poster child for the “charitable organization society” 
approach to serving the neediest in Indianapolis. As we will see, these diverse influences 
resulted in a decision-making process that was inconsistent, confusing, and sometimes, 
truly offensive. 
To their credit, the trustees must have acknowledged among themselves that they 
were in over their heads. In November of 1923, they decided that as a board they did not 
want to enter into any agreements with organizations, or do work with other 
organizations. The trustees determined they should select a director to supervise any such 
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activities. As a result, all surveys and investigations were put off until a suitable person 
was found. Their choice was strongly influenced by the examples of other community 
foundations and private foundations such as the Russell Sage Foundation, to rely on the 
expertise of those heavily involved in charity organization societies. The name of the 
former secretary of the Indianapolis Charity Organization, Eugene C. Foster, was 
suggested as a prime candidate. The Indianapolis Charity Organization operated within 
the traditions and philosophies of charity organization society ideals, which expressed 
contempt for any “charitable” action that could lead to the poor‟s dependency on relief of 
any kind. Although Foster was the current assistant secretary of the Associated Charities 
of Cleveland, it was felt that he might be interested in returning to Indianapolis. The 
trustees decided to invite him to meet with them at their next meeting on November 27
th
.1 
Foster accepted the invitation and dined at the University Club with the trustees, 
who were all guests of J. K. Lilly. They discussed the “possible lines of useful service for 
the Indianapolis Foundation in the City of Indianapolis, and the methods in which it 
could best function […].”2 Foster must have impressed the group because after excusing 
himself from the gathering, the trustees made a unanimous decision that he was the man 
for the job. In December, he met again with the trustees and formally accepted the 
position with a start date of January 1, 1924. A salary of $5,000 [$55,000 CD] was agreed 
upon, which was less than the other heads of many other social welfare organizations 
were receiving, but far higher than the wages earned by most workers at the time. 3 With 
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a new leader at its helm who was firmly indoctrinated by the charity organization society 
movement and its belief in the superiority of “scientific philanthropy,” a new phase of the 
Indianapolis Foundation began.  
Word must have traveled fast among social agencies that the Indianapolis 
Foundation had funds to distribute, as five of them submitted a letter to the foundation 
requesting funds for an Indianapolis Employment Bureau. This diverse coalition of 
agencies consisted of the Family Welfare Society, the YMCA, the Catholic Community 
Center, the Jewish Federation and Flanner House. They had initially proposed this plan to 
the Indianapolis Community Fund (precursor to the United Way), where the project had 
received initial approval, but was later cut from the budget. The savvy petitioners 
regrouped, recast the bureau as “scientific philanthropy” rather than charity, and pursued 
funding from the Indianapolis Foundation. Advocates for the bureau perfectly understood 
the impact of Andrew Carnegie‟s writings about wealth and his insistence that people 
should never be helped by meeting their immediate needs. Instead, Carnegie 
recommended they should be given opportunities to help themselves, guided by well-
schooled benefactors who were better informed about real socio-economic conditions 
than any lowly beneficiary. Bureau proponents appealed to the desire of the trustees to 
solve social problems by attacking their root causes: 
To help a man get a job – to help the right man get the right job – 
is a community problem that is fundamental, universal in scope 
and entirely constructive in nature. It involves not almsgiving nor 
relief, but self help and self development. The highest aim of the 
philanthropic work is to make the individual self-supporting. The 
Employment Bureau‟s whole activity would be in that direction. It 
would work as a direct preventive of social maladjustment, misery 
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and waste. Is not such an agency, surely, one with which the 
Indianapolis Foundation may properly deal? 4  
 
Bureau proponents requested $4,700 [$52,000 CD]. The foundation trustees had 
stated, more than a year before, that $12,000 [$135,000 CD] was available for 
expenditure. Considering that very little had been spent, and that another $1 million [$10 
million CD] had been added, there was no doubt that substantial funds were available, 
even with the added expense of Foster‟s salary. The trustees discussed the proposition 
and were in favor of its goal, but voted again to delay action until Eugene Foster was 
officially in place.5 This blatantly indecisive behavior of early community foundation 
trustees shows that the organizations they ruled made few, if any, quick changes or 
improvements to the socio-economic conditions of the communities they aspired to serve. 
There were others, like the charity-minded activist Mrs. Carey of Indianapolis, 
who bypassed the Indianapolis Foundation altogether and made a request by letter 
directly to the foundation‟s first donor, Alphonso Pettis, in France. On December 20, 
1923, Alphonso Pettis responded from Nice, France, to a request for funds from a Mrs. 
Carey of Indianapolis. The request was to support work she was doing in Haughville, an 
area of Indianapolis that was deeply impoverished at the time and one that remains 
impoverished even in 2010. Pettis responded that although he approved of her charitable 
efforts, he was unable to lend her “a helping hand in the great and good work that you 
have undertaken, for the very good reason that I have nothing whatever to give.” He 
explained that he had given his fortune away to relatives and charities in New York, and 
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that the remainder had been given to the Indianapolis Foundation. “In return,” Pettis 
stated, “the Foundation gave me a life annuity to pay for my bread and cheese, and that is 
all I have left.”6 Pettis continues: 
Dr. Charles Pettis, my grand nephew, who types my letters, is now 
at his home in Grant City, Missouri, because of the death of his 
stepmother, a few weeks ago, leaving his father in a weak 
condition of health, and he cabled for Dr. Charles to come home. 
By the time this letter reaches you, he may be or may have been in 
Indianapolis where he intends to make his future home. As soon as 
he arrives in Nice, I shall place in his hands your letter and booklet 
and ask him to do all possible to help you along in your good 
work.7 
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The First Office of the Indianapolis Foundation 
Eugene Foster arrived in Indianapolis on 2 January 1924 and began his new 
position in an office space secured by Henry Hornbrook at 1016 Hume Mansur Building 
(Figure 19). A few days later, with the help of Gustave Efroymson and his connections 
with the Aetna Cabinet Company, he purchased a suite of office furniture at 40 percent 
off for a total bill of $252.90 [$2,700 CD]. This meant that, in today‟s dollars the 
furniture alone retailed for $5,000, again showing that the trustees spared no expense in 
taking care of their own and in projecting an image of upper-class décor. A female office 
assistant, Miss Mildred Stone, was also hired and started at a rate of $50 [$550 CD] per 
month for half-time work. 
Foster gave his first report to the trustees on 8 January 1924, and addressed the 
letter from Stanley Roth and the five agencies requesting funds for an Employment 
Bureau. He stated that he had consulted with many individuals inside and outside of 
Indianapolis about the idea, and all but a few thought it should not be taken on as the 
work of the foundation. It was generally felt the state or the municipality should fund an 
employment bureau since there were funds available from the state for such a purpose. 
Foster was also convinced that the foundation should not support any work that might 
require constant and ongoing support. In his opinion, the Employment Bureau would 
entail such a commitment. In line with the foundation‟s preference to maintain a good 
public image and avoid controversy, Foster also related the opinion of one informant he 
had spoken to who felt that “the Trade Unions have looked with considerable suspicion 
upon Employment Agencies as combatant to their interest.” Another informant 
commented that there was “antipathy, suspicion and resentment existing between the 
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Trade Union Group and the group represented by the Employers Association [and] he 
questioned the advisability of the Foundation entering upon a work which would 
necessitate entering into this controversy.”8 Foundations, and community foundations in 
particular, have long been allergic to public controversies of any kind. This general 
aversion limits the ability of any such organization to promote progressive or even 
substantive socio-economic change and has carried forward into the current operating 
standards of most foundations.  
 
 
 
Figure 18: The Hume-Mansur Building in Downtown Indianapolis, first office of the Indianapolis 
Foundation 
Source: The Indiana Historical Society 
 
Foster recommended that the trustees decline to fund the Indianapolis 
Employment Bureau, but instead offered its backers help in establishing a bureau with the 
support of state funds. One of the reasons given for the trustees‟ refusal defies logic, 
given the desire of the foundation to assist social welfare agencies in their work. The 
letter to Stanley Roth stated that “it will not be the policy of the Foundation to 
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supplement budgets of local welfare agencies […].” 9 Apparently both the policies and 
the early funding priorities of the Indianapolis Foundation became confused. Like most 
foundations today, the Indianapolis Foundation showed itself far more interested in 
funding new programs of its own design rather than supporting the general operating 
budgets of existing charities.  
A program mentioned during this same meeting was the care of crippled children, 
a suggestion made in a letter from W. H. Insley and Alex Holliday, the son of John H. 
Holliday.10 As a result of the 1916 polio epidemic, and a lack of any cure, thousands of 
U.S. children had fallen ill and suffered permanent, crippling paralysis by 1924. As we 
will see later, this lobbying by the Holliday family led to the Indianapolis Foundation‟s 
funding of special services for children stricken by polio in Indianapolis.  
By January of 1924, the Indianapolis Foundation had $19,000 [$208,000 CD] 
available from the Pettis Fund, with projections of additional funds of $8,000 to $10,000 
[$88,000 to $110,000 CD] per year for the foreseeable future. In addition, the Roberts 
trust fund was expected to yield about $2,000 [$22,000 CD] a month, or $24,000 
[$264,000 CD] a year. Added to the funds already available from previous years, this 
would give the foundation more than $32,000 [$351,000 CD] per year to use for its 
substantial administrative expenses and the funding of programs.11 
Luckily for the crippled children of Indianapolis, several incidents converged 
before the next trustee meeting. First, Foster met with Mrs. James Roberts, who was 
incensed by the foundation‟s continuing failure to use the funds that her late husband had 
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donated to the foundation. She told Foster that Mr. Roberts had expressly set aside 
$25,000 [$275,000 CD] to help crippled children in Indianapolis and that the Union Trust 
Company held those monies, of which $1,500 [$16,000 CD] could be used immediately. 
At the same time, Alex Holliday sent a letter to Henry Hornbrook urging the foundation 
to fund the work of the Public Health Nursing Association, especially its efforts to visit 
and care for the 300-400 crippled children in Indianapolis. Here Holliday sought, above 
all, to enhance the image of the foundation, and by implication, the public repute of his 
own father, a founder of the organization. Alex Holliday wrote: 
Permit us to make the suggestions that a part of the Foundation 
income be used in a manner that will result in publicity for the 
Foundation and in keeping before the community the names of 
those who have contributed to it. Publicity will attract other 
bequests particularly from such persons who are not in touch with 
the welfare work being carried on. Welfare at its best is not 
spectacular and its needs are hard to get before the community. 
Helping children always appeals to the popular imagination and in 
our minds would be the best method to bring about the popularity 
of the Foundation as indicated in the foregoing.12 
 
Early on at the Indianapolis Foundation, one sees the still common bias at such 
organizations to aid specific beneficiaries whose plight stirs public sentiment and 
favorable publicity. One also sees here the clear importance family and business 
connections had in shaping foundation aid policies. 
Taking young Holliday‟s written suggestions seriously, Foster suggested using the 
$1,500 available from the Roberts trust to fund a new nursing position named the “James 
E. Roberts Nurse” for the Public Health Nursing Association. This would solve the need 
to supply adequate help to children and satisfy Mrs. Roberts‟ concern over the 
foundation‟s neglect of her husband‟s bequest. Even more pointedly, Foster set a 
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precedent for the development of donor-advised funds in the Indianapolis Foundation by 
asking the rhetorical question “Do we not want to reflect the interests and wishes of our 
donors in the work we initiate and perpetuate?”13 The trustees directed Foster to contact 
the Public Health Nursing Association about their needs. Here, quite ironically, neither 
Foster nor the trustees remembered or understood that the original justification stated by 
Fredrick Goff of the Cleveland Trust for the establishment of community foundation was 
to rid the world of mortmain, or “Dead Hand,” trusts. Indeed, this was the very rallying 
cry that trust company executives used to convince the public of their civic concern. 
Community foundations supposedly existed to take from donors the private authority to 
name any recipient or cause for a trust and to socialize that power by putting it in the 
hands of community representatives presumably more attuned to general community 
needs. Currently, donor-advised and donor-directed funds dominate the portfolios of 
modern day community foundations, circumventing the reason for community 
foundations in the first place. The early history of the Indianapolis Foundation shows that 
this counter-productive mix-up started long ago. 
A pointed exchange occurred when the trustees next declined a large request from 
Salvation Army Major W. B. Sowers. Foster reported to the trustees the funding request 
from the Salvation Army for a summer camp for poor mothers and their children called 
the “Fresh Air Camp.”14 Sowers asked for $15,000 [$165,000 CD] to pay off the Army‟s 
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mortgage on the property and to fund a year‟s expenses.15 The trustees felt that the 
request “did not seem to be within the scope of our work.”16 Sowers responded “I deeply 
regret that your Trustees do not consider our request within the scope of your work. It is 
not quite clear to me just what scope your work covers […].”17 The truth was, at this 
point in the foundation‟s evolution, the scope of that work was also entirely unclear to its 
own director and trustees. 
As directed, Foster followed up with the Public Health Nursing Association and 
in February 1924 gave them the promise of foundation support for naming of James E. 
Roberts Nurse.18 The cost was estimated at around $3,000 [$33,000 CD] and Foster 
seemed to think that was a reasonable amount to pay. However, from February to April, 
the trustees had postponed or cancelled several meetings and a decision still was not 
made. On 24 April, the trustees ordered Foster to obtain a more extensive report on the 
work that the Public Health Nursing Association was involved in as well as details on its 
staff and operations.19 The trustees took a year to make a $3,000 decision to help these 
crippled children, despite the fact that James Roberts had specifically designated funds 
for such a cause in 1923, and that the foundation had over $32,000 in total funds to 
disburse. Even though the toll the polio epidemic had taken on the children was evident 
in the large number of them who became handicapped, the board did not feel a sense of 
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urgency to address this need until it was brought to their attention by other concerned 
citizens.  
The following May, the board was given reports from both Foster and Edna 
Hamilton, superintendent of the Public Health Nursing Association. In addition to funds 
for nursing help for crippled children, Hamilton asserted that the need “for a special 
school for crippled children in Indianapolis is imperative. Of the 335 cases visited by the 
Public Health Nursing Association, 229 were of school age. Fifty-three were unable to 
attend school, and twenty-five had never been to school.” 20 She believed that such a 
school should be part of the public school system and be built and equipped with private 
monies to meet the children‟s special needs.  
Although the trustees did not comment on the school at this time, Hamilton‟s 
vision struck a chord with the trustees and the Roberts estate just a few years later. 
Trustee Henry Bennett expressed his opinion that the funding should be granted for the 
new nursing position because “this particular work seemed especially appropriate 
inasmuch as Mr. Roberts had expressed an especial interest in the crippled child and he 
[Bennett] trusted that this would be emphasized in any publicity which might be made in 
connection with the initiation and maintenance of this work” (wording in original 
document). Clearly, multiple foundation trustees coveted favorable publicity for their 
organization and for themselves, often to the detriment of effective charitable action of 
any kind. 
The trustees did finally agree to fund the James E. Roberts Nurse for Crippled 
Children, but with specific conditions. The foundation would be “providing monthly 
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salary, equipment and care for one year, not to exceed $3,000 [$33,000 CD]; that there 
should be a clear understanding that the work for the crippled children is extended and 
that the Foundation is not meeting the expenses of the work already being done in this 
field.”21 With those conditions clearly outlined and with an unabashed emphasis on 
favorable publicity for their belated good works, the trustees were clearly warning all 
potential recipients that they would not fund current programs and were only interested in 
new programs that had the highest potential for positive public relations.  
In June 1924, the trustees changed their opinion on a request they had rejected 
eighteen months earlier on the grounds that the foundation should not fund programs that 
should be funded by the government. The sub-committee for an Indianapolis 
Employment Bureau, headed by the persistent Stanley Roth, sent a letter to J. K. Lilly 
requesting foundation assistance in creating the bureau because they had already been 
rejected by both government and charitable funders. However, the budget had grown 
substantially, from the original $4,700 [$52,000 CD] to $12,000 [$132,000 CD], with the 
justification for the increase due to the need for more agency personnel in the face of a 
weak economy. While Roth and his sub-committee members made their case to the 
trustees, two of the most prominent trustees lent their support. Efroymson stated that 
“social agencies would be greatly benefitted by such a bureau.”  J. K. Lilly gave 
conditional support, saying that the foundation “would consider this matter only as a 
demonstration plan.” After the sub-committee was excused, the trustees reversed their 
earlier position and agreed to fund the bureau quite cautiously for only one year, 
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beginning in September.22 Part of this change of attitude could be because of Roth‟s 
persistence and his ability to convince others, and part could be due to the fact that the 
foundation was flush with a large amount of money that still had not been used in any 
philanthropic way. The trustees desperately needed a project that was acceptable in order 
to show the public that their philanthropy was actually doing something. In addition, 
Roth had assured the trustees of some protection from the anger of the trade unions by 
explaining that the bureau would not focus on the skilled laborer, but the “placement of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor, both male and female” and that, in the bureau‟s facility, 
“there should be a physical separation between male and female applicants.”23 Here, it 
would appear that Roth was playing to the trustee‟s presumptuous fear of lower-class 
promiscuity and immoral behavior, a common belief system of elitist American 
philanthropists of the era. Whatever the trustees‟ reasons for approving the funding, they 
ignored Foster‟s previous warning that the foundation should not become involved in any 
effort that might require their ongoing financial commitment. His warning was well 
warranted, because it would be several years before the Indianapolis Foundation would 
free itself as the main financial supporter of the Indianapolis Employment Bureau.  
1924 was also the same year of the first arts organization request for support from 
the foundation. In a letter from the Little Theatre Society of Indiana, its president, Mrs. R. 
S. Sherwood, requested the foundation‟s help in purchasing a building for the theatre 
company. With little discussion, the board rejected the request outright on the basis that 
                                                          
22
 “Meeting of the Trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation,” June 17, 1924, Box 1/5. 
 
23
 J. I. Holcombe Stanley Roth, John F. White, “Tentative Plan of the Organization and Budget for 
an Indianapolis Employment Bureau,” June 17 1924, Box 1/5. 
 155 
“it was not within the province of this Foundation to render this assistance.”24 It is not 
clear that anyone at this time really knew what the limits of the foundation‟s activities 
might be as the trustees had already reversed their opinion on the employment bureau. 
Although they rejected the theatre‟s proposal because funding of the arts was not part of 
their by-laws or charter, nine years later they violated their charter and their own 
precedent when they funded the Indiana State Symphony Society in 1933, at the height of 
the Great Depression.  
So why did they reject the theatre then and fund the symphony later? A report by 
Foster in January of the following year stated that the theatre was rejected because “its 
service and interest affect too limited a group for the use of Foundation funds.”25 It 
probably did not help that Mrs. R. S. Sherwood was not listed in the Blue Book of 
Indianapolis, so her social status, compared to the rank of those lobbying for the 
symphony, was surely deemed inferior. Also, most American urban theatres evolved out 
of the vaudeville tradition and were historically places only men frequented for racy 
entertainment. A decent, respectable, rich man, like the ones who sat on the board of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, would not be caught dead in such an establishment, or at least 
conspired to keep up appearances as such. Uplifting music, especially as provided by 
symphony orchestras, was a much more socially acceptable and less controversial art 
form, especially since only a small number of the wealthy could and did attend such 
performances.26 As we will see, the trustees bent all sorts of rules and outdid themselves 
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to justify funding of the Indianapolis Symphony while thousands of city residents 
suffered during the worst economic collapse America had ever experienced.  
The foundation‟s support of a nurse for crippled children paid public relations 
dividends almost immediately. Foster reported to the trustees in June that he had heard no 
negative comments about their support and “several people have verbally expressed 
themselves as feeling that the Foundation has done a very considerate and wise thing in 
honoring Mr. James E. Roberts in that manner. A letter was written to Mrs. Roberts 
before any publicity was given to this matter and she called our office and expressed 
herself as very appreciative of this action.”27 
At the same meeting in June 1924, Gustave Efroymson announced that he was 
leaving the next day to travel to Europe. Understanding the importance of keeping good 
relations with the foundation‟s donors, the trustees suggested that he try to meet with 
Alphonso Pettis to gain “some thought as to how [he] would like to have the fund 
employed which he has placed at the disposal of the Foundation.”28 The next day Foster 
sent a letter to Alphonso Pettis, who was now 94 years old, requesting such a visit. This 
visit was to show the board‟s appreciation for Pettis‟ “expressed interest in and 
contribution to the Indianapolis Foundation. If Mr. Efroymson is fortunate enough to 
have an interview with you I trust that he may learn in what way our Foundation Board 
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may follow out such thought and inspiration which prompted you to make this 
magnificent gift to Indianapolis through our Foundation.”29 
On 24 July 1924, from the Grand Hotel du Parc in St.Martin-Vesubie, France, 
Alphonso Pettis wrote to Gustave Efroymson, who was visiting Paris and staying at the 
swank Claridge Hotel. Responding to a letter from Efroymson on 7 July about a possible 
visit while he was in France, he thanked Efroymson for his “kind intentions” and that he 
would be glad to meet with him but that he was “afraid that was impossible.” Vesubie 
was located 40 miles north of Nice and evidently was considered a remote area. Although 
Pettis stated that he only stayed there a few months of the year for the clean air, he also 
explained that “[…] everything here is primitive. There are no modern comforts 
whatever.” He also reminded Efroymson that he was born in central Massachusetts on 
August 16, 1830, and that although he was almost 94, he was in good physical condition 
except that his sight and hearing were “greatly impaired,” and he considered both “a 
serious handicap.” 30 
The next official meeting of the trustees was not until three months later, on 26 
September. Foster reported that from July to September, the funds available in the Pettis 
trust grew from $19,125 to $24,599 [from $209,000 to $270,000 CD], more than a 25% 
increase in just three months. The Roberts trust available funds grew from $27,920 in 
February to $46,095 [from $307,000 CD to $507,000 CD] in September, an almost a 60% 
increase in seven months. Even after subtracting the expenses and funding obligations for 
September, the amount available to fund worthy causes was more than $70,000 
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[$769,000 CD] and growing.31 Now the trustees faced accumulating financial pressure to 
decide who would finally be worthy of their elite largesse. 
Perhaps emboldened by the scent of money and the news about the commitment 
the trustees made to the creation of the Indianapolis Employment Bureau, the 
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce made a request for assistance. With supreme irony, 
this bid came from one of the richest organizations in the city. It was also self-serving, as 
the program the Chamber proposed would directly benefit its own members, the 
businesses and industries of Indianapolis. The Chamber‟s Education Committee had 
decided that it was most urgent to “deal with the problem of vocational counseling and 
dissemination of vocational information.” This situation was, in their estimation, so 
intolerable that “Indianapolis could no longer maintain a passive attitude toward a 
problem so basic to its social, educational and economic welfare […].” Reflecting the 
times, the list of jobs that they considered vocational included many that today we might 
consider professional, including banking, nursing, teaching, journalism and publishing. 
Others were the telephone industry, department stores, and printing.32 Like so many 
philanthropic agencies of the era, the Indianapolis Foundation actually sought to promote 
and deepen the professionalism of American society and economy, with the chief 
beneficiaries of such endeavors being the adroit, schooled and upwardly mobile members 
of the middle-classes. 
 The dropout rate in Indianapolis high schools was too high and intolerable, a 
concern as common among elite U.S. philanthropists in 2011 as it was 100 years ago. To 
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address this problem, the trustees decided that the target for all educational improvement 
efforts would be young people ages 15-19 who were in grades 9-12. They would further 
restrict their efforts to “(a) the most talented and (b) the most needy.” Specifically, the 
purpose of the initiative was two-fold: 
(1) to enable those of the most talented to continue their school 
work who would otherwise for financial reasons have to drop 
out, and 
(2) to enable all who would have to drop out to determine more 
judiciously which vocational field to enter.33 
 
Here is an excellent local example of U.S. philanthropies‟ historic preoccupation with 
articulating, sharpening and enforcing class distinction in American society. 
The chamber had already begun activities to move this project forward, such as 
finding part-time job opportunities for youth so they could finish school, securing college 
scholarships for eleven high school graduates, creating seven pamphlets on different 
vocations, and gaining cooperation from principals of several technical high schools in 
Indianapolis to assist in a program of vocational counseling.34 The total cost of the 
program they proposed, titled the Indianapolis Vocational Bureau, was $22,000 
[$242,000 CD], of which only $5,000 [$55,000 CD] was budgeted for scholarships. 
There were three stated objectives, the first two being to “reduce social waste in the 
community due to the high proportion of vocational and professional placement” and the 
second to “reduce the vocational turnover of young boys and girls.” These problems are 
never quantified or explained in detail, but they were used as smokescreens for the third 
and primary objective:  
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To reduce waste in business due to: 
Inability to get boys and girls when young to train 
definitely for vocations. 
Inefficiency on the job attributable to improper placement. 
Improper handling of “blind alley” people. 
Improper consideration of “blind alley” jobs.35 
 
“Blind alley” jobs were jobs deemed menial and with no chance for advancement, 
or “dead-end” jobs. “Blind alley” people were those thought to be mentally or physically 
handicapped, lacked motivation or sufficient intelligence, or were too lazy. The Chamber 
clearly desired a greater effort to make sure promising young people did not end up in 
“blind alley” jobs. At the same time, the Chamber sought to assure that “blind alley” 
people were properly allotted to labor and indoctrinated to accept their permanent 
positions in these “blind alleys.” Such thinking today would be abhorrent and politically 
incorrect, but the wealthy elite of the early 1900s had little real concern about the lives or 
feelings of the under-classes. The actions of the local commercial-philanthropic elite are 
even more reprehensible here in that they sought access to children at a young enough 
age to train them in what the business world deemed as their proper vocations, however 
limiting or demeaning. Here the early history of the Indianapolis Foundation aptly 
confirms Jacques Donzelot‟s irreverent definition of “modern philanthropy” as the 
“consolidation […] of all the forms of direction of the life of the poor, so as to diminish 
the social cost of their reproduction and obtain an optimum of workers at public 
expense.”36 
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The trustees did not take action on the Chamber of Commerce request until their 
October meeting. Of course, deepening their charitable inaction, they declined to fund the 
entire project, but agreed only to consider “inviting an experienced Vocational Guidance 
worker to this city for a period of study” as recommended by Eugene Foster.37 The offer 
was never taken, and less than a year later the trustees were advised by E. U. Graff, 
superintendent of the Indianapolis Public Schools, not to grant such support. He felt that 
the “vocational guidance field had thus far been largely experimental and not productive 
of satisfactory results and that it would be advisable for the Foundation to devote its 
attention and funds to work which provides more tangible results.”38  
It is revealing that the Foundation trustees felt the Vocational Bureau program 
was well within their scope, given that the program would benefit businesses more than 
the citizenry as a whole. Just a month earlier, the trustees turned down a request by the 
Christamore Settlement House for the funding of part of a building in Haughville, on the 
west side of Indianapolis. This was, and remains in 2011, one of the most impoverished 
areas in Indianapolis. Christamore House existed to assist poor families with services. 
Although the amount requested was large, $50,000 [$550,000 CD], the trustees did not 
bother to offer any help at all to an organization whose mission was to help people help 
themselves.39 Foster‟s denial of their request asserted that “although our Board is much 
interested in the work which Christamore Settlement represents, and recognizes the high 
character of its work and leadership, it feels it can not, with its present limited income, 
supplement either the budgets of Member Agencies of the Community Fund or contribute 
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to their various capital expense accounts.”40 Christamore got no funding, despite the 
report by Foster in September that the Foundation had more than $70,000 at its disposal. 
But there was not much favorable public relations payoff to be had in funding poor 
people in a small area that the socially prominent generally ignored anyway. In addition, 
the foundation‟s support could have been looked upon as charity rather than 
philanthropy, which was not within in its alleged “scope.”  
The trustees‟ decision was complicated by the fact that Mrs. Carey wasn‟t the 
only person in Haughville who decided to bypass the judgment of the foundation and go 
straight to Alphonso Pettis. Like Carey, Larz Whitcomb and the board of the Christamore 
House sent a letter to Pettis a year before requesting support. Pettis replied on December 
23, 1923, and although the letter was not present in the records, the minutes of the 
meeting state that “much interest was manifested in the letter from Mr. Pettis.”41 Whether 
this meant that Pettis expressed interest in supporting the Christamore House or whether 
the trustees were simply interested in what he wrote is uncertain. However, the 
Christamore House did not receive any funding from the foundation until 1936, two years 
after it funded the Indiana Symphony Orchestra Society. The amount was $9,500 
[$130,000 CD] for a camp for children, a safe donation to make in terms of its all-
important public relations. That was the only money the Christamore House received 
from the foundation until 1948, when the foundation gave $2,213 [$17,300 CD] for the 
same cause, which in real dollars was less than 15 percent of its contribution twelve years 
previous. By contrast, just a few years earlier, in 1944, the trustees gave more than 
double that amount, $5,000 [$54,000 CD], to the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra, just 
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a small payment in what would become a long and munificent tradition of funding that 
elite arts organization. 
Another curious precedent was set during the October 1924 meeting of the 
trustees regarding the scope of the foundation‟s work. Reverend Charles Linders of the 
Church Federation of Indianapolis requested that the foundation purchase the Cadle 
Tabernacle property, which could eventually be demolished and a public auditorium built 
where “the public can be served by high class entertainments, presented at nominal 
prices. With the Foundation back of this movement, patronage is guaranteed.”42 However, 
the reverend‟s request may have been motivated more by religious intolerance than by 
any benevolence. His desire here was to rid the city of what he preserved as an aberrant 
place of worship. It was a built by E. Howard Cadle in 1921 in honor of his mother for 
the purpose of hosting traveling evangelists such as Billie Monday. Cadle lost control of 
it briefly in just a few years after it was built, which was during the time that Linders 
approached the foundation. His motivations might also have been driven by jealousy and 
competition, at the Cadle tabernacle had a seating capacity of 10,000 and attracted large 
crowds. Linders asserted: 
[…] I am interested in the social and educational development of 
the citizens of Indianapolis. The Tabernacle is making no 
contribution practically to either, and is really a hindrance in the 
realm of religion. It has been used to foster and promote a type of 
religion which requires no culture, and, I might say, encourages 
ignorance. So far as its religious contribution to the city is 
concerned, it would have been vastly better if the Tabernacle had 
never been built.”43 
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The trustees did not comment on Winder‟s religious justification for the 
destruction of the Tabernacle, and declined to extend funding, perhaps fearing even the 
appearance of sectarian favoritism and the likelihood of unwelcome bad publicity or 
controversy of any kind. Drawing another line in the sand, they stated that “it was not the 
policy of the Foundation to purchase or own property, and that this request does not come 
within the scope of the Foundation program as now outlined.”44  
At this same time, there were major funding decisions made with little discussion. 
Contrary to their claim that they did not fund an organization‟s normal operating needs 
about which they were adamant when they funded the James E. Roberts Nurse for 
Crippled Children, they once again changed their “scope.” On 9 October 1924, Arthur 
Baxter requested $4,000 [$44,000 CD] to fund the Indianapolis Community Fund, the 
precursor to the United Way. This was because, as he explained, “the current year will 
require larger funds than heretofore have been received, because of the unemployment 
that has existed in Indianapolis during this year. By the same token some of our business 
houses will be unable to respond as liberally as they have in the past, so that the taking up 
of the slack by such an agency as yours would be deeply appreciated and doubly valuable 
this year.”45  
Baxter‟s detailed one-page letter could have thoroughly convinced the trustees 
that they should give the agency $4,000, which the trustees immediately upped to $5,000 
[$55,000 CD].46 If it had been deemed an urgent need, like the building for the 
Christamore House, the motivation for funding would have been clear. The true reason it 
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the trustees supported it was that it was simply a safe agency to fund, with no foreseeable 
controversy attached and the foundation would reap very positive press for helping save 
the day. Plus, the foundation was flush with expendable funds that it needed to use soon, 
lest it be criticized for sitting on its fortune while doing nothing for the community. To 
fully understand the driving force behind the speed of approval and the size of the 
contribution, one needs to look no further than the left side of the Indianapolis 
Community Fund letterhead on which Arthur Baxter sent his plea for support. Its General 
Campaign Committee read like a Who‟s Who of the Indianapolis Foundation trustees and 
founders, including J. K. Lilly, G. A. Efroymson, Henry Hornbrook, and the main figure 
behind the creation of the Indianapolis Foundation, Evans Woollen.47 No doubt the 
“scope” of acceptable foundation assistance now included kindred organizations in which 
the Indianapolis Foundation trustees also became personally involved.  
By November of 1924, the Indianapolis Employment Bureau was finally up and 
running, but was rife with problems. The bureau had processed 832 applicants, pointing 
out that 64 were “colored,” but they had only placed a total of 65, with another 155 sent 
to job interviews. Most problematic was an embarrassing incident where “one of the men 
placed through this Bureau last week stole a truck belonging to the employer who sought 
this Employment Bureau for help, and such incidents of course tend to bring some 
criticism upon the Bureau.”48 This funding choice was not exactly reaping the enhanced 
public relations return the foundation trustees so carefully sought and cultivated. 
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As 1924 wound down, the trustees expanded the funding of assistance to crippled 
children with $2,000 from the James E. Roberts trust to start an Orthopedic Appliance 
Shop to supply leg braces at a location within the Riley Memorial Hospital. The 
foundation also had much to publicize from its support of the James E. Roberts Nurse for 
Crippled Children. To date, the nurse had made 291 calls to 71 children, transporting 52 
of them to clinics and hospitals for care. While 26 were not attending school, 80 were 
attending school, yet having a difficult time due to their handicaps. Members of the 
public suggested again that a school expressly for these children should be built.49 
The Indianapolis Employment Bureau was not proving to be as successful. By 
December, they had amassed 1,232 applicants, 107 of them “colored,” but had only 
successfully placed 132 in permanent jobs and 106 in temporary jobs. Foster offered 
mitigating circumstances for the low performance, insisting that “these placements seem 
low but the Bureau is still new and not very well known.” Much to the board‟s relief and 
pleasure, he shared that despite the current performance of the program, it seemed to be a 
public relations hit with commercial publications from which there had been 
“considerable good publicity.” However, Foster must have been concerned about the 
effectiveness of the bureau, as he suggested that an investigator be hired to “follow the 
placements of this Bureau so in order that we may know after six months just what has 
been accomplished by the Bureau.”50 Foster was way ahead of his time in insisting not 
only on the evaluation of a program‟s effectiveness, but also in asking the funder to pay 
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for such an evaluation. Today, program evaluation is a small but quickly growing area of 
philanthropy. 
During its first year with a director the foundation also had its share of requests 
for bizarre and unproven projects that promised fantastic results. One was from Dr. 
Charles Emerson, dean of the Indiana University School of Medicine in Indianapolis. 
Emerson wrote to make the trustees aware “of the problem of Mental Hygiene, especially 
as it relates to children, as one of the most promising fields in which medical and social 
organizations and institutions may cooperate with promising results.” His zeal was almost 
prophetic, as he claimed that “advances in medicine of the past few decades have made 
Mental Hygiene actually possible.” He offered impressive statistics, insisting that through 
Mental Hygiene “the 50% efficient may become 60% or 70% efficient and the genius 
90%” more efficient, yet he did not offer any statistical proof of these claims.51  
Without really ever stating what is meant by “Mental Hygiene,” nor offering an 
explanation for the process of its improvement or evidence of its success, Emerson makes 
the suggestion that “if the Indianapolis Foundation would provide a very well trained 
psychiatrist case worker who could work with the organization of Indiana University […] 
and study the children from Indianapolis admitted to the Robert W. Long or James 
Whitcomb Riley Hospitals and the City Dispensary. […] this work would because of its 
fundamental accuracy and the thoroughness, soon assume an importance which would far 
more than justify the expense involved.”52 He did not state what the expense of such a 
program would be or how it would be justified.  
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Foster seemed to be in favor of Emerson‟s proposal, having pressed the trustees 
for several months about funding psychiatric and mental health clinics in Indianapolis. 
He believed that, based on Emerson‟s letter, they should also “extend our service to the 
clinics at Robert Long and City Hospitals” and encouraged more discussion on the 
subject.53 However, according to the meeting minutes, the board failed to bring it up for 
discussion. 
Even more “Barnum-esque” was a claim by a Mr. H. F. Dunn that he had 
invented a way to cure cancer and organic diseases through the use of electromagnetic 
wave action. Such a treatment is still often claimed as a cure today, although there is no 
scientific evidence to support its effectiveness. When Dunn was asked for supporting 
documents from physicians, he contacted Emerson at Indiana University, the promoter of 
“Mental Hygiene,” but even Emerson declined to comment on his credibility.54 The 
trustees unanimously voted down the request with the standard explanation that the 
“request does not properly come within the province of this Foundation.”55 As we will 
see, the definition of that “province” continues to shift in close accord with the personal 
whims and tastes of the foundation‟s elite trustees. 
Rather than be proactive in understanding the community‟s needs, Foster and the 
trustees consistently responded to pressure from close associates, business interests, and 
donors, always weighing the potential of each program as an opportunity for positive 
local press. Reviewing the programs funded so far, we see a definite pattern. Mrs. 
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Roberts expressed her displeasure at the lack of use of her husband‟s bequest, and the 
foundation responded by funding a program to help crippled children. This action not 
only satisfied an important donor, it was also perfect for a heart-warming newspaper 
story. The funding of the long-established Indianapolis Community Fund was a foregone 
conclusion because several Indianapolis Foundation trustees were personally associated 
with the organization. In addition, the foundation‟s trustees stood to be revered for 
pulling the organization out of the red, positioning them as heroes in the eyes of the 
citizenry. The promise of favorable publicity was also blatant in some of the appeals 
made to the foundation, most of which were effective enough to secure funding. This was 
certainly true of the efforts to create the unemployment bureau, in addition to the fact that 
the bureau fit well into the “before you feed a starving man, teach him to fish” 
philosophy of philanthropy so esteemed by the elites of the day. However, if you were an 
organization that offered summer camps to poor mothers and their children, or a house 
that served one of the poorest neighborhoods in Indianapolis, or a fledgling arts 
organization that catered to the lower-classes, that was not within the scope of the 
foundation‟s work. Over the next decade, the Indianapolis Foundation‟s trustees 
continued to attempt to define and justify their fickle funding goals, often with bizarre 
and dumbfounding results. 
 170 
Chapter 5: The Formative Years before the Funding of the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra, 1925-1933 
 
Direct evidence that at least one of the founders felt that funding of the arts was 
within the Indianapolis Foundation‟s province came from an article in the Cleveland 
Press in January of 1925. This piece highlighted Evans Woollen‟s role in the creation of 
the foundation, and he stated that there should be very few “strings attached” to donations 
to the foundation. However, donors should be allowed to “name the general purposes – 
health, art, education – let the foundation pick the specific institutions or other 
instrumentalities to carry out the purposes. Institutions, hospitals, museums, etc, come 
and go. General purposes do not. Neither does the foundation.”1 It does not appear, 
however, that the trustees thought the same way for the first nine years of funded 
operations, as evidenced by their rejection of funding for the theatre group in 1924. 
By 1925, a full year had passed since Foster‟s appointment as the new director of 
the Indianapolis Foundation and judging from his reports he was becoming bolder in his 
recommendations to the board. Foster summarized the work of the foundation during its 
first year of funding in his January report, championing causes that had not been funded, 
but had been discussed. One of those causes was the promise of the practice of “Mental 
Hygiene.” Even though Dr. Emerson gave little information as to what “Mental Hygiene” 
was, he certainly had a convert in Eugene Foster. In January 1925, Foster communicated 
to the trustees that he felt Dr. Emerson‟s vision could not be carried out in the current 
social programs that served the poor, because the children there did not meet the criteria 
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that Emerson had outlined that identified the types of children who had the highest 
potential to benefit from such a program. As Foster explained, “the problems of feeble 
mindedness and mental maladjustments occur most frequently in the homes where there 
are problems of child welfare and relief […].”2 Emerson was very explicit that children 
with handicaps of any sort were not the focus of his miraculous “mental hygiene” 
therapy. Foster suggested that as a first step in this direction, the trustees should consider 
paying for a person to study adult mental patients in the City Hospital at a cost of $6,000 
[$64,000 CD].  
Part of the attraction of Emerson‟s program to the foundation no doubt came from 
the far broader popularity of “eugenics,” especially in the conservative Midwest. Elite 
medical opinion held that although the feeble and weak should be taken care of, they 
would never contribute much to society and should not be allowed to propagate. The 
eugenics movement and its solutions to curb propagation of inferior races and 
undesirables involved several countries in the world and their science professionals.
3
 
Justifications proliferated for the sterilization of such undesirables. This movement 
peaked in the 1920s and the foundation‟s associate, Fr. Frank Gavisk, became 
instrumental in such cleansing campaigns. American eugenics became a focal point of 
foundation philanthropy, revealing the perennial popularity of social science schemes to 
the “benevolent” in the U.S. Under the impress of eugenics, elite philanthropists believed 
that productive resources should be focused on those who had the ability to make the 
greatest contributions to humankind. It is this elitist thought leadership that so fired the 
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imagination of Dr. Emerson and like-minded philanthropists anxious to promote a more 
“mentally hygienic” population. The board must have been convinced by Dr. Emerson‟s 
promising, but unsubstantiated, claims and Foster‟s equivalent enthusiasm and sense of 
urgency, because it funded two psychiatric workers: one at City Hospital to observe all 
patients admitted to detention, and one for the Robert Long Hospital and Riley Memorial 
to study children showing signs of mental illness. A total of $6,000 [$64,000 CD] came 
from the foundation to fund this work. 4 This funding decision also reveals that both 
Foster and the trustees relied heavily on the opinions of experts and did little 
investigation of their own into the validity of the research they subsidized so generously. 
The trustees expressed to Dr. Emerson that they funded a mental-hygiene worker “with 
the thought that her study and findings would help direct our Board in their desire to be 
helpful in the field of Mental Hygiene in some program which may eventually develop.”5 
Further justification for the foundation‟s involvement came from public health official 
Herman Morgan, M.D., who wrote to Foster that his board “expressed great appreciation 
for the assistance rendered by the Indianapolis Foundation in bringing about a better 
service in the mental hygiene field.”6 For foundation agents, deeper engagement in the 
study and resolution of aberrant or counter-productive mental states, especially among 
the lower classes and children, constituted a viable and worthy long-term commitment. 
Energized by the incontrovertible opinions of esteemed medical men, the trustees 
naturally wanted to help the mentally deficient by classifying their problems and, ideally, 
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teaching them how to think in a more productive manner. Although this pretentious 
initiative might offend the poor and feeble, that population had little public voice and no 
countervailing influence. The media, of course, was primed to praise those who sought 
philanthropically to improve the social behavior of others, especially lower-class 
impressionable children.  
A year earlier, the foundation had taken up the idea of creating a facility for 
crippled children. Discussions on the matter grew more serious, and by February 1925, 
the Superintendent of Indianapolis Public Schools had become fully engaged in the 
planning of the project, even visiting Chicago to see what that city was doing about the 
problem. He became convinced that the type of school that was needed was one that 
could offer expanded service to children with other disabilities such as defective hearing 
or speech. He even mentioned the need for new “fresh air” schools for children with 
tuberculoses to supplement city school systems inadequate to handle these challenges. 
There had already been similar studies in Chicago, and Harvard University even offered 
specialized courses for teachers to promote the physical training of crippled children. The 
foundation‟s board voted to move forward with a survey of crippled children in 
Indianapolis so that “a more careful study could be made of our defective groups of 
school age […].” They also agreed to support transportation for crippled children to 
attend school for another year, as well as site visits to other schools that were working 
with crippled children.7 The preoccupation here with “defective” segments of society 
shows how fully the Indianapolis Foundation embraced the scientifically philanthropic 
obsession with curing physical, mental and spiritual deficiencies of economically 
displaced and socially disadvantaged people.  
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The foundation‟s serious investment in the Indianapolis Employment Bureau 
failed to return the commercial social benefit the trustees had envisioned. At of the end of 
January 1925, the bureau had signed up 374 employers seeking employees among 2,412 
job seekers. The foundation‟s investment had only secured permanent employment for 97 
people, while 163 were given temporary employment. The foundation moved to take full 
ownership of this endeavor, pressing on past an experimental stage. Foster was now 
referring to it as “our Employment Bureau.”8 Despite these disappointing results, the 
foundation persisted in funding the bureau as advocated by the Chamber of Commerce. 
The extent to which Chambers of Commerce shaped the funding priorities of 
“community” foundations deserves closer investigation in Indianapolis and other 
American cities, but that research area is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
A special meeting of the foundation trustees was convened to discuss the long-
term subvention of an employment bureau. The trustees sought out Dr. John Brewer, 
director of the Bureau of Vocational Guidance at Harvard University, for his expert 
advice on the matter. Dr. Brewer had spent the previous two days visiting and 
interviewing people associated with the proposed Vocational Bureau, including the 
Chamber‟s sub-committee backing the bureau. True to the trustees‟ penchant for more 
reports over charitable action, it was agreed that Dr. Brewer would submit yet another 
report on the feasibility of a Vocational Bureau in Indianapolis. Brewer agreed to charge 
$150 [$1,600 CD] for the study plus his expenses, and felt that he had “covered the 
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ground enough to submit a recommendation.”9 The Indianapolis example confirms the 
general, catalytic role of early U.S. community foundations in translating and applying 
academic professional expertise to the social and bureaucratic problems of effective 
municipal government. Monies spent there nurtured new crops of middle-class experts 
while doing little to redress the real social ills those experts discovered. 
Brewer submitted his report on 27 February 1925, and immediately commented 
on the lack of trust toward the Chamber of Commerce by those who ran the city‟s 
schools. Clearly noting popular suspicion of the Chamber‟s motives, Brewer reported: 
As you may have guessed the school people raised at once the 
question about the Chamber of Commerce Committee. Evidently 
there is great doubt among them on the Chamber‟s support of 
school policies. The school people were not quite confident that 
the Committee‟s administration of the bureau would be for the 
benefit of the schools. […] I jokingly told them that I had little 
thought that I was to play the role of an industrial arbitrator and of 
course I could not be expected to do so. […] The school people 
seem to have the idea that the Committee wants to get children into 
factories and stores as early as possible and are not interested in 
introducing vocational guidance into schools.10 
 
Such excellent testimony reveals fully in a U.S. urban context how “philanthropic” 
interventions by experts tended to exacerbate, rather than diffuse, the burgeoning civil 
wars between the goals of contending, professionalizing classes, such as educators and 
businessmen. These conflicts over how the youth of the city should be educated and for 
what careers they should be prepared were ongoing battles over who would control the 
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economic development of cities and the future lifestyles of their soon-to-be modern 
urbanites.  
Brewer had spent more than two intense hours with the representatives of the 
schools attempting to convince them that a trustworthy director would be put into place 
who would be subject to their oversight. He assured his listeners that checks and balances 
on the Chamber would be put in place. In fact, Brewer recommended that the 
Indianapolis Foundation appoint an administrative board to oversee the bureau. He felt 
the schools would be more comfortable if this board drew no members from the Chamber 
of Commerce.11 
This project became even more controversial and public debate grew sharp. 
Indianapolis newspapers had a field day with the debate and accusations were cast on 
both sides. Like so many crusading “philanthropists” before them, the trustees of the 
Indianapolis Foundation stoked opposing camps in civil strife rather than provide 
direction to the community. The foundation got caught in a battle of public interests it 
helped foment, foisting public acrimony upon the trustees and the one thing they most 
feared -- negative press. Eugene Foster recommended against the bureau, but did not use 
bad public relations as the real reason. In fact he side-stepped it completely, stating 
instead that decisions were based on his subsequent meetings with school representatives: 
 [...] it seemed to be the consensus of opinion that this proposed 
plan for a Vocational Bureau for Indianapolis is perhaps too 
theoretical and indefinite to warrant the expenditures of so large a 
budget as the Subcommittee and Dr. Brewer‟s report recommend. 
We are anxious as a foundation, I am sure, to meet the most 
outstanding needs and to use our available funds as far as possible 
to produce tangible results in better living and living conditions in 
this community, but I am not convinced by Dr. Brewer‟s report 
that this field of work at the present time has reached a point of 
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development to warrant so large a proportion of our fund as this 
report recommends.12  
 
Foster never mentioned the real tension between the two sides. The reason he 
gave for abandoning the project was a reflection of the previous opinion of E. U. Graff, 
superintendent of the Indianapolis Public Schools, who six months earlier claimed that 
the programs in vocational guidance were still experimental and not something the 
foundation should invest in until results could be shown. The board of trustees agreed 
with Foster‟s recommendation, echoing his reasoning to abort the Vocational Bureau.13 
When Dr. Brewer learned of the foundation‟s decision and justification, he thanked 
Foster for the “explanation of the argument by which the Board reached its decision. Of 
course I am left wondering what the Board found more tangible and important than 
vocational guidance […].”14 Although the board unfavorably cited the lack of proof for 
tangible results from Vocational Bureaus, their retreat came in the face of determined 
opposition from professionalizing teachers unwilling to allow elite philanthropists and 
their experts to co-opt youth training for future careers. The schools had drawn a line in 
the sand of public opinion and won out against corporate interest. 
Having dodged a public relations nightmare, the trustees moved on to less 
controversial decisions. Contemporaneously, Foster shared a letter from the executive 
committee of the Indianapolis Chapter, American Association of Social Workers. This 
organization requested support for a conference to be held in Indianapolis in 1926. The 
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social workers sought $500 [$5,375 CD]. With absolutely no discussion, the trustees 
unanimously voted to support the effort.15 The reason for this quick decision was not 
obvious from Foster‟s report or the foundation‟s meeting minutes, but was easily 
revealed by the masthead of the letter sent to Eugene Foster from the association, which 
listed none other than the same Eugene C. Foster as its president.16 Once again, another 
example of the Indianapolis Foundation trustee‟s making funding decisions based on 
cozy relationships rather than the merits of a proposal or request, a pattern that would be 
repeated numerous times throughout its early history. 
By April 1925 the progress of the Indianapolis Employment Bureau picked up 
some momentum, with 405 placements out of more than 3,000 registrants for work. The 
study the foundation trustees had commissioned had already followed up on 100 
placements and was starting work on another 100.17 Its success was impressive enough to 
garner the attention of the Indianapolis Community Fund, which was considering taking 
over the funding of the bureau.18 
Another project the trustees had been discussing for more than two years was the 
possibility of funding another local Health and Hospital Survey. They finally sought out 
the advice of medical professionals from institutions such as the State Board of Health, 
the City Board of Health, the Indiana University School of Medicine and the Marion 
County Tuberculosis Association. They all agreed that another survey was not needed as 
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plenty of surveys had been done by other organizations. They were confident that 
Indianapolis was “conscious of its shortcomings in the medical field […].” Dr. King, of 
the State Board of Health, did state what he felt were the four or five urgent health and 
medical needs of the community, among them “better facilities for venereal disease 
control.” Foster had sought from Dr. King “his thought regarding the most important 
contribution which the Foundation might make to the field of public health he [Dr. King] 
suggested that a better program for venereal disease would, he thought, bring more 
satisfactory results and meet a greater need than extending the work in any other division 
of this field.”19 Such a program sponsored by the trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation 
could hardly have been expected to play well in the press, to say nothing of the trustees‟ 
elite peers. Yet venereal disease was a serious problem in Indianapolis, so rather than 
ignore the recommendation, the foundation chairman, J. K. Lilly, did the only honorable 
thing an upstanding Protestant man could do in this situation -- he asked a Catholic, 
Father Gavisk, to look into the matter and give the board a recommendation.20 Not 
surprisingly, the matter was never brought up again. Here we see the foundation trustees 
ignoring a local health problem deemed urgent by health professionals in order to avoid 
public controversy and embarrassing press coverage.  
The nurse who was hired to help out with a study of “mental hygiene” was now 
running into some overwhelming issues that needed to be dealt with. She was caught off 
guard because she was “accustomed to work in private hospitals where the facilities are 
more adequate and more satisfactory than she finds in a city institution.” The number of 
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patient cases she was expected to study were also overwhelming, with thirty different 
patients per month, or one a day. It was decided by the trustees that “only the more 
hopeful cases will receive intensive study by Mrs. Ballou – the senile and paretic cases 
which are not hopeful but which create quite as great a social problem to the community, 
will necessarily have to be neglected until a better service is provided for their care.” The 
foundation, however, would not be providing that service. Rather than fund another nurse 
to care for the worst cases, they decided to hire a stenographer to help Mrs. Ballou in her 
research.21  
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Controversy with the Alphonso Pettis Fund: Indianapolis Public Schools versus the 
Indiana Trust Company. Philanthropy Tangles again with the Professions 
At the 12 May 1925 meeting, Foster made a recommendation for funding that 
once again reinforced the very self-interested reasons impelling trust companies to create 
the Indianapolis Foundation. The superintendent of the Indianapolis Public Schools had 
recently discussed the possibility of setting up a scholarship fund to help current high 
school students complete their education and help graduates afford college. Foster 
recommended that $6,000 [$65,000 CD] be granted for this cause from the Alphonso P. 
Pettis Fund.22 The board agreed and directed that $6,000 be granted for the next school 
year and that it “be known as the Pettis Scholarship and to be placed under the direction 
of the Attendance Department of our Schools for distribution and supervision […] 
[emphasis added].”23 The point here is that the foundation trustees had specifically stated 
that the scholarship funds should be placed under the control of the school, not the 
Indiana Trust Company which had released the funds for charitable use. 
On 15 May the trustees were confronted with the issue of who controlled the 
trusts that were designated to benefit the foundation as well as the use the income from 
those trusts in the form of grants. Eugene Foster notified Mr. E.U. Graff, Superintendent 
of Indianapolis Public Schools, that the school system had been awarded $6,000 [$65,000 
CD] for the Pettis Scholarships.
24
 A check went out several days later, but not all parties 
agreed about where the funds would be deposited until the full distribution of the 
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scholarships was completed. A classic struggle began between the patron trust company, 
the community foundation and its various recipients over control of the funds disbursed. 
It did not take long for bankers, represented by adroit lawyers, to become involved in the 
control of this philanthropic enterprise. On 6 June, Albert Baker, principal of the elite 
Baker & Daniels law firm, wrote a letter to Mr. C.R. Yoke, president of the Board of 
School Commissioners. Baker discussed the fact that J. P. Frenzel, president of the 
Indiana Trust Company, believed that: 
Since the A.P. Pettis gift to the Indianapolis Foundation had been, 
by Mr. Pettis, put in the custody of the Indiana Trust Company to 
manage the principal, that it seemed natural and proper that the 
income from that fund, after its appropriation to this scholarship, 
should remain, until finally expended or paid to the ultimate 
beneficiaries, in the hands of the Indiana Trust Company.25 
 
The importance to the Indiana Trust Company of the future interest and 
administrative fees resulting from these funds is blatant in this exchange. Baker found the 
trustees to be ambiguous regarding who was to control the funds in distribution. He held 
that although the letters and notes in the minutes indicated that the funds “be placed 
under the direction of the Attendance Department of our public schools for distribution 
and supervision,” and although the check was made out to IPS School Board Secretary 
Frank E. Reisner, the foundation had still not legally given the money to the school. 
However, it seemed to be clear that IPS had “a large, if not exclusive control” over the 
key decisions selecting the recipients of the scholarships. Baker felt that he could not 
                                                          
25
 President Mr. C.R. Yoke, Board of School Commissioners, Letter, by Albert Daniels, June 6, 
1925. Pettis Scholarship Fund File, Indiana Trust's Opinion of Pettis Scholarship Fund for IPS, Private 
Archives of the Indianapolis Foundation.  
 183 
answer the question as to where the funds should be deposited without further direction 
from the foundation.26 
There were two letters dated 25 June sent from Eugene Foster to C.R. Yoke. The 
first advised him that the foundation‟s trustees would discuss the decision regarding the 
deposit and administration of the $6,000 check on 14 July. Foster asked Yoke to delay 
the deposit of the check until after that date.27 The second letter addressed what the 
board‟s intention was when it awarded the grant to IPS. In it, Foster stated that the check 
was made out to Mr. Frank L. Reissner, who was Secretary of the Board of School 
Commissioners, and was to be administered by W.A. Hacker and the Attendance 
Department. Foster then closed with, “In connection with the depository of this fund I 
believe our Board should leave this entirely to the discretion of the [school‟s] department 
which controls the management of same.”28 In a third letter dated the same day to Henry 
Hornbrook, Foster asked Hornbrook to review the other letters and lend his approval. He 
then stated that J. P. Frenzel‟s insistence to have the funds deposited in the Indiana Trust 
Company was causing problems because it “involves a policy with the School 
Commissioners in allowing outside influence to designate depositories for their funds but 
they are anxious to take action in this matter as our Foundation Board of Trustees 
advise.”29 
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 In a rare glimpse of the power struggles between benefactor and beneficiary, a 
hand-written letter to Foster from W.A. Hacker, director of the Department of 
Attendance, at IPS, relates the anger of IPS Superintendent E. U. Graff, toward J. P. 
Frenzel and his bank:  
On Monday, I went to your office and got the letter as you had 
dictated it to Miss Stone on Saturday. Mr. Graff approved it just as 
you wrote it - and I found him very bitter indeed, toward the bank 
for its part in the matter. His advice was that a fellow could go so 
far in acceding to unreasonable demands and that in order to 
preserve one‟s self respect he would have to rise up and tell 
somebody to go to h ____ and act accordingly.30 
 
Graff‟s disgust with these self-serving bankers, especially the Indiana Trust 
Company and J. P. Frenzel, was palpable. The $6,000 check was held and not deposited 
while the disagreement raged on. The scholarships, however, were awarded, with 13 
going to Indiana college-bound graduates for a total of $2,435 [$26,000 CD]. The 
remainder of the $6,000 was to be used to help high school students stay in school. Henry 
Hornbrook presented a letter from John P Frenzel, president of the Indiana Trust 
Company, concerning his belief that the money should be held by his company until final 
distribution. Hornbrook asked the trustees for their opinion on the matter.31 The trustees 
sided with Frenzel, which is not surprising since most were simply agents of the trust 
companies with which they had professional and personal relations. Foster “was 
authorized to secure this check” from the secretary of the School Board of 
Commissioners. The School Attendance Department was then told that they could only 
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request funds as they were needed from the Indiana Trust Company.32 This is another 
glaring example of how the trust companies‟ desire for profit was the real catalyst that 
impelled trust company executives to create community foundations. The control of the 
foundation trustees by the trust companies is evident as well in the complicity of the 
foundation trustees‟ support of the Indiana Trust Company‟s control of over such a small 
amount of money until the very last cent was expended.  
The trustees also strategized on how to get the most advantageous and self-
glorifying public relations out of their benevolent action of establishing the scholarship 
fund. They first had to smooth the ruffled feathers of their friends and fellow elites at the 
Chamber of Commerce over their rejection of the Vocational Bureau. The Chamber‟s 
Education Committee had proposed a similar scholarship in the Vocational Bureau 
proposal, and the trustees felt that in “the publicity regarding this appropriation some 
mention be made in recognition of the program which the Committee on Education of the 
Chamber of Commerce has proposed in this field of service.”33 This insinuated, of course, 
that the Chamber had originally suggested the scholarship fund to the foundation, and 
that the trustees were influenced by the intent of these honorable men. The trustees were 
giving credit where credit wasn‟t due in order to throw a bone to their wealthy cronies at 
the Chamber, and to maintain cordial relations among their fellow Indianapolis elite.  
The foundation was not original in funding the scholarships and probably 
followed the lead of one of the founders of the Indianapolis Foundation rather than the 
Chamber of Commerce. Several years earlier, John H. Holliday created a similar 
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foundation for scholarships in the name of his deceased son, John H. Holliday, Jr. 
Holliday‟s son had joined the Army during the beginning of World War I and within a 
month contracted a fatal case of influenza. Being a Civil War Veteran, Holliday was no 
doubt very proud of his son for serving and this was his memorial to him. Although John 
H. Holiday was a founder of the Indianapolis Foundation, the scholarship fund had no 
association with the foundation. 
As far as the trustees were concerned, the education and welfare of children was 
valued on a sliding scale, with the mentally ill on the low end, black children a little 
higher, those with vocational potential or minimally handicapped higher, and, finally, the 
respectable and gifted white children on the high end. For instance, when Mrs. Frances 
Coston, president of the Educational Aid for Colored Orphan Children, requested support 
for her program, Foster assured the board that she was “considered a capable and reliable 
colored woman, a teacher in our public schools.” However, he made it clear to the 
trustees that he requested her to “make her letter to us as brief as possible […],” 
something he had not requested of any other petitioners.34  
Yet Frances Coston was not just a “reliable colored woman.” She was the 
principal at School No. 68, the Colored Orphans Home. Not only were these children 
segregated because of their color, they were also segregated because of their unfortunate 
circumstance of being without parents or family. Coston wrote a two-page letter and 
avoided any plea for mere charity. She wrote about the good that her organization was 
doing and how it was positively influencing the lives of these children. She reported that 
they had “sent twenty children from the home to Tuskegee, Hampton Institute, 
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Wilberforce University, Knoxville College, Lincoln Institute, Spelman Seminary, and 
Fisk University.” Most were involved in vocational training which included “carpentry, 
printing, steam-fitting and plumbing, machine work, auto-mechanics, sewing and 
millinery.” She also strove to make the all-white male trustees more comfortable with her 
request by making the point that “white friends have given $600 [6,500 CD] this year 
toward a deficit in our budget.” So far they had spent only $2,706 [$29,000 CD] to 
support all twenty college students and she even sent them an audited account of their 
finances.35 
Still, the trustees were not entirely confident in the credentials of Mrs. Coston. 
They asked Foster to check with the Flanner House and the Community Fund as to the 
“cooperation which has been extended those two organizations though Mrs. Coston and 
her Society.”36 When Foster reported back that he found Mrs. Coston‟s relations with 
both organizations satisfactory, he recommended the trustees award her organization 
$500 or $600 for the year.37 In 2004 constant dollars, that is $5,500 to $6,000 for a 
scholarship fund for black orphaned children who have no family or financial support. In 
contrast, that is one-tenth of the funding that was extended to the promising children in 
the white public schools. It took two months to finally approve the $500, the same 
amount that Foster requested for his own organization for a single conference that was 
approved without debate the day he proposed it.38 If we compare the use of funds by the 
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Indianapolis Public Schools and the Society for Colored Orphan Children, it is clear that 
only thirteen students were funded by the public schools while twenty were funded by the 
society for about the same amount of money. Add to that the fact that the society also 
paid for clothing and other necessities for the orphans while they were attending college. 
In short, the society was much more efficient with their resources than the schools, but 
that did not seem to weigh at all into the equation when the funding decisions were made. 
It was much more advantageous for supplicants to have elite friends in high places at the 
foundation. 
Black children were regarded higher on the scale of suitable recipients for support 
than “retarded” or “subnormal” children, as Foster referred to them.39 Mrs. Richard 
Lieber, from the Indianapolis Public Schools, requested $1,000 for a summer program for 
“those who have a tendency toward delinquency,” which really meant “retarded” children 
who, of course, usually came from less than desirable homes. She stated her case with 
certainty, claiming that: 
During the winter months, these retarded children are segregated in 
the public schools of Indianapolis and given special courses of 
training, but during the summer months no such opportunity is 
afforded them, and since, in most instances, their home 
surroundings are not entirely what they should be, the opportunity 
for actually becoming delinquent is greatly increased during the 
summer months.40 
 
Mrs. Lieber made it clear that the objective of employing professional teachers for these 
children was to “train these boys and girls along vocational lines and aid them in their 
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struggle against delinquency.” She also inferred the support of E.U. Graff, superintendent 
of Indianapolis Public Schools. She insisted in her grant request that, after the first year 
of foundation support, they would pursue public funding from the city.41 
It is hard to know exactly why the trustees declined to fund Leiber‟s request.42 It 
could have been their experience with the “temporary” funding of the Indianapolis 
Employment Bureau that the city declined to pick up and with which the foundation was 
now saddled. Or it could have been that the trustees felt they had already given enough to 
the public schools in the way of scholarships. Or, perhaps, they doubted the teaching 
abilities of a woman who wrote long, run-on sentences, like the one in her letter. Given 
the lack of a stated reason for the rejection and society‟s low priority of mentally 
handicapped children at this time, it is highly likely that funding the education of 
“retarded” children was not considered a good use of the foundation‟s resources. In 
addition, these children‟s families were an often ignored, small minority with no public 
visibility, and the potential for increasing the foundation‟s public repute with such a 
program was questionable at best.  
The rejection or low funding of these worthy programs is even more puzzling 
considering that the foundation had over $60,000 [$645,000 CD] at its disposal from the 
Roberts and Pettis funds.43 Added to that were the funds that would eventually become 
available from the Delavan Smith trust once it was free from litigation. The amount 
available to the foundation from Smith‟s trust alone would be more than $90,000 
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[$968,000 CD] by October 1925.44 Unfortunately, Smith‟s estate was being sued by the 
State of Illinois for $200,000 [$2,150,000 CD] in death duties, and his heirs felt his will 
was invalid and legally challenged it. Even with these obstacles, the Fletcher Savings and 
Trust Company claimed that funds would be available within a few months.45 Given the 
amount of money available, competition from other organizations for a limited pool of 
funds was not the reason for foundation‟s parsimony in awarding early gifts. The real 
causes of such stinginess, I believe, were two-fold. First was the social priority as viewed 
through an elite lens that the trustees ascribed to the grant proposals. Second was the 
trustees‟ perception of potential positive or negative publicity associated with any gift 
act.  
By mid-year 1925, the Employment Bureau had been in existence for eight 
months, had over 3,000 applicants looking for jobs and 682 placements. Although the 
Community Fund had considered stepping in to supply funding for the next year, they 
could not find it in their budget. The city of Indianapolis also declined to fund it, so 
Foster suggested that it had proven itself an asset to the community and recommended 
funding it for another year. Being a social worker by background, it was only natural that 
Foster would think his professional colleagues should play an important role in solving 
social ills. He always recommended adding a social worker to almost all significant 
programs funded by the foundation, and the Employment Bureau was no exception. He 
strongly believed that the bureau “could be more efficient if it had a social worker full 
time for follow up and research work,” but declined to make a recommendation to fund 
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one until other funding obligations were met.46 The trustees agreed with Foster‟s 
recommendation to fund, and granted the agency another $12,000 [$129,000 CD] for the 
coming year.47  
One of the most compelling reports given to the trustees in 1925 was one marked 
“confidential.” It was an account of the conditions at the City Hospital psychiatric 
detention ward by Mrs. May Ballou, the psychiatric social worker assigned there and 
funded by the foundation. Her criticism was so scathing and the conditions she described 
so reprehensible that it convinced Foster that the foundation needed to “build up some of 
our local resources to this group of patients before we plan a program for the extension of 
Mental Hygiene work in this community.”48 Complaining of crowded and under equipped 
facilities, Ballou devoted three pages to her report. These are best summed up in a few 
paragraphs: 
The ward is bare, being furnished only with the most out-standing, 
actual necessities and these of the ugliest obtainable, while no 
attempt has been made […] to provide one comforting offset to all 
of this ugliness and dreariness. […] In any case, [a patient] can 
have derived little benefit from his stay and it is only hoped that he 
is not worse for his experience in the ward. […] Our mental cases 
are relegated to a cheerless basement ward and where there is a 
deplorable lack of scientific interest manifested by those 
responsible for care, diagnosis, and treatment. In fact, I am frank to 
state that so far I have seen little but the most perfunctory and 
casual attention to the entire ward either by the hospital authorities 
or by the attending staff physician. […] I know you will give 
earnest consideration to this narrative report and I feel it will 
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probably cause you no little disappointment, for I believe you 
expected as much as I had hoped for […].49 
 
The trustees asked Foster to talk to Mrs. Ballou and the hospital about what kind 
of help would be needed to provide better care for the patients, but no one discussed 
either the location of the ward in the lifeless basement nor the lack of decent equipment. 
Unfortunately for the foundation, these problems would manifest themselves in public 
within a few days when the “confidential” report was leaked to the press and caused quite 
a stir. The administration of the hospital told Foster that there had been “greater interest 
from the general public directed to this particular ward than in all the other departments 
of the hospital” and hospital officials apparently saw the uproar as a positive 
development. Foster, on the other hand, was livid about the bad publicity of a program 
the foundation was involved in, and was blunt in his opinion that “it is both pathetic and 
discouraging that such satisfaction has been apparent from our hospital officials […].”50  
The one redeeming foundation program demonstrating success was one of the 
first funded, the James E. Roberts Nurse for Crippled Children. The results of this effort 
had been so successful that plans were moving forward quickly for the new school that 
was proposed earlier for crippled children. However, not all crippled children were 
created equal in the eyes of those who were making the rules of admission, which 
included Foster. A study of 289 crippled children had been done to assess the potential of 
such a school and Foster seemed delighted that 61 qualified. Among those deemed not 
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eligible included “colored” children and mental defectives of any race.51 Clearly, social 
hygiene as well as mental hygiene became an early obsession of the foundation‟s trustees.  
Aware of the importance of good donor relations, on 15 August 1925, the trustees 
sent a Western Union Telegram to Alphonso Pettis at S Jardin D‟Alsace Lorraine, Nice, 
that read “BIRTHDAY WISHES AND HEARTY GOOD GREETINGS.”52 A few days 
later, the Indianapolis Foundation received a “notice of non-delivery of telegram” from 
Western Union. The reason given was that the “addressee said to have left message 
posted.” This could mean that Pettis might have requested the telegram be sent by postal 
service because he was living at the Grand Hotel du Parc in St.Martin-Vesubie in France 
during the summer months and was in a remote area that could not be serviced by 
Western Union.53 In addition to the telegram, Eugene Foster sent a personal letter to Pettis 
in August, wishing him a happy birthday and outlining the causes the foundation had 
supported since it started funding programs in 1924. These included funding studies of 
unemployment, vocational training, and the needs of crippled children. He touted their 
support of a free employment bureau, establishing scholarships for students in high 
school and college, and assisting in the “vocational training and education of colored 
orphans.” In addition, Pettis was informed that the foundation supported the Community 
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Fund and a psychiatric social worker for the city hospital in order to “further better 
mental hygiene treatment to the patients of the detention ward there […].” 54 
Foster chose not to mention the problems that plagued foundation efforts at the 
City Hospital, which were growing more difficult each month. In September he reported 
to the trustees that: 
 The situation at the Detention Ward of our City Hospital is not 
improved. Dr. Humes was asked to leave the service because of his 
unfortunate addiction to drink and Dr. Cottingham has been 
carrying on the service alone. […] Psychiatrists are not being 
trained to meet the demand. The American Psychiatric Association 
was unable to recommend anyone for the work here. Dr. F. B. E. 
Miller, Assistant Superintendent of the Foxboro, Massachusetts 
State Hospital, has been recommended […]. Even if he is willing 
to come here for an inspection trip I am afraid he will find the 
situation so discouraging that he may not care to attempt to render 
a service here. […] Our Mrs. Ballou has become so discouraged 
that twice within the past months she has begged to be relieved of 
her services there […].55 
 
A month later, Dr. Miller did come for an inspection trip, and before his arrival he 
suggested that he might be willing to come to work for the City Hospital at a salary of 
$5,000 [$54,000 CD] plus “maintenance.” However, he returned to Foxboro to think it 
over before he made a commitment. To complicate matters, Mrs. Ballou was offered 
$3,600 [$39,000 CD] to return to Washington, DC as head of Medical Social Service at 
the Red Cross. Foster met with J. K. Lilly and decided between them to offer Mrs. Ballou 
$3,000 [$27,000 CD] to stay, which was $600 [$5,400 CD] more a year than she was 
currently receiving. Foster must have impressed upon her the importance of her staying 
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on to help them in “the development of our Mental Hygiene program,” because she 
accepted their offer. It was really not an overly generous offer, however, because they 
had already approved another person, Miss Katherine Howland, for the same job at a 
salary of $3,000 to serve the Robert Long and Riley Hospitals. Like Mrs. Ballou, Miss 
Howland was also unhappy with the “lack of cooperation and opportunity of service” in 
her position, and made Foster and J. K. Lilly aware of it. 56 Foster was not successful 
keeping Miss Howland, and she resigned “to accept a very responsible position in 
Minnesota at a much larger salary.” Dr. Miller agreed to take the position at City 
Hospital, which Foster hoped would “be a marked contribution in our mental hygiene 
field if we are successful in securing sympathetic and understanding cooperation.”57  
The School for Crippled Children opened mid-September 1925 with twenty 
students attending. The capacity was thirty per year, all selected from the acceptable 
original sixty-three that had been vetted. Three specially trained teachers were assigned 
to the school, as well as a nurse. The foundation agreed to pay for transportation of the 
children via a street car at about $6,000 [$65,000 CD], as well as equipment, materials, 
lunches and the nurse‟s salary.58 Nowhere in the previous minutes of the board meetings 
were these large expenditures discussed and voted upon.  
Ever conscious of public opinion and being concerned with the negative 
connotations of calling it the School for the Crippled, Foster urged the trustees to 
consider other names that might not have such a stigma attached. He felt that the current 
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name carried with it “an appeal for pity and sympathy which we do not want to 
encourage in behalf of this group of children.” He offered other names that would honor 
the funds used from the James E. Roberts fund, such as the “James E. Roberts Gift 
School, James E. Roberts Opportunity School, and the James E. Roberts Friendship 
School,” although he admitted that no matter what they named it, it would probably still 
be known as the James E. Roberts School for Children.59 The trustees recommended the 
James E. Roberts School.60 
The Indianapolis Employment Bureau had its first annual dinner on 12 October 
1925, at which the director, George B. Gill, gave a report on its progress. He stated that 
when the bureau began, the main objective was to serve any man or woman seeking a 
job. However, they soon stopped working with black girls and women, instead referring 
them to the Phyllis Wheatly Branch of the YMCA and the Flanner House. The Flanner 
House helped “colored” women get domestic jobs, while the YMCA matched women 
with retail and industrial jobs. Gill explained that “these two organizations serving 
colored girls and women exclusively asked us to do this and as their employment offices 
were already functioning our board thought it best not to compete with them or do 
anything which might tend to disrupt the contacts they had already established with both 
employers and workers.”61 This poorly reasoned attempt to appear sensitive to both black 
women and the organizations that served them did not stand up in the face of other 
factors. First, these organizations already serving black women were nonprofits using 
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their limited resources to help these women find work, so the bureau was not doing them 
any favors economically. Second, the insinuation here is that a limited number of black 
women sought work and were already well served by existing employment agencies 
when, in fact, the opposite was true. Third, Gill mentioned that there was “another free 
employment bureau now in operation in Indianapolis. It is the State, City, and U.S. Public 
Employment Bureau […].”62 This was another resource for white people and increased 
competition for jobs, yet that did not stop the Indianapolis Employment Bureau from 
serving white applicants. Again, this is exemplary of how those in power 
philanthropically decided whom they would serve depending on potential participants‟ 
place on the sliding social scale to which the trustees adhered rigorously.  
This new, publicly funded bureau posed a threat to Gill‟s bureau, and he admitted 
that a publicly funded bureau would be preferred since it served the citizens of the city. 
He also held that “the important factor is to make the service efficient and perpetual,” 
making the case for continued support of his bureau, claiming efficiency had never been 
the government‟s strong suit and the fickleness of government funding was unpredictable 
and dangerous to count upon. He also reiterated that the Indianapolis Employment 
Bureau was a free service and an asset to the community because the other twenty-eight 
employment bureaus that operated in Indianapolis all charged fees.63 
Over the previous year, the bureau had registered almost 5,000 job seekers, 67 
percent men, and 33 percent women. Gill‟s report, like other reports before, singled out 
the number of black men, which was 347, or 7 percent of the total applicants. The bureau 
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had also placed 1,063 people, about 20 percent of applicants, but the majority of those 
positions, 625, were temporary. One of the challenges of placement was the education 
levels of the applicants, as 68 percent of the applicants had only completed eighth grade, 
only 20 percent had graduated from high school, and another 10 percent attended college. 
Less than 2 percent of those seeking jobs through the bureau actually had a college 
degree. Given this educational demographic of the work force, it is easy to see why the 
educated elites of the city wielded so much respect among the public and could command 
popular deference when important decisions had to be made.64 
The trustees discovered that their apparently wise decision to fund the 
employment bureau was not yielding the positive public relations results that they 
desired. Foster lamented that they were “expending $12,000 a year on our employment 
bureau, which is considered by many to be an unsatisfactory means in the working out of 
better industrial conditions for our unemployed.” 65 Notice how Foster uses the possessive 
pronoun “our” in this statement, thereby claiming ownership by the foundation and its 
trustees. His concern became urgent as a result of a letter from William M. Leiserson, the 
former director of the Wisconsin Employment offices. Leiserson was not impressed by 
the statistics that Gill had reported and compared them to statistics from Wisconsin‟s 
bureau that showed 60 to 80 percent of their manual laborers had been placed. He felt 
that a monthly report should be published by the Indianapolis Employment Bureau to 
track its operational progress. Leiserson criticized the bureau‟s performance in relation to 
the amount of money it was receiving from the foundation, warning that the bureau 
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would not be able to justify its existence for another year “if the cost of placement is up 
anywhere near $10 again. It should be brought down to about $2 the second year, and 
lower than that the third year.”66  
There may well have been an ulterior motive behind Leiserson‟s letter, even 
though his criticism now seems warranted. To solve the bureau‟s problems, he proposed 
a business arrangement to the board:  
For $600 I will install a complete system of working cards, records 
and form of reports, and train all the staff in their use. Also I will 
make a study of the methods by which your office can better meet 
the needs of your city and your industries, and devise the business 
system to meet those needs. I can do this in about five weeks, 
spending one day each week in the office actually working at the 
desks, and meeting the staff in the evening for conferences and 
instruction. I have done such work for the United States 
Employment Service as well as for the states of New York, Ohio 
and Wisconsin, and in this way I can assure your board that by the 
first of the year the office will be doing much more effective 
work.67 
 
Foster grew even more desperate to improve the image of the bureau and the 
foundation, as he believed that the trustees should secure “all the help and direction 
possible in making this service as efficient and profitable as possible.”68 He urged the 
trustees to agree to pay for Leiserson‟s services. They voted that if the bureau agreed that 
his advice was needed, the foundation would support the expense.69 By piling on and 
paying for expert after expert, the foundation used its funds primarily to enrich highly 
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literate, self-promoting, middle and upper-middle class purveyors of organizational 
management and bureaucratic control. 
The end of 1925 marked the beginning of new projects that the foundation had 
never before embarked upon. One was the consideration of another research bureau to 
study tuberculosis at Sunnyside Sanatorium where patients had already been receiving 
treatment. J. K. Lilly was directly involved in these discussions with Dr. Alfred Henry 
from Sunnyside and Dr. William Charles White, chairman of the Research Committee of 
the National Tuberculosis Association. Dr. White was scheduled to visit Sunnyside to 
advise Lilly about the desirability of such a bureau, and Lilly‟s involvement in this 
decision makes sense in that he was part of the medical establishment through Eli Lilly & 
Company..70 However, it was clearly a conflict of interest and would be seen today as a 
matter of self-dealing by a trustee, especially when any remedies that might be 
discovered through such a research bureau could be profitably exploited by Lilly‟s own 
drug company. 
Another novel area of foundation funding included a new athletic field for Manual 
Training High School. The principal, E. H. Kemper McComb, suggested the cost would 
be about $20,000 [$215,000 CD] and claimed the project would be filled with “civic and 
educational possibilities.”71 McComb was masterly at writing an appeal letter designed to 
shame the trustees if they refused funding. The principal asserted that his proposal would 
be attractive to the board if they were: 
[…] looking for a small project of civic value as an outlet for some 
comparatively small sum left with the Foundation. What I propose 
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would be a worthy memorial for anyone interested in boys and 
girls and their education. Your board, I hope, will see in my 
proposal an opportunity to invest a small portion of the trust funds 
in their control in the health and happiness of many generations of 
high school youngsters; especially those who come from the south 
part of town, a district which does not have adequate recreational 
facilities.72 
 
McComb may not have known that this was not a small request. It was, in fact, 
the largest amount the foundation had considered to date. Apparently, at least some civic 
actors were becoming aware of how much unused money the foundation had or would 
have at its disposal in short time. Requests for support became larger, such as the one 
from the Christamore House seeking board reconsideration for an earlier denial of 
funding for completion of a building. At that time, the foundation claimed that it was 
beyond its province to pay for capital projects, especially those that were already being 
supported by the Community Fund. The foundation had already decided to give the 
Community Fund another donation, this time in the amount of $10,000 [$108,000 CD] 
without it even requesting that large an amount. Foster explained to the trustees why the 
Christamore House had to build a new facility: 
You will recall that the Christamore Settlement for many years had 
maintained its work in the northeast district of our city but the 
increase of the Negro population there made social and 
recreational work for white people impracticable at that location. A 
study of the city was made […] and it was decided that the largest 
field uncovered was in Haughville, to which Christamore directed 
its attention.73 
 
This might have been Foster‟s way of making the request even more appealing 
since the move was done to avoid the Negro population and focus on poor white people 
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instead. Foster went on to say that one of their long-time workers, Miss Martha Carey, 
passed away, and other donors had contributed $20,000 [$215,000 CD] toward the 
$30,000 [$323,000 CD] necessary to complete the building. He was making the case to 
get the remaining $10,000 [$108,000 CD] because the foundation had already suffered 
bad repercussions for their decision not to fund the Christamore House the first time. The 
Christamore board let their disappointment at being rejected become known to the 
trustees, and also made it clear to them that their “work has been much handicapped 
during the past year because of [an] inability to complete their building […].”74 A little 
bad public opinion and guilt went a long way, and Foster stated that James E. Roberts‟ 
widow “was considerably disappointed our board did not deem it advisable to contribute 
to this fund.” 75 To ameliorate the damages he suggested that the building addition could 
be known as the James E. Roberts Club Rooms.  
The Christamore House, the athletic field and a proposal to help fund the 
Department of Child Hygiene to the tune of $15,000 [$161,000 CD] were all tabled for 
the next meeting later in the month. At the subsequent 23 November meeting, the trustees 
finally gave the Christamore House the $10,000 requested. The Principal from Manual 
Technical High School was officially invited to meet with the trustees at their next board 
assembly to discuss the athletic field project. The request to assist the city-run 
Department of Child Hygiene was tabled again until the new city administration took 
office at the first of the year. However, the trustees must have thought that Foster was 
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doing an outstanding job because they gave him a 20 percent raise from $5,000 to $6,000 
[$65,000 CD], one of the board‟s most decisive actions. 76 
Foster was evidently doing a lot of talking to the trustees and potential recipients 
outside of the official meetings. For instance, Foster suggested to Manual Training High 
School Principal E. H. Kemper McComb the possibility that if they were to fund the 
athletic field, it could be named after Delavan Smith as a memorial to him. Smith‟s trust 
was near the end of its extensive legal challenges, freeing almost $100,000 [$1,075,000 
CD] available for new foundation projects. McComb quickly realized the importance of 
naming the field after Smith, as well as the importance of publicizing the work of the 
foundation, and used both as leverage, musing that: 
A memorial like the one we have been discussing set up in 
connection with the activities of the school would become as 
nearly a living memorial as possible. A field like the one we 
propose to build would be used almost daily. Nearly every week 
there would be some activity there to which publicity would be 
given, and I feel pretty sure that were this field built the way we 
talked of the expression of the Delavan Smith Memorial Field 
would be appearing in the newspapers of the city with great 
frequency. What finer type of memorial could one ask than that?77 
 
The foundation redeemed itself with its donation of $10,000 [$108,000 CD] to the 
Christamore House, garnering the trustees high praise from another important constituent, 
Mrs. James E. Roberts. After being informed by letter of the foundation‟s intent, she sent 
a handwritten note that “nothing would please and delight me more than to have you 
contribute the $10,000 to the splendid work of the „Christamore Settlement,‟ not only for 
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my love of Mr. and Mrs. Carey, but my great admiration of their daughter Martha. I 
believe it was she who started this good work.”78 
The last trustee meeting of 1925 was 9 December and ended as, T. S. Eliot once 
wrote, “not with a bang but a whimper.” A discussion of a new funding request from the 
YWCA was discussed as was the meeting between J. K. Lilly and Dr. Charles White 
about a tuberculosis research bureau at the Sunnyside Sanatorium, but all of the business 
brought forth was summarily delayed until after the holidays.79 Consistent with previous 
precedents, Henry Hornbrook succeeded himself like all the other trustees by being 
appointed for another six years by the mayor of Indianapolis.80 
In the first five to six years of the Indianapolis Foundation‟s existence, the 
trustees never really embarked on any course of substantial scientific philanthropy. They 
committed to no detailed surveys to pinpoint vital community needs that might show how 
the foundation‟s funds could be best used. In fact, surveys or their results were rarely 
used and the programs and organizations that were funded were essentially decided by 
five factors: (1) the interests of a trust‟s surviving family members, as in the case of Mrs. 
James E. Roberts; (2) the trustees‟ familiarity with the organization; (3) personal and 
professional relationships between leaders of funded organizations and the trustees; (4) 
the recommendations of Eugene Foster and other experts, especially those in the medical 
fields; and (5) the potential of a project to create positive publicity and increase the 
public‟s esteem for the foundation and its directors. From 1926 through 1930 the board 
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continued this pattern of operation, with a few highlights, therefore a summary of those 
years is in order to contextualize the decision to step outside its original purpose 
statement to fund the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra in the early 1930s during the 
Great Depression. 
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The Continuation of Previously Funded Programs, 1926-1933 
The funding table in the appendix, which is based on annual financial reports 
from the Indianapolis Foundation archives, tracks what projects continued to get funded, 
what programs were started new, and what organizations had their funding cancelled. By 
following the money, the foundation‟s priorities before and directly after the stock market 
crash of 1929 are blatantly apparent. Common sense would lead one to predict that more 
money would be given post-‟29, at the greatest time of need, to relieve suffering in areas 
of food, shelter and employment assistance. To assist the reader to better comprehend and 
contextualize the sizeable amount of money being granted during this crucial time, dollar 
amounts are only listed in 2004 Constant Dollars [CD]. 
One of the first programs of the foundation, the Indianapolis Employment Bureau, 
continued to be substantially funded by the trustees until 1930, when funding temporarily 
ceased. Before that, from 1926-1929, their funding by the foundation remained between 
$120,000 to $130,000 CD per year. After 1930 funding continued for another three years, 
declining in 1933 to only $57,000 CD. That was the last year the Indianapolis Foundation 
supported it, presumably because of the Federal WPA programs and the work of the 
government employment agencies. From 1926-1933, the Indianapolis Foundation 
invested a total of $857,000 CD in the Indianapolis Employment Bureau, for a total of 
more than $1 million CD since 1924 when they helped create it. Results, in terms of 
workers successfully placed in permanent jobs, were limited at best and always ran along 
racial lines. 
The Indianapolis Community Fund was a major recipient during this time, 
especially after the stock market crashed in 1929. From 1926 to 1929, it received more 
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than $450,000 CD, but during the years of 1930 through 1933, that amount more than 
doubled to over $950,000 CD, making the total foundation support in excess of $1.5 
million CD. Since the community fund helped feed, shelter and clothe those in need, it 
would only follow that the foundation trustees would invest more resources in that 
institution at this deeply troubling time in local and American economic history. 
Even through the early years of the Great Depression, funding increased for the 
two projects that had received Mrs. Roberts‟ blessing: the James E. Roberts Visiting 
Nurse for Crippled Children and the James E. Roberts School for handicapped and 
crippled children. The Visiting Nurse Program increased from $53,000 CD in 1926 to 
$124,000 CD in 1933, adding $713,000 in funding during that eight-year period. The 
school more than doubled from $105,000 CD to $230,000 CD, for a total of $1.2 million 
granted in the same period. The Visiting Nurses program continued to receive funding 
well into the early 1950s and the school received funding until 1947, demonstrating that 
having a donor‟s, or one of his relative‟s, interest in your cause had significant 
implications for the sustainability of funding from a community foundation. These funds 
were clearly more donor-directed and not subject to the priorities or fickleness of trustees 
who have their own fractious views of what a community really needs. 
The trustees‟ venture into the world of “mental hygiene” did not go quite as well. 
Their funding of the City Hospital psychiatric ward was short lived, beginning in 1926 
and ending in 1929. The trustees invested $210,000 CD over the three years, but decided 
to discontinue their support, after they realized that this was a huge long-term 
undertaking with a negligible return on their investment both in terms of the program‟s 
“cure” rate as well as positive publicity. The Sunnyside Sanatorium‟s research facility for 
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tuberculoses did get funded for several years but was also discontinued in 1933. Funded 
at $37,000 CD in 1926, the amounts declined steadily until a final grant of $7,000 CD in 
1933, culminating in a total of $230,000 CD. This program was a solid one for the 
foundation as it helped young people and others who were ill, and most people at least 
knew of someone with the dreaded disease. Therefore, its funding was publically 
justifiable and the effort earned the foundation trustees a warm public relations payoff.  
Efforts to help black men and women received the trustees‟ nominal attention and 
then mostly for the appearance of trying to do good. The $500 [$5,300 CD] that the 
colored orphanage received in 1926 was the first and last foundation gift the orphanage 
ever received. There was a later study commissioned to look at establishing a colored 
hospital, because black citizens either were not allowed to enter a hospital for whites, or 
did not for fear of retribution. The study‟s cost was a pitiful grand total of $2,100 CD. 
Imagine the inferior quality of such a study today if it were funded at that same level. 
Repeating a consistent pattern of commissioning and then ignoring studies, nothing was 
ever implemented as a result of its completion. One must be reminded that this was 
during a time when the Ku Klux Klan was not only strong throughout the country, but 
was also particularly well established in Indiana State Government. It would be hard to 
imagine that any of the elite trustees really cared about the plight of “colored” people, as 
they were often referred to at that time, or that their attitudes would be any different than 
most white people of the time. Although we might hope for enlightenment and wisdom 
from a group of men who had substantial power, resources, and potential to shape the 
future, they proved through their funding decisions that they were more concerned about 
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their image than relieving the oppression and poverty of this growing minority population 
in the city.  
The Alphonso Pettis Scholarship Fund continued until 1929, when it was 
discontinued due to the Great Depression. The years from 1930 through 1932 were not 
funded, since fewer students were attending college and other community needs were 
more pressing. Scholarship funding resumed in 1933 and 1934. From 1926 to 1934, the 
Indianapolis Schools received more than $222,000 CD, but the Alphonso Pettis 
Scholarship Fund program was dropped forever after that.  
In spite of the trustees‟ fickle disbursement of the Pettis Funds, it is clear that they 
understood the concept of offering up fulsome gratitude toward such a major donor. On 
August 16, 1928, an article in the Indianapolis Star highlighted the celebration of 
Alphonso Pettis‟ 98th birthday and Eugene Foster sent a letter of congratulations to Pettis 
on behalf of the Indianapolis Foundation. Foster also sent a booklet to Pettis in Nice, 
titled “A Report of Four Years‟ Development of the Indianapolis Foundation, Presented 
to Mr. Alphonso P. Pettis, Nice, France, on His Ninety-eighth Birthday Anniversary, 
August Sixteen, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight, by the Trustees of the Indianapolis 
Foundation.” The booklet stated that Pettis‟ donation “comes from a living donor who 
has the pleasure and satisfaction during his lifetime of seeing beneficent results accrue 
from his gift […] [his gift] also has proved an inspiration and encouragement to other 
donors looking for an opportunity to serve their fellow men and posterity.” The article 
also stated that Pettis had given $300,000 to the foundation, in spite of never having been 
a resident of Indianapolis, and that much of his fortune was made through ventures in the 
city, such as a dry goods store.  
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The board‟s high ambition to always satisfy a donors‟ intent can be seen in 
the wording of Eugene Foster‟s letter to Pettis, which stated: 
We trust that as you review [the booklet] you will find some share 
of satisfaction and gratification in the gift you have made to 
Indianapolis through the foundation, which I am sure Indianapolis 
has experienced in the benefits derived there from. We feel 
especially pleased with and indebted to you because yours was the 
first gift to the foundation, and coming to us from a donor who has 
lived to see beneficent results accrue from his gift we feel that we 
have been unusually favored and honored. We are hoping that your 
own life has been enriched and blessed in giving as the better life 
of Indianapolis has been in receiving.81  
 
But not everyone was pleased with how the foundation was disbursing Pettis‟ 
largesse to the community. On 4 September 1928, a hand-written letter came to the 
foundation from M. Paith -Pettis, the adopted daughter of Alphonso Pettis. It is 
reproduced here in full because it represents a more personal look into Pettis‟ life and 
gives us a glimpse of the turmoil by the families of wealthy donors and the power they 
sought to yield over the trusts. His adopted daughter wrote: 
Sir, 
My dear, venerable father, Mr. A. P. Pettis, whose adopted 
daughter I am, not being able to write on account of his weak 
eyesight, begs me to thank you for the beautiful Report-book 
which you were so kind to send him and which he read with great 
interest.82 
 
It is interesting that this man had such terrible eyesight but could still read the 
foundation report. It is also interesting that his helpful daughter also took the liberty of 
dismissing as undeserving most of the recipients, suggesting ways in which his donation 
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should be spent, all the while denigrating the rest of the Pettis‟ family (note the martyred 
tone): 
He was pleased to know that the money he gave to the 
“Indianapolis Foundation” is spent to relieve some human 
suffering physical [and] moral. We see you do much good for 
human creatures who, in many cases deserve it so little, and who, 
generally are so ungrateful. Could not a part of that money be 
spared to relieve also the suffering of poor animals, cast out dogs 
and cats, for which a clinic might be established to put them 
painlessly to death or to nurse them and find kind masters who 
would take care of them? We spoke of this, my venerable father 
and I, and he approved of it. The animal world is a great mystery --
-- one finds, sometimes, more intelligence and more feeling in a 
dog than in some human beings, and animals are at least grateful.  
My dear father thanks you also for the booklet and, particularly, 
for the two very kind letters he received from you and the good 
wishes you sent to him for his anniversary. He appreciated that 
delicate attention of yours which touched him much. He is a good, 
noble hearted man, with a great serenity and happy disposition of 
mind. […] 
 
Since he distributed his wealth to his numerous nephews and 
nieces, he has been deserted by them who do not write to him 
anymore – even the two Indianapolis grand nieces, Mrs. 
Bookwalter and Mrs. Hall, to whom he has been so generous, as 
well as to their parents. Also, his nephew, Charles Wesley 
Bressler, who pledged himself to stay with his uncle to the end, 
and who, on account of that pledge, had the largest share, has left 
him; finding his uncle lasted too long, he went back to America, 
got married and continues in rambling all over the world, to enjoy 
himself with his uncle‟s money. He never earned a cent and styles 
himself a Doctor! Nobody has ever seen his diploma --- such is 
human gratitude! So, we have no one to whom we could present 
your booklet, as you so courteously suggest, but we thank you all 
the same for the kind offer. Excuse, please, the length of this letter, 
but those explanations were, I think, necessary.  
My dear venerable father sends you his kindest regards and I beg 
you to believe me, sir.83 
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On March 6, 1929, the Indianapolis Star announced the death of Alphonso Pettis, 
which had occurred the prior month in France. More news of Pettis came from Howard 
M. Gay, the vice-president of the Pettis Company. Gay had subsequently received a cable 
from Pettis‟ great nephew, Bressler Pettis, now living in Revoilbenounif, a French 
outpost in the Sahara desert. According to the cable, Alphonso Pettis had been living in 
France for the past 25 years with his adopted daughter and was survived by many 
relatives, three of whom lived in Indianapolis. They were listed as: Indianapolis: Two 
nieces, Mrs. John Bookwalter and Mrs. William P. Hall; and a nephew Dr. Charles 
Bressler Pettis. In the U.S.: Nieces: Mrs. Alice S. Eldridge of Springfield, MA; Mrs. Lena 
D. Hamilton and Mrs. Abbie L. Kellogg of Feeding Hills, MA; and Mrs. Bertha E Russell 
of Palmer, MA. Nephews: Alphonso B. Roberts of East Hampton, MA and Charles Pettis 
of Springfield, MA.84 Later, during the Great Depression, these so-called loving relatives 
all challenged the validity of the Pettis trust in the attempt to reclaim the fortune 
Alphonso Pettis had willed to the Indianapolis Foundation. This litigation, so common in 
dysfunctional and charitable elite families, caused the Indianapolis Foundation to suspend 
all use of Pettis‟ funds while the lawsuits wound their way through the courts. 
At this same time, another trust that had been in litigation, the Delavan Smith 
fund, was now finally free of legal entanglements and its funds were available. From 
1926 through 1929, the Delavan Smith Athletic Field at the Manual Training High 
School was funded from the formerly contested trust of Delavan Smith to the tune of $1.8 
million CD. To the foundation‟s credit, it also supplied a Delavan Smith Scholarship fund 
to the school from 1927 through 1934, with a total outlay of more than $830,000 CD. 
Both the Pettis and the Smith Scholarships funds were discontinued in 1934 without 
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explanation. In 1935, the foundation contributed new funds under a “General 
Scholarship” category for the Indianapolis schools and this program extended into at least 
the early 1950s. Yet the fact that the trustees invested $1.8 million dollars for a high 
school athletic field creates an ever-deepening understanding that the lens that the 
wealthy elite used to define “community need” was a very different view than that of the 
citizens who were attempting to hold on to the lowest rungs of Maslow‟s hierarchy of 
need, a reality from which the trustees were well insulated. 
 Given the scope of the projects that the Indianapolis Foundation Funded or 
considered funding during its first few years, the influence of the elite lens is evident. 
Most of the programs were those championed by elite donors, or the business and 
professional elite who pressed for employment bureaus and vocational training as their 
contribution to relieve the suffering of those most in need. The elite bankers also weighed 
in as powerful influencers who attempted to control the largesse of the foundation as 
evidenced by the Indiana Trust Company‟s attempt to hold on to the very money it had 
given away in the form of student scholarships. These attempts by the foundation‟s elite 
creators, trustees, associates and recipients to view and define community need through 
their limited lens becomes even more evident when the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra 
is funded and justified as vitally important to the citizens of Indianapolis. 
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New Programs Funded, 1926-1933 
 There were few new programs funded by the foundation at this time that garnered 
any degree of funding longevity. Most of those funded for extended periods of time from 
1926 to 1933 tended to be either health programs, programs for children, or education 
related programs. For example, St. Margaret‟s Guild received a total of $256,000 CD for 
an occupational therapy program, a Sight Conservation Class was funded to the tune of 
$19,000 CD, as well as a program for the hard of hearing at $8,000 CD. There was also 
short-term support for the Boys Club, the Board of Health for Prenatal and Orthodontia 
services, occupational therapy at City Hospital, the Children‟s Aid Society and the Child 
Guidance Clinic. The education programs included scholarships for teachers, free 
kindergarten classes and the Teachers College of Indianapolis. In its early years, the 
Indianapolis Foundation clearly reinforced locally the historic propensity of 
philanthropists to advance medicine and education as the highest forms of western, 
professionalized benevolence. Again, one finds no funding at all for any of the 
performing or visual arts, and little mention of such support in the foundation‟s board 
meetings. That pattern was about to change dramatically when the “need” for a 
symphony arose. 
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Chapter 6: The Indianapolis Foundation’s Funding of the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra, 1933-1966 
 
From its establishment in 1916 through 1933, there was no precedent-setting 
funding of the performing or visual arts in spite of requests to do so. That pattern of 
support changed in the summer of 1930, at the beginning of the Great Depression, when 
the first arts organization to be funded by the Indianapolis Foundation was born -- the 
Indianapolis State Orchestra Society. As the orchestra toured less through the state of 
Indiana, it was later renamed the Indianapolis Symphony Society. Both iterations of this 
society were created for the sole purpose of supporting the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra (ISO). For the purposes of simplicity, any reference to either of these societies 
or to the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra will be referred to as the ISO. The symphony 
was first formed as a “co-operative cultural organization,” which meant that the 
musicians were not paid a set salary but earned money from the net proceeds of each 
concert. In the beginning, the founders touted with pride that it relied on “no one for 
endowments and subventions,” a fact that changed significantly within a short period of 
time. Its initial purpose was to “foster music in Indianapolis and afford opportunity to 
talented musicians of the city for expression and sustained interest in their art.”1 
In 1931, the new orchestra decided that it was time to expand the organization‟s 
prestige and financial base by soliciting influential members of the community to become 
members of the Indiana State Orchestra Society. In the spring of that same year, orchestra 
promoters sent a letter to one hundred prominent people throughout Indianapolis and 
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Indiana, inviting their membership in the society. The director of the Indianapolis 
Foundation, Eugene C. Foster, received one such invitation. The orchestra had been 
discouraged by scanty attendance at its first four concerts, and was just about to disband 
when “a large group of people” deemed it worthy of new support.2 The society‟s purpose 
was to encourage the continuation of the orchestra through enhanced financial support. In 
return, new members were promised preferred seating when they purchased a season 
ticket for the 1931-32 season.
3
 
To impress upon recipients what a special opportunity this was, the letter 
proclaimed that the orchestra was “so unusual that the news magazine Time has published 
an article about it – and which the Chicago Tribune expects to feature and describe in its 
music and drama departments!” Putting the ISO in this national celebrity light was 
important because one of the main points of the letter was to form a board of directors of 
wealthy people who were interested “in the civic and cultural advantages offered by such 
an organization.” The invitation letter also stated that there would be little problem in 
presenting concerts to other parts of the state as transportation was of minimal cost. 
However, in the years to come, this vision of traveling concerts proved difficult to 
achieve. Letter recipients were urged to respond before the next concert so that the new 
board could be announced at the event. The letter also stated that the board members 
would not be solicited for financial contributions.
4
  
The letter was convincing enough to establish a prestigious slate for the new 
board of directors of the Indiana State Orchestra Society. The letter also revealed an 
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important direct connection to the Indianapolis Foundation, as Eugene Foster, the 
Indianapolis Foundation‟s director, was also listed as a founding board member of the 
Indiana State Orchestra Society. It was under Foster‟s leadership that the foundation 
made its first grant to any arts organization in the form of a gift of $50 [$724 CD] to the 
ISO. It is also significant that Eli Lilly, son of one of the foundation‟s founding directors,  
J. K. Lilly, was also a founding member of the orchestra society.  
Requests for ISO support had been submitted to the Indianapolis Foundation for a 
few years before the first grant was made. The first request to the Indianapolis 
Foundation for symphony money came in person by George Calvert of the Indianapolis 
Clearing House Association. A memo signed with the initials E.C.F., assumed to be 
Eugene C. Foster, recorded the meeting as having taken place on January 8, 1931. Calvert 
explained that several attempts had been made in the past to start a symphony but all had 
failed, and that this orchestra was now being guided by the best leadership yet. He 
insisted that the symphony could be of service to the city and that with some help could 
be self-sustaining through the performance of concerts in other towns. Foster replied that 
the Pettis Trust Fund was not generating any income at the time, and no funds were 
available. He stated that when money was available, Calvert should send a letter to the 
foundation trustees.
5
 
The first formal symphony society letter requesting financial support came March 
4, 1931 and was addressed personally to Eugene Foster. The solicitation letter was signed 
by the president of the Chamber of Commerce, Louis Borinstein, and by Ferdinand 
Shaeffer, the director of the ISO. It was written on the Indianapolis Chamber of 
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Commerce stationery, with the names of interested parties listed at the end. The authors 
explained that the orchestra‟s concerts for that year had been successful but not well 
attended. The letter‟s authors requested a luncheon with Foster at the Chamber of 
Commerce to discuss “plans for helping the orchestra both for their final concert on April 
19, and for next season.”6 Since the Indianapolis Foundation recorded no funding for the 
symphony in 1931, it can be assumed that the luncheon appeal either never took place or 
that the meeting was unsuccessful. In 1932, another letter from the society, now named 
the Indiana Symphony Society, went to the foundation, this time signed by the society‟s 
president, Herman C. Wolf. This letter, again addressed to Eugene Foster, gave a brief 
history of the symphony‟s accomplishments and challenges, especially the extremely low 
wages paid to its musicians: 
We need your help very badly. We do not feel that we can again 
ask our musicians to play for a wage that is hardly more than a day 
laborer‟s. Can you put this matter before your board and invite 
their attention to these facts: 
(a) That a symphony orchestra “hall marks” a city and its 
cultural life. 
(b) That the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra has proven 
itself and made a sure place for itself in our community. 
(c) That the value of the children‟s concerts is constructive, 
outstanding and of cultural promise. 
(d) That the orchestra desperately needs and is worthy of help 
from the Indianapolis Foundation. 
May I anticipate a frank letter from you covering the points 
outlined in this letter? 
7
 
 
A year and a half after receiving Wolf‟s letter, the Indianapolis Foundation finally 
responded on 12 December 1933 with the good news that a small gift from the estate of 
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Robert Leiber, who was interested in music and cultural development, had been given to 
the foundation. As the letter explained, “We are designating $50 [$724 CD] per year for 
three years to your Association to be used for a limited number of scholarships for the 
youth of our city who otherwise would be unable to attend and profit by your programs 
[…]. We regret that our interest in your association cannot be expressed by a larger 
financial gift.”8 Here is a case where the foundation gave money for the purpose of 
scholarships which was never mentioned or requested by the beneficiary, showing the 
Indianapolis Foundation trustees unilaterally deciding what was best for an organization 
and the community, rather than responding to the expressed needs of an organization. 
True, it was the Great Depression and the foundation was probably hard pressed to justify 
supporting an orchestra at a time when many in the community were out of work and 
going hungry. Regardless, Foster and the trustees always sought maximum public 
relations benefit for their acts, even for the smallest grants, and for those unrelated to the 
recipient‟s actual, expressed needs. The foundation was anxious to have its name 
associated with funding the symphony, and their modest gift was given with the condition 
that “among your list of patrons we will be pleased to have you include the name of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, Robert Leiber bequest.”9  
 A local radio address from the 1930s attempted to justify spending money on the 
ISO during the depression. Whether this broadcast came in response to public criticism 
concerning the ISO‟s philanthropic funding or not is unknown, but the message certainly 
strove to make the case for supporting symphonies even during very hard times:  
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I have been requested to speak to you, fellow listeners, on the 
social significance of a Symphony Orchestra, or majestic 
music….For ages we have been taught that “Music hath charms to 
soothe the savage beast.” It can drive out of the mind unhealthy 
depression, and fill it with beauty. … During the Great War we all 
recall the part that music played in refreshing and restoring 
breaking and broken spirit and morale. …many unemployed 
homeless men have had to be cared for [and] musical programs 
more than any other thing have helped to crowd out discontent and 
restore morale. … With these things in mind, it would seem that 
Indianapolis and Indiana are fortunate to be planning a special 
musical treat for our citizens at just this time, this time in which 
many of our minds are troubled with problems and financial cares 
and perplexities. Out of this period of depression perhaps there 
may come a greater appreciation of those things which money 
cannot buy…Let the music speak to you…and take you with it into 
beautiful thoughts and tender memories…until you are relaxed, 
refreshed and restored. …Appreciation of good music in childhood 
may develop genius and creative artists…Symphony Orchestras 
have ever been a great school of opportunity for musical genius 
and music appreciation. …I hope Indianapolis will not fail to take 
advantage of this opportunity for the enrichment of its individual 
and community life.
10
 
  
Radio, at this time, was a new and unique broadcast medium. The Symphony 
Society and its network of local supporters apparently used a variety of novel methods, 
urging the community to appreciate the need for classical music and a vibrant ISO. The 
preparation of such innovative media appeals suggests broader public confusion, or even 
dissent, over the proper use of philanthropic gifts at a time of great economic dislocation 
and hardship. 
 To me, the radio address script indicates that there was dissent from those in the 
community who saw no need for, or benefit in, philanthropic subsidies to symphony 
orchestras or other arts organizations. The address sounds to be an attempt to remedy 
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popular disinterest in the arts and to pre-empt any critical response to philanthropic arts 
funding in Depression times. It insists that although many do not care for music, they 
should, or at least would, if they would only listen to it long enough, stating: 
[…] anyone may have this happiness in his life who will take the 
trouble to listen. Suppose you have not found the fullest enjoyment 
in such concerts. Let‟s go again and again,- and in spite of those 
who do not listen, in spite of those who looked bored, you will find 
here and there those who are radiantly happy in the melodies they 
are hearing. That same happiness is yours for the listening.
11
  
 
This evangelistic tone is remarkably reminiscent of a cleric trying to attract the un-
churched to the benefits of worship. It also begs the question: was ISO funding driven by 
true community need or by zealous elite advocates seeking flattering entertainment and 
enhanced social status for the discriminating, elite few? It must also be emphasized here 
once again that when we speak of defining community need through the lens of the elite, 
this includes all elites that were associated with the Indianapolis Foundation, such as the 
wealthy elites that represented the chamber of commerce and those that founded and 
advocated for the ISO.  
The unbidden scholarship grant continued for two years, and the symphony‟s 
fundraising tenacity finally paid off in 1935 when a letter from the foundation to the ISO 
in July announced that the board of trustees “voted to appropriate the amount of $1300.00 
[$18,493 CD], which we trust will cover the cost of two children‟s concerts for the 
ensuing year.” Building its own generous public repute, the foundation required that 
future symphony programs clearly acknowledge both the Leiber Memorial donation and 
the Indianapolis Foundation by name for the new grant. The letter stated “we shall be 
pleased to have this same caption continued and for the $1300 [$17,808 CD] item we will 
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appreciate mention of the same in the name of the Indianapolis Foundation.”12 The check 
was sent on September 16, 1935, fully establishing what was to become long tradition of 
funding in exchange for public recognition.
 13
 
A draft of a press release shortly thereafter from the president of the Symphony 
Society stated that performing concerts for school children was the most important work 
of the orchestra. This endeavor made concerts available to school children who would not 
normally have access to such cultural benefits. We see here how U.S. arts organizations 
were quick to capitalize on a general and growing preoccupation with child services, and 
exploit children as prime targets of philanthropic betterment among elite American 
donors and public service organizations throughout this era. A major reason for this 
preoccupation was the unfortunate spike in the number of orphans in the early part of the 
twentieth-century, from over 50,000 in 1880 to more than 142,000 in 1923. No doubt, a 
major cause in this three-fold increase was the loss of fathers in World War 1, which was 
coupled with the inability of poor, unskilled, newly single mothers to support their 
children. As there was no government support or subsidy for these fractured families, 
fraternal societies stepped in to fill the void. During this same time, 1880 to 1922, 
fraternal societies, such as the Moose and the Masons, created 71 new orphanages.
14
 
Savvy leadership proved this pertinent appeal to be invaluable to the ISO‟s fundraising 
success. 
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It is no coincidence that the minutes of the July 1935 board meeting revealed that 
one of the six trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation, Thomas D. Scheerin, was also 
simultaneously a board member of the ISO when the foundation‟s greater gift to the 
symphony was awarded, with Scheerin recorded as voting in favor of the large gift 
increase to the symphony.
15
 Scheerin was also a banker and a member of the Indianapolis 
“Blue Book” society, and was yet another key relationship that now clearly existed 
between the trustees of the foundation and the symphony‟s board of directors. Such 
overlapping contacts and directorships among midwestern cultural and philanthropic 
elites were a key determinant in how funds for “community” development were granted, 
a practice that continues to this day in many foundations.
16
  
In September 1936, Jacob Mueller, president of the ISO, wrote another letter 
requesting funds and followed up with a phone call to Eugene Foster, and in October, the 
symphony funding from the Indianapolis Foundation took another leap. Foster replied to 
Mueller that the foundation had voted to increase its contribution by $650 [$8,800 CD] to 
cover the cost of an additional children‟s concert, bringing their total contribution for that 
year to $2000 [$27,027 CD].
17
  
In November 1936, an ISO bulletin gave an outline of the young organization‟s 
accomplishments, failures and future plans. Although their efforts at increasing 
attendance and season ticket sales had succeeded, they still had not expanded their reach 
across the state of Indiana. As a memo from the executive committee stated, its 
organization name, Indiana State Society, was “pretentious” because “so far, in spite of 
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undeniably increasing prestige, it has amounted to only an Indianapolis organization.” 
However, a symphony committee, chaired by Mrs. Herbert Woollen, planned to expand 
their concerts into other areas of the state. Here we see another elite link between the 
Indianapolis Foundation and the symphony, in that Mrs. Woollen‟s husband was a cousin 
to trust company president Evans Woollen, the orchestrator of the creation of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, and both men became officers of the American Central Life 
Company in 1914. Mrs. Woollen‟s social status proved helpful in soliciting favorable 
responses from the letters she sent to several hundred potential new donors across the 
state.
18
 
The Indiana State Symphony Society, Inc. gained official incorporation April 
1937 – four full years after they received their first grant from the Indianapolis 
Foundation. In fact, according to IRS records, the society did not fully attain its Federal 
Tax Exempt status until September 29, 1943. 
19
 This shows an early example of the often 
informal nature of American philanthropic organizations frequently created in a rush of 
enthusiasm for self-glorifying civic improvements among wealthy citizens, as well as 
how slowly these organizations were brought into conformity with government 
regulations applicable to charities. Although the IRS had created exemptions for 
nonprofit organizations starting in 1917, very few nonprofits registered as such. This was 
mostly due to the fact that income tax and corporate tax was low and most organizations 
did not create enough income to justify such action. This changed starting 1942 when 
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Congress voted to invoke progressive personal and corporate income which could be 
quite steep.
20
 
Members of the local civic elite in Indianapolis who dominated the symphony 
board rigorously controlled the access of others into its ranks. One filter became the 
importance of contributing money to the organization in order to be placed under 
consideration for board membership. This was evident from the very beginning of the 
society and got codified in its bylaws, Article II, Sections 2 through 4. These sections 
state different levels of membership. A membership contribution of $5 to $25 [$66 to 
$329 CD] made one an “Annual Associate.” Gifts between $25 to $100 [$329 to $1,315 
CD] earned a “Sustaining Associate.” Only if a member contributed $100 [$1,315 CD] or 
more, he or she would be considered an “Active Member” and eligible for election to the 
board by its directors. Additionally, only “Active Members” had voting rights, thereby 
securely placing power over the direction of the organization in the hands of the very 
wealthy.
21
 Therefore, only the wealthy could attain such membership privileges in order 
to be enfranchised to shape the society‟s development and direction.  
The social importance of one‟s place on the society‟s organizational ladder could 
not be overestimated, especially among the wives of the wealthy. On April 20, 1937, the 
new members of the ISO held their first board meeting at the exclusive Columbia Club 
where participants created the new Women‟s Board. Mrs.  J. K. Lilly became its 
chairman and Mrs. Frederick Ayres, of the L. S. Ayres department store fame and 
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fortune, became its first vice-chairman.
22
 Once again, the common dominating presence 
in early 20
th
-century American philanthropy was men and women enriched by urban, 
commercial and mercantile entrepreneurial wealth. The Lilly family grew wealthy from 
the innovative development and marketing of pharmaceuticals, while the Ayres 
dominated local mass-merchandise retailing via department stores. The emerging socio-
cultural and socio-political influence of elite bourgeois women was gained via their 
competitions for prominence in the governance of reputable civic charities. As author 
Kathleen McCarthy states of the charitable involvement of elite women, they “couched 
their claims to public authority in terms of their ethical purity […].”23 
One example of this fierce competition among wealthy women for these claims to 
public authority came only ten days after the ISO‟s Women‟s Board was created. On 
April 30, another board meeting was held where certain members contested the 
leadership of the Women‟s Committee and as a result the power was immediately 
reshuffled. Mrs.  J. K. Lilly had dropped from the prestigious chairman‟s position to 
second vice-president and Mrs. Frederick Ayres ascended to the chairman‟s position, 
which now held the title of president. Mrs. A.J. Beveridge moved from third vice-
chairman to second vice-president, and Mrs. Charles Latham retained her position as 
third vice-president. The titles of these positions were changed from “chairman” to 
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“president” in a very short period of time, no doubt because the term “president” was 
imbued with more social prestige, and was more gender neutral.
24
  
The turmoil within the women‟s committee continued until the meeting of May 
1937, when the positions were revised again, with those who were not presidents or vice-
presidents being named as “officers of the Women‟s Committee.” This shows, again, the 
importance of titles among this small circle of elite women, and how charities were used 
to enhance their public image. It was noted that “a committee of four, consisting of Mrs. 
Ayres, Mrs. Beveridge, Mr. Ball and Dr. Clowes, shall meet to discuss the problems of 
the Women‟s Committee.” The jockeying for position to obtain the title of one of these 
unpaid, volunteer board officers was so important to these women that the first two 
months of the board‟s existence was wholly dominated by intense political battles, 
demonstrating that the female as well as the male elite used these organizations to not 
only lay claim to their efforts to improve the culture of the community, but also as 
vehicles for their own self-aggrandizement.  
May 1937 also marked the first time prices were set for the choicest season seats 
to the symphony‟s performances: lower boxes, $200 [$2,632 CD]; second group $250 
[$3,289 CD]; upper boxes from $150 to $175 [$1,974 to $2,303 CD].
25
 This was based 
on a twenty-week season and ten different performances.
26
 These prices reflected the 
demarcations of the rungs and ranks of Indianapolis high society. 
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 The very close relationships between the creators and trustees of the Indianapolis 
Foundation and the ISO board members continued to multiply. A foundation letter 
informing the ISO of the 1937 grant for $5,000 (dictated 5 November 1937) was signed 
by Eugene Foster and went to Dr. G.H.A. Clowes, Director of Research at Eli Lilly & 
Company, in response to Clowes‟ request for the funds just a day before.27 This means a 
symphony board member benefitted exclusively from a surprising one-day turnaround of 
$66,000 CD, 24 hours from grant proposal to grant funding. This is a stunning response 
time for philanthropic action by any measure, unless one considers that at this same time,  
J. K. Lilly, president of Eli Lilly & Company and boss of Dr. Clowes, was also serving as 
a trustee of the Indianapolis Foundation. Thus, at the highest echelon of Indianapolis‟ 
industrial bourgeoisie, thick connections of professional service and inside friendship 
guaranteed near-immediate funding streams from elite philanthropists to their pet cultural 
organizations.  
Supplicants for foundation aid who lacked such personal or professional ties to 
agents of the organization often went begging. This is evidenced by the foundation‟s 
rejection of grant appeals from Grace Wilson Evans, president of the Indiana State 
Federation of Colored Women‟s Clubs. Evans wrote in October 1937 requesting 
foundation funds to open a training school for “colored girls” in the State Club Home. 
Evans‟ proposal reached the foundation three weeks before the symphony‟s request. The 
foundation rejected Evans‟ request on the same day it granted the $5,000 [$66,000 CD] to 
the symphony. Foster wrote to Evans, stating “Our Board has given consideration to your 
request and I regret to advise you that it is not in a position to make any appropriation to 
                                                          
27
 Dr. G. H. A. Clowes, Letter, by Eugene C. Foster, November 5, 1937, Box 65/14. 
 229 
your project for Indianapolis colored women at this time.” 28 In Indianapolis, as elsewhere 
in midwestern cities, local “community” foundations at this time existed to serve and 
promote a very narrow range of “civilized” organizations, largely confined within the 
social circles of wealthy white, Protestant males and their wives. Such funding streams 
regularly excluded organizations directed by, or limited to benefit, ethnic and religious 
minorities of any kind. The class-based and sectarian nature of “community” foundation 
operations is blatantly demonstrated in this instance as it is in many cited before. 
Although Foster claimed that he “regretted” the decision, he in fact recommended 
to the board that the organization not be funded and that he “would be willing to try to 
answer any questions you have regarding this matter.”29 The minutes of the meeting at 
which the funding of the training school was rejected noted that “the Director was 
instructed to advise that our foundation is not in a position to make this appropriation.”30 
The language of the trustees here perhaps reveals more than they intended. They spoke of 
“our foundation” versus the “Indianapolis Foundation.” To me, this unguarded comment 
reveals the very proprietary attitude the trustees had regarding the foundation and its 
funding priorities. It is a statement of personal, not community, ownership, as though 
they are saying; “Our foundation only funds our kind of philanthropies and exists to 
satisfy our wishes regarding the proper endowment and embellishment of our community 
needs as we view them.” 
This self-serving decision must be put into the historical context of a deeply 
segregated Indianapolis, and the common, avowedly racist public policy of the 1930‟s. 
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But it is equally clear that the board‟s view that the proper, imperative local need for 
classical music, whether shared widely by the citizenry or not, took far greater priority 
over the charitable education of female African-Americans. This lack of the foundation‟s 
commitment to the welfare of local African-Americans and its persistently informal and 
unprofessional funding process is further illustrated in the March 1938 meeting minutes. 
Here, the board responded to a request for $6,000 [$81,080 CD] from the Flanner House 
to conduct a “Community Study of Indianapolis with Particular References of the 
Negro.” This proposal included a two-page letter and a detailed, seven-page outline of 
how the project would be conducted. This documentation far exceeded the explanatory 
paperwork submitted by any other organization that year, especially requests from the 
symphony.
31
 In predictable manner, the board declined the Flanner House projects, 
stating in the minutes that “the Director was requested to advise the officers of the 
Flanner House that the survey as presented seems beyond the scope of what our 
foundation could assist in doing, but that reconsideration could be given this matter at a 
later meeting.”32 Note again the reference to “our foundation” and to “the scope” of 
foundation operations normally excluding sociological or political investigations, 
especially when concerning urban minorities. This is further evidence of how U.S. 
community foundations commonly both policed and reinforced the class and racial lines 
of early twentieth-century U.S. cities. 
Foster wrote to Dr. Winders, the president of Flanner House the next day, 
explaining that “a more modest programme might conceivably be developed in 
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conference with this office and to which sympathetic consideration could be given.”33 
Direct tutelage from foundation executives to Flanner House personnel resulted in a 
modified request of $4,000 [$54,054 CD]. With this intervention, Foster could justify 
funding because a “less ambitious study is now contemplated and […] might prove a 
wise investment.” 34  
Compare this process of intervention with the near automatic funding of the 
symphony. Clowes wrote for funds again on 5 December 1938, making an additional 
request just a month after the last grant from the foundation for another $5,000 [$67,000 
CD] for the next year. Foster promptly responded two weeks later with the promise of 
another grant for $5,000 [$67,000 CD] for the 1938-39 season. The funds were sent only 
two days later. Like clockwork, a year later on 22 December 1939, another letter was sent 
to Clowes and another $5,000 [$68,000] was speedily approved for the 1939-40 season.
 35
 
Conversations and letters in 1939 also set the groundwork for a symphony endowment 
fund to be managed by the Indianapolis Foundation. In July, Foster wrote to Franklin 
Miner, the manager of the ISO, that the board believed “such a fund quite within the 
direction of our foundation… [and the accrued earnings would] be directed to your 
Society as you might choose to receive them.”36 A memo in August 1939 by Foster noted 
that a pledge had been made for $3,000 [$41,000 CD], and that $1,000 had already been 
received with another one thousand to be received within a few weeks. These funds 
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established the symphony‟s endowment under close foundation management and 
control.
37
 For Foster and the trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation, the needs of the 
symphony orchestra regularly trumped further investigations of urban sociology that 
might have improved conditions for those in need.  
The foundation‟s commitment to the symphony increased again in March 1941 
when it unilaterally upped the symphony‟s funding to $5,500 [$65,000 CD].38 Evidently, 
the funding had been delayed by several months due to the inability of the board to meet 
and the ISO had experienced a larger than usual deficit as a result of uncertainty 
concerning he 1940 race for U.S. president and the raging European war.
39
 Again, 
Clowes acknowledged the importance of his association with  J. K. Lilly, who was 
chairman of the Indianapolis Foundation at that time. He wrote to Foster, “I appreciate 
the way you and Mr. Lilly and the members of the Indianapolis Foundation Board have 
co-operated with us in the support of the orchestra and I can truthfully state that I do not 
believe the orchestra could have survived the somewhat precarious times we have had, 
had it not been for your most generous support.”40  
If there remains any doubt that  J. K. Lilly‟s dual status as corporate and 
foundation leader had vital influence over the funding of the ISO, this can now be 
dispelled by a series of letters in 1942. The foundation was short on funds immediately 
after the entry of the United States into World War II, and could not make a financial 
commitment to the symphony.  J. K. Lilly personally loaned the ISO $5,000 [$58,000 
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CD], evidently predicated upon the expectation that the foundation would eventually 
designate funds to the ISO for the same amount. Sure enough, in March of 1942, Foster 
sent a check to the ISO for $5,000 with the understanding that it was to be used to repay  
J. K. Lilly. Lilly‟s secretary acknowledged on March 27 that the check had indeed been 
received, endorsed by Lilly and deposited. (Note: although the ISO was receiving the 
same amount of funds each year from the foundation, the actual value of those 
contributions, in 2004 current dollars, decreased each year due to inflation, especially 
during the war years of 1941-1945.) 
The 1943 foundation grant to the symphony of $5,050 [$55,000 CD] gained 
approval in December 1942. This continued generosity of the foundation toward the ISO 
during war time was acknowledged by the associate director of the Indianapolis 
Symphony, Howard Harrington. He stated, “I realize that the demands for support upon 
you are tremendously heavy, and your continued interest in our activities means a great 
deal to us, especially in these times.”41  
Harrington became the manager of the ISO in 1943 and initiated other fundraising 
efforts such as the newly created “Friends of the Orchestra,” and its campaign for 
“Musical Dollars.” This campaign must have been aimed at attracting new donors, 
because Harrington stressed that past and potential donors would not be called upon 
unless it was absolutely necessary. The ISO staff included a card with their appeal letters, 
which could be returned with pledge support. Local radio, once again, was pressed into 
service as a promotional tool for the symphony. Recipients of the new written funding 
appeal were encouraged to: 
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LISTEN TO THE  
“MUSICAL DOLLARS” BROADCAST 
OVER RADIO STATIONS WFBM – WIRE – WIBC 
SUNDAY, JANUARY 17, 12:15 NOON 
42
 
 
However, such fundraising campaigns proved inadequate to shore up the sagging 
income of the symphony. The war, inflation and increased taxes all took their toll, 
complicated by the fact that half of the symphony‟s young musicians had already been 
drafted. This left the ISO no choice but to employ older, more experienced, and more 
expensive musicians, adding to the symphony‟s economic ills. In part to cope with these 
new fiscal challenges, the Indiana General Assembly passed a law allowing local city and 
school corporations to use tax revenues to reimburse the ISO for services rendered.
43
 The 
Indianapolis City Council and Indianapolis School City voted to support the ISO with 
$50,000 [$574,000 CD] in appropriations in 1944 and another $50,000 [$526,000 CD] in 
1945. This led to the classic “crowding out” phenomenon that many modern researchers 
have identified, especially in regards to public perceptions of government funding. Many 
existing and potential donors came to believe that since the ISO was now being funded 
by public revenues, private funds were no longer necessary. Like today, some citizens 
were critical of public funding of the arts, such as the head of the Indianapolis Taxpayers‟ 
Association, who complained that he “attended the first of the 1944 concerts and didn‟t 
recognize a single tune that was played. Give me „Glowworm‟ or „The Surrey With a 
Fringe Around the Top‟.”44 In contrast, a newspaper editorial defended the public 
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expenditure because it made low cost concerts available to the citizens and children of 
Indianapolis and was not a subsidy, but an expansion, of the symphony programming that 
allegedly benefited the entire community.
 45
 
1944 set a precedent as the first time that the ISO was forced to borrow bank 
funds to meet its payroll. Clowes expressed these problems to the Indianapolis 
Foundation and implored it to continue its funding for the current season. He bargained 
that if the foundation maintained its commitment, and “if the civil city and school city 
appropriations made this year are continued on the same scale as next year, the orchestra 
will make no presentation to the Foundation next season or in subsequent seasons so long 
as the city appropriations are maintained at least on the present basis.”46 Foster responded 
on March 9
th
 with the usual check for $5,000 [$54,000 CD] and a sentence that 
foreshadowed the end of the ISO‟s funding by the foundation - at least temporarily. He 
wrote, “As has been explained to you, we are hoping that your arrangement with public 
funds may make it possible for you to maintain your organization without further funds 
from our organization.”47 This ended eleven years of a virtually uninterrupted funding 
stream from the Indianapolis Foundation to the ISO that would not re-emerge for another 
10 years.
48
  
In 1947, however, the ISO lost its funding from the city for that year and was in 
danger of losing the city‟s 1948 funding as well. This was due mostly to fierce debates in 
the legislature about the appropriateness of using tax-payer dollars for such entertainment 
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while other departments suffered budget cuts. At the same time, the Indianapolis 
Foundation leadership previously indulgent of the ISO had changed when  J. K. Lilly, a 
foundation board member for 31 years and staunch ISO supporter, died on 8 February 
1948. Keeping true to the nepotism that was prevalent among the trustees, his son, Eli 
Lilly, was appointed to the board on 16 January. Eugene Foster, also a stalwart supporter 
of the ISO at the Foundation, died just 18 days after  J. K. Lilly. A new director of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, Paul Ross, took charge and received a desperate plea in 
December 1948 from Clowes for any type of funding, but Ross did not respond 
immediately as the board had yet to meet. In the meantime, the city responded to the 
ISO‟s panicked appeals in spite of its previous discontinuation of the ISO‟s public 
funding. The city reluctantly made a promised payment of $15,000 [$119,000 CD] in 
January 1949. This allowed the ISO to struggle on for a time, as future funding by the 
city now became uncertain. To make matters worse for the ISO, a memo from the new 
foundation director instructed the ISO not to make another funding request until they had 
clearly addressed how they were going to finance the coming year‟s season. 49  
The foundation‟s hesitancy to fund the symphony can, in part, be attributed to the 
slow growth in annual support, bequests, and endowments that community foundations in 
general were experiencing throughout the country. By 1950, most community 
foundations had suffered through the economic instability of the Great Depression, the 
military insecurity of World War II, the early Cold War, and the threat of imminent war 
in Korea. These events caused greatly reduced financial resources for most philanthropies 
and charitable organizations, retarding flows of support to their favored recipients. Yet 
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there were other, more fundamental and serious problems afflicting community 
foundations. In a rare self-critical analysis, community trusts began to admit to many of 
the mistakes they had made over the course of decades. This sharp candor was due to 
Frank Loomis, who had recently retired as executive director of the Chicago Community 
Trust after thirty years of service. He was now free to write unfettered by the constraints 
of what was deemed acceptable public knowledge by his former employer. By 1950, 
twenty-five of the one hundred community foundations started during the 1914-1949 
period had disappeared, due in part to the collapse of stock market speculation and the 
evaporation of the “easy money” that flowed copiously from stock manipulation in the 
1920s. Some early community foundations, and more importantly, the trust companies 
that controlled them, profited handsomely from such reckless speculation. Of those 
community foundations still in existence by 1950, many rested ineffective because of 
stultifying control by trust companies or simple, lazy lack of action by the Board of 
Trustees or Distribution Committees. Such committees, Loomis complained: 
[…] appear to have been appointed in connection with the early 
organization of most of the Trusts, but apparently have nothing to 
do and no effective challenge to assume responsibility, some seem 
to have lain dormant or to have been forgotten. Some have been 
relegated to the inept position of being merely advisory to the bank 
trustee which has assumed full control of the entire enterprise, 
while others complain that they have really no discretion as to 
disbursements or the shaping of policies since nearly all gifts are 
strictly for designated institutions and their approval of 
appropriations is merely perfunctory. 
50
 
  
The fact that some trust companies exerted so much authority over gifting 
decisions strongly indicates that for many bankers the community trust was merely a 
shell, a tool to be used for self-promotion, a means to enhance the trust company‟s public 
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image of trustworthiness, thereby increasing the prestige of banks and trust departments 
and to grow their more profitable deposits. As Loomis lamented, many of these charitable 
trust funds were already fixed, utterly incapable of progressive development since their 
payouts had long ago been committed to specific, named institutional beneficiaries. This 
situation created the sad possibility that the designated institution could fold and the trust 
company would be, once again, saddled with a dreaded “dead hand,” or moribund, 
useless trust. Loomis stoutly warned against this trend, stating, “Experience has shown 
that the institutions so designated will not always be among the strongest and best. Others 
may diminish in usefulness or their need for support may greatly decline. […] If not 
carefully watched the Community Trust list may become overloaded with them.” 51 
Ironically, it was precisely the attempt to avoid such moribund funds that supposedly 
drove advocates of community foundations, especially trust company officers, to create 
such foundations in the first place. Now they were becoming agents of the very problem 
they were intended to solve. These facts reinforce one of the main discoveries of my 
research: trust companies created community foundations primarily to grow their own 
profits and rarely, if ever, to combat mortmain problems, or to address the real charitable 
needs of any community. Seen in this historical perspective, early community 
foundations did little or nothing to set an example of or promote the relentless reinvention 
and refocusing that is characteristic of major modern day U.S. philanthropies. 
Subsequently, forces outside of the community foundation must be credited with 
stimulating and driving the operational innovations of institutional philanthropies.   
Loomis also accurately stated that “Community Trusts in the past have usually 
been created and sponsored by a local bank or banks, too often with too little correlation 
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or cooperation on the part of other community social and civic interests.”52 For all of their 
talk of concern for the community in their public speeches, publicity campaigns and 
especially written communications, trust companies and banks really were not concerned 
with the health and welfare of the community. Nor did they create community 
foundations primarily to address those ends as professed. The fact that many community 
foundations were created hastily, without much thought or planning, points to their 
financial agents‟ much greedier motivations. Even more damning was the accusation 
made by Loomis that more than half of all community trusts were actually managed by 
the trust companies themselves, through employees of their trust divisions, giving them 
complete control over the principle and interest of the trust assets and grant making from 
those funds. Loomis registered strong disapproval with this arrangement of using trust 
company men as administrators, citing the: 
[…] uncertainty which may exist in the public mind as to their 
disinterestedness, their freedom and independent judgment in the 
management of an important charitable enterprise. A bank is a 
corporation organized for profit; should it also manage and control 
a charitable institution organized not-for-profit? Experience 
indicates that such a relationship between a bank and a charity can 
be bad for both the bank and for the charity. In the Community 
Trust such a relationship seems to violate the original and creative 
purpose of a Community Trust, the principle on which it was 
established – a clear separation of functions, management of 
capital by corporate trustees and direction of charitable services by 
charitable trustees. […] The Community Trust could not exist 
without the banks. But can it exist without a strong and 
independent board of trustees of the charitable foundation itself 
and executive officers selected by and directly responsible to 
them? 
53
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 Essentially, a majority of U.S. banks refused to give up control over disbursement 
of the charitable funds generated by their “charitable” trust accounts. Here, one sees the 
financiers‟ self-interest repeatedly win out over community interests. This strengthens my 
contention that, clearly, the men running these community trusts were not at all 
representative of their communities, nor devoted to deeper community needs. These early 
community foundations persistently served and enriched the pet charities which trustees 
and wealthy bank clients deemed proper and “worthy.” Whatever the public reasons 
given for creating community trusts were, in reality these foundations more often 
operated to increase the power of the wealthy urban elite, enabling them to set the 
philanthropic agenda of a community and to manipulate public perceptions of their 
thinly-veiled self-dealing and self-glorifying munificence.  
Such elite control early in the Indianapolis Foundation‟s history explains why the 
ISO was funded in the middle of the Great Depression and outside the province of the 
foundation‟s own officially started purpose. However, the changing from the old guard to 
new players in both foundation trusteeship and administration obviously affected the 
decision to discontinue funding to the symphony in 1945. The late 1940s and early 1950s 
were boom years for the United States, a time when it was exporting and enormous 
amount of goods to rebuild Europe as a result of the Marshall Plan, and the domestic 
economy was enjoying a healthy rate of expansion. So a growing, but increasingly 
unstable, local and national economy did not make philanthropic resources far scarcer. In 
this instance, economic factors alone cannot adequately explain flows of charitable 
capital into and out of the Indianapolis Foundation. The crucial initial determinant of 
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early funding was the class-conscious ambitions of the foundation‟s original financial 
proponents.  
The leadership of the Indianapolis Foundation was in a state of change, as well as 
its interest in funding the ISO. The symphony must have gotten the foundation‟s new 
negative message as it was several years before another request from the ISO was 
submitted to the Indianapolis Foundation. In April 1953, Dr. G.H.A. Clowes, director of 
Research at Eli Lilly & Company and longtime elite advocate for the ISO, sent a letter 
appealing to the Indianapolis Foundation director, Paul Ross. He trumpeted the 
accomplishments of the ISO during the previous sixteen years, presenting the symphony 
as one of the city‟s chief assets. He then highlighted the high taxation and inflation that 
had plagued the country during the war years, citing that the dollar was now worth 50 
percent less than just sixteen years before when the foundation was supporting the 
orchestra. Neither outside financial assistance nor ticket prices had kept pace, and Clowes 
stated, “for the first time in our history…we were compelled to borrow from the bank.”54 
Evidently Clowes had forgotten about, or simply omitted, the first time the ISO borrowed 
funds from the bank in 1944, just nine years earlier. Ross replied that he seriously 
doubted that “the trustees will look with favor upon any proposal involving continuing 
commitment of funds for the Orchestra, as worthy a civic institution as it is.” 
Nevertheless, Ross offered to put a proposal before the foundation board. 
55
  
Two months later, Clowes came up with a new approach to raising funds for the 
ISO. He proposed to engage the services of the American City Bureau (ACB), which had 
recently completed a successful campaign for a hospital in Indianapolis. ACB was one of 
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several private fundraising companies that would move into a community to survey its 
wealthy citizens about how much money they might be willing to give to a particular 
cause. Once ACB and the organizations leaders were convinced that there was ample 
interest and the potential for sufficient funds, ACB worked with the contracting 
organization to create a fundraising campaign. Clowes stated that there would be a one-
time cost of $16,000 [$113,475 CD] to cover the expenses of hiring the ACB, and that 
the private firm would take no percentage of the monies raised. His justification for such 
an expense was that ACB had been “uniformly successful and cannot afford to fail.”56  
However, Clowes did not venture to estimate how much additional funds this 
effort might generate. A Colonel Herrington, who evidently was associated with the ISO 
board, informed one of the executives at American City Bureau, Bart Brammer, that he 
would only support a contract if ACB could guarantee that they would raise $300,000 
[$2,127,660 CD], which was $50,000 more than the symphony‟s annual budget. 
Brammer wrote Ross at the foundation about the expectations that Herrington had put 
forth, and wondered what Ross‟ thoughts were on the subject.57 A week later, Ross 
notified Dr. Clowes that his request for funds had been reviewed by the foundation board 
and that they did not consider his letter a request for funding as it contained no details 
about how the campaign would be conducted. He also explained that even as the details 
were forthcoming, he doubted the board would approve the funds. In a diplomatic 
rejection, he stated, “Because of their high regard for you and the Orchestra, […] the 
Trustees particularly regretted their inability to view the matter otherwise.”58  
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Ross responded frankly to Bart Brammer of ACB a few days later, relating the 
history of the Indianapolis Foundation‟s role in funding the ISO over the years, especially 
to support programs for school children and scholarships. Ross also detailed the 
subsequent financing of the ISO by the city of Indianapolis. He believed that most of the 
orchestra‟s funding came from very few sources, and that there was a need to expand its 
income base in order to better ensure its future. He was not convinced, however, of 
Clowes‟ assertion that only one campaign would solve the ISO‟s long-term financial 
problems and he thought such an approach was unrealistic. Although he had respect for 
the reputation of American City Bureau as fundraisers, he stated “I question the ability of 
any fund-raising organization to do the entire job in one campaign.” He also made it clear 
that it was unlikely that the foundation would support such a campaign regardless of the 
merits of the ISO, further reinforcing a change in the funding priorities of the board.
59
 
Here, one sees how the post-war proliferation of private, for-profit fundraising companies 
and their growing professionalism was altering the balances of power and prestige 
between old guard urban philanthropy patrons and successors.  
Undaunted, Dr. Clowes responded within a week to Ross‟ bad news and pressed 
his case again, this time requesting $8,000 [$56,738 CD], only half the fee needed to 
engage the private fundraising firm. He also guaranteed to raise the additional $8,000 by 
other means, saying that it was absolutely necessary to conduct the campaign if the 
symphony was to survive. He reiterated what a fine job American City Bureau had done 
raising money for a local hospital, and that he was sure it could do the same for the ISO. 
Hesitant about asking his current donors for additional support, he asked the board 
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members of the foundation to assist him in finding other funding if they refused to 
approve his grant request. He offered to spend a few weeks putting together a detailed 
plan for the campaign, but shared that the board of the ISO “would hesitate to expend any 
portion of our resources on such plans at the present time so long as there is uncertainty 
regarding the financial support required to put the project through effectively.”60 Ross 
again declined funding, suggesting Clowes look to the larger national foundations that 
were starting to support the arts.
61
 This communication suggests that the Indianapolis 
Foundation‟s commitment to funding arts organizations was decreasing, especially those 
with such wealthy patrons. This is further evidenced by the lack of funding that other arts 
organizations received from 1946 - 1951 – only $5,000 in total. Compare that to the 
previous six years, 1939-1945, of ISO funding in the amount of $30,000 and we see an 
84 percent reduction in arts funding, making it clear that funding arts and culture was 
becoming less a priority.  
By contrast, other program funding totaled $569,000 for 1939-1945, and 
$522,000 for 1946-1951, only an 8 percent decrease in funding, most of that due to a 
decrease in the support of services for orphans.
62
 In the coming months, the ISO‟s 
situation was becoming increasingly desperate and the foundation was contacted by 
several different people lobbying for new gifts to the ISO. In addition to the ongoing 
deficit issues the ISO faced, a new issue that adversely affected symphony income was 
the sudden decline in support from several older patrons due to their dissatisfaction with 
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symphony‟s artistic leadership. The orchestra‟s long-time music director and conductor, 
Dr. Sevitzky, was causing strife with the musicians and patrons, and as a result donors 
and season ticket holders were withholding their support as long as he continued to be 
employed. Sevitzky was dismissed in 1955 and guest conductors were brought in at half 
the cost. What was unknown to most outside the symphony was that on top of paying 
guest conductors, the ISO still had to pay $15,000 [$106,000 CD] to terminate Sevitzky‟s 
contract, causing even more financial strain in the months to follow.
63
 Even with the 
$15,000 obligation to Sevitsky, the ISO still claimed that Sevitsky‟s departure had the 
double effect of saving money and improving relationships with estranged supporters. 
Bolstered by the critics who claimed that the guest conductors presented better programs, 
the ISO leveraged this move to help improve its reputation in the community, thereby 
expanding its philanthropic audience. The ISO board members assured the foundation 
that these recent events would help lure back former donors and attract new ones.
64
  
The symphony‟s advocates switched their lines of argument, now adopting the 
vocabularies of business and shrewd investments strategies to make the case that more 
than $5 million had been invested in the ISO in the previous years, and arguing that it 
would be a mistake to allow the organization to disband and waste this “investment.” In 
the U.S., the socially prominent backers of elite cultural organizations aided and abetted 
the repackaging of “charitable capital” into “investment capital.” This was a shrewd 
maneuver on the ISO‟s part, because whoever “invested” in the organization would in 
actuality not be helping it grow, but instead servicing the symphony‟s debt to various 
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banks and concerns, which now stood in excess of $30,000 [$212,765 CD]. The 
organization‟s leadership was desperate for a healthy dose of new funding, and it turned 
again to the Indianapolis Foundation for support in the amount of $10,000 [$70,000 CD] 
for the rest of the 1955-56 season and $5,000 [$35,000 CD] for the 1956-57 season. 
These funds were intended to buy the ISO time to solicit monies from their reclaimed and 
new patrons. The ISO‟s plea ended with “The Directors feel that the Orchestra should 
stand on its own two feet and we do not intend to leech on the Indianapolis 
Foundation.”65 That promise was not to be kept. 
These renewed lobbying efforts by the ISO and its influential advocates 
influenced a change of stance by the Indianapolis Foundation trustees. In October 1955, a 
check for half of the requested amount was issued from the Gustave A. Efroymson Fund 
for $5,000 [$35,211 CD], to Herbert E. Wilson, the new president of the ISO.
66
 The 
symphony now also employed a new music director, Izler Solomon, at a much-reduced 
salary compared to Dr. Sevitsky‟s former compensation. By 1956, the ISO had raised the 
money to pay off Dr. Sevitzky‟s contract, reducing their debt to only $10,000 [$69,000 
CD].
67
 Symphony advocates again requested $5,000 from the Indianapolis Foundation for 
the 1956-57 season and received $4,000 [$27,777 CD] from the Pearl H. Mallott Trust, 
now managed by the Indianapolis Foundation.
68
 Yet another foundation grant for $5,000 
[$33,577 CD] was awarded for the 1957-58 season in September 1957, announced in a 
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letter from Robert. A. Efroymson, Chairman of the Board. In 1946, Efroymson had 
inherited the Indianapolis Foundation trusteeship that his father, the late Gustave 
Efroymson, had held earlier, again, another example of nepotism and entitlement among 
the Indianapolis Foundation trustees. This combination of new leadership in both the ISO 
and the Indianapolis Foundation board ushered in change, re-establishing the previous 
pattern of elite support for an elite arts organization.  
  
 248 
A Change in the Foundation’s Funding Objectives: from Serving Children 
Musically to General Organization Support for the Symphony 
The Indianapolis Foundation grants awarded to the symphony from 1955 onward 
were no longer designated as funds to be used for concerts in the park for the general 
public, nor to support the musical education of students. The designation shifted to the 
support of the orchestra‟s “maintenance fund,” or in more contemporary terms, general 
operating support. This was a major change in the funding priorities of the Indianapolis 
Foundation. The long quote that follows is the foundation‟s explanation of how it 
justified the unrestricted expense of thousands of dollars to this pet organization that 
served only a sliver of the community made up of the elite and upper-classes. Even the 
foundation‟s executive director at the time stated that “The relationship of the particular 
proposal to existing programs and to general community needs must be scrutinized and 
weighed.”69 But that scrutinizing of the ISO funding as a community benefit was left 
squarely in the hands of the trustees themselves. In the agenda for the foundation‟s 
October 1955 board meeting, Paul Ross stated: 
For approximately 10 years prior to the time when the Indianapolis 
Symphony Orchestra began receiving tax funds from the Civil City 
and School City, the Foundation annually appropriated funds to 
help provide children‟s concerts by the Orchestra. There was no 
need to continue this program after the Orchestra became the 
recipient of $50,000 annually for special concerts for children and 
adults. 
 
In my recent conversations with Mr. Herbert Wilson I have made it 
clear that I do not believe the Board would consider becoming an 
annual contributor again to the Symphony Society. However, since 
the Symphony is definitely a civic asset which raises the cultural 
level of the entire community, I do believe that there are occasional 
                                                          
69
 Paul Ross, “Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Health and Welfare Council of Indianapolis,” 
April 24, 1956. Speech, Box 51/37.  
 249 
instances where we should consider financial assistance for the 
Orchestra [emphasis added]. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: As indicated in the preliminary letter 
about this meeting, I am recommending that we make an 
appropriation in the current emergency. The extent of that 
assistance must be determined in part by action taken today on the 
preceding requests.
70
 
 
Ross‟ insistence that the symphony raised the cultural level of the citizenry of 
Indianapolis and therefore was a civic asset was affirmed by the decision to fund the 
symphony in the amount of $5,000 [$35,000 CD]. The motion was made by Eli Lilly, the 
son of the biggest proponent of the symphony, J. K. Lilly, and was unanimously 
supported by the entire board of trustees. 
71
 This perceived need for high culture tops 
Maslow‟s hierarchy, and again affirms that the definition of community need that the 
wealthy patrons of the ISO held was at the expense of Maslow‟s more basic essential 
needs of existence barely met by the most vulnerable among Indianapolis society.  
What originally began as elite largesse for civilizing a mass public through public 
concerts in the parks now waned as a prime criterion for further support. The foundation 
had yet to designate “arts and culture” as a category of funding interests, as Paul Ross 
alluded, but his participation in this eventual evolution was cut short. On 19 August 1957, 
the Indianapolis Times reported that he was found dead in his apartment.
72
 The truth was 
that he committed suicide over personal problems, a gruesome fact that was mysteriously 
kept out of the newspapers and away from the public‟s knowledge. The foundation 
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trustees would have certainly preferred that such information not be released, as the 
public‟s perception of Ross‟ shocking action would reflect badly on the combined 
wisdom and judgment of the trustees who chose him. Their impeccable reputations might 
be sullied by scandal due to their failure to detect, or their willingness to tolerate, mental 
instability among their own. This would have generated the much-feared negative 
publicity for the foundation, leaving a stigma that would have been hard to shake. The 
foundation board was not prepared with a succession plan and had no one in line to take 
over the position, so the search began immediately for a new director. This lack of 
planning for staff departures highlights the informal and ad-hoc nature of nonprofit 
operations at this time, a pattern that persists in many nonprofits today.  
By September of 1957, things had improved immensely for the ISO. According to 
a report to the foundation, the symphony had raised $149,474 [$1,003,181 CD], nearly 
$9,000 more than anticipated. This left them with a positive balance of $8,914 [$59,825 
CD], which was applied to the more than $26,000 [$174,496 CD] of debt. Some of this 
debt was incurred from previous deficits and some was the result of a loan taken to make 
recordings of ISO concerts, the royalties from which were used to help retire the debt. In 
spite of these advances, new costs were incurred when the symphony‟s payroll increased 
because the ISO began paying Social Security taxes for the musicians and staff. In the 
September report, the ISO requested Indianapolis Foundation funding of $5,000 [$34,000 
CD] for the 1957-58 season, which was granted just 10 days later with a check to follow 
in October.
73
 Symphony executives informed the foundation of deeper local corporate 
support with the news that the Chairman of the Board of Indianapolis Power and Light  
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had increased his company‟s contribution by 20 percent.74 This example of the 
emergence of corporate philanthropy in mid-century Indianapolis is another modernizing 
aspect of the nonprofit sector, the full effect of which on the operations of local 
community foundations has yet to be fully investigated. 
The foundation‟s search in 1957-58 to replace the late Paul Ross reveals the 
trustees‟ persistent efforts to safeguard the organization as an agency of the city‟s male, 
largely WASP elite. This was still a time when a man‟s religion was no small matter for 
those ultimately deciding on foundation personnel, especially one as important as the 
director. During the search for a new director, an anonymous note referred to a possible 
candidate, Joseph Dunnington, Chief of the St. Joseph County Welfare Board. The note 
was addressed to Robert Efroymson, who was chairman of the foundation‟s board of 
trustees, and Jewish. It confided that “he [Dunnington] is, I am told, a Catholic.”75 
Whether that information was positive or negative or negative in the eyes of the trustees 
is uncertain, but Dunnington was not chosen to replace Ross. Robert Efroymson informed 
Jack Killen in November that he was chosen as the new director, and in December 1958, 
Killen took the head position at the Indianapolis Foundation.
76
 On December 10, a letter 
was sent to all of the candidates informing them that Jack Killen had been appointment as 
managing director of the foundation, a position he held for the next twenty years. As has 
been established earlier in my research, social and personal connection were important in 
many other decisions made by the trustees, and Killen‟s membership in Christ Church 
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Cathedral in downtown Indianapolis could have been an advantage in winning the 
directorship, as it was also the same church attended by Eli Lilly.
77
 
In 1958, the ISO became serious about raising funds from a far more diverse 
donor base through the use of various fundraising events and by tapping a wider array of 
influential people. This not only increased the ISO‟s bank account, it also enhanced its 
public visibility as the Indianapolis News and the Indianapolis Star began to regularly 
cover symphony fundraising events, profiling their volunteers, and reporting on surveys 
that showed the public wanted more outdoor concerts.
78
 Another impetus for this 
fundraising initiative was a commitment that the manager of the symphony, Alan 
Meissner, and the symphony board made to retain high quality musicians. They 
expressed concern that without superior symphony musicians, local universities would 
lack quality teachers for their music programs, and parents would fail to find the best 
private instructors for their children. The board was well aware that orchestra members 
were paid for only 21 weeks a year, and that current stagnant pay rates lagged behind the 
salaries at other major orchestras and could never keep up with the escalating cost of 
living.
 79
 Here again, we see the professionalizing of middle-class Americans of the era in 
the service and entertainment industries putting pressure upon nonprofit cultural 
organizations and their philanthropic patrons, spurring them to devise even more 
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lucrative funding drives, in part to pay the respectable salaries highly trained musicians 
demanded.  
Symphony executives were in constant negotiation with Local No. 3 of the 
American Federation of Musicians regarding increases in the salaries for their musicians 
while still keeping their budget manageable. The 1958 salaries for musicians ranged from 
$80 [$523 CD] to $200 [1,307] per week, with an average salary of $2,200 [$14,379 CD] 
per 22-week season (expanded an extra week from the year before), with some musicians 
being compensated far better, up to $4,400 [$28,758 CD] for the 22 weeks. The union-
approved salary pact for the 1958-1959 season drove symphony expenses up $16,000 
[$104,575 CD] over the previous year, an amount that also included increases for the 
conductor and guest artists‟ salaries and fees. In anticipation of these increases, the 
symphony board voted to raise ticket prices by 12 percent, and added several more 
concerts in order to appeal to a wider array of people, such as “pops” concerts and 
concerts for young people. Meissner stressed that this would be earned income, not 
donated.
80
 Many arts organizations of the time faced this similar need to diversify their 
operating income streams as much as possible. A new internal professionalization of all 
symphony operations complemented the professionalism of its musicians and this 
required a new rapport with old guard arts patrons. 
These important changes in the operation of the symphony society reflect how its 
leaders began to understand the importance of offering more popular and commercially 
viable concerts to supplement the rest of the season, which still featured classical pieces 
of limited public interest that satisfied season ticket holders and long-time patrons. 
Symphony executives also began thinking seriously about long-range planning, which 
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included raising an additional $200,000 [$1,307,189 CD] during the 1958-59 season “not 
only to insure the current season, but to give us a financial backlog to plot the next.” One 
of the strategies they employed to accomplish this was to ask each of their “larger and 
traditional contributors to increase their pledges by at least 20%.” They then requested 
from the Indianapolis Foundation a contribution of $7,500 [$49,019 CD], a whopping 50 
percent increase over the previous year.
81
 
Although the foundation did not fund the amount requested, they did agree to 
fulfill the desired goal of the ISO for 20 percent increases by upping their standard 
contribution of $5,000 to $6,000 [$39,215 CD].
82
 Yet, in terms of 2004 constant dollars, 
this was $15,000 less than the symphony received 14 years previous from the 
foundation‟s 1944 grant of $5,000 [$54,000 CD] due to the tremendous inflation that had 
occurred in the intervening years. This was, and still is, an ongoing pattern of foundation 
funding -- the continued financial support of an institution at the same level for several 
years without considering inflation. While the Indianapolis Foundation could indeed 
boast that their contributions to the symphony were substantial, the truth is that they had 
declined drastically in constant dollars over the years. This blatant failure on the part of 
foundations to acknowledge the impact of inflation on nonprofit operating budgets 
contributes, in large part, to the need for nonprofits to constantly find new funding 
sources.  
Several other funders followed the lead of the Foundation and increased their 
contributions to the symphony as well. Among them were the Lilly Endowment [$25,000 
to $30,000 or $167,785 CD to $196,078 CD], the Clowes Foundation, [$5,000 to $6,000 
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or $33,557 CD to $39,215 CD], and the Nick Noyes, Jr. Fund [$3,000 to $4,000 or 
$20,134 CD to $26,143 CD].
83
 Newspaper articles and pictures from 1958 through 1959 
reveal that the Symphony Society had recruited some highly influential members of the 
corporate world as fundraisers, such as Tom Billings from Indiana Bell Telephone, and 
Harry Pritchard, chairman of Indianapolis Power & Light and president of the 
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce. The ISO also profited by a poll by the Indianapolis 
News that stated that 43 percent of those surveyed wanted more concerts.
84
 
The following year, in October of 1959, the foundation again funded the ISO at 
$6,000, [$39,000 CD], this time from the James E. Roberts trust fund. This was in 
response to a letter from Meissner explaining that the budget for the 1959-60 season 
would be $318,097 [$2,065,000 CD], or $31,697 [$206,000 CD] more than the previous 
year, mainly due to salary increases for the musicians required after extending the season 
by two weeks. Meissner also made clear that although the ISO ended with a profit of 
$23,356 [$152,000 CD], most of that surplus was used to pay off past debts. 
85
 Another 
$6000 [$38,000 CD] was awarded in 1960, and the ISO was gaining some celebrity. 
Meissner apologized to Killen for his tardiness in acknowledging the gift, writing, “as 
you know, we have been up to our ears in the Jack Benny concert and have had little time 
to do anything else.”86 
In September of 1961 Meissner sent a letter to the foundation bemoaning the fact 
that due to the recession of the previous year and “the sudden death of the Society‟s 
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largest donor,” the ISO had fallen “$20,100 short of the mark” [$127,215 CD]. Given the 
small and insular nature of the city‟s philanthropic elite, Meissner did not even have to 
mention this donor, who was quite probably Dr. George Clowes, who is listed in the 
Encyclopedia of Indianapolis as the ISO‟s principal supporter at the time of his death in 
August of 1958. Clowes had set up his own separate foundation in 1952, but it is unclear 
from records whether the ISO was a recipient of those funds at any time. In spite of these 
deficits, the ISO‟s budget was increased yet another $15,000 [$94,936 CD], mostly due 
to expanding the season one more week and increasing the musicians‟ salaries 
accordingly.
87
  
The next year, Meissner had some slight improvements to report, such as the 
1960-61 deficit was only $7,723 [$49,000 CD], despite a $12,500 [$79,000] budget 
increase over the previous year. However, they had to renegotiate their contract with the 
Musicians Union for the next year, adding a $5 [$31 CD] per week increase per musician, 
resulting in a total increase of $8,000 [$50,000 CD]. Although wage increases were 
eating away at the ISO‟s budget and inflation was eating away at the real value of the 
foundation‟s contribution, Meissner again requested only $6,000 [$37,500 CD] for the 
fifth year in a row.
88
 
In September 1963, Alan Meissner resigned to take another position, and a new 
managing director of the ISO took the helm, Hubert N. “Scotty” Scott. During the 
transition, the president of the Symphony Society, Clarence F. Elbert, vice-president of 
the Indiana National Bank, wrote to foundation director Jack Killen to plead the ISO‟s 
case, once again due to desperate circumstances. The symphony was moving from its 
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long-time home at the Murat Theatre to the new Clowes Hall at Butler University, 
causing it to incur expenses for risers, transportation and shipping of instruments, printing 
and advertising. The Musicians Union continued to create financial strain by pushing for 
another wage increase for $25,000 [$154,320 CD]. Scott noted the “Herculean effort” of 
the symphony‟s last fundraising drive and promised to raise even more money in 1964 to 
meet the $30,000 increase of the budget. In the face of these rising costs, Scott 
acknowledged the $6,000 donation from the foundation the year before, but also added 
“we are desperately in need of extra help in this, our most crucial year.”89 
This plea did not move the foundation board to increase its donation. Jack Killen 
sent a letter to Scott, stating “enclosed herewith are three checks totaling $6,000” 
[$30,037 CD].
90
 Why there were three checks was not explained, but it may have been 
because the funds were donated from three separate donor funds. Scott‟s “thank you” 
letter pointed to an understanding by the symphony‟s leadership of the foundation‟s 
interest in continued funding, stating “the Symphony Society is constantly endeavoring to 
improve on its already fine record of community service by making the benefits of our 
great musical organization available to more and more young people and adults each 
year. Your interest and generosity will do much to assist in accomplishing our goal.”91 
Notice how development executives like Scott were becoming savvy in their fundraising 
appeals by constantly invoking the value of their organization to the community and 
youth. These appeals were targeted more toward to second and third tiers of Maslow‟s 
hierarchy, those that deal with the welfare of family and children, rather than the loftier 
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top tier of self-actualization and creativity that were the domain of the wealthy. Clearly, 
the ISO was attempting to appeal to a much broader constituency now than it did before 
by defining the need for the orchestra in this way. 
Scott informed Killen in October 1964 that the budget would rise again, this time 
more than $44,000 [$268,292 CD] due to adding two more weeks to the season and 
thereby increasing further the musicians‟ salaries. The accumulating deficit had reached 
$210,000 [$1,280,487 CD] and Scott hoped that the foundation‟s “Board of Directors 
will see fit to increase its annual contribution.”92 One sees here the dynamic of prominent 
arts organizations expanding their services in a booming post-war America, while still 
running persistent deficits in operating expenses. By regularly providing new and larger 
grants to the ISO, the Indianapolis Foundation clearly aided and abetted, indeed 
subsidized, the ISOs fiscal imprudence. Private and corporate foundations were even 
more to blame, as their assets and funding ability gradually exceeded those of the 
community foundation. In addition, the community foundation had clearly redirected its 
priorities compared to its earlier years, with its support of educational and social 
programs increasing while its support for the arts became sporadic. Yet it‟s ironic that 
narrow coteries of experienced businessmen controlling community and private 
foundations apparently overlooked such persistent deficit spending, a practice they no 
doubt would have condemned in their own corporations. Thus, the financial indulgence 
of foundations toward local arts organizations may, in part, explain the chronic economic 
insecurity of such organizations and their slowness to adopt more rigorous methods of 
budgeting and accounting.  
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While survival of arts organizations under such circumstances was ensured, this 
type of regular indulgence by elite philanthropists toward the “civilizing” institutions 
they loved likely impeded the maturation of those artful groups as business enterprises. 
Further research is required to determine to what extent the elite businessmen running 
U.S. foundations actually managed, or even intended, their grant-making to communicate 
their own business management skills to other civic organizations like symphony 
orchestras. The accumulating death toll of U.S. symphonies and theatres, most often due 
to large budget deficits, suggests the early elite largesse may have fatally weakened 
symphonies and kindred arts organizations as viable, long-term businesses due to an 
engrained reliance on foundation bailouts. 
One of the ISO‟s board members, Herbert Wilson, followed up on Scott‟s October 
plea a few weeks later by sending a copy of a statement he had composed concerning the 
history of the ISO to Jack Killen. This was written on the heels of the 1964 “Music 
Memory Contest” that involved 19,564 participants, obviously a large event for the ISO. 
At that time, the symphony employed 80 musicians for 27 weeks out of the year. Wilson 
pointed out that many orchestra members taught in the Indianapolis area schools or gave 
private lessons, and that most of them spent the money they earned in Indianapolis. In the 
late 1950s, Time Magazine listed the ISO as one of the Ten Best Major Symphony 
Orchestras in the country. They also toured all over the United States in order to meet the 
year‟s budget and Wilson stated that the critics in these cities often “included a comment 
that the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra must be recognized as one of the great 
symphony orchestras in the United States.”93 
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 Wilson‟s letter to Killen demonstrates how ISO boosters sought to extract more 
generous foundation grants by playing up the capacity of the symphony to elevate the 
city‟s own rank and distinction among other increasingly competitive American urban 
centers. Such intensifying U.S. rivalries catalyzed more foundation grant making to major 
arts organizations that were believed to be standard bearers of a city‟s civility and 
desirability. Under this pressure of such civic pride, indulgent grant makers had little 
incentive to demand fiscal discipline or management expertise from their pet 
organizations. I believe thus conjunction explains, in part, the long-term economic 
fragility of many U.S. nonprofits, among them the ISO.  
This process of invoking the ISO as a positive civic and cultural force is visible in 
Herbert Wilson‟s special pleading for more foundation grants in aid to the symphony‟s 
civilizing work among Indianapolis citizens, especially youth. Wilson noted: “The 
Orchestra plays three free concerts to the citizens of Indianapolis each year, and as many 
as 1000 have been turned away from these concerts.” In addition, the ISO played many 
outreach “Tiny Tot Concerts,” where families were charged only fifty cents per person to 
attend the concert and mingle with the musicians afterward. But Wilson asserted that the 
Music Memory Contest was the greatest instructive contribution the ISO made to the 
community. Sponsored in 1958 by the Indianapolis Star, WIRE radio station and the 
ISO, the objective of the contest was to conduct ear-training in classical music for a new 
generation of music lovers and to broaden the dissemination of western musical traditions 
via school and home listening. ISO musicians selected and played twenty-four 
compositions each year in local school classrooms, reaching an audience of 100,000 
captive students. In addition, ISO records of the compositions were distributed to homes 
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and were broadcast on WIRE radio for ten weeks before the contest in order to 
communicate this “great music” to a young audience so that they might someday become 
avid symphony enthusiast, and perhaps even patrons. Students competed against one 
another to identify the excerpts from these works in a contest performed live by ISO 
musicians. Each year, this contest boasted over 4,500 finalists, something that no other 
city in the country could match. In addition, the symphony still played 20 concerts a year 
in area high schools.
94
 
In the same appeal letter, Wilson noted that several independent colleges in 
Indiana wanted to have the ISO visit to perform, but couldn‟t afford the cost. To support 
such K-16 exposure to great western music, the Lilly Endowment stepped in and offered 
to finance $1,000 of the $1,800 cost for each of five college concerts a year, or a yearly 
commitment of $5,000 [$30,000 CD]. This left them in need of an additional $4,000 
[$24,000 CD] from other sources in order to deliver the concerts. Wilson also highlighted 
an area of philanthropy that is still in modern times often overlooked when discussing 
organizational resources -- volunteerism. Wilson reported that “more than 6,000 men and 
women in some way or another take part in promoting the activities of the Indianapolis 
Symphony Orchestra.” Most of this volunteer effort involved soliciting funds, and 
although there were more women than men volunteering to do the actual work, “the more 
experienced men work soliciting larger contributions from professional groups and 
business organizations.” 95 
Wilson‟s letter included an understanding of the competitive aspects of American 
businesses and their tenuous commitments to local communities. As early as 1964 
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Wilson was lamenting a serious change that has only grown more prevalent in today‟s 
philanthropic climate: 
A big problem facing the Orchestra in the future, as it now does, is 
convincing the corporations not domiciled in Indiana, and with 
home offices in some other State, that they owe something to the 
community and should support the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra. The past few years have shown that a number of home 
owned industries have been sold to or merged with national 
corporations not domiciled in Indianapolis, and we often lose the 
support that was forthcoming when the plant was locally owned.
96
 
 
 Wilson highlighted the importance of a vibrant arts and culture institutional base 
to attract businesses and their employees to any city: 
Recently industrial leaders have been telling us that when they are 
seeking a high grade person to bring to their plants in Indianapolis, 
the individual often asks what the City has to offer in the way of 
good schools and good music for himself and his family. This, we 
are informed, is becoming very important in enticing good 
personnel to come to Indianapolis.
97
 
 
 Wilson‟s argument anticipated by fifty years the similar argument made in 2002 
by Richard Florida that members of the “creative class” actively seek out cities of 
residence where arts organizations of all kinds thrive.
98
 Although Wilson made the case 
that the ISO was vital to Indianapolis, and H.N. Scott made it clear that the symphony 
needed the foundation to increase its support, the Indianapolis Foundation merely 
maintained its support at $6,000 [$36,585 CD], translating to a 9 percent decrease in real 
dollars since the first $6,000 [$39,215 CD] contribution in 1958, only 6 years earlier. At 
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the same time, expenses that were expanding at about 7-8 percent per year for the same 
period compounded the symphony‟s troublesome circumstances.  
Henry F. DeBoest, the vice-president of Eli Lilly & Company, became the 
campaign chairman for the ISO Maintenance Fund in 1965. DeBoest was another in a 
long line of wealthy elite who served on the boards of other Indianapolis high-culture 
nonprofits, including a board position for the Indianapolis Museum of Art and as 
president of the Indianapolis Art Association. His legacy as a major Indianapolis 
philanthropist has been secured via a lecture hall that bears his name at the Indianapolis 
Museum of Art. In September 1965, DeBoest sent a letter to the board of the Indianapolis 
Foundation asking them to “give serious consideration to increasing the subscription of 
the Indianapolis Foundation from $6,000 to $7,500 [$45,000 CD] for the current 
campaign” [emphasis added]. His use of the word “subscription” instead of “donation” 
indicates that DeBoest‟s chief objective was to establish a perennial, rather than 
discretionary, nature to the foundation‟s ongoing support for the symphony. Ideally, a 
subscription is maintained perpetually and never allowed to lapse, precisely the kind of 
complacent foundation support to which the symphony was already clearly addicted. 
DeBoest‟s choice of words bespeaks precisely the degree to which symphony boosters 
came to expect such elite largesse, leaving little incentive toward more diversified 
fundraising and more prudent spending, despite the departure or amalgamation of older 
local firms and funders.  
To push the foundation board to increase their support yet again, DeBoest stated, 
“We rarely quote what other contributors have been subscribing, but Lilly Endowment, 
Inc., has been contributing $30,000 per year. Eli Lilly and Company supplemented this 
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gift by a $4,000 underwriting.”99 In 2004 dollars this represented $183,000 from the Lilly 
Endowment alone. DeBoest‟s letter was written on “Eli Lilly & Company,” letterhead, 
rather than that of “The Indianapolis Symphony,” suggesting that he wanted to give both 
his employer and the Lilly Endowment adequate recognition, as any good company man 
at that time would do. When one looks at the different players in the Indianapolis 
Symphony Society who were connected in some way with the Lilly name, it becomes 
clear that both the Lilly company and Lilly Endowment were tightly woven together with 
the ISO in many ways from its inception throughout its growth. 
The watershed year for the symphony was 1965, when the symphony was being 
considered for a large endowment grant from the Ford Foundation, ranging anywhere 
from $600,000 [$3,592,814 CD] to $2,500,000 [$14,970,059]. The Ford grant sought by 
the ISO was part of an $85 million program created to support more than 50 orchestras 
throughout the country and the Ford Foundation identified the ISO as one of its targeted 
25 major orchestras, each with a budget of $250,000 [$1,497,005 CD] or more. News of 
the Ford Foundation‟s interest in the ISO gave the Indianapolis Foundation board little 
incentive to increase their symphony donations. Despite DeBoest‟s lobbying, the 
foundation only maintained its “subscription” of $6,000 [$35,928 CD]. Jack Killen tried 
to ameliorate the decision, writing to DeBoest that “while the Trustees did not approve an 
increase as you requested, I know how important the continuing grant is for the needs of 
the Orchestra. Henry, you may wish to discuss this further, and if you do, please call 
me.”100 
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 A major turning point for the ISO came on June 24, 1966, when the Ford 
Foundation awarded the symphony $2,500,000, [14,500,000 CD] with $500,000 
[$2,900,000 CD] to be used solely for maintenance expenses over five years. The 
remaining $2,000,000 was designated for an endowment that had to be matched by equal 
contributions from the community over a five-year period ending on June 30, 1971. 
During that five-year period, the symphony was allowed to draw on accumulating interest 
from the endowment.
101
 By the terms of this largesse, the ISO was also expected to raise, 
in addition to the matching funds, an annual maintenance amount of at least $225,000 per 
year. This was both a blessing and a curse, because the ISO not only had to raise their 
annual maintenance fund, they also had to raise an average of $400,000 per year for the 
endowment over the next 5 years, for an annual fundraising campaign of more than 
$625,000 [$3,742,514 CD]. To add to the pressure, the Musicians Union seized this 
opportunity to enrich themselves by insisting on large increases in salaries for their 
musicians.
102
 Although the aim of the Ford Foundation‟s philanthropy was to generate 
enough financial support for these arts organizations to become financially stable, the 
reality was that such generosity aroused the demands by professionals to be better 
compensated, such as the musicians and executive staff. This did much to reward many in 
the ranks of American middle class society, but did little in the way of providing future 
financial security for the ISO.  
 The nationalization of philanthropic activity by major private and corporately 
owned grant makers began to alter the relationships between local arts organizations and 
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their long-term civic patrons, the local community foundations. Such examples of 
modern corporately endowed philanthropies, such as the Ford Foundation, were stepping 
in to take up the more antique mission of supporting major, civic arts organizations like 
symphonies, ballet troupes, and theatre companies. Although the power of the individual 
elite funders were fading in comparison to these large foundations, old habits of elite 
philanthropic gift-giving to civilizing arts organizations died slowly, if at all, in the 
United States as the baton was passed directly to the new elite corporate foundations. 
 To make clear how it thought the Ford Foundation money should be spent, the 
ISO sent “An Open Letter to the Musicians of Indiana” that was a very detailed plea to 
the musicians of Union Local No. 3.
103
 The union was pushing for a giant leap in salaries 
and the number of weeks of playing, asking for the total annual amount of musicians‟ 
salaries to be increased $267,000 [$1,598,802 CD] above what they were currently paid. 
They also demanded additional increases every year totaling $1.5 million [$8,982,035 
CD] over the five-year contract. Staff and executive salaries constituted 35 percent of the 
symphony‟s budget, so the annual budget, if the union‟s demands were accepted, would 
leap to $1,900,000 [$11,500,000 CD]. Even with the Ford Foundation money, the 
symphony would have to ask its elite patrons and the businesses of Indianapolis to 
increase their giving by more $1,000,000 [$5.8 million CD] per year.  
Both parties came to an impasse and the ISO threatened to cancel the season if a 
more reasonable agreement was not reached. 
104
 However, this was avoided when the 
ISO factored in public opinion and “responded to the wish of the citizens of this 
community” by committing to a five-year contract with the musicians, which raised their 
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minimum weekly salary by $64 [$370 CD] each by the end of the five-year period. This 
increased the ISO‟s annual budget another $208,000 [$1,175,141 CD] in 1967, and even 
with the Ford Foundation contributing $160,000 [$903,954 CD] for that year, the ISO‟s 
deficit was still projected to be $48,000 [$271,186 CD].
105
 Again, the ISO requested a 
substantial increase in support from the Indianapolis Foundation, and the trustees obliged 
by increasing their annual “subscription,” awarding the symphony $8,000 [$46,511 CD] 
for their 1966-67 season.
106
 Hubert Scott replied with a sincere thank-you, wherein he 
noted “this represents a 33-1/3% increase by the Foundation and constitutes a sincere 
belief in the future of the Orchestra in the community, and we are extremely grateful.” 
But even this increase was a failed attempt to put a finger in the ISOs leaking financial 
dike, as the goal of getting the symphony on solid financial ground was, once again, not 
accomplished and remained ever elusive. 
  
                                                          
105
 Jack Killen, Letter, by H. N. Scott, November 3, 1966, Box 65/13. 
 
106
 H. N. Scott, Letter, by Jack Killen, December 28, 1966, Box 65/13. 
 268 
Conclusion 
The rapid evolution of the partnership between the Indianapolis Foundation and 
the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra is indicative of the ISO‟s importance to the status 
of the social elite of Indianapolis. The ISO began in 1930 as a cooperative endorsed by 
the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and its leadership bragged that it did not rely on 
endowments or grants. However, this quickly changed as ISO leaders decided several 
times to expand the number of weeks in its season and to offer concerts throughout 
Indiana. As the number of performances and weeks of the season grew, so did the budget 
exponentially. In order to feed this civilizing instrument of elite choice, the wealthy 
patrons and the Indianapolis Foundation steadily fed its unfettered growth and the 
unsound business practices of their perpetual deficit spending, resulting in ongoing 
funding dependency.  
Supporting the ISO during the Great Depression was justified at first as a 
civilizing distraction from the pressures of the economy, reflecting the top tiers of 
Maslow‟s hierarchy, and later as an important part of children‟s education, reflecting the 
middle and lower tiers. Soon, the symphony appealed to the donors with business 
arguments, stating that the community‟s “investment” in the ISO over the years was 
substantial and one that shouldn‟t be lost from lack of further funding. The ISO leaders 
made their case that it was not only a community asset, but that it enhanced the reputation 
of Indianapolis, creating a force that attracted people and business to the area. This claim 
of its value as a community need targets more the lower first and second levels of 
Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs, those of employment, food and shelter. In essence the elites 
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of the ISO changed their definition of community need as it related to the orchestra‟s 
importance in a way that expanded its appeal to a broader base of donors and citizens.  
The ISO‟s escalating financial growth and fundraising savvy were enabled by the 
relationships that existed between the ISO board and the creators and trustees of the 
Indianapolis Foundation, and by the increased funding from large private foundations. 
Social, political, and professional ties paved the way for the annual grants from the 
Indianapolis Foundation that at least maintained their previous levels and sometimes 
increased. Corporations and large, private foundations also fueled this growth through 
large infusions of cash and challenge grants toward building an endowment. 
My research question asking why the foundation trustees violated the purpose 
statement in the organization‟s original bylaws and funded an arts organization has been 
addressed by showing that funding the ISO enhanced their prestige, and their elite social 
positions allowed them the power and influence to do so. The symphony was a priority 
for the trustees because it was important to their elite society friends and business 
associates. The ISO‟s funding had little to do with crucial community needs, and the 
trustees routinely supported charities that were priorities of other powerful organizations 
such as the Chamber of Commerce. Equally crucial to their decision-making was whether 
or not the proposed programs were vehicles for substantial positive public relations for 
the board of trustees, the foundation and the trust companies that controlled both of them. 
What is also clear is that although the funding of the ISO by the Indianapolis Foundation 
was at times stagnate or even non-existent, as was the case from 1946-1955, other elites 
such as the Lilly family and Dr. G. A. Clowes established their own foundations and 
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accelerated the level of funding to the ISO far above any efforts the Indianapolis 
Foundation had ever attempted. 
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Chapter 7: The Indianapolis Foundation’s Funding of the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra, 1967-1984 
 
The Symphony’s First Development Director  
 By December of 1967, the ISO had added a new administrator to its payroll, 
Nicholas L. Jones, as director of development. Up until this time, the fundraising had 
been done by an amateur coterie of volunteers, officers of the ISO, or the executive 
director. Jones‟ addition marked the next step in the symphony‟s evolution toward 
professionalism over volunteerism. By this time, the symphony had expanded its season 
to 33 weeks with plans to expand one week a year for the next three years. One of the 
first letters that Jones sent to Jack Killen in December 1967 stated that five years 
previous the ISO‟s annual budget had been less than $500,000 [$3,000,000 CD] and that 
the budget for the 1968-69 season was to nearly double that to $975,500 [$5,500,000 
CD]. He predicted that by the 1970-71 season the budget would exceed $1 million. The 
budget he submitted revealed municipal funding expectations of $60,000 [$339,000 CD] 
per year from 1967 through 1971, signaling that the city and county governments had 
agreed to help support the ISO once again.1 It was evident that the Indianapolis 
Foundation was not as important to the symphony‟s survival as it had been 35 years 
before. Jones and the ISO now operated in a complex late 1960s fundraising environment 
where the Indianapolis Foundation had become only one of several local sources of 
potential symphony donations.  
 Jones still continued to aggressively pursue funding from the foundation and his 
continued courtship paid off with a grant of $8,000 [$45,000 CD]. However, Jones‟ letter 
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was replied to with an admonishment from Killen, giving the new development director 
an education in the proper protocol to request funds. Killen wrote Jones that any funds 
requested should be solicited at least thirty days before the foundation board‟s meeting. 
“We came very close,” Killen warned, “to not getting this grant authorized before the end 
of 1967 which would have meant considerable financial loss to the Orchestra.”2 Such a 
warning was never given to any other grant seeker, and the 30-day protocol had rarely 
been practiced in the ISO‟s previous appeals to the foundation. 
 Staring in June 1966, the Ford Foundation contributed $100,000 [$581,000 CD] 
per year for the operating budget and the ISO received another $80,000 [$465,000CD] 
per year from the interest on the Ford Foundation Endowment funds. By 1968, symphony 
agents were in full swing to raise money for a $10,000,000 [$54,000,000 CD] 
endowment, of which they had already raised $4,000,000 [$21,000,000 CD]. In spite of 
the annual Ford support and the endowment fund‟s interest, Jones felt that “there always, 
as far as we can foresee, will be the necessity of conducting a sustaining fund drive. 
During 1968/69 we must raise at least $300,000 [$1,600,000 CD].”3  
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From Private Preference and Community Entertainment to Community Necessity 
Jones thanked Killen and made an assumption about the foundation‟s motivations 
for continued funding, stating: “This contribution is graphic evidence of our belief that 
Greater Indianapolis and Indiana want and need a major symphony orchestra in their 
midst” [emphasis added].4 Jones‟ claim that general citizenry felt a need for the 
orchestra‟s presence in the community was a leap of faith and wishful thinking for his 
organization. Ordinary citizens may have wanted access to great music, but Jones‟ 
conviction of their need for a full-blown symphony reflects a middle-class bureaucrat‟s 
zealous attempt to champion the artistic tastes of the elite. Like the wealthy ISO 
advocates of the 1930s, Jones also presumed that regular inhabitants of the city somehow 
needed, or would benefit from, the sophisticating and civilizing effects of symphony 
music. 
For several years the expense of touring had been unprofitable and hard on the 
ISO musicians, even though days of rest were built into their contracts when they were on 
the road. By August 1969, the ISO was beginning to phase out touring performances, and 
began to feel the pinch of a sagging U.S. economy, as were other orchestras across the 
country. ISO was forced to cut back the number of musicians to 82, and symphony 
executives recalculated the total projected budget downward to $1,032,925 [$5,325,000 
CD], resulting in $46,000 [$237,000 CD] less than the previous season. Musicians‟ 
salaries and the conductor‟s pay now amounted to only 58 percent of the total annual 
budget, compared to 90 percent just a few years before. This highlights the rise in 
administrative and facility costs associated with running the organization. The symphony 
was now too large to function administratively by utilizing only dedicated volunteers 
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engaged by a passion for music or a belief that a city without a symphony lacked 
refinement and competitive prestige. The symphony‟s bureaucracy now had a life of its 
own, with professional fundraisers and administrators vying to steer the organization‟s 
entire course. 5 
Even with professionals on board, in June 1970 the ISO teetered on the brink of 
financial disaster. In addition to a tough economy, the Ford Foundation commitment in 
1966 of $100,000 each year for five years was about to end. In a series of newspaper 
articles, three root causes of this dilemma were cited: (1) “The rising costs of maintaining 
an outstanding orchestra,” (2) “The impossibility of earning income to keep pace with 
rising costs,” and (3) the impending “loss in 1971 of $100,000 a year from the Ford 
Foundation.”6 Yet, this crisis might have been a blessing in disguise. Newspaper men and 
community leaders came to the symphony‟s defense, stating several key reasons why the 
organization should be considered important to the entire Indianapolis community. These 
exponents stressed that the ISO‟s current situation was desperate and could “determine 
whether the symphony lives and adds even greater luster to the name of Indianapolis, or 
dies and cuts deeply in to the soul of the city.”7 The newspaper acknowledged that the 
community was divided on the issue, claiming that some people thought the ISO would 
survive this crisis and go on to be the top orchestra in the country, while others felt it was 
time to stop trying to support a local orchestra and import musical groups instead.  
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Justifications for increased support of the ISO were a combination of civic 
boosterism and the farsighted promotion of local business expansion. With constant 
touring to other cities, the symphony carried “the name of Indianapolis to the industrial 
executives who make the decision concerning the location of new plants.”8 A traveling 
orchestra also communicated to the rest of the country that Indianapolis was culturally 
advanced and possessed a cultured populace. In the words of the ISO‟s conductor, Dr. 
Izler Solomon, “those who criticize solid Midwestern genuineness as „backward‟ and 
„provincial‟ are forced underground when the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra plays 
their city.”9 Explaining that the ISO was not alone in its current financial crisis, Bierce 
also stated that out of twenty-three major orchestras in the country, nine of them had to 
open their seasons late and two had yet to reopen. Raising ticket prices would only make 
it appear that symphonic music catered to an “affluent elite,” and this would be a 
“distasteful development.” He also pointed out that subscription sales increased by 59 
percent the year before, highlighting the popularity of the ISO to the monied public and 
the envy this prized cultural advancement would surely generate in other cities.10 
The musicians were determined not to back down on their demands as they felt 
they had already sacrificed enough by accepting lower pay than other major orchestras 
were offering. Conductor Izler Solomon agreed with the musicians, pointing out that 
most of them held at least one and sometimes two college degrees and were paid poorly 
for professionals. In addition, because they only played for about two-thirds of the 
season, they were forced to find other jobs in the off-season to support their families. The 
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musicians strongly suggested that the federal government should help support orchestras, 
although most orchestras intentionally steered clear of federal funding. Other 
propositions to solve the immediate financial crises were to merge the ISO with another 
orchestra, or to change the name to the Indiana Symphony Orchestra, which would 
supposedly widen its support base across the state. To do that, it would also demand more 
traveling outside of Indianapolis, which was hard on the musicians and financially 
draining on the budget.  
The new chairman of the ISO, Robert Seastrom, felt the American Federation of 
Musicians (AFM) was too demanding and quoted a musician from London who stated 
“The AFM must have a death wish. Their contract led to an upsurge of recording dates 
for London musicians where the rates are lower. It‟s a godsend.”11 This growing 
internationalization of the music business created new problems and opportunities for the 
survival and funding of many arts organizations, as it reshaped the world of arts funding 
for not only community foundations, but other funders as well. Although the Ford 
Foundation had given $2 million [$9 million CD] for an endowment fund, matched with 
$2 million [$9 million CD] by the Lilly Endowment, providing the ISO with $4 million 
[$18 million CD] toward its goal of $10 million [$45 million CD], Seastrom now 
projected that, in order to survive long-term, the symphony needed an endowment of at 
least $26 million [$135 million CD]. With that, he appealed to the citizens of 
Indianapolis: 
I‟m asking the whole community to support the orchestra. 
Everywhere we go we find people wanting to do what they can to 
help. We are going to implement this program and we are going to 
use the orchestra in ways never dreamed of. After Indianapolis has 
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licked these problems the sky is the limit. Other cities may give up 
on their orchestras but Indianapolis is not about to.12 
 
 Complicating the funding issues were new tax laws that were being considered at 
the time, and questions arose on how those new laws might negatively impact donors. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 placed new reporting rules on private foundations, taxed 
their net investment income, and required private foundations to adhere to paying out five 
percent of its assets annually to support charitable organizations. However, the Tax 
Reform Act defined community foundations as “public foundations,” and as such were 
determined to be exempt from the five percent payout rule, although most now usually 
follow the rule and sometimes even exceed it. Wealthy donors were limited in the amount 
of tax deductions they could claim annually for their charitable contributions, which had 
an impact on large donations to major nonprofits and metropolitan cultural institutions, 
such as art museums and symphonies. Nonetheless, the impact of these laws were 
generally beneficial to nonprofit organizations that were dependant on foundation 
funding, as foundations could no longer hoard the interest income from their investments 
and were ultimately forced to give a designated portion of it away to charitable 
organizations each year.  
The ISO‟s leadership understood that it would need to develop sources of income 
other than ticket sales, because expanding the season or adding more concerts did not 
increase ticket sales in line with the costs of musicians‟ salaries and other expenses. To 
further complicate matters, symphony funding from the Indianapolis Public Schools for 
school concerts was also cut in half, although annual city funding remained at $60,000. 
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At the same time, other orchestras were giving major concessions to musicians, such as 
52-week seasons and extended vacations, forcing the ISO to become more competitive to 
attract top musicians. The symphony was already losing 20 percent of its musicians a 
year to turnover and that figure threatened to get worse if the financial problems 
continued. In protesting the Tax Reform Act legislation being debated in Congress, the 
American Symphony Orchestra League argued “we are apprehensive that […] 
cancellation of long established tax incentives for giving would prove to be the final push 
toward a disastrous breakdown of the willingness of voluntary givers […] to continue to 
shoulder these charitable burdens.”13 As it turned out, the financial impact on a large 
organization like the ISO was a mixed bag, with decreases caused by greater restrictions 
on an individual donor‟s ability to write off charitable gifts, while increases were gained 
in funding from private foundations, due to 5 percent payout requirement that forced 
them to stop hoarding their cash. 
As they had done for the last several years, the Indianapolis Foundation again 
granted checks totaling $8,000 [$41,000 CD] to the ISO in November 1969. It did so 
again in 1970, but this time with a breakdown of the funds from which the checks were 
drawn. $6,300 [$31,000 CD] was from the Roberts fund and $1,700 [$8,000 CD] was 
from the Rynearson fund.14 Again, we see the annual amount the Indianapolis Foundation 
donated to the ISO as being relatively level, which at first glance appears to be a nod of 
approval from the foundation trustees toward the values of the symphony to the 
                                                          
13
 `Harley Bierce, “City Symphony Good As Best,” 1969-1970, Box 65/13. Newspaper article, 
unidentified source or date but probably from the Indianapolis Star sometime in 1969 or 1970. 
 
14
 “Disbursement Statement to the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra,” October 13, 1970, Box 
65/13. 
 279 
community. But in fact, not only did the foundation‟s contributions become stagnate, 
they actually declined in constant 2004 dollars from $41,000 to $39,000 due to inflation.  
Symphony board directors estimated in 1971 that their shortfall for the next five 
years would be about $1.8 million [$8,400,000 CD]. The Lilly Endowment, once again, 
came to the ISO‟s rescue, but not without a catch. It pledged $600,000 [$2,800,000 CD] 
as long as the symphony could raise double that amount in matching funds, another 
$1,200,000 [$5,600,000 CD]. The general manager of the Lilly Endowment, John S. 
Lynn, wrote to the ISO, “We recognize that meeting these conditions…will involve a 
great deal of work on your part…But it is apparent that if the orchestra is to exist through 
the next five years, a broad base of community support will be vital.” We see here the 
growing use of the “matching grant” method of giving by major foundations, such as 
Ford and the Lilly Endowment, as a powerful tool of philanthropic leverage that forced 
arts organizations to expand their community outreach by convincing the broader public 
of their legitimacy to exist.  
This matching grant came during the time when the symphony was not only 
facing the aforementioned economic obstacles, but an impending contract renewal with 
the Musicians Union, and a five year wait until the Ford Foundation endowment was 
officially turned over to the ISO.15 At the same time, the $1.2 million [$5.6 million CD] 
in matching funds for the Lilly grant had to be raised in addition to the regular annual 
fund campaign, as well as donations to the endowment fund that the Ford Foundation had 
initiated in 1966 to in order to grow it to the stated goal of $10 million. The Lilly 
matching grant $1.8 million total was only to meet the increased expense for the next five 
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years, until the Ford Foundation endowment income would become available in 1976. 
Unmoved by the ISO‟s fiscal challenges, the Indianapolis Foundation contributed its 
usual $8,000, which in constant 2004 dollars had declined 10 percent, from $41,000 in 
1970 to $37,383 in 1971. For the first time, the check was drawn from the Indianapolis 
Foundation itself, and not from other donor directed trusts.16 This signifies that no longer 
were individual trust donors designating the ISO as a funding interest, and the trustees 
were now using funds that were granted at their exclusive discretion, clearly indicating 
that they personally thought the ISO should still remain a funding priority. However, the 
priority among others arts organizations had changed, as the foundation contributed 
$25,000 [$122,000 CD] to the Indianapolis Museum of Art that same year, as they had 
done previously in 1969. From the annual reports of the foundation, we also discover that 
the trustees funding the Children‟s Museum of Indianapolis at the level of $50,000 
[$213,000 CD] in 1973 and $25,000 [$96,000 CD] in 1974, while the ISO funding 
remained level at $8,000. So even though total arts funding by the Indianapolis 
Foundation was on the rise, in comparison the ISO was not one of those being funded at a 
high level. 
As their five-year contract neared its end, The ISO musicians and their union were 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied. They had agreed to a five-year contract in 1966 that 
was substantially lower than symphony musicians in other cities by as much as $3,500 to 
$9,000 [$16,355 to $42,056 CD] less per musician. The contract was signed with the 
understanding that the ISO would solve its financial problems within the five-year 
agreement so that at the next contract negotiation the musicians could be brought up to a 
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pay scale more in line with other symphonies. When the new contract came up for 
negotiation in 1971, the ISO‟s financial problems had not been addressed and the Local 3 
American Federation of Musicians was not about to settle for less again. The ISO‟s 
negotiating team tried to erase these old obligations while also asking for future 
concessions. The musicians, to their credit, did not strike and continued to play in the fall 
of 1971 under the old contract. Fifteen negotiating sessions were held to attempt to 
resolve the dispute, but to no avail. The musicians union notified the ISO that the 
musicians were going on strike at 1:00 P.M. on 21 January 1972. They believed there was 
no other alternative in the matter.17 
A day before this ultimatum, the Indianapolis Foundation had committed another 
$8,000 [$36,000 CD] to the ISO, but this ever dwindling sum had no effect on the 
negotiations. The musicians held true to their threat, and the strike grew so big that its 
story made the New York Times as a special report on 1 February, with the headline 
“Strike and Shortage of Funds Threatens Indianapolis Symphony.” The ISO responded 
by canceling all of its concerts through 18 February 1972, with the possibility of more 
cancellations to be announced. The entire orchestra and management team were evicted 
from Clowes Hall on the day of the strike and the musicians proceeded to picket the 
building, causing disruption to many other entertainment events taking place at the hall. 
Although the musicians were obviously suffering from lack of income due to the strike, 
eight ISO staff members suffered job losses due to concert cancellations and the loss of 
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income from ticket sales.18 Acrimonious labor relations at major arts organizations 
complicated all aspects of fundraising, and this event certainly attracted the dreaded bad 
publicity that funders of the ISO wished to avoid, especially the trustees of the 
Indianapolis Foundation. By 1972, the stagnant perfunctory support from the Indianapolis 
Foundation had contributed to its decreasing significance as a revered funder of the ISO. 
The foundation thereby assisted in its own eclipse by larger foundations and donors as a 
primary patron.  
The musicians had grown tired of hearing excuses from the ISO board and did not 
believe the claim that there was no money for increased salaries. The day after receiving 
the strike letter from the musicians union, H. N. Scott, president of the symphony board, 
wrote back and assured them that the ISO negotiators were being completely candid. 
Although the symphony was soon to lose the $100,000 [$467,000 CD] per year grant 
from the Ford Foundation, administrators did not want to propose a salary decrease for 
anyone. They were even willing to draw down on the small reserve they had in order to 
keep the musicians employed at their current salaries, plus provide a small increase over 
the next five years. The symphony board members insisted that they believed the 
musicians‟ salaries should be raised, but the immediate economic situation prohibited 
such generosity. Scott‟s exasperation and passion became evident as he concluded his 
letter to the musicians union: 
Faced with the monetary facts of the situation, we do not know 
how we could have proceeded differently. In response to your 
desire for an economic offer, should we have proposed a salary 
decrease, which was all our funds allowed? Should we have 
promised money which we did not have, something which we felt 
would be fraud on the musicians? What should we have done, 
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differently than we did? …We do, however, deeply regret your 
decision to strike… It will produce less revenue, and therefore less 
money out of which we can pay salaries. I hope it will not 
discourage those who might otherwise be persuaded to pledge the 
balance of the $1,800,000 fund [,]…discourage annual 
contributors[,]…result in musicians taking jobs elsewhere[,] 
…discourage and drive away any of the hundreds of volunteer 
workers upon whose dedicated services the existence of symphony 
music depends.19 
 
Such evidence shows the vital struggles with harsh economic realities occupying 
arts administrators at this time. Generations of reliable largesse from wealthy elites left 
these groups ill-prepared to run themselves effectively in more economically complex 
and leaner times. From a historical perspective, it would appear that there were mistakes 
made on both sides. Unlike the for-profit corporations that the unions were used to 
dealing with, the symphony society had no motive for personal financial gain from the 
negotiations. No one would be profiting from the musicians receiving lower wages and, 
unlike business corporations, the finances of the ISO were truly an “open book.” They 
were not hiding any assets or hoarding profit. The demands the musicians made were 
tantamount to squeezing water out of a rock. However, in its effort to be honest, the 
symphony violated a basic and important negotiating tactic: never go to the table with 
your best offer, because it leaves you no further room to bargain. Instead of trying to 
placate the union, Scott could have improved the ISO‟s negotiating position by initially 
demanding a decrease in the musicians‟ salaries. If the negotiating team had stated the 
fact that the ISO‟s financial deficits would force a cut in salaries, then the musicians 
might have turned their focus on retaining their current salaries instead of insisting on an 
increase.  
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The negotiations failed and the strike continued, stretching into a devastating 
event for all concerned. It became such an important issue that in March, the second 
month of the strike, even the mayor of Indianapolis, Richard Lugar, intervened by 
forming a task force headed by local media and communications businessman, Robert B. 
McConnell. The Indianapolis Star claimed that “Indianapolis has a loss on which no one 
can put a price,” and that the strike was “a tragedy whose effects stretch through the 
whole center of the state[…] Both sides are immensely unhappy and the rancor may 
poison the city‟s cultural life in the future.” It was believed that few musicians had yet 
moved out of the state or sought employment with other symphonies, but that the 
possibility of such action was very real if the strike were to continue for much longer. If 
the ISO lost many of its top musicians, the article continued, it would become impossible 
for it to rebuild to its former status as one of the top ten orchestras in the country.20 
The strike caused more than just financial hardship and the threat of diminished 
cultural capital. It also called into question the ethics and morals of those involved, as 
well as how the image of the city of Indianapolis would be perceived by others 
throughout the Midwest and the entire country. As the Indianapolis Star reporter inferred, 
“It raises fundamental questions about what the values and resources are of the most 
influential people in the community, and of the musicians. It alters the cultural and social 
climate in a way that can affect barometers of opinion elsewhere, about this city.”21 One 
sees here how the media of this era grew more critical of the motivations of the elite, 
which amplified and complicated problems in arts administration and philanthropy at the 
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time. This was a more skeptical and opinionated civic world than that in which the 
Indianapolis Foundation had come to maturity as an early prominent funder of the 
symphony. 
 Fractures in the ranks of performers started to appear. One musician had already 
taken a position in Canada and others were sure to follow. Most of them had part-time 
jobs, especially during the summer off season, often doing manual labor such as house 
painting. But with inflation and a short season, the musicians believed they were falling 
further behind their professional peers in other cities, and the higher salaries of 
Washington, DC and Detroit created temptation to relocate. Some musicians were 
fortunate enough to be married to each other and were therefore bringing in dual 
incomes, but it was charged that the ISO management often took advantage of the 
situation and offered both lower salaries. The musicians also felt that the ISO had five 
years and the support of the Ford Foundation to prepare for the future and that they had 
failed in this vital responsibility. However, they also recognized that the ISO was 
attempting to raise an additional $8 million [$37 million CD] for the Ford Foundation 
endowment at the same time that other large civic projects were making new large 
additional demands on local donor resources. There were onging fund drives by several 
nonprofits: the Indianapolis Museum of Art, educational television, Butler University for 
a science building and Indiana University for a scientific research center. Yet the 
musicians believed that the ISO was wrongly forced to take a back seat to these 
competing drives, citing the positive public relations that the ISO generated through its 
traveling concerts. One musician pressed the case that the ISO should get funding priority 
over other civic projects like museums because “You can‟t put a museum on 
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wheels…and we know this is important to the image of this city.”22 Here we see the 
musicians themselves now becoming agents of fundraising, pressing the case that the ISO 
was an important public relations tools of the city and deserved to be supported above all 
other cultural institutions. 
 In these controversies, the Indianapolis Foundation trustees did what little they 
could to help ameliorate the situation. In this instance, they took an unusual step by 
announcing early approval of the 1972 grant to the ISO of the long fixed amount of 
$8,000 [$36,199 CD], with the condition that the regular concert schedule be resumed for 
1972. This was only three months after their previous symphony grant of $8,000 and had 
not been requested by the ISO. The foundation stated “we hope this early and unsolicited 
response to your present situation will help the symphony.”23 However, the funds did 
little good as they did not arrive until seven months later on 16 October 1972. 24 Clearly, 
there were now sharp limits on how much clout the community foundation could wield 
on behalf of its oldest arts project, exacerbated by its lethargy to follow through in a 
manner to actually be effective. Part of this dilution of its influence and decreased interest 
might have been due to the fact that that during this time not only was the foundation 
supporting the Indianapolis Museum of Art and the Children‟s Museum of Indianapolis, 
but theatre had finally been put on the foundation‟s radar. During 1972 and 1973, the 
Indianapolis Foundation began to fund the Indiana Repertory Theatre, the Booth 
Tarkington Civic Theatre and the Christian Theological Seminary Theatre.  
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The Public Fight for Control of the Symphony Society and the Eclipse of  
Community Foundation Arts Support 
The multiple crises caused by the musicians‟ strike unleashed the first public 
revolt amongst the membership of the ISO. One of its members, Sigmund Beck, now 
called for the ouster of the organization‟s chairman, Robert Seastrom. In addition, several 
board members and the society‟s chief legal counsel and its lead negotiator in the talks 
with the musicians union, Frederick D. Anderson, now faced calls for their dismissal. 
Anderson responded with a letter to the editor of the Indianapolis News, claiming that he 
had personally committed hundreds of hours to the negotiations in order to develop 
bargaining policies, asserting that “if those policies, and those who have formulated 
them, are rejected by the membership, then the negotiating must be put into other hands. I 
could not effectively implement substitute policies which Mr. Beck has described as 
„visionary‟.”25 
The ISO‟s financial situation became even more perilous. Of the $1.8 million 
[$8.1 million] annual budget for 1973, the society had received pledges of only $1.3. 
They also had $340,000 [$1,538,461 CD] worth of cash and assets which they were 
asking the Lilly Endowment to consider as part of the matching funds in order to increase 
the Lilly Endowment‟s contribution. To make matters worse, in September 1972 the 
negotiating team for the ISO offered the musicians $1.2 million [$5.4 million CD] over 
five years, an amount they were not even sure they could raise. Again, this is another 
example of the lax, irresponsible managerial and budgetary culture of the symphony, 
made all too ingrained by decades of complacent funding by elite philanthropists.  
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The fight for control of the symphony raged on. A card was sent out from the ISO 
board to all the symphony‟s members urging them to appoint three particular people as 
their voting proxies. An accompanying letter warned them that, if they signed a 
competing proxy from Sigmund Beck and two others, they would be voting to eliminate 
Anderson, Seastrom and six other board members. The board urged the ISO members to 
return the enclosed proxy card in order to cancel out a vote from any proxy card they 
might have signed previously from Beck‟s efforts and that it “should be signed, dated and 
witnessed.” 26 The current board members were desperate to hold on to their power and 
retain control, and they were leaving nothing to chance.  
 An agreement was finally reached with the union and the first concert of 1972 
opened on September 28
th
. However, the chaos, layoffs and internal staff acrimony must 
have caused some administrative lapses within the organization because the ISO failed to 
submit a request to the Indianapolis Foundation before January for the 1973-74 season.27 
As a result, they did not receive another grant for that year. Herbert A. Huene, chairman 
of the Operating Drive Fund for the ISO, wrote to Killen in February of 1974 informing 
him that the ISO was anticipating yet another deficit for the 1975-76 season, this time 
amounting to $800,000 [$3 million CD]. Huene emphasized that not only was the 
foundation‟s continued support needed, but he also requested an increase of at least 20 
percent over that of previous gifts from all donors to offset the never-ending shortfall. 
Although the Indianapolis Foundation continued its support with another grant in April, 
the trustees were not swayed by the plea for an increase of 20 percent. They again sent 
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the perfunctory annual contribution of $8,000 [$31,000 CD], which translated into 2004 
constant dollars reflects a decline of 30 percent from 1966.28  
By September 1974, the ISO‟s budget had grown to $1,603,458 [$6,100,000 CD], 
but now with a net deficit of $442,003 [$1,700,000 CD]. The symphony‟s annual report 
emphasized how important having an orchestra in the city was to the Indianapolis 
community by listing in the “donors” section over 100 corporate and foundation names 
and more than 250 individual patrons. The ISO‟s pleading had prompted several donors 
to increase their contributions, including the Lilly Endowment, Inc., Krannert Charitable 
Trust, Indianapolis Banks Clearing House and both Indianapolis newspapers.29 They, 
along with the Indianapolis Foundation, were listed in the top category of “Corporate 
Patron” for those who gave over $1,000 annually to the ISO. 30 Like the Indianapolis 
Foundation and the wealthy elite individual donors of previous years, large foundations 
and large businesses continued to fuel the ISO‟s unbridled budget growth.  
The symphony‟s failure to send a grant request to the Indianapolis Foundation for 
the 1973-74 season could have been because the symphony had lost its development 
director in the interim. A letter dated 25 February 1974 from the ISO to the foundation 
was signed by the symphony‟s new development director, T.D. Hudson, and included 
was a copy of the symphony‟s 1972-73 audit, which the foundation had requested, as 
well as a proposed budget for 1973-74. This is the first time during their 40-year 
relationship that the Indianapolis Foundation, signaling that the foundation‟s trustees 
were less willing to continue funding an organization that did not have its fiscal house in 
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order and was constantly operating in deficit, requested any such accountability from the 
ISO. Hudson‟s letter thanked Jack Killen for agreeing to meet with him and two other 
members of the ISO, impressing upon him that they were “mindful of the excellent 
support the Foundation has given us in the past, and we look forward to a continuing 
relationship in the future.” 31 Given the fallout of the strike year, it was imperative for 
symphony executives to mend fences with their oldest and most relied-upon patrons. This 
long-term status was certainly true with the Indianapolis Foundation trustees, who had 
given the symphony $156,000 [$1,163,000 CD] since their relationship started in 1933.32  
For the first time, symphony executives emphasized their growing concern 
regarding competition from other entertainment venues, including theaters, sporting 
events, and television, and blaming them as the culprits that were sapping the 
symphony‟s attendance and support. The post-war proliferation of American mass-media 
entertainment and venues became a trend that old-line arts organizations and their patrons 
were ill equipped to challenge or reverse. As part of their a new attempt to save money, 
symphony directors decided to merge the management of the ISO with that of Clowes 
Hall, making each responsible for 50 percent of the expenses. Although they planned 
concerts throughout the state, 90 percent of the concerts took place in Indianapolis. In 
spite of the fact that the musicians‟ contracts were to expire in two years, requiring new 
renegotiations, “extremely good relations were reported with the Union by Messrs. 
Huene, Weedman and Hudson.”33  
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 Jack Killen and the Indianapolis Foundation were supplying more than money to 
the symphony. Killen supplied volunteer service and expertise as well, especially in the 
area of fund raising. He held a mentoring session on the finer points of fund development 
with Terry Hudson, the symphony‟s new development director. Hudson acknowledged 
that “it was extremely helpful to talk with a seasoned pro about areas that have been 
question marks for me for some time. It was reassuring to know that some of the things I 
was doing are among the tested methods of good fundraising administration. The 
additional ideas and insights you gave me will help put the Symphony on an even more 
solid footing in the future.”34 It is rare, indeed, when a foundation executive shares the 
secrets of how to coax more money out of a foundation. However, Hudson was letting 
Killen know, in a subtle and politically savvy way, that Hudson did, indeed, know what 
he was doing, while tipping his hat to Killen‟s wisdom.  
 Hudson‟s comment that the symphony was on “even more solid footing,” 
inferring that the ISO had been solvent before, was a questionable claim at best. The 
symphony‟s annual budget had risen to $2.3 million [$8.8 million CD], projecting a 
looming deficit of over $500,000 [$1.6 million CD] by 1976. “Solid” was a wholly 
inaccurate description. Although the Ford Foundation endowment of $2 million would 
arrive in 1975, the interest on the endowment would only make a dent in defraying 
symphony expenses. It was estimated that an additional $5.5 million [$18.6 million CD] 
would be needed through the 1978/79 season in order to break even. It was proposed that 
a $25 million [$88 million CD] endowment be established to defray future costs. In the 
face of continuing financial problems, the ISO again requested an increase in the 1975 
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grant amount from the Indianapolis Foundation.35 The foundation responded with the 
same donation it had given the ISO for each of the previous six years, $8,000 [$28,070 
CD], yet another $2,000 drop in constant dollars from the previous year.36 With such 
persistent refusal to augment financial assistance, the Indianapolis Foundation 
progressively diminished in stature among the symphony‟s influential patrons. Structural 
limits to the foundation‟s assets and its position as one of the lesser arts patrons in the 
city marked the end of an era of symbioses between trust bankers, community 
foundations, and the local chief cultural organizations they once sponsored. 
 In 1975, the ISO organized a major campaign supported by a well written case 
statement with the theme “GO SYMPHONY $500,000.” Its goal was to raise $500,000 
[$1.8 million CD] to cover the anticipated deficit for the 1975-76 season. This drive‟s 
chairman was Richard DeMars, President of Geupel DeMars Inc., a construction 
company that managed large Indianapolis projects such as the Indianapolis Zoo and the 
Children‟s Museum of Indianapolis, both projects of which the Indianapolis Foundation 
trustees had voted to support with large donations. DeMars served on the boards of 
several Indianapolis nonprofits, and not surprisingly, his company was later contracted to 
manage the renovations of the Circle Theatre when the ISO made the theatre its home in 
the 1980s. Again, these business and social relations created opportunities for the wealthy 
to use their connections to charitable organizations to advance their own interests and 
expand their wealth.  
DeMars aggressively advocated for additional financial support, not only from the 
community, but also from the ISO‟s traditional funders. He strongly suggested that the 
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Indianapolis Foundation should double its contribution to $16,000 [$53,156.15 CD]. His 
strategy was the now oft used method of showing how much the ISO contributed to the 
community and to the reputation of Indianapolis. Playing on the old-line, elite funders‟ 
love of acculturating lower class children, he even quoted a letter from Lisa Perry, a 7
th
 
grader from Westlane School, in which she wrote, “I really enjoyed the concert very 
much…I was taking Orchestra in school, but I had to stop…I really would like the 
Indianapolis Sympony [sic] Orchestra to come back.”37  
 DeMars also exploited the opinions of critics outside Indianapolis to demonstrate 
how important the ISO was to the city‟s continued good public relations and enhanced 
national repute. He quoted Winthrop Sargeant, a critic from The New Yorker, who wrote, 
“[…] the Indianapolis Symphony has it all. It is simply one of the most magnificent 
orchestras in the country.” DeMars also quoted Harold Schonberg of the New York 
Times, who stated “it is a typical American orchestra in its smoothness, power, brisk 
ensemble and adept solo playing.” DeMars drove his point home by quoting Byron Belt 
in the Chicago Daily News: “Hopefully audiences in the Indianapolis Area recognize 
their treasure and will support […] the orchestra to the hilt. The orchestra was a proud 
ambassador of Indiana.”38 
The complacent $8,000 annual contribution from the Indianapolis Foundation had 
diminished in significance compared to most other funding sources by 1975. The ISO‟s 
annual budget had burgeoned to $1,867,826 [$6.6 million CD], with an expected climb to 
$2,118,700 [$7.4 million CD] for 1976. The dividends from the Ford Foundation 
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endowment were $124,376 [$436,000 CD], dividends from the ISO‟s own endowment 
were $66,710 [$234,000 CD], and municipal and local government funding now came to 
$71,000 [$249,000 CD]. The National Endowment for the Arts became a new contributor 
at $140,000 [$491,000 CD], and was slated to increase to $150,000 [$526,000 CD] for 
the next season. The latter sum was the maximum amount of matching federal support 
that any U.S. symphony could receive. Even arts grants to the symphony from the 
always-parsimonious Indiana State Government had grown two to three times larger than 
the Indianapolis Foundation‟s support. State funding now amounted to $18,000 [$63,000 
CD], and was projected to increase to $35,000 [$122,000 CD] the next year. The rest of 
the income for the symphony‟s total budget was raised through ticket sales and 
fundraising drives.39 
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Support in the Media and Newspapers 
 Growing and lucrative subscriptions expanded the power of newspapers, and they 
took over as prime boosters of local arts organizations. One example of this was an 
editorial piece by the Indianapolis Star that contributed to the arts promotion effort: 
If a city‟s stature is measured by its cultural achievements, then 
Indianapolis is at the top of the list. Indianapolis has been able to 
maintain this position through the years because private citizens 
from all strata of society have contributed generously to the 
support of our institutions when the need arose…[T]his time the 
city‟s residents are being asked to support the nationally acclaimed 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra…[last season] 276,400 persons 
saw and heard the 80 professional musicians …More than 34,000 
persons in cities across the nation saw and heard the symphony last 
season in 23 concerts, even though the symphony directs its efforts 
primarily to local audiences…Reviews in publications across the 
nation show it to be instrumental in establishing Indianapolis as a 
cultural location. It has been called one of the 10 best orchestras in 
the United States by national critics.”40 
 
This writer‟s assertion that the ISO‟s existence was due to the support of “private 
citizens” overlooks the many years of support by the Indianapolis Foundation, indicating 
that the foundation‟s efforts to use its largesse to impress the general public with its good 
community works had ultimately failed. As the foundation‟s contributions to the ISO 
diminished in comparison to large private foundations, so did its ability to command 
special recognition by the press and the community.  
 It is an important historical lesson for arts organization fundraisers today to 
understand that the ISO grew in importance as a public relations instrument for the city 
rather than as a vehicle for providing cultural enrichment to local audiences. This is one 
effect of the growing influence of the media on fundraising, as well as the intensified 
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cultural competitiveness among U.S. cities, especially in the Midwest. Although a 
smaller and smaller percentage of the community actually attended the symphony, it was 
often poised as an organization that the entire community insisted upon. Even the new 
president of the symphony board, William Weisell, claimed “we are on trial this year. We 
must prove that the symphony is supported by the people of Indianapolis.”41 Such quasi-
democratic puffery made good newspaper copy, but essentially disguised the diminished 
attendance at symphony concerts. It also reduced the role of old-guard elites in the 
effective, predominant funding and control of major arts organizations.  
The symphony‟s new case statement and resulting public relations campaign 
eventually pushed trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation into higher levels of support, 
and they met Richard DeMars‟ request for a substantial increase in their symphony 
contribution.42 They doubled their standard contribution of $8,000, to $16,000 [$53,000 
CD], but this was still a very minor amount compared to the total funds raised for the 
orchestra.43 Corporate donations and corporately fueled endowments, like the Lilly 
Endowment, now contributed far more money to the symphony, overshadowing the old 
bankers‟ trusts that had morphed into the Indianapolis Foundation.  
Although ISO budget continued to increase in 1977, the Lilly Endowment, again, 
came to the rescue. It offered a “Two-For-One Match,” which meant that for every dollar 
another donor gave the Lilly Endowment would give two dollars, up to $1 million. This 
had the potential to provide the ISO with $1.5 million [$4,673,000 CD] toward its annual 
fund drive. In a letter to Jack Killen, professional fundraisers for the symphony asked the 
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Indianapolis Foundation to increase its contribution to $25,000, which would leverage an 
additional $50,000 from the Lilly Endowment.44 In response, Jack Killen sent a letter 
notifying Richard Hoffert, the new development director for the ISO, that the 
Indianapolis Foundation had approved the $25,000 [$83,000 CD] grant, but cautioned 
him that “our board of trustees requested that I advise you not to expect the same level of 
support from The Foundation in the future.” He also revealed the continuing importance 
of proper recognition for the Indianapolis Foundation‟s contributions, stating “Thank you 
for the plaque, however, we would like to have the name corrected to read The 
Indianapolis Foundation, if this can be done conveniently.”45 Although the foundation‟s 
contributions now comprised a miniscule amount of the symphony‟s total funding, it was 
apparently deemed vital by symphony directors to acknowledge in an old-fashioned 
manner even a small foundation contribution. 
Richard DeMars sent a thank you letter to Jack Killen a day before Killen‟s letter 
arrived awarding the ISO the grant, which shows that DeMars was notified of the grant 
by Killen before the official conferral letter arrived. The correspondence between them 
also revealed the closeness of their relationship, beginning with “Dear Jack,” and closing 
with “Sincerely, Dick.” This web of tight personal relationships between those involved 
with the symphony and trustees of the Indianapolis Foundation had a long tradition but 
was not to last much longer. Jack Killen was about to retire and the cozy relationship 
between the foundation and the symphony did not transfer to the next executive director 
of the foundation, Kenneth I. Chapman, who took the helm on 1 January 1978. 
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Jack Killen had invested twenty years of his life as the foundation‟s head and his 
service there was viewed as exemplary. The Indianapolis Star wrote: 
As executive director of the foundation, Jack Killen has been a 
quiet but strong figure familiar to just about every volunteer 
cultural, health and welfare organization in the community. His 
counsel has been sought and respected, and under his direction the 
foundation and its affiliate, the English Foundation, have 
accomplished much.46 
 
The Indianapolis News echoed its approval:  
[Ken Chapman] …has a hard act to follow. Jack Killen is a 
lifetime resident and a lifetime friend of the city of Indianapolis. 
He has been director for the foundation for 20 years and his 
stewardship has shown an amazing concern for the careful 
distribution of donated funds – a concern that is rarely found even 
in the best of charitable organizations. His 1976 record was 
outstanding: the foundations expenses amounted to only $41,000, 
or 4.6 percent of its operation. The foundation‟s annual report 
listed a whopping $10 in miscellaneous expenses….We wish both 
men well, and we envy them: Killen for such a fine record of 
public service, and his successor, for a chance to continue the 
tremendous work [of the foundation].47 
 
These glowing comments from the Indianapolis press are in sharp contrast to the often 
deeply adversarial nature of relations between the local press and philanthropic 
organizations typical of other U.S. cities. Such public criticism came very slowly to 
Indianapolis, no doubt due to the arch-conservative nature of the Indianapolis Star, 
owned by the Pulliam family, and its notorious bias against all forms of government 
assistance. It consistently favored private philanthropy, no matter how ineffectual, and 
impeded public awareness of the real limits to elite largesse of the time. 
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The Ken Chapman Era 
Ken Chapman was a long-time resident of Indianapolis and had worked for the 
Community Service Council of Metropolitan Indianapolis for more than twenty years, the 
last eleven as its executive director. He graduated from the University of Connecticut and 
held two master‟s degrees, one from Indiana University and the other from Harvard. He 
was quoted in the newspaper as saying “I look forward to using experience accumulated 
in 20 years of community planning toward continued development of the Indianapolis 
Foundation‟s role in the community […].”48  
 Perhaps expecting the complacent relationship between the foundation and the 
ISO to continue, the symphony‟s director of development, Richard Hoffert, wished the 
outgoing Jack Killen luck in his future endeavors, noting that he was “looking forward 
with anticipation to working with the new Director, Kenneth Chapman.”49 But it seemed 
that Chapman was not familiar with the gift approval process that had gone on previous 
to his appointment. He was slow to respond to the case for funding that the ISO had 
previously pressed upon the foundation. In response to a new symphony request for funds 
in 1978, Chapman returned a rather curt letter to Hoffert stating, “our board of trustees 
has deferred your request for consideration until its first meeting after October 1, 1978 
with the observation that the request should be more fully substantiated. The board felt 
that since we had just made the payment in December, 1977 in support of your 1977-78 
budget, it could hold off on the 1978-79 request until fall when it had a better 
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understanding of the financial position of The Foundation.”50 Why Chapman and the 
board made this decision is a mystery, as they had for the previous four years always 
approved the ISO‟s grants in the spring and distributed them the following December. It 
could be that the foundation‟s board composition had changed and the members did not 
remember, or that the financial state of the foundation was in limbo. More likely, the 
Indianapolis Foundation‟s arts funding priorities had changed significantly, because it 
increased total its total funding of arts and cultural organizations from $8,600 [$42,000 
CD] in 1970 to more than $167,000 [$484,000 CD] in 1978. The new arts organizations it 
was now funding at significant levels included ballet and opera companies, the Arts 
Council, and public television. Whatever the reason, the decision to defer funding surely 
caused a panic at the ISO office since they were in the final year of the Lilly 
Endowment‟s “Two-for-One” match and a contribution from the foundation was crucial. 
 Hoffert quickly replied, attempting to justify the amount requested by explaining 
the funding approval process and distribution of funds in the past, and how these funds 
were used to serve the community: 
The grant received from the Indianapolis Foundation is primarily 
used to help underwrite educational programs of the Symphony 
which include an In-School Program, Visions Concerts and the 
Lolli-Pop Series. Last year, the Vision Concerts, which are held at 
Clowes Hall for elementary school children, reached 17,000 
students. The In-School program reached 45,000 students, and the 
nationally known Lolli-Pop Series for pre-schoolers reached 
15,000 children. This means that 77,000 Indianapolis children 
were exposed to live symphony music. For the Board‟s 
information, I am enclosing some letters received from students 
and faculty in response to our In-School Program.51 
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Hoffert‟s explanations and the letters from students and teachers, usually so 
persuasive in the past, were no longer effective. The foundation requested much more 
specific information, such as the actual budget figures for these programs, and was 
demonstrating skepticism of this youth investment at the ISO, a skepticism perhaps 
heightened by its recently increased donation level to $25,000 [$83,000 CD]. Hoffert 
quickly produced a budget and informed Chapman that the costs for the student and 
municipal concerts were $288,000 [$835,000 CD]. He explained that although the 
symphony received $11,000 [$32,000 CD] from the schools and $100,000 [$290,000 
CD] from other sources for these concerts, more than $177,000 [$513,000 CD] in costs 
remained. “It is for this reason,” he said, “that we try to use the monies acquired from 
local foundations (i.e., Noyes, Jordan, Krannert, Lilly and Indianapolis) to offset the 
expenses of these programs which directly benefit the children and adults of 
Indianapolis.”52 
This last letter produced the desired result, as the Indianapolis Foundation 
approved a grant of $26,000 [$75,362 CD] that May for distribution in December. 
Hoffert thanked Chapman for the donation and sought to clarify the application process 
for the next year and to correct a misunderstanding of Chapman‟s, writing “I note on your 
letter that you refer to „support for 1978/79.‟ In order to avoid confusion in the future, 
this gift was requested for and accounted for toward the 1978 Fund Drive. The 1979 Fund 
Drive will have its kick-off in November.”53 
In an effort to thank the Indianapolis Foundation, the ISO devoted a half page ad 
in their 1977-78 program stating in large letters, “The Indianapolis State Symphony 
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Orchestra Gratefully Acknowledges the Indianapolis Foundation …for contributing over 
$200,000 since 1955.”54 Unfortunately, whoever wrote the copy did not research the 
facts, and perhaps by that time the foundation trustees themselves had no comprehension 
of their long history with the ISO. The Indianapolis Foundation was one of the first 
foundations to fund the ISO in its infancy, and supported it from 1933 to 1944, during 
which time it donated $38,600 [$480,000 CD]. From 1945 to 1954 the city took over the 
major financing of the ISO and the Indianapolis Foundation bowed out for about ten 
years, then re-emerged in 1955 as a funder when city budgets were cut. Even the 
$200,000 claim did not tell the whole story, because those figures were in historical 
dollars, not 1978 current dollars. If they had been converted to 1978 dollars the figure 
would have been much higher. 
It does not appear that anyone caught this error, or if they had it was not 
mentioned in the Indianapolis Foundation records. This reflects the short-term memory of 
organizations that have revolving boards of directors and staff. At any rate, this omission 
did not seem to dim the foundation‟s commitment, because in November of 1979 they 
sent a check to the symphony in the amount of $25,000 [$65,000 CD] “to support your 
music education and free public concert program during 1979.”55 This was, nonetheless, 
still a very small part of the symphony‟s overall operating expenses and fundraising 
capacity and only a fraction of the $159,000 [$457,000 CD] that the Indianapolis 
Foundation spent that year on arts and culture. 
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Solicitation for Trusts through Grantees 
The question of why the Indianapolis Foundation continued very modest support 
for the symphony for so long may be related to the audience of donors to whom the 
foundation itself was hoping to appeal. It was no secret that many subscribers to the ISO 
were wealthy and this opportunity to attract them to the foundation itself could not be 
missed. In the ISO program‟s erroneous tribute about the amount of funding the 
Indianapolis Foundation had provided to the ISO over the years, a paragraph of 
solicitation was also included, reading: 
The Indianapolis Foundation relies upon public support for its 
continued growth and development. Gifts and bequests in any 
amount are welcomed. All donations to The Foundation are 
invested, with charitable grants drawn from income only. Thus, a 
gift to the Indianapolis Foundation provides ongoing support for 
community betterment. For further information, contact Mr. 
Kenneth Chapman at The Indianapolis Foundation, 634-7497.
56
 
 
1980 marked the 50
th
 anniversary of the ISO, with preparations begun in 1979. 
After receiving the foundation‟s check for $26,000 [$75,000 CD] in December of 1978, 
Richard Hoffert wasted no time requesting another grant for $30,000 [$87,000 CD]. He 
used the same plea as the year before, citing the 76,000 children and 47,000 citizens who 
had attended the symphony‟s free concerts. Hoffert also emphasized that the ISO had 
been one of only three orchestras chosen nationwide “to be recorded for the National 
Public Radio‟s „Great American Orchestras Series‟.” This was quite prestigious to locals, 
and was helpful in convincing people outside of Indiana of the reputation of Indianapolis 
as a city of class and culture. This was certainly in line with the Indianapolis 
Foundation‟s own mission to promote community civility. The 50th anniversary also 
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coincided with the end of the ISO‟s capital campaign inspired by the Lilly Endowment, 
which had raised $3.3 million dollars and included $1.65 million of another $2.5 million 
matching grant from the Krannert Charitable Trust.57  
Hoffert‟s fundraising savvy became evident in late 1980 when he invited the 
members of the Indianapolis Foundation board to attend one of the ISO‟s “Visions 
Concerts” for children so the trustees could witness first-hand the symphony‟s work in 
the community. He stated: “I thought it a good idea that the members of the Indianapolis 
Foundation attend this series of concerts to see how the grant from the Foundation is used 
toward the educational program of the Symphony. [...] By advising you early in the year, 
we hope you will be able to discuss this possibility at your next meeting, in time for your 
Members to fit the concerts into their schedules.”58 Whether the foundation‟s trustees 
attended or not is unknown, but a check for $26,000 [$60,000 CD] was approved a month 
before the children‟s‟ concerts, so perhaps the invitation itself was enough to be 
convincing. 
The foundation‟s support for the symphony grew again. As usual, Hoffert 
requested another grant in February of 1980, this time for $27,000 [$62,000 CD]. The 
language was very similar to the previous two years, citing the free concerts for children 
and families, but this time proudly reporting that the endowment drive exceeded 
expectations and instead of $5 million, they had raised $6,000,275 [$13.8 million CD]. 
“In addition,” Hoffert stated, “the Orchestra was awarded an $850,000 matching grant 
toward the Endowment Drive which, by the way, was the same amount granted to the 
Boston and New York Philharmonic Orchestras.” Although he doesn‟t state the source of 
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the funds, the fact that the New York and Boston symphonies received the same amount 
points to a major private foundation. To add to its success, the ISO achieved its first full-
season sellout of seats.59 In March of 1980, Chapman wrote to inform Hoffert that the 
ISO had been granted $25,000 [$57,339 CD], which was applied toward a matching grant 
from the National Endowment of the Arts for that year.60  
This was just the beginning of the foundation‟s newly expanding financial 
commitment to the ISO. In June, Chapman received a letter from the chairman and the 
president of the ISO, requesting funds to help the symphony‟s office move from Clowes 
Hall into new office space in the Holcomb Building at Butler University. They opened 
their letter explaining the situation: 
The administrative offices for the Indianapolis Symphony 
orchestra have been located in Clowes Hall for the past seventeen 
years. During this period the Orchestra has grown into a $4M a 
year business. We have now come to a point where the Board of 
Directors of the Symphony feel because of the limitations of the 
present office situation in Clowes Hall and the adverse conditions 
under which the staff is functioning that they should move into 
new offices which are more conducive to a professional 
organization…. This situation exists because Clowes Hall was 
never designed to house any great number of offices other than 
those deemed necessary to run Clowes Hall.61  
 
This use of the word “professional” to describe the ISO shows that the symphony 
was one of many charitable Indianapolis organizations that had evolved from 
predominantly volunteer labor in the early years of the twentieth century to 
mostly paid professionals by the 1980s. 
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Some of the problems with the cramped space at Clowes Hall included having to 
share offices with Clowes employees, offices placed in open lounge areas, lack of privacy 
for delicate discussions, offices in the film projection room, and probably worst of all – 
no air conditioning in the summer when the stage was rarely used. Butler provided them a 
makeshift office space below market value at $2.00 [$4.58 CD] per square foot on the top 
floor of the nearby Holcomb Research Center. Architectural plans designed by 
Richardson, Munson and Weir called for 4,500 square feet of remodeled space for 
symphony administrators. Most of the design work was donated, but funds for the 
construction costs had to be raised. Thus, the symphony asked “The Indianapolis 
Foundation to consider a one-time special grant to the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra 
to help underwrite the costs of developing a new office space which we believe will 
present the kind of image to our donors and volunteers that reflects the quality of the 
organization. The amount requested is $56,000 [$128,000 CD].”62 This was mostly for 
office furnishings, partitions and carpeting, because, as the symphony executives stated, 
in order to attract wealthy, elite donors, quality music was simply not enough. An image 
of appropriate standards was essential if the ISO was to increase its appeal to wealthy 
donors who held the financial keys to its future. 
 On June 24
th
, Ken Chapman called Paul Spitz, chairman of the ISO, to 
inform him that the foundation had indeed granted them $50,000 [$115,000 CD] for the 
move, bringing the symphony coffers to $75,000 [$172,000 CD] for 1980. However, the 
foundation‟s funding of arts and culture organizations for 1980 jump more than 80 
percent over the previous year, to almost $293,000 [$672,000 CD]. This impressive 
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increase in arts funding started in 1978, with the Indiana Repertory Theatre receiving 
more than $200,000 [$534,000 CD] from the Indianapolis Foundation in just three years.  
In a later letter, Chapman commended Spitz on his leadership, and stated “I am 
looking forward to meeting with you and Dick Hoffert regarding the publicizing of this 
grant which, as you know, is important to the continuing development program of The 
Foundation.”63 The ISO responded with a news release to the papers, which resulted in a 
story in the Indianapolis News with a picture of Kenneth Chapman looking over 
blueprints of the new office space.64 This was the kind of positive press that the 
foundation had long coveted and strove to attract through its philanthropy. 
The ISO once again inserted a half-page tribute to the foundation in its concert 
programs, stating erroneously again that the foundation had lent support since 1955 
instead of 1933. The soft-sell appeal from the Indianapolis Foundation to potential 
wealthy donors for charitable trusts was included once again in the program. Evidently 
the promotion in the program was working to the foundation‟s benefit, as Chapman 
thanked Hoffert for the program tribute and informed him that “It‟s great and we really 
appreciate the publicity. A number of people have mentioned it to me already…I 
requested a few more for our Board. I know they will be pleased.”65 The ISO‟s 
newsletter, Ovation, which was circulated to 18,000 people, featured a story about the 
new offices and the Indianapolis Foundation‟s role in financing the move, garnering 
another great public relations piece for the foundation.66  
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 The ISO published an 88-page report for its 50
th
 anniversary titled “Fifty Colorful 
Years, 1930/1980,” in which a brief history of the symphony was highlighted. However, 
nowhere in the history was the Indianapolis Foundation mentioned, although financial 
support from the Clowes Fund, Lilly Endowment and Ford Foundation did get 
acknowledged.67 Such a glaring oversight of the Indianapolis Foundation‟s importance to 
the birth and long-term support of the ISO testifies to a more general neglect of the local 
history of philanthropy in much of the mainstream local and national media. Such an 
omission also reflects how insignificant the Indianapolis Foundation‟s contributions to 
the ISO had become in comparison to the support from these larger philanthropic entities. 
 Perhaps emboldened by the $75,000 the ISO had received from the Indianapolis 
Foundation in 1980, Hoffert requested $32,000 [$66,500 CD] in 1981. He also revealed 
that the Lilly Endowment and the Krannert Charitable Trust had pledged another $2.2 
million [$4.6 million CD] over the next three years, with Lilly offering a new dollar-for-
dollar challenge grant of up to $500,000.68 Maybe Hoffert hoped that this match 
challenge would encourage the Indianapolis Foundation to increase its contribution again. 
He may also have been encouraged by Chapman‟s letter sent a few days later 
acknowledging receipt of the proposal, stating that the foundation “greatly appreciated 
what you did in publicizing The Foundation in relationship to the capital grant for your 
new office space [….] The plaque is beautiful […].”69 However, no more extra donation 
came forth and the foundation remained stalwart, granting only $25,000 [$52,000 CD], 
                                                          
67
 Orchestra, “Fifty Colorful Years 1930/1980: The Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra.”  
 
68
 Kenneth Chapman, Letter, by Richard R. Hoffert, February, 1981, Box 65/17. 
 
69
 Richard R. Hoffert, Letter, by Kenneth I. Chapman, February 19, 1981, Box 65/17. 
 309 
stating “in view of the grant for the relocation of your offices, our Board did not feel it 
could go beyond the level of support it provided last year.”70  
 By November 1981, Richard Hoffert had left the position of development director 
and was replaced by Wendy Boyle. By this time, the annual 1982-83 fund drive for the 
ISO sought $975,000 [$1,908,023 CD], and the Indianapolis Foundation was approached 
for $28,750. The funds were needed even more that year than in the others before, 
because the city reduced its musical support from $100,000 to $76,900 for the free 
concerts in the parks. The concept of the symphony as a “business” had been used a few 
times in previous proposals, but it became especially pronounced in Boyle‟s appeal:  
The Symphony is in business to perform and educate. And 
business is a key word here. …The Orchestra‟s financial stability 
is envied in these economically trying times. Despite major 
increases in ticket prices, product demand is up and our 
subscription renewal rate is among the highest in the country. The 
ISO‟s efforts to maintain financial stability were recognized by the 
Mellon Foundation which awarded us a $37,000 grant for financial 
achievements in the three year period beyond the Foundations 
original award.71  
 
The foundation board was not convinced by the explicitly hard-nosed, all-business 
approach of the solicitation to increase its donation, approving the usual $25,000 
[$49,000].72 The genesis of this appeal by the symphony‟s own new professionalized, 
business oriented managers shows again how vital repackaging arts organizations as 
financial enterprises came about through outside pressures from the businessmen and 
bankers who continued to control community and private foundations. This trend 
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expanded even more through an emerging entrepreneurial spirit among well-trained, 
competitive, middle-class “development professionals.” 
 
The Move to the Hilbert Theatre – 1983 
 Transient partnerships between various U.S. urban nonprofits now proved 
increasingly volatile and problematic, eliciting new challenges for survival and 
profitability. After a few short years in the ISO‟s new offices, the relationship with Butler 
University and Clowes Hall took a surprising turn for the worse when Butler increased 
the rent for the newly remodeled office space by 300 percent. The ISO board looked for 
alternatives and found one at the Circle Theatre in downtown Indianapolis. Rehearsal 
time had become more difficult to schedule around the other events being held at Clowes, 
preventing the ISO from expanding the number of programs offered. The symphony 
society felt that a new downtown location would give them a “real home” while 
increasing the quality of performances and expanding the season. This move mirrored 
other urban renewal schemes in other major cities at the time that attempted to save 
floundering downtown districts that suffered from the flight to the suburbs by wealthy 
and middle-class citizens, as well as the businesses they owned.  
The Cleveland Foundation, which was the first community foundation in the 
country, purchased real estate in Cleveland‟s crumbling downtown and moved its offices 
there. It also invested heavily in the arts in an attempt to lure residents back, and to 
increase tourism.73 This new approach to resuscitate urban centers from near death 
catalyzed the ISO‟s plans to move its operations to the literal center of Indianapolis, 
Monument Circle.  
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The symphony conductor, John Nelson, signed on for another three-year contract, 
and a new contract was negotiated with the musicians union. The annual fund drive 
would be increased 13.5 percent over the previous year‟s goal of $975,000, putting it at 
$1,106,625 [$2,100,000 CD], so Wendy Boyle asked for a 13.5 percent increase in the 
foundation‟s contribution, to $28,500.74 The foundation still held fast to its $25,000 
[$47,000 CD] donation “in support of its 1983 series of youth education and municipal 
concerts programs.”75 This persistent stagnation in foundation support is a clear indication 
that such allegedly “community” foundations played an ever-diminishing role in the 
revitalization of civic and arts organizations during the economic expansion of the 1980s. 
As the Indianapolis Foundation‟s financial records show, except for two large grants 
totaling $160,000 [$286,000 CD] for the Indianapolis Zoo during 1984 and 1985, the 
foundation‟s support of the arts decreased from a high of $293,000 in 1980 to around 
$140,000 to $150,000 from 1982 through 1986.  
Moving forward on their plans to relocate into the downtown Circle Theatre, the 
ISO engaged the services of the professional fundraising firm C.W. Shaver & Company 
of New York to conduct a feasibility study. The main objective was to find out if there 
was enough interest and money not only to support its move to, and renovations of, the 
Circle Theatre, but also to expand the endowment to help ensure its long-term financial 
stability. The staff of Shaver & Company interviewed several prominent people in 
Indianapolis, including Ken Chapman of the Indianapolis Foundation.76 The confidential 
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report was presented on 11 July 1983 and revealed much about the state of the orchestra 
and its local patrons.  
 According to the report, the ISO was interested in raising $13 million [$25 million 
CD] in new endowment funds by 1988, as well as an additional $9.4 million [$17.9 
million CD] for its move the Circle Theatre. The company conducted more than forty 
interviews using questions about the ISO and its move to the theatre. Three years of 
financial history were analyzed and projections for five years out were estimated. The 
report stated that for a city the size of Indianapolis, the ISO‟s annual expenses were very 
high, exceeding those of other symphonies in major cities such as Denver, Buffalo, 
Portland and Seattle. It revealed that although Indianapolis ranked 34
th
 among 
metropolitan areas in terms of its population, its per-capita expenses for its orchestra 
ranked 19
th
.77 A few cities such as Syracuse, Rochester and Cincinnati were paying much 
more, but were heavily subsidized either by government or endowment funds, as shown 
in the Table 4. 
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City 
Per Capita 
Expense 
1982 Dollars 
Per Capita 
Expense 
Constant 
Dollars (CD) 
*Syracuse $5.50 $10.76 
*Rochester 5.36 10.49 
**Cincinnati 4.67 9.14 
Indianapolis 3.86 7.55 
Denver 3.52 6.90 
Buffalo 3.23 6.32 
Milwaukee 3.16 6.18 
San Antonio 3.11 6.08 
New Orleans 3.01 5.89 
Portland 2.50 4.89 
Seattle 2.41 4.71 
 
Table 4: Comparison of 1982 symphony per capita expenditures among several U.S. cities 
* Both Syracuse and Rochester received very large subsidies from the New York State Arts 
Council 
** 41% of Cincinnati‟s income was from an endowment, twice the percentage of any other 
orchestra. 
Source: Confidential Report to the Board of Directors of the Indiana State Symphony Society, Inc. 
of a Study Conducted by C.W. Shaver & Company, July 11, 1983. 
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The report emphasized the financial importance of having a long tradition of audience 
attendance to a symphony, noting that half the symphonies in existence when the ISO 
was created in 1930 had been established long before, such as the New York 
Philharmonic in 1840 and the Boston Symphony in 1880. Because of this historical lack 
of a deep support and roots, the report asserted that Indianapolis needed to build a larger 
attendance base. However, it stated it saw no reason why the ISO couldn‟t improve 
attendance, because it was “an unusually progressive city” and regional assets like the 
Jordan School of Music at Butler University and the Indiana University School of Music 
at nearby Bloomington could be relied upon to generate appreciative future audiences. 78 
The report did not define how C. W. Shaver & Company determined that Indianapolis 
was an unusually progressive city, which could easily suggest a simple case of 
consultants embellishing the city‟s attributes and potential in order to secure additional 
business. This report substantiates the culpability of the wealthy elite and major 
foundations in fueling the financial precariousness of the ISO. The fact that the per-capita 
expenditures of the ISO were so high at a time when the symphony was declining in 
attendance strongly indicates that a small cadre of wealthy patrons contributed large sums 
of money to grow an organization whose general Indianapolis citizenry neither had the 
means nor the interest to support it.  
An assessment of the ISO‟s financial history and health has important 
consequences for conceptualizing this history of the Indianapolis Foundation and its 
effects, both good and bad, on the local arts community. Since the early 1970s, several of 
the symphony seasons ended with large deficits, four of which were $500,000 [$949,000 
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CD] or more. Over a period of ten years, the symphony‟s annual operating expenditures 
increased 252 percent, while performance income rose only 128 percent and earned 
income rose only 105 percent, indicating the inevitability of large yearly deficits. During 
this same ten-year period, the audience for full orchestra performances had increased 
very little, but the number of orchestra players had increased more than 10 percent. By 
1983, the number of weeks played had increased more than 20 percent, and musicians‟ 
salaries had increased by almost 200 percent, to very comfortable income levels. This 
indicates that the chief beneficiaries of U.S. arts philanthropies have been the newly 
professionalized musicians who had risen to become members of the comfortable new 
American middle-classes, while the arts organizations themselves struggled to survive.79 
 Although those involved consistently claimed that the ISO was one of the top ten, 
and often the top five, orchestras in the country, in reality it ranked far lower. As the 
Shaver report pointed out, the top ten U.S. orchestras had annual budgets at least double 
that of Indianapolis, which ranked 19th out of 29 in annual expenditures. Unfortunately, 
it ranked only 29
th
 out of 30 in terms of ticket sales, selling only about 66 percent of its 
seating capacity. In addition, its artistic personnel accounted for 67 percent of its 
expenditures, which was the second highest in the nation, and performance income 
covered only 38 percent of those artistic expenses – the lowest percentage in the United 
States. The report predicted that by 1986 the salary of Indianapolis musicians would rank 
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at least 12
th
 in the nation, higher than Dallas, Houston and St. Louis, far larger cities with 
far more prestigious orchestras.80  
 The move from the 2,106-seat Clowes Hall to the 1,898-seat Circle Theatre not 
only caused expenses in terms of renovation and moving, it also resulted in a net loss of 
seating revenues by nearly 10 percent. If the ISO had plans to expand its audience, this 
was hardly a prudent business strategy. Circle Theatre was the second smallest hall used 
by any symphony in the nation, leaving only Atlanta with fewer seats at 1,762. For most 
American symphonies that were leaders in ticket sales, the hall sizes ranged from 2,700 
to over 3,000. This move limited the ISO‟s potential tickets sales while increasing its 
expenditures significantly.81 This is the kind of financial predicament old-guard arts 
patrons seemed little inclined to notice, protest or fix.  
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Income from Endowments and Foundations 
 
From the standpoint of foundation and endowment funding, the ISO was doing 
quite well in 1983. The ISO ranked second highest in the nation in terms of percentage of 
annual income from endowments and investments at 26 percent, outranked only by 
Cincinnati at 41 percent. Part of the ISO endowment was the Ford Foundation challenge 
grant from 1966-1971, which matched dollar-for-dollar, and garnered a total of 
$4,350,000 [$20,327,000 CD]. The ISO then instituted a program from 1977-1979 titled 
“Plan for Permanence,” which raised most of the remainder of the endowment. In 1983, 
the ISO permanent endowment stood at about $11,000,000 [$51,402,000 CD], still small 
in comparison to the greatest of U.S. symphonies in Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and 
New York.82 Although the annual fund drive amounts were increasing each year, inflation 
was causing expenses to grow more rapidly and the percentage of the costs covered by 
the annual fund now decreased every year.  
 By 1983 the Indianapolis Foundation had become a very minor player in the 
financial support of the symphony and was not even mentioned among the ISO‟s main 
funders. However, local private foundation funding, which was mainly corporately 
fueled, was abundant and crucial, as the Shaver report makes clear: 
Of inestimable value to the Orchestra‟s annual operations have 
been the grants of the Lilly Endowment, Inc., and the Krannert 
Charitable Trust, which together over the past three seasons ending 
in 1983 have totaled a little more than [$2,640,000]. These two 
benefactors, which have been to a great extent responsible for the 
progress made by the Orchestra, have indicated they will give a 
total of $840,000 in 1983-84, but then will review possible grants 
for future years.83 
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The report applauded the ISO‟s success in generating contributions from individuals, but 
found it lacking in the ability to obtain similar contributions from corporations and 
philanthropic organizations. It deemed the symphony‟s fundraising and administrative 
staffs to be small in comparison to other orchestras and the size not increasing at the rate 
of their more costly artistic staff. To add to the dire assessment, the ISO was expecting a 
large drop in municipal funding and larger than usual increases in its yearly budget.  
In the interviews with stakeholders and donors, the highly-paid Shaver 
consultants discovered that most thought the ISO should have a goal of raising 10 percent 
more each year for the annual fund and aim for an increased endowment of more than 
$13 million [$25 million CD]. This would be in addition to the $1 million [$1.9 million 
CD] needed immediately for renovations to the Circle Theatre. One revealing passage in 
the study illuminates the perceived value of the ISO to its patrons: 
The Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra, by all evidence gained in 
the study, is highly regarded – for its artistic proficiency and as one 
of the leading cultural organizations of its city and state. Its 
economic and educational impacts appear to be widely recognized. 
Almost nobody ventured the thought that it might be dispensable. 
Some feel the lives it touches are too few [emphasis added].84 
 
It must be kept in mind that the consultants were not interviewing the general populace, 
but the wealthy elites who possessed the means to sustain the ISO. Many of these were 
old-guard donors who had already invested heavily in the symphony‟s growth and 
survival. Perhaps they, like their early 20
th
-century predecessors, still believed that the 
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civilizing music of the symphony should be an essential part of the arts diet of the 
citizens of Indianapolis.  
Part of moving to the new Circle Theatre might have been to address the concern 
that ISO‟s reach was limited, as the new location “would offer more community-wide 
visibility, […] [and] the smaller hall will provide a closer orchestra-audience 
relationship.”85 However, it must be remembered that downtown Indianapolis in the mid 
1980s had serious parking and security issues that were raised by many interviewees. A 
major concern was that the “many members of the Orchestra‟s largely Northside 
audience will not want to make trips downtown,” especially with the added problems of 
security and parking. 86 
 In terms of the Shaver Company‟s assessment of the board, many of the classic 
problems associated with volunteer board members could also be found at the ISO. Some 
business people interviewed who were not part of the ISO board felt that the ISO‟s 
relationships with businesses were poor and that more businessmen should be added as 
board members. Even some of the current board members interviewed saw much room 
for improvement: 
Some members of the Board were especially critical of their 
organization in the study interviews. They said that a relatively few 
Board leaders make all the important decisions. The Executive 
Committee and the Finance Committee, they said, actually hold all 
of the power and, as a consequence, some Board members have 
elected not to be active at all. In general, some of the persons 
interviewed believe, the Board ought to be much more effective in 
concert going, fund raising, active advocacy for the Orchestra, in 
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long-range planning, and in prompt and decisive attention to the 
organization‟s most important problems and challenges.  
 
It is felt by some that the Board is going to have to be greatly 
strengthened for the major tasks ahead, and that to solve some of 
its biggest problems it is going to have to ask for help where it can 
find it rather than trying to work in its own vacuum.87 
 
One sees here, perhaps all too clearly, a remnant of the historic situation where 
very small numbers of social elite businessmen and bankers sought to raise up and 
exclusively control a prestigious arts organization for their own benefit, as well as 
pursuing a self-appointed civilizing mission to improve the lower orders of the citizenry. 
Institutional cultures like this die slowly and still persist in many present day major arts 
organizations. The ISO to this day may bear the marks, for good or ill, of its long co-
evolution with the Indianapolis Foundation and its elite directors. 
In terms of the performance of the staff, the report felt that they were earnest but 
overworked and that “generally, among persons close to the organization, it was felt that 
the staff has been too small in numbers and, in the case of some individuals, too lacking 
in professional experience, for too many years and that it will have to be strengthened 
markedly in the near future.”88 Almost three decades later in the nonprofit world of 2011, 
this problem of overworked staff with limited access to professional development still 
persists. As the administration of nonprofits becomes more complex, this is a serious 
human resources problem that is still largely ignored by the nonprofit community. 
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 Scant attention was paid to local foundations in the Shaver report regarding the 
future funding of a major capital campaign and an increased symphony endowment. The 
importance of building and maintaining relationships with local foundations was also not 
part of the ISO‟s eventual fundraising strategy. Considering the past importance of 
foundation funds to the survival of the ISO, this would appear, at first, to be an egregious 
error. But here, I believe outside professional consultants clearly appreciated and acted 
upon an emerging reality that local foundations, managed and operated in conservative, 
largely stagnant fashion, were simply no longer the force they once were in local arts 
patronage. Times changed, and the Shaver consultancy‟s report documents the end of an 
antique regime of local, elite run, foundation funding in Indianapolis. 
 The ISO proceeded to raise more than $14 million [$25 million CD] by March of 
1984. It had secured committed matching grants from the Krannert Charitable Trust for 
$4 million, which was, at the time, the second largest challenge grant ever made to a 
symphony, exceeded only by an $11.2 million grant to the Pittsburgh Symphony by W.C. 
Heinz III of ketchup fame. With this grant, the Krannert Charitable Trust had contributed 
more than $11 million to ISO, and stated “we feel that the Orchestra has an excellent 
record of public service and a capacity to bring even greater benefits to its audiences of 
the future.” The Krannert Foundation also donated $3 million and the Lilly Endowment 
$2 million to help fund the $6.9 million needed to purchase and renovate the Circle 
Theatre. 89 
The Eli Lilly & Company Foundation, not to be confused with the Lilly 
Endowment, Inc., committed to a $1 million challenge grant, matching 1 dollar for every 
2 committed by businesses or other foundations. This was meant to encourage 
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corporations to give, prompting a $250,000 pledge by Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. This 
big announcement was made during a luncheon at the Columbia Club, the guest list of 
which included Governor Robert Orr of Indiana and Mayor William Hudnut of 
Indianapolis. The ISO president, Dr. Curtis Clark, declared that the symphony‟s 
endowment had to be increased from $11 million to $25 million in five years if it was to 
achieve “financial soundness.” This claim was, yet again, another optimistic 
proclamation that a new round of fundraising could, once and for all, lead to the 
symphony‟s financial stability. We can now judge these declarations as nothing more 
than fantasies that stoked the hopes of donors, becoming part of the symphony‟s 
fundraising rhetoric and ongoing self-promotion.  
 By May of 1984, the ISO had a new executive director, Robert Jones, who 
solicited a $25,000 [$45,454 CD] grant from Kenneth Chapman, emphasizing how the 
Indianapolis Foundation had contributed to the community, stating that Chapman had 
“made it possible for thousands to hear the world‟s finest music, many of whom would 
otherwise have been unable to do so. We hope you will continue to support the youth and 
community concerts which are so widely enjoyed […] for the 1983-84 season.”90 The 
next day, Jones sent another request to the foundation, this time for an additional $50,000 
[$90,909 CD] to assist with start up and operating expenses for the new offices on East 
Washington Street, located directly behind the Circle Theatre. He emphasized the value 
of the ISO offices to the community because “the Orchestra will be making a significant 
contribution to the multi-faceted renaissance of downtown Indianapolis, which will be 
among the most dramatic concerted efforts of any American city in the 1980‟s. Even 
more important will be the cultural vibrancy provided to the region.” He also offered to 
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take the trustees of the foundation on a tour of the Circle Theatre and the office space so 
that they could see what their money was being used to accomplish.91 
 In the symphony‟s annual report for 1983-1984, several foundation contributions 
were recorded as income, including the City of Indianapolis, the Board of School 
Commissioners, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Indiana Arts Commission, the 
Krannert Fund, Eli Lilly & Company Foundation and the Lilly Endowment, Inc. But the 
Indianapolis Foundation was not listed and the only mention of it was as a patron in the 
$1,000 or more category.92 This could be one of the reasons why Chapman responded a 
few weeks later with a cryptic letter that informed Robert Jones of the approval of the 
$25,000 [$44,000 CD] grant. He then wrote to Jones that his “request for $50,000 toward 
start-up costs in the Circle Theatre and current operating expenses was declined for the 
reasons I explained to you on the phone. […] Greg and I greatly appreciated the tour. The 
finished product will be most impressive.”93 Jones responded with an equally cryptic 
letter a few days later when he thanked Chapman for the $25,000: 
This will allow us to continue our commitment to community 
outreach and education. We are particularly pleased to be able to 
bring Indianapolis youth downtown for their concerts next season 
as we feel that it will help to develop a pattern of attendance that 
will assure the vitality of downtown and its cultural opportunities 
for future generations. 
 
Naturally, we are disappointed that our request for support for 
start-up costs at the Circle Theatre and first year operating 
expenses were declined. We hope that your Board of Trustees 
understands the reason for our move to the Circle Theatre. It was 
simply a matter of not being able to get enough dates at Clowes 
Hall in order to carry on the activities of the orchestra at even the 
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current level, let alone expansion, and because of the sky-rocketing 
costs there. These are the real two issues. I know that there has 
been some unfortunate rhetoric with regard to other issues, none of 
which would have precipitated the move but for the two I have 
mentioned.94 
 
Whatever these other issues were, they also negatively affected the Indianapolis 
Foundation‟s response to a request in August for $2,500 [$4,500 CD] to promote the 
opening of the ISO‟s new home at the Circle Theatre. Kenneth Chapman stated “as I 
suggested to you, there are two or three significant reasons why this decision 
developed.”95 A few months before, Kenneth Chapman had informed Robert Jones that 
“in all of the prior publicity about the new facility, apparently your important but simple 
rationale for the move did not come across to all of our Trustees. If it had, then the 
response to your request may have been different. Some of them feel the problems could 
have been resolved.”96  
What these problems were is unclear, but they could be related to the rocky 
relationship between the ISO and the Symphonic Choir. The Indianapolis Foundation had 
been funding the Symphonic Choir separately since 1966 at very low levels of $200 to 
$500, probably because it was a pet project of one of the trustees, given the passage 
below. By September, the symphony decided to accept the Shaver study and 
recommendations and contracted them to handle its capital campaign.97 Robert Jones 
asked for a list of the Indianapolis Foundation‟s Trustees to solicit for the campaign and 
received a warning and stern criticism from Chapman: 
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I would caution you about approaching some of our members. 
Check carefully with your leadership before you make a move. 
 
There is one other point for you to consider. The Indianapolis 
Symphonic Choir approached us for assistance with a cash flow 
problem. It has also come to us in the past. Our evaluation of its 
situation leaves us with the impression that the Choir‟s financial 
problems have developed as a result of the requirements by 
Maestro Nelson for quality performances. This in turn has put the 
Choir in the position of increasing the time of its professional 
director(s). The Orchestra‟s rate of remuneration to the Choir 
should also be renegotiated. 
 
The leadership of the choir knows nothing about my bringing these 
points to your attention so don‟t say anything to them. 98 
 
This is a prime example of a funder attempting to meddle in the business affairs of a 
nonprofit organization he knew little about. Instead of serving as a patron, the foundation 
was now wielding its power as a philanthropic institution to force policy and fiscal 
decisions on the ISO.  
 In 1985, Robert Jones requested $30,000 [$55,000 CD] to support educational 
programs for students because the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners reduced 
its support from $35,000 [$170,000 CD] in 1970 to $11,000 [$19,000 CD] in 1985. The 
foundation granted the request, but for some unexplained reason did not give the 
symphony any money in 1986.  
 The alleged “community contribution” by the ISO as a result of its move to the 
Circle Theatre was promoted in a November 1984 New York Times article about the 
opening of the symphony‟s new home. The article noted the trend of orchestras around 
the country to use old, but ill-suited, movie and vaudeville theatres as concert venues 
instead of building new buildings. It reported that “city fathers are happy: the renovations 
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often take place in downtown areas that need rehabilitation. Local economies are helped: 
new businesses, especially restaurants, are opened and consequent increases in tax 
revenue help once blighted areas to thrive.” The symphony‟s Robert Jones claimed that 
“we are already helping the area revitalize. Already 18 new restaurants in the area have 
opened. The ladies who come to the Coffee Concerts would not normally have come into 
this area a few years ago. Now they are thronging here.”99  
All of this history returns us to an ancillary question of my research, “How did 
funding of the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra become defined as filling a community 
need?” A brochure for the symphony‟s annual fund drive in 1985 provides an answer: 
A fine orchestra is a prime resource for any community. It 
perpetuates musical masterpieces, it introduces little known works; 
it entertains, it educates and it provides a new dimension to the 
lives of its listeners. It is for people of all ages, backgrounds and 
ways of life. 
 
In the United States, there are no great cities without great 
orchestras. Their economic impact (about 15 million annual in 
Indianapolis, where the Orchestra‟s payroll and expenditures are 
among the city‟s largest) makes them very important. 100 
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Summary 
 The Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra is still located, as of this writing, at the 
Circle Theatre, currently named the Hilbert Circle Theatre after the infamous couple, 
Stephen and Tomisue Hilbert. Stephen Hilbert became a household name as the founder 
of Conseco who drove the company into the ground and used corporate money to fund 
his philanthropic ventures. When I asked the ISO why his name had not been removed 
from the building, I was told that there is a ninety-nine year contractual agreement that 
prohibits its removal. Some ambitious ISO development executive obviously wrote a 
flawed donor‟s agreement, resulting in the association for the next century of the 
symphony‟s name and reputation with one of the most scandalous business implosions in 
Indianapolis history. 
According to the Indianapolis Foundation‟s annual financial reports, it continued 
to fund the ISO at least through 1998. The amount of funding from 1933 to 1998 in 2004 
constant dollars was almost $2.5 million. In addition, the ISO not only was funded more 
during that time period than any other arts organization, they received more money than 
all of the other musical organizations combined.  
This brings us to my original research question: “Why and how did the trustees of 
the Indianapolis Foundation justify the funding of the arts as a community need when arts 
and culture were not part of its original mission and charter?” I have provided several 
answers to that question, starting with the fact that the ISO was seen as a status symbol 
by the Indianapolis elites who founded it. Being able to claim a symphony as part of the 
culture of Indianapolis was very prestigious and being a member of the Indiana State 
Symphony Society was very important to the “Blue Book” citizenry of Indianapolis. 
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These wealthy elite included not just the members of the ISO, but also several trustees of 
the Indianapolis Foundation. Using the argument that music is necessary during times of 
economic strife, such as the Great Depression, was the way in which the elites justified 
the ISO as a community need. Yet their real motive was that the wealthy wanted a 
symphony for their private pleasure and to improve their social-cultural status.  
Part of why they stepped outside the foundation‟s mission lies in the fact that they 
really did not know what they were doing. The surveys they suggested or conducted, or 
the expert advice they relied upon, were often incorrect at best and suspect at worst. They 
did little investigating themselves and were not proactive in searching out problems 
within the community and instead waited for the problems to be brought to their 
attention. They preferred to engage in philanthropy, not charity, with the rewards of being 
well recognized for their efforts. So choosing the “right” recipient was key, and the 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra was absolutely the right recipient for a myriad of 
reasons. 
First, the ISO was started by the Chamber of Commerce and so had the support of 
the wealthy power brokers of the day who would have been contemporaries of the 
Indianapolis Foundation trustees. From the beginning, prominent chamber members 
understood the immense business importance of being able to tout the glorious fact that 
Indianapolis had its own symphony. Potential manufacturers and business owners wanted 
access to elite entertainment for themselves and their wives, and Indianapolis was 
competing with cities like Buffalo, New York, that also boasted a symphony. So, from 
the beginning, the main way that the foundation and others justified the symphony as a 
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community need was its importance in attracting corporate elites and their business 
enterprises. 
There were also other, more personally motivated reasons that the trustees 
decided to fund the ISO while many in the community struggled to secure the bare 
essentials. Supporting the ISO was an acceptable artistic activity of the elite men and 
their wives, and belonging to the Symphony Society signified an elevated station in life. 
As we have discovered, the battle among the women members of the Symphony Society 
Auxiliary was ruthless, revealing how important it was for them to ascend to the highest 
rank of power possible and increase their status among other elite female friends and 
associates. Second, there were many social and professional connections between the 
officers of the Symphony Society and those of the Indianapolis Foundation. Today those 
associations would constitute a clear conflict of interest, but at the time there was no 
formal nonprofit sector and very few laws or rules that governed charitable organizations. 
Third, one of the trustees, J. K. Lilly, was a staunch supporter of the symphony, even 
lending it substantial money until he convinced the rest of foundation trustees to make 
good on his loan so that his money was reimbursed. In addition, his head of research at 
Eli Lilly & Company, Dr. Clowes, was also the president of the Symphony Society. 
But how did the Indianapolis Foundation justify funding the ISO at the height of 
depression when tens of thousands were out of work and their families went hungry? 
While in private the trustees were shrewdly scheming to fund this pet project of the 
wealthy, in public they were extolling the fact that even musicians had to eat, and that 
keeping them employed was necessary because many taught music in the public and 
private schools. They also claimed that public concerts would lift the spirits of all the 
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citizens, which was especially needed during the Great Depression. Again, the elite were 
addressing Maslow‟s higher needs, while the vast community struggled to realize the 
lower needs of food, shelter, and clothing. But the hidden agenda of this seemingly 
compassionate gift was to form a kind of U.S. commercial, “noblesse oblige” to 
acculturate the lower-class orders of Indianapolis citizens.  
After the depression it was necessary to change the public justification for 
continued foundation funding of this cultural asset that was actually only accessible to the 
well-to-do few. Thus, the foundation decided that it would fund programs that would be 
performed in the public schools, thereby serving an educational need. This also allowed 
for the “civilizing” of children of the lower urban social ranks to the elite cultural norms. 
Who could argue with educating school children about the wonders of classical music? 
And how could the press report on this in other than a positive way? No doubt, funding 
this kind of program graced the foundation‟s elite operators with more coveted accolades. 
The Indianapolis Foundation funding was discontinued only when the city took 
over funding of the ISO from 1945 to 1954. When the city could no longer support the 
ISO in 1955, the Indianapolis Foundation stepped up again. By this time the ISO was 
firmly entrenched in the culture of Indianapolis and had gained a national reputation. 
Letting it languish would not have been a good public relations move for the foundation, 
so funding was resumed. Eventually, Dr. Clowes invested in the construction of Clowes 
Hall on the Butler University campus for the main purpose of housing his beloved 
symphony, and the ISO became a revered Indianapolis institution, making public 
justification of the symphony as a community need no longer necessary. 
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The foundation‟s funding of the ISO‟s move to the Circle Theatre in the 1980s 
was surprising, given the size of the grants to which they agreed. Yet looking through the 
lens of the wealthy trustees, it was a way to bring vitality back to the blighted downtown 
of Indianapolis. No doubt they were following the lead of the Cleveland Foundation 
which invested in a revival of the arts district in their own decayed downtown. Anyone 
who has been to Cleveland or Indianapolis recently can attest to the wisdom of those 
decisions. Arts organizations like the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra helped spark the 
fire of revival for both cities that continues to this day. 
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Chapter 8: The Significance of these Historical Findings 
 
In this dissertation I have attempted to dispel many of the myths that have been 
written about the creation of community foundations and the men who gave birth to 
them. These men were first and foremost wealthy, white, elite businessmen, whose first 
priority was making money. None of them had experienced first-hand the squalor that 
existed in their community and they only saw the signs of the multitude of social needs 
from afar. Although many sat on the boards of state and local charity organizations, they 
had little idea what were the pressing community needs, what needs were priorities, or 
what charitable organizations deserved assistance.  
Early trust companies were vehemently opposed by lawyers, especially those who 
were directly involved in serving as trustees for estates. The legal profession successfully 
delayed the approval of the establishment of trust companies for several years, and 
continued to criticize them for many years afterward. This conflict was ameliorated when 
trust companies began to partner with, or hire, lawyers to draw up trust documents and 
handle legal issues connected with the administration of trusts. The state laws that 
eventually governed trust companies made it clear that only institutions that were charted 
as trust companies could engage in trust business. This gave trust companies a virtual 
monopoly on trust business which, along with lenient state requirements, brought on the 
ire of bankers. This dissatisfaction from their peers in the financial industries no doubt 
forced legislatures to change the laws that led to the establishment of community trusts. 
These laws made it imperative that the trust companies make money to ensure 
their solvency, and that appropriate fees were charged for each and every service that was 
performed for a trust. The worry over the issue of “Dead Hand” trusts had little to do with 
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what was in the best interest of the community and everything to do with the profitability 
of the trust companies. Establishing a community foundation that the trust companies 
could control through surrogate representatives on the board of trustees of the 
Indianapolis Foundation allowed them the best of many worlds. First, trusts could be 
established so that the beneficiary never became obsolete, allowing the trust companies to 
avoid the unprofitable litigation caused by invoking cy pres. Second, trust companies 
were now able to charge administration fees for perpetuity on these trusts, which was not 
possible on the older “Dead Hand” trusts. Third, it satisfied the government and its 
regulators that these fees were helping to keep the trust companies solvent. And fourth, 
trust companies were freed from the expense of time and money in locating the 
beneficiaries, carrying out the decree from the donor, or deciding whom the recipient 
should be. In other words, they could concentrate on making money while others worked 
for them for free to give the residuals of the trusts away. All this, plus there was no 
financial donation required on their part, yet their association with the community 
foundation made the trust company executives appear magnanimous. Best of all for them, 
they could control the community foundation by appointing hand-picked foundation 
trustees. This control of community foundations by self-dealing trust companies is cited 
by at least one former community foundation executive as one of the great problems that 
limited the ability of many community foundations to become true community assets. 
The historical hot points are the years of 1913 and 1915. Beginning in 1913, the 
Ohio State Legislature amended the banking laws so that any bank could handle trusts, 
thereby breaking the monopoly that trust companies had on the trust business. It is not a 
coincidence that in 1914 the Cleveland Trust Company created the Cleveland 
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Foundation. It is also not a coincidence that it did not allow any other bank or trust 
company to join in this philanthropic venture that was presumably created for the benefit 
of the community. The Indiana State Legislature changed its trust laws in 1915, and the 
Indianapolis Foundation was formed in 1916 by the three largest trust companies in the 
city to the exclusion of all others. What these two foundations supplied to the trust 
companies included positive public relations, a marketing tool for future trust clients, a 
benevolent reputation for both the trust companies and their executives, and a 
competitive edge over all the other banks and trust companies. As the asset charts 
indicate, the trust companies that were connected to a community foundation did far 
batter in terms of growth of assets than those who were not so attached. It was primarily 
about business and profit, and secondarily about philanthropy. 
The Indianapolis Foundation trustees who were hand-picked by the three trust 
companies were mostly the trio‟s surrogate representatives. They, like the foundation‟s 
creators, were all members of the Indianapolis “Blue Book” society. The fact that the 
trust company presidents and the vast majority of the trustees gave no money to the 
foundation during or after their lives puts in serious question their support its mission. 
This is especially true for those who were philanthropic in other areas of their lives, yet 
ignored the financial needs of the community foundation that they helped shape and 
controlled. The foundation was simply a business vehicle and another philanthropic stripe 
to wear on their well-tailored shoulders.  
The funds that the trustees did grant were for “safe” projects that would be 
supported by the high society of Indianapolis. This “safety” factor was viewed and 
judged through a decidedly elite lens. The trustees made sure any potential gift passed the 
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public relations litmus test before dispensation. The three creators of the Indianapolis 
Foundation -- Evans Woollen, John Holliday and J. P. Frenzel -- all either worked in or 
owned newspaper businesses at one time, and all understood the power of the press and 
its impact on public opinion. The fact that the importance of positive public feedback was 
mentioned several times in the board minutes proves that good public relations, and not 
the public good, was of primary importance. This could explain why many programs with 
great need, such as education and jobs for “colored” people, and decent facilities for the 
mentally handicapped were not funded, or worse yet, such funding was discontinued 
because of poor press coverage.  
For all their wealth, or perhaps because of their wealth, the early foundation 
trustees were not a socially enlightened group of men. Although most were involved 
with, or financially supported, charitable organizations, none of them were 
knowledgeable about the most urgent problems of the community, let alone how to solve 
them. Nonetheless, they understood money, power and politics and they used them as 
needed in the execution of the work of the Indianapolis Foundation. The glaring, self-
interested decision to fund the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Society at the height of 
the Great Depression is a blatant example of the elite arrogance and sense of entitlement 
of this privileged group.  
Insulated from the threat of the most essential needs as theorized by Maslow, in 
their sequestered worlds they were able to ignore the throngs who struggled to attain what 
the wealthy had in abundance. Oblivious to the needs of the poorest, they defined 
community need as that of self-actualization through the civilizing power of classical 
music. While tens of thousands in Indianapolis were out of work, the Indianapolis 
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Foundation was supporting an arts organization that very few citizens had access to or 
interest in. This self-serving funding request was initiated by the Chamber of Commerce, 
which was not a charitable organization, and was driven forward through the efforts of 
several of the foundation‟s trustees and its executive director. Even more wealthy elites 
controlled the symphony through membership rules that excluded all but the wealthiest, 
and to be on the symphony board was a prestigious symbol of high social status. This was 
an organization that benefitted a small private group of elites, yet it was touted to the 
public as a critical community service. In the end, the wealthy elite, both inside and 
outside the Indianapolis Foundation, persevered in keeping the Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra solvent, nursing it along for several years, and today it stands as one of the 
wealthiest nonprofit arts organizations in the State of Indiana. The Indianapolis 
Foundation was complicit, along with other foundations and elite supporters, in feeding 
the constant growth of the symphony that left it constantly in need of additional funding. 
Each fundraising campaign stressed the need for more funds to ensure its fiscal solvency, 
but that promise, no matter how large the funding increase, was never realized. Part of 
this was due to the evolving trend of referring to musicians as “professionals” and paying 
them accordingly, as well as employing staff professionals that usurped the role of 
volunteers in the areas of fundraising and administration, thereby driving up annual 
operating costs.  
Although the Indianapolis Foundation funded many arts organizations during the 
years covered in this history, none received the indulgent amount of funding that the 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra enjoyed. Yet the funding it offered remained at a 
stagnant level for several years at a time, making the foundation‟s actual support in 
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constant dollars forever dwindle. This and the entrance of large individual and corporate-
funded foundations into the area of arts funding in Indianapolis, as well as the 
Indianapolis Foundation‟s decisions to fund other arts and culture organizations, 
eventually led to the eclipse of the Indianapolis Foundation as a substantial supporter of 
the ISO. From 1924 through 1988, according to the charts that I have compiled from the 
Indianapolis Foundation annual financial reports, the foundation has supported the ISO 
with more than $3.3 million in 2004 constant dollars. In the area of music alone, not 
counting opera, it funded 20 other organizations for a total of 1.5 million CD. Thus the 
ISO has received more than twice as much funding as all other musical organizations 
combined. 
Three major changes have taken place in the community foundation since 1988, 
when this history ends. First, the way community foundations since then have been 
formed is drastically different. Funding by private foundations emerged in the 1990s, 
such as the Lilly Endowment‟s GIFT program, which funded 92 new and existing 
community foundations throughout Indiana, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. 
Other private foundations, such as the Knight Foundation, have also invested heavily in 
community foundations throughout the country. As a result, the governance culture and 
structure of those community foundations that were created by private foundations might 
prove to be very different than those begun in the early part of the last century. Second, 
creation of donor advised-funds and the increasing role of the community foundation as 
an administrator of private foundation and corporate foundation funds fueled tremendous 
growth in the assets and change in the staffing of community foundations. These changes 
have included adding “philanthropic advisors” to assist donors in their philanthropic 
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efforts. And third, the assets of many community foundations are no longer under the 
control of trust companies or banks, but are now under the umbrella of the community 
foundations themselves to invest as they see fit. In essence, the community foundation 
has become a trust company that, for an administrative fee, administers funds for private 
and corporate foundations, endowment funds for other nonprofits, donor-advised and 
donor-directed funds. In order to fully understand how the community foundation of 
today operates, and how their trustees define modern day community needs, additional 
research covering the last two decades should be pursued. 
Today, many of the assets of the Indianapolis Foundation have been transferred to 
the larger Central Indiana Community Foundation (CICF), which also serves 
communities in greater Indianapolis and surrounding areas. In addition, the battle over 
control of the charitable trust funds so once closely held by the trust companies was 
eventually won by the Indianapolis Foundation and CICF, giving them complete control 
over both the trusts and the charitable funds they create. The Indianapolis Foundation 
Board of Trustees remains at the original six members appointed by judges and 
politicians, but its size in terms of assets is significantly less than that of CICF, which 
boasts 20 trustees on its board. Six of those 20 are the Indianapolis Foundation Trustees, 
three are from the Legacy Fund Community Foundation, a sister foundation, and 12 are 
elected by the CICF board. The Legacy Fund itself is comprised of 30 board members, 
making it the most expanded board of the three.  
The expansion of the board to be more inclusive of other members of the 
community appears to be reshaping community foundation decision-making to be more 
cognizant that these foundations are, indeed, there for the benefit of the entire 
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community. One recent example that is related to my research shows how the 
justification of arts and culture as a community need continues, but the reasons for the 
arts have morphed into building a more family and pedestrian friendly Indianapolis. 
Again, however, the project was funded primarily because of the positive economic 
ramifications of being identified as a city of arts and culture rather than for the aesthetics 
of any particular art form. To their credit, the leaders of the Indianapolis Foundation,  
the Central Indiana Community Foundation, and the Legacy Fund have been responsible 
for working with Indianapolis philanthropists to create the new Cultural Trail Initiative in 
Indianapolis to link together a majority of the downtown‟s arts and cultural organizations. 
Although the project, like most arts and culture projects of the past, have been driven by 
economic benefit in terms of tourism and positive public relations for the image of the 
city, unlike the past support of elite cultural institutions, the Cultural Trail Initiative does 
benefit the general public rather than the wealthy few. Instead of defining community 
need through an elite lens, the Cultural Trail can be viewed as filling a community need 
as defined though the lens of every citizen of, and visitor to, the city of Indianapolis. 
 My research has helped address some important questions, but it has also raised 
many more that wait to be answered. Some of those questions that could be addressed by 
additional historical research are: How do the histories of the creation of other 
community foundations compare with that of the Indianapolis Foundation? Were there 
similar changes in state law trust company laws that precipitated the creation of other 
community foundations? Is there more evidence of profit being a motive for their 
creation than a sense of commitment to the community? When and why did the ways in 
which community foundations were created change? Under what pressures and 
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circumstances did the original trust companies that created community foundations open 
up participation to additional trust companies and banks? How did community 
foundations eventually wrestle control of the charitable trusts from the original trust 
companies? My hope is that as more community foundation archives become available, 
future researchers will be able to use the findings in this dissertation as a starting point for 
comparison and a foundation for additional historical research. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: A Summary of when Other Arts Organizations Obtained Funding 
Source: Indianapolis Foundation Annual Financial Reports, RLSCA/IUPUI 
 
1945 - Opera: It appears from newspaper articles that although the Indianapolis Theatre 
Association and the Parks Department co-sponsored the event, the opera was actually 
performed by the Indianapolis Opera Theatre. On May 3, 1945, the foundation approved 
the request for $2,000 [$21,052 CD] in funding in response to a written appeal made by 
Paul Brown on April 3 of the same year. 
 
1948 - Musical Theatre: The summer opera program was now titled “Stars Under the 
Stars.” Once again, the foundation granted $2,000 to this effort, but in 1948 inflation had 
taken a huge jump since 1945, reducing the purchase power of the grant to $15,625, a 
decrease of more than $4,000 compared to only three years before. 
 
1949 - Film: The first funding for film was actually received by Civic Films, Inc, a 
production company from Hollywood (and proudly promoted as such). The grant was 
$1,000 [$7,936 CD] and these films were made to “promote citizenship” and American 
values and were made available at no cost to the public. Because the time period was 
during the “Red Scare” and McCarthy-ism, it is probable that these were propaganda 
movies about the attributes of American democracy and free enterprise, and the evils of 
socialist or communist thought, however more research is forth coming. 
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1955 - Museums: The Children‟s Museum of Indianapolis was the first Museum funded 
by the foundation, although it later funded the Indianapolis Museum of Art in 1969 and 
the Museum of Indiana Heritage (eventually the Eiteljorg Museum of American Indians?) 
in 1986. The first funding was for $5,000 [$35,211 CD], and was followed by several 
more grants between 1956 and 1974. 
 
1958 - Visual Arts Funding: $16,000 [$104,575 CD] was granted to the Southwest 
Social Center in 1958 for a building to conduct arts and crafts workshops. In  
1963, they were given another grant for $14,000 [$86,419 CD] to complete the building. 
Whether this would be classified as visual arts support or arts education will be 
determined with more research into what exactly this organization's function was. 
 
1963 - Zoo Funding: The Zoological Society was gifted a rather large gift for the 1969 - 
$25,000, which is $154,320 CD. This was obviously a big project for the community 
because another large gift was made the next year of $35,000 [$154,320]. These grants 
were followed by more funding through the years until the Zoo relocated to its present 
location at White River State Park. In 1984, the foundation granted the Zoo $110,000 
[$200,000 CD], of which $10,000 was to be used for educational programming and the 
rest for relocation and building expenses. This was part of a three year commitment, and 
another $50,000 [$87,719] was appropriated the next year. 
 
1964 - Arts Education: The first program funded for Young Audiences, Inc., was a 
music education program for school children in Indianapolis. This follows a similar 
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pattern of funding music-oriented arts activities above all else, especially early in the 
foundation's history with groups like the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra. The initial 
grant was $2,880 [$17,569 CD] and was followed by several more though 1986 ranging 
from $1,000 to $3,500 per year in non-converted amounts. 
 
1966 - Choirs: Choral groups were among those funded at very low levels in comparison 
to other art forms. The first grant was in 1966 to the Indianapolis Symphonic Choir in the 
amount of only $200 [$1.162.79]. Unfortunately for choirs, not only was funding low, but 
it often remained at the same dollar amount over a number of years, so that the actual 
value in current dollars constantly declined. For example, the Symphonic Choir received 
$200 in several years from 1966 through 1975, so that by 1975 the current dollars were 
only $701. This was a reduction of real purchasing power of more than $500 in less than 
ten years. Their final grant was in 1982, which was $1,000, but in 2004 current dollars 
this still only amounted to $1,956, only an $800 increase in more than 15 years. 
 
1971 - Radio and Television: WIAN Radio was a public broadcasting station and the 
Fine Arts Society submitted a proposal to fund a radio show about the arts in 
Indianapolis. Its first funding was in 1971 for the amount of $3,000 [$14,018 CD], and 
the show was launched. Although it still exists on the radio, the Indianapolis Foundation 
for it continued through 1975 and then stopped. However, in 1983 WIAN radio station 
was awarded $9,076 [$17,222 CD] to promote station membership development. 
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1972 - Theatre: Both the Indiana Repertory Theatre and the Booth Tarkington Civic 
Theatre (soon to be the Indianapolis Civic Theatre?) received their first funding in 1972. 
The Indiana Repertory Theatre (IRT) was a new start-up during this time when regional 
theatres were the rage across the country and funders like the Ford Foundation were 
investing large sums of money in regional arts organizations. The IRT's first grant was 
for presenting programs to students at high schools, and the amount was $4.500 [$21,493 
CD]. The Booth Tarkington Civic Theatre was given $2,500 [$11,312 CD] to build a new 
theatre, but it is unclear if that was ever accomplished. 
 
1975 - Dance: The Civic Ballet Society of Indianapolis was the first dance organization 
to receive support, and it was impressive for a first grant. The amount was for $6,500 
[$22,807 CD] in 1975, and was followed up with $7.500 [$24,916 CD] in 1976, and then 
a quantum leap in 1977 to $22,500 [$70.093 CD]. Another huge increase occurred in 
1980 in the amount of $60,000 [$137,614 CD], part of which was for programs for school 
children but part of it was to replace costumes and sets lost in a fire the previous year.  
 
1977 - Arts Council: There were only two grants awarded to the Metropolitan Arts 
Council (precursor to the Arts Council of Indianapolis?) during this period. The first was 
in 1977 in the amount of $12,000 [37,383] and the second in 1978 for $8,000 [24,637].  
 
1980 - Arts Promotion: The Arts Insite Monthly Newsletter was the first arts promotion 
program that was funded, and the grant was to form a development plan. However, the 
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development plan must not have worked well because the first grant was the only grant 
made to it in 1980 in the amount of $500 [$1,149 CD].  
 
1985 - Art Festivals: In 1985, the foundation gifted $15,000 [$26,315 CD] for the White 
River Park Art Festival. This was the first year of the festival and it lasted for ten days, 
but I have not discerned from my efforts if its funding was continued after 1986. 
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Appendix B: Timeline for Beginning Arts Funding by Indianapolis Foundation,  
1933-1986 
 
 
 
 
 
KIND OF ARTS 
YEAR 
STARTED ORGANIZATION 
AMOUNT IN 
YEAR 2004 DOLLARS 
Music - Orchestra 1933 
Indianapolis Symphony 
Orchestra Assn. 
 
50.00 724.64 
Opera 1945 
Board of Parks Summer 
Opera Program 2000.00 21,052.63 
Musical Theatre 1948 
Indianapolis Theatre Assn. 
(Stars Under the Stars) 2000.00 15,625.00 
Film 1949 Civic Films, Inc. 1000.00 7,936.51 
Museums 1955 
Children‟s Museum of 
Indianapolis 5000.00 35,211.27 
Visual Arts 1958 
Southwest Social Center 
(Building for Arts and 
Crafts) 16,000 104,575.16 
Zoos 
 1963 
Indianapolis Zoological 
Society 25,000.00 154,320.99 
Arts Education 
(Music) 1964 
Young Audiences, Inc. 
2,880.00 17,560.98 
Music – Choral 1966 
Indianapolis Symphonic 
Choir 200.00 1,162.79 
Museums – Art 1969 
Indianapolis Museum of 
Art 25,000.00 128,865.98 
Radio/Television 1971 
Fine Arts Society, WIAN 
Program 3,000.00 14,018.69 
Theatre 1972 
Booth Tarkington Civic 
Theatre 2,500.00 11,312.22 
Theatre 1972 Indiana Repertory Theatre 4,750.00 21,493.21 
Dance – Ballet 1975 
Civic Ballet Society of 
Indianapolis 6,500 22,807.02 
Arts Council 1977 Metropolitan Arts Council 12,000 37,383.18 
Arts Promotion 1980 
Arts Insight Monthly 
Newsletter 500 1,149.79 
Art Festivals 1985 
White River Park Art 
Festival 15,000 26,315.79 
  
Appendix C: Charts of Indianapolis Foundation Funding of Charitable Organizations  
 
Source: Indianapolis Foundation Annual Financial Reports, Indianapolis Foundation Collection, RLSCA/IUPUI 
 
Category Organization 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Family and Community               
Employment Indianapolis Employment Bureau           4,000.00        12,407.25           11,550.00           12,501.10          12,000.00          12,078.62  
Indianapolis Community 
Fund Indianapolis Community Fund 5,000.00  5,000.00  10,500.00  11,750.00  13,750.00  15,500.00  
Employment Unemployment Study              261.04            
Employment Vocational Bureau Study              189.70          
Social Services 
Community Welfare Institute              533.57                789.57        
Criminal and Legal Issues Probation Study                     600.00      
Capital Expenditures Phyllis Wheatly Building Fund                 18,500.00    
Capital Expenditures Wheeler City Mission Building                   2,500.00    
Research and Information Census Tracts Appropriation                          5.48            2,411.08  
Research and Information Recreation Survey                     7,404.75  
Criminal and Legal Issues Marion County Detention Home             
Recreation Indianapolis Park Board             
Criminal and Legal Issues Indianapolis Bar Assn - Legal Aid Society             
Community Projects Fletcher Place Community Center             
Family and Community 
Total             9,261.04        18,130.52           22,839.57           24,851.10          46,755.48          37,394.45  
        
   
     3
4
7
 
  
Category Organization 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Family and Community             
Employment Indianapolis Employment Bureau               10,000.00              11,000.00                4,000.00    
Indianapolis Community 
Fund Indianapolis Community Fund 18,000.00  10,000.00  10,000.00  35,000.00  30,000.00  
Employment Unemployment Study           
Employment Vocational Bureau Study           
Social Services Community Welfare Institute           
Criminal and Legal Issues Probation Study           
Capital Expenditures Wheeler City Mission Building           
Research and Information Census Tracts Appropriation                    12.82          
Research and Information Recreation Survey               2,199.67          
Criminal and Legal Issues Marion County Detention Home                          209.30  
Recreation Indianapolis Park Board           
Criminal and Legal Issues Indianapolis Bar Assn - Legal Aid Society           
Community Projects Fletcher Place Community Center           
Family and Community 
Total               20,212.49              20,000.00              21,000.00              39,000.00              30,209.30  
  
      
     3
4
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Category Organization 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Family and Community             
Employment Indianapolis Employment Bureau           
Indianapolis Community 
Fund Indianapolis Community Fund 30,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  
Employment Unemployment Study           
Employment Vocational Bureau Study           
Social Services Community Welfare Institute           
Capital Expenditures Phyllis Wheatly Building Fund           
Capital Expenditures Wheeler City Mission Building           
Research and Information Census Tracts Appropriation           
Research and Information Recreation Survey           
Criminal and Legal Issues Marion County Detention Home                    150.00        
Recreation Indianapolis Park Board                     1,000.00                   825.00  
Criminal and Legal Issues Indianapolis Bar Assn - Legal Aid Society           
Community Projects Fletcher Place Community Center           
Family and Community 
Total               30,000.00              25,150.00              25,000.00              26,000.00              25,825.00  
 
  
      
      3
4
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 Category Organization 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Family and Community               
Employment Indianapolis Employment Bureau             
Indianapolis Community 
Fund Indianapolis Community Fund 25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00              25,000.00  
Employment Unemployment Study             
Employment Vocational Bureau Study             
Social Services Community Welfare Institute             
Criminal and Legal Issues Probation Study             
Capital Expenditures 
Phyllis Wheatly Building Fund             
Capital Expenditures Wheeler City Mission Building             
Research and Information Census Tracts Appropriation             
Research and Information Recreation Survey             
Criminal and Legal Issues Marion County Detention Home             
Recreation Indianapolis Park Board             
Criminal and Legal Issues Indianapolis Bar Assn - Legal Aid Society                 6,250.00                2,437.02                2,409.20  2,874.00                3,800.00  
Community Projects Fletcher Place Community Center             
Family and Community 
Total               25,000.00              31,250.00              27,437.02              27,409.20  27,874.00              28,800.00  
 
  
     3
5
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Category Organization 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Family and Community               
Employment Indianapolis Employment Bureau             
Indianapolis Community Fund Indianapolis Community Fund 25,000.00  25,000.00  25,000.00  27,500.00  27,500.00  29,000.00  
Employment Unemployment Study             
Employment Vocational Bureau Study             
Social Services Community Welfare Institute             
Criminal and Legal Issues Probation Study             
Capital Expenditures 
Phyllis Wheatly Building Fund             
Capital Expenditures Wheeler City Mission Building             
Research and Information Census Tracts Appropriation             
Research and Information Recreation Survey             
Criminal and Legal Issues Marion County Detention Home             
Recreation Indianapolis Park Board             
Criminal and Legal Issues Indianapolis Bar Assn - Legal Aid Society 
              
4,240.00  
              
5,130.00  
              
3,800.00  
              
4,515.00            4,500.00  
           
4,500.00  
Community Projects Fletcher Place Community Center                   5,000.00  
           
4,000.00  
Family and Community Total   
            
29,240.00  
            
30,130.00  
            
28,800.00  
            
32,015.00          37,000.00  
         
37,500.00  
  
    3
5
1
 
  
 
        
Category Organization 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation               
Health Organization 
Pub. Health Nursing Assn./For Crippled (Visiting 
Nurse Association)  2,049.22  2,198.00  4,971.50  5,830.12  7,486.36  8,794.22  
Hospital James Whitcomb Riley Hospital     2,000.00            
Hospital City Hospital, Psyche Ward  22,571.30      3,060.83   11.066.22         6,959.00  
 
      1,525.00  
Hospital Psychiatric Services, Indiana Univ. Hos.           678.50         
Handicapped Services (Roberts) School/Handicapped Children        5,860.50         9,905.19       10,215.77     11,016.33      12,527.38  
Study Crippled Children Study           638.19          
Hospital Sunnyside Sanatorium        712.75        3,500.00         3,000.00        3,500.00        2,000.00  
Psychiatric Services Study - Julietta Hospital for Insane               518.93        
Health Organization Board of Health/Prenatal and Orthodontia     
           
8,000.00  
           
7,500.00  
          
5,500.00    
Hospital Occupational Therapy, City Hospital                 600.13      
Study Colored Hospital Study                 187.82             10.50    
Handicapped Services James E. Roberts Appliance Fund                  76.50             27.00    
Study Hospital Survey               1,070.88    
Hospital St. Margaret's Guild, Occup. Therapy             1,799.16        2,850.01  
Handicapped Services Sight Conservation Class                    300.00  
Study Hospital Study             
Handicapped Services 
Indpls League for the Hard of Hearing (Hearing 
Society)             
Handicapped Services Hard  of Hearing Demo             
Health Organization Flower Mission Society             
Health Organization 7th Dist. Fed, of Clubs- Cancer              
Handicapped Services Education of Handicapped Children             
Hospital Cancer Clinic - City Hospital             
Handicapped Services Marion Co. Society for the Crippled             
Health Organization Indianapolis Hospital Development Association             
Health Organization Norways Foundation             
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation Total   
        
26,620.52  
      
13,148.77  
         
26,895.62  
         
34,369.34  
        
30,410.23  
        
27,996.61  
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Category Organization 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Health, Handicapped & Rehabilitation             
Health Organization 
Pub. Health Nursing Assn./For Crippled (Visiting Nurse 
Association)  8,219.00  8,219.00  7,135.80  8,583.00  7,500.00  
Hospital James Whitcomb Riley Hospital           
Hospital City Hospital, Psyche Ward           
Hospital Psychiatric Services, Indiana Univ. Hos.           
Handicapped Services (Roberts) School/Handicapped Children 
            
12,063.72  
            
11,927.67  
            
13,570.26  
            
15,947.04  
            
16,411.88  
Study Crippled Children Study           
Hospital Sunnyside Sanatorium 
              
3,000.00  
              
3,000.00  
              
1,500.00  
                 
500.00    
Psychiatric Services Study - Julietta Hospital for Insane           
Health Organization 
Board of Health/Prenatal and Orthodontia         
              
3,497.58  
Hospital Occupational Therapy, City Hospital 
              
5,127.39          
Study Colored Hospital Study           
Handicapped Services James E. Roberts Appliance Fund 
                 
170.00  
                 
506.15        
Study Hospital Survey           
Hospital St. Margaret's Guild, Occup. Therapy 
              
4,035.83  
              
2,260.00  
              
4,550.00  
              
4,733.33  
              
5,916.67  
Handicapped Services Sight Conservation Class 
                 
278.00  
                 
547.38  
                 
253.14  
                 
200.00  
                 
100.00  
Study Hospital Study 
                 
687.30          
Handicapped Services Indpls League for the Hard of Hearing (Hearing Society) 
                 
100.00  
                 
700.00  
                 
400.00  
                 
600.00  
                 
400.00  
Handicapped Services Hard  of Hearing Demo           
Health Organization Flower Mission Society         
              
1,500.00  
Health Organization 7th Dist. Fed, of Clubs- Cancer            
Handicapped Services Education of Handicapped Children           
Hospital Cancer Clinic - City Hospital           
Handicapped Services Marion Co. Society for the Crippled           
Health Organization Indianapolis Hospital Development Association           
Health Organization Norways Foundation           
Health, Handicapped & Rehabilitation 
Total   
            
33,681.24  
            
27,160.20  
            
27,409.20  
            
30,563.37  
            
35,326.13  
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Category Organization 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation               
Health Organization 
Pub. Health Nursing Assn./For Crippled (Visiting 
Nurse Association)  7,500.00  7,500.00  7,500.00  9,843.97  9,844.00  9,844.00  
Hospital James Whitcomb Riley Hospital             
Hospital City Hospital, Psyche Ward       
                 
906.75  
              
3,550.00    
Hospital Psychiatric Services, Indiana Univ. Hos.             
Handicapped Services (Roberts) School/Handicapped Children 
            
17,182.91  
            
18,423.81  
            
16,639.85  
            
21,883.36  
            
21,999.75  
            
20,973.75  
Study Crippled Children Study             
Hospital Sunnyside Sanatorium             
Psychiatric Services Study - Julietta Hospital for Insane             
Health Organization Board of Health/Prenatal and Orthodontia             
Hospital Occupational Therapy, City Hospital     
                 
150.00        
Study Colored Hospital Study             
Handicapped Services James E. Roberts Appliance Fund             
Study Hospital Survey             
Hospital St. Margaret's Guild, Occup. Therapy 
              
3,550.00  
              
3,550.00  
              
3,550.00  
              
3,550.00    
              
3,783.00  
Handicapped Services Sight Conservation Class 
                 
100.00    
                     
4.60        
Study Hospital Study             
Handicapped Services 
Indpls League for the Hard of Hearing (Hearing 
Society) 
                 
600.00  
                 
650.00  
                 
850.00  
                 
850.00  
                 
850.00  
                 
850.00  
Handicapped Services Hard  of Hearing Demo 
              
2,061.00  
              
1,901.54  
                     
3.30        
Health Organization Flower Mission Society             
Health Organization 7th Dist. Fed, of Clubs- Cancer    
              
2,000.00          
Handicapped Services Education of Handicapped Children     
                   
31.06        
Hospital Cancer Clinic - City Hospital         
              
3,112.10  
              
2,500.00  
Handicapped Services Marion Co. Society for the Crippled             
Health Organization Indianapolis Hospital Development Association             
Health Organization Norways Foundation             
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation Total   
            
30,993.91  
            
34,025.35  
            
28,728.81  
            
37,034.08  
            
39,355.85  
            
37,950.75  
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Category Organization 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation               
Health Organization 
Pub. Health Nursing Assn./For Crippled 
(Visiting Nurse Association)  9,844.00  10,620.00  10,620.00  10,620.00              10,620.00  10,620.00  
Hospital James Whitcomb Riley Hospital             
Hospital City Hospital, Psyche Ward               2,291.00                   150.00    2,800.00                5,600.00                5,600.00  
Hospital Psychiatric Services, Indiana Univ. Hos.             
Handicapped Services (Roberts) School/Handicapped Children             21,128.32              21,315.30              22,530.69  28,399.98              15,210.89              15,501.40  
Study Crippled Children Study             
Hospital Sunnyside Sanatorium             
Psychiatric Services Study - Julietta Hospital for Insane             
Health Organization Board of Health/Prenatal and Orthodontia             
Hospital Occupational Therapy, City Hospital                         1,150.00  
Study Colored Hospital Study             
Handicapped Services James E. Roberts Appliance Fund             
Study Hospital Survey             
Hospital St. Margaret's Guild, Occup. Therapy               4,250.00                4,538.34                5,115.00  3,410.00                6,820.00                5,515.00  
Handicapped Services Sight Conservation Class             
Study Hospital Study             
Handicapped Services 
Indpls League for the Hard of Hearing 
(Hearing Society)                  850.00                   850.00                   900.00  900.00                   900.00                1,200.00  
Handicapped Services Hard  of Hearing Demo             
Health Organization Flower Mission Society             
Health Organization 7th Dist. Fed, of Clubs- Cancer              
Handicapped Services Education of Handicapped Children             
Hospital Cancer Clinic - City Hospital                 3,000.00          
Handicapped Services Marion Co. Society for the Crippled             
Health Organization 
Indianapolis Hospital Development 
Association             
Health Organization Norways Foundation             
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation Total               38,363.32              40,473.64              39,165.69  46,129.98              39,150.89              39,586.40  
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Category Organization 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation             
Health Organization 
Pub. Health Nursing Assn./For Crippled 
(Visiting Nurse Association)  10,620.00  10,620.00  14,409.00  10,620.00  10,620.00  
Hospital James Whitcomb Riley Hospital           
Hospital City Hospital, Psyche Ward               2,800.00          
Hospital Psychiatric Services, Indiana Univ. Hos.           
Handicapped Services (Roberts) School/Handicapped Children             15,177.30          
Study Crippled Children Study           
Hospital Sunnyside Sanatorium           
Psychiatric Services Study - Julietta Hospital for Insane           
Health Organization 
Board of Health/Prenatal and 
Orthodontia           
Hospital Occupational Therapy, City Hospital               1,200.00          
Study Colored Hospital Study           
Handicapped Services James E. Roberts Appliance Fund           
Study Hospital Survey           
Hospital St. Margaret's Guild, Occup. Therapy               6,315.00                5,876.67                5,000.00            5,000.33              5,000.00  
Handicapped Services Sight Conservation Class           
Study Hospital Study           
Handicapped Services 
Indpls League for the Hard of Hearing 
(Hearing Society)               1,200.00                1,200.00                1,500.00            2,155.00              2,600.00  
Handicapped Services Hard  of Hearing Demo           
Health Organization Flower Mission Society           
Health Organization 7th Dist. Fed, of Clubs- Cancer            
Handicapped Services Education of Handicapped Children           
Hospital Cancer Clinic - City Hospital           
Handicapped Services Marion Co. Society for the Crippled               3,200.00                3,200.00              3,200.00              5,000.00  
Health Organization 
Indianapolis Hospital Development 
Association                 5,000.00    
Health Organization Norways Foundation                   10,000.00  
Health, Handicapped & 
Rehabilitation Total               40,512.30              20,896.67              20,909.00          25,975.33            33,220.00  
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Category Organization 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Youth Services               
Orphaned Children Education for Colored Orphan Children              500.00                500.00                        -        
Boy's Organization Indianapolis Boys Club Assoc.              10,000.00        
Children's Welfare Children's Aid Society                  1,704.21      
Children's Welfare Child Guidance Clinic                     6,657.24  
Children's Welfare Board of Children's Guardians             
Male Organization Boy Scouts of America             
Female Organization Campfire Girls             
Children's Welfare 
Christamore Settlement - Child's Camp 
(Christamore House)              
Female Organization YWCA             
Male Organization YMCA             
Children's Welfare Day Nursery             
Female Organization Girl Scouts of America             
Youth Services Total                        -               500.00           10,500.00             1,704.21              6,657.24  
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Category Organization 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Youth Services               
Orphaned Children 
Education for Colored Orphan 
Children             
Boy's Organization Indianapolis Boys Club Assoc.             
Children's Welfare Children's Aid Society             
Children's Welfare Child Guidance Clinic             13,049.21                4,361.09                         650.46  
Children's Welfare Board of Children's Guardians                      95.67                       43.75      
Male Organization Boy Scouts of America                            200.00  
Female Organization 
Campfire Girls                         5,000.00  
Children's Welfare 
Christamore Settlement - Child's Camp 
(Christamore House)              
Female Organization YWCA             
Male Organization YMCA             
Children's Welfare Day Nursery             
Female Organization Girl Scouts of America             
Youth Services Total               13,049.21                4,456.76                       43.75                  5,850.46  
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Category Organization 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
Youth Services                                -          
Orphaned Children 
Education for Colored Orphan 
Children                              -          
Boy's Organization Indianapolis Boys Club Assoc.             
Children's Welfare Children's Aid Society             
Children's Welfare Child Guidance Clinic             
Children's Welfare Board of Children's Guardians                  129.10            
Male Organization Boy Scouts of America                 6,500.00          
Female Organization Campfire Girls                     1,000.00      
Children's Welfare 
Christamore Settlement - Child's 
Camp (Christamore House)                9,500.00            
Female Organization YWCA               1,200.00                    2,025.50                1,660.00                1,330.00  
Male Organization YMCA                 6,000.00          
Children's Welfare Day Nursery                         5,000.00  
Female Organization Girl Scouts of America             
Youth Services Total               10,829.10              12,500.00                           -                  3,025.50                1,660.00                6,330.00  
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Category Organization 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
Youth Services                 
Orphaned Children 
Education for Colored Orphan 
Children     0.00                        -                           -      
Boy's Organization Indianapolis Boys Club Assoc.               
Children's Welfare 
Children's Aid Society               
Children's Welfare Child Guidance Clinic               
Children's Welfare Board of Children's Guardians               
Male Organization Boy Scouts of America                    2,500.00      
Female Organization Campfire Girls               
Children's Welfare 
Christamore Settlement - Child's 
Camp (Christamore House)                         2,213.00  
Female Organization YWCA           1,450.00            1,800.00                          -          
Male Organization YMCA                    8,000.00      
Children's Welfare Day Nursery               
Female Organization Girl Scouts of America               
Youth Services Total             1,450.00            1,800.00  0.00                        -             10,500.00                       -               2,213.00  
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Category Organization 1949 1950 1951 
Youth Services         
Orphaned Children 
Education for Colored Orphan 
Children       
Boy's Organization Indianapolis Boys Club Assoc.            5,000.00      
Children's Welfare Children's Aid Society       
Children's Welfare Child Guidance Clinic            5,000.00      
Children's Welfare Board of Children's Guardians       
Male Organization Boy Scouts of America            2,500.00               1,625.00  
Female Organization Campfire Girls       
Children's Welfare 
Christamore Settlement - Child's 
Camp (Christamore House)                 5,000.00  
Female Organization YWCA       
Male Organization YMCA       
Children's Welfare Day Nursery       
Female Organization Girl Scouts of America             1,245.00                932.25  
Youth Services Total            12,500.00            1,245.00             7,557.25  
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Category Organization 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
Education                 
Scholarship Alphonso Pettis Scholarship Fund           4,949.52             4,408.44             2,375.56            5,586.00  
          
1,414.00    
Recreation 
Manual Training H.S., Devlan Ath. 
Field                26,500.00           50,382.19          24,865.18   7, 374.20    
Scholarship Devlan Smith Scholarship Fund                  7,800.00            7,450.00  
          
8,605.00              12,335.00  
Scholarship Teacher Scholarships                     600.00    
             
500.00    
Elementary Education Indianapolis Free Kindergarten                  5,978.98            1,704.21  
             
720.00                   800.00  
Higher Education 
Teachers College of Indianapolis                   5,000.00  
          
5,000.00                5,000.00  
Scholarship Social Service Scholarships                   1,570.00  
          
2,400.00                   830.00  
Scholarship Occupational Therapy Scholarship           
             
785.00    
Scholarship 
General Scholarships (Indpls 
Schools)               
Scholarship Kathryn Daniels Scholarship Fund               
Higher Education Butler University               
Education Total                        -            4,949.52           30,908.44           67,136.73          46,175.39  
        
19,424.00              18,965.00  
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Category Organization 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Education               
Scholarship Alphonso Pettis Scholarship Fund                   5,000.00              10,500.00      
Recreation 
Manual Training H.S., Devlan Ath. 
Field               
Scholarship Devlan Smith Scholarship Fund             11,986.75              13,325.00                6,690.00                1,300.00      
Scholarship Teacher Scholarships             
Elementary Education 
Indianapolis Free Kindergarten               1,200.00            
Higher Education Teachers College of Indianapolis             
Scholarship Social Service Scholarships             
Scholarship Occupational Therapy Scholarship             
Scholarship 
General Scholarships (Indpls 
Schools)                     13,575.00  12,000 
Scholarship Kathryn Daniels Scholarship Fund             
Higher Education Butler University             
Education Total               13,186.75              13,325.00              11,690.00              11,800.00              13,575.00  12,000 
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Category Organization 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Education                   
Scholarship Alphonso Pettis Scholarship Fund                 
Recreation 
Manual Training H.S., Devlan Ath. 
Field                   
Scholarship Devlan Smith Scholarship Fund                 
Scholarship Teacher Scholarships                 
Elementary Education Indianapolis Free Kindergarten                 
Higher Education Teachers College of Indianapolis                 
Scholarship Social Service Scholarships                 
Scholarship 
Occupational Therapy Scholarship                 
Scholarship 
General Scholarships (Indpls 
Schools)           9,754.09  
         
13,000.00  
      
17,301.85  
     
11,016.51  
         
15,483.49  
       
9,624.51          9,727.25  13,508.10  
Scholarship Kathryn Daniels Scholarship Fund              500.00                
Higher Education Butler University                 
Education Total           10,254.09  
         
13,000.00  
      
17,301.85  
     
11,016.51  
         
15,483.49  
       
9,624.51          9,727.25  13,508.10  
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Category Organization 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Education                 
Scholarship Alphonso Pettis Scholarship Fund               
Recreation 
Manual Training H.S., Devlan Ath. 
Field                 
Scholarship Devlan Smith Scholarship Fund               
Scholarship Teacher Scholarships               
Elementary Education Indianapolis Free Kindergarten               
Higher Education 
Teachers College of Indianapolis               
Scholarship Social Service Scholarships               
Scholarship Occupational Therapy Scholarship               
Scholarship 
General Scholarships (Indpls 
Schools)         7,000.00           12,000.00          12,000.00           12,000.00          12,750.00          12,750.00            12,400.00  
Scholarship Kathryn Daniels Scholarship Fund               
Higher Education Butler University                     2,500.00              5,000.00  
Education Total           7,000.00           12,000.00          12,000.00           12,000.00          12,750.00          15,250.00            17,400.00  
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Category Organization 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Social Services                       
Elderly Care 
Marion County Farm 
(Home for the Elderly)     
           
1,492.42  
              
302.40                           
    
                         
Orphaned 
Children 
Indianapolis Orphans 
Home (Asylum?)                     
Orphaned 
Children 
Social Serv. Indpls. Orphan 
Asylum                     
Public -Social 
Services 
Indpls Council of Social 
Agencies                     
Public -Social 
Services 
Social Services, Public 
Schools                     
NP Org. - Social 
Services Flanner House                     
NP Org. - Social 
Services 
Theodora  Home Campaign                      
Public -Social 
Services 
Board of School 
Commissioners                     
NP Org. - Social 
Services Goodwill Industries                     
Handicapped 
Services 
Cab Fare for Crippled 
Children to go to School                     
NP Org. - Social 
Services Salvation Army                     
Social Services 
Total                             
           
1,492.42  
              
302.40  
     
                             
                        
Administrative                        
Administrative  Administrative  
          
7,579.64  
         
7,810.37  
           
8,438.85  
           
8,565.94  
        
17,792.23   9, 134.26  
          
8,767.74  
           
8,827.15  
          
8,750.69  
              
7,982.77  
Administrative  
Total   
          
7,579.64  
         
7,810.37  
           
8,438.85  
           
8,565.94  
        
17,792.23   9, 134.26  
          
8,767.74  
           
8,827.15  
          
8,750.69  
              
7,982.77  
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Category Organization 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
Social Services                 
Elderly Care 
Marion County Farm (Home for 
the Elderly) 
       
Orphaned Children 
Indianapolis Orphans Home 
(Asylum?)            15,000.00            
Orphaned Children 
Social Serv. Indpls. Orphan 
Asylum                  15,000.00          15,000.00          13,500.00  
Public -Social Services Indpls Council of Social Agencies                 3,000.00        
Public -Social Services Social Services, Public Schools                 2,856.66             3,628.32            4,564.72    
NP Org. - Social 
Services Flanner House                    4,000.00              4,500.00  
NP Org. - Social 
Services 
Theodora  Home Campaign                        1,200.00  
Public -Social Services Board of School Commissioners                       1,806.81  
NP Org. - Social 
Services Goodwill Industries               
Handicapped Services 
Cab Fare for Crippled Children to 
go to School               
NP Org. - Social 
Services Salvation Army               
Social Services Total                                         15,000.00  0           5,856.66           22,628.32          19,564.72          21,006.81  
                  
Administrative                  
Administrative  Administrative                8,179.04             8,109.00  8384.01           9,621.36             9,303.31            9,378.24            9,382.40  
Administrative  Total                 8,179.04             8,109.00  8384.01           9,621.36             9,303.31            9,378.24            9,382.40  
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Category Organization 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 
Social Services                 
Elderly Care 
Marion County Farm (Home for 
the Elderly)               
Orphaned Children 
Indianapolis Orphans Home 
(Asylum?)               
Orphaned Children 
Social Serv. Indpls. Orphan 
Asylum          12,000.00          10,500.00          9,000.00  7,500.00          5,000.00             2,500.00    
Public -Social Services Indpls Council of Social Agencies               
Public -Social Services Social Services, Public Schools               
NP Org. - Social 
Services Flanner House            3,000.00            3,000.00          1,500.00            4,725.00             7,975.00            7,500.00  
NP Org. - Social 
Services Theodora  Home Campaign                
Public -Social Services Board of School Commissioners               
NP Org. - Social 
Services Goodwill Industries       5,000.00        
Handicapped Services 
Cab Fare for Crippled Children to 
go to School               
NP Org. - Social 
Services Salvation Army               
Social Services Total            15,000.00          13,500.00        10,500.00  12,500.00          9,725.00           10,475.00            7,500.00  
                  
Administrative                  
Administrative  Administrative             9,360.25            9,421.16          9,234.07  9,858.00        10,071.36           10,000.26          10,137.29  
Administrative  Total              9,360.25            9,421.16          9,234.07  9,858.00        10,071.36           10,000.26          10,137.29  
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Category Organization 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Social Services           
Elderly Care 
Marion County Farm (Home for 
the Elderly)                      500.00  
Orphaned Children 
Indianapolis Orphans Home 
(Asylum?)         
Orphaned Children 
Social Serv. Indpls. Orphan 
Asylum         
Public -Social Services Indpls Council of Social Agencies         
Public -Social Services Social Services, Public Schools         
NP Org. - Social 
Services Flanner House            2,300.00              3,000.00    
NP Org. - Social 
Services Theodora  Home Campaign          
Public -Social Services Board of School Commissioners         
NP Org. - Social 
Services Goodwill Industries                   3,750.00  
Handicapped Services 
Cab Fare for Crippled Children to 
go to School            2,250.00        
NP Org. - Social 
Services Salvation Army               1,500.00    
Social Services Total              4,550.00              4,500.00              4,250.00  
            
Administrative            
Administrative  Administrative             9,051.35          10,347.17          11,434.04            10,938.66  
Administrative  Total              9,051.35          10,347.17          11,434.04            10,938.66  
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Music Funding Organization 1933 CD 1933 1934 
CD 
1934 1935 CD    1935 1936 CD 1936 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO  50.00      724.64     50.00   704.23   1,350.00   18,493.15   2,000.00   27,027.03  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis 
        Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds 
        Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society 
        Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc  
        Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra 
        Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band 
        
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis 
        Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association 
        Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra 
        Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band 
        Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band 
        Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks) 
        
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter 
        Music Ensemble Music Society 
        Music International Center of Indianapolis 
        Music Earth Music Center of Indiana 
        Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir 
        Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
        
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)  
        Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir 
        
Music Total 
 
 50.00      724.64     50.00   704.23   1,350.00   18,493.15   2,000.00   27,027.03  
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Music Funding Organization 1937 CD 1937 1938 CD 1938 1939 CD 1939 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO  5,000.00   65,789.47   5,000.00    66,666.67        5,000.00       67,567.568  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis 
      Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds 
      Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society 
      Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc  
      Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra 
      Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band 
      
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis 
      Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association 
      Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra 
      Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band 
      Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band 
      Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks) 
      
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter 
      Music Ensemble Music Society 
      Music International Center of Indianapolis 
      Music Earth Music Center of Indiana 
      Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir 
      Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
      
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)  
      Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir 
      
Music Total 
 
 5,000.00   65,789.47   5,000.00    66,666.67        5,000.00       67,567.568  
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Music Funding Organization 1940 
CD 
1940 1941 CD 1941 1942  CD 1942 1943 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO          5,050.00     64,743.59       5,050.00     58,720.93       5,050.00  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis               
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds               
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society               
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band               
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis               
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band               
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band               
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)               
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter               
Music Ensemble Music Society               
Music International Center of Indianapolis               
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana               
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir               
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir               
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)                
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir               
Music Total                     5,050.00     64,743.59       5,050.00     58,720.93       5,050.00  
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Music Funding Organization CD 1943 1944 CD 1944 1945 CD 1945 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO    54,891.30  5,000.00  53,763.44      
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis           
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds           
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society           
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc            
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra           
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band           
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis           
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association           
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra           
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band           
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band           
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)           
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter           
Music Ensemble Music Society           
Music International Center of Indianapolis           
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana           
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir           
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir           
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)            
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir           
Music Total      54,891.30  5,000.00  53,763.44      
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Music Funding Organization 
CD 
1947 1948 CD 1948 1949 CD 1949 1950 
CD 
1950 1951 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO                 
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis                 
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds                 
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society                 
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                  
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra                 
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band                 
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis                 
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association                 
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra                 
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band                 
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band   
    
      
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)   
    
      
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter   
    
      
Music Ensemble Music Society   
    
      
Music International Center of Indianapolis   
    
      
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana   
    
      
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir   
    
      
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir   
    
      
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)    
    
      
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir   
    
      
Music Total     
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Music Funding Organization 
CD 
1947 
CD 
1951 1952 
CD 
1952 1953 
CD 
1953 1954 
CD 
1954 1955 CD 1955 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO                      5,000.00     35,211.27  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis                     
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds                     
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society                     
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                      
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra                     
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band                     
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of 
Indianapolis                     
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association                     
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra                     
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band                     
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band                     
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)                     
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central 
Indiana Chapter                     
Music Ensemble Music Society                     
Music International Center of Indianapolis                     
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana                     
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir                     
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir                     
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, 
inner city functions)                      
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir                     
Music Total                        5,000.00     35,211.27  
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Music Funding Organization 
CD 
1947 1956 CD 1956 1957 CD 1957 1958 CD 1958 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO   
     
4,000.00     27,777.78  
     
5,000.00     33,557.05  
     
6,000.00       39,215.69  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis               
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds               
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society               
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band               
Music - Orchestra 
International Violin Competition of 
Indianapolis               
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band               
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band               
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)               
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central 
Indiana Chapter               
Music Ensemble Music Society               
Music International Center of Indianapolis               
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana               
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir               
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir               
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, 
inner city functions)                
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir               
Music Total     
     
4,000.00     27,777.78  
     
5,000.00     33,557.05  
     
6,000.00       39,215.69  
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Music Funding Organization 1959 CD 1959 1960 CD 1960 1961 CD 1961 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      6,000.00     38,961.04       6,000.00     38,216.56       6,000.00     37,974.68  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis         100.00  
         
649.35          100.00  
         
636.94          100.00  
         
632.91  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir             
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        6,100.00     39,610.39       6,100.00     38,853.50       6,100.00     38,607.59  
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Music Funding Organization 1962 CD 1962 1963 CD 1963 1964 CD 1964 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      6,000.00       37,500.00       6,000.00       37,037.04       6,000.00       36,585.37  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis             100.00  
           
617.28          100.00  
           
609.76  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir             
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        6,000.00       37,500.00       6,100.00       37,654.32       6,100.00       37,195.12  
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Music Funding Organization 1965 CD 1965 1966 CD 1966 1967 CD 1967 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      6,000.00     35,928.14       8,000.00     46,511.63       8,000.00       45,197.74  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis         100.00  
         
598.80          100.00  
         
581.40          200.00         1,129.94  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)              5,000.00       28,248.59  
Music American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             200.00       1,162.79          200.00         1,129.94  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir             
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, 
inner city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        6,100.00     36,526.95       8,300.00     48,255.81     13,400.00       75,706.21  
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Music Funding Organization 1968 CD 1968 1969 CD 1969 1970 CD 1970 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      8,000.00       43,478.26       8,000.00       41,237.11       8,000.00     39,024.00  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis         300.00         1,630.43          100.00  
           
515.46          200.00    
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)      3,000.00       16,304.35          
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir         200.00         1,086.96          200.00         1,030.93          200.00    
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir                       -            200.00         1,030.93          200.00    
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, 
inner city functions)                        -            
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total      11,500.00       62,500.00       8,500.00       43,814.43       8,600.00     39,024.00  
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Music Funding Organization 1971 CD 1971 1972 CD 1972 1973 CD 1973 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      8,000.00       37,383.18       8,000.00     36,199.10      
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis         200.00  
           
934.58          200.00  
         
904.98          200.00  
           
851.06  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir         200.00  
           
934.58          
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir         200.00  
           
934.58          200.00  
         
904.98          200.00  
           
851.06  
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, 
inner city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        8,600.00       40,186.92       8,400.00     38,009.05          400.00         1,702.13  
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Music Funding Organization 1974 CD 1974 1975 CD 1975 1976 CD   1976 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      8,000.00       30,651.34       8,000.00       28,070.18       16,000.00        53,156.15  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis      2,700.00       10,344.83                        -    
           
500.00          1,661.13  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)           
                     
-    
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir         200.00  
           
766.28          200.00  
           
701.75    
                     
-    
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir         200.00  
           
766.28          200.00  
           
701.75  
           
200.00             664.45  
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)       3,000.00       11,494.25       3,000.00       10,526.32         3,000.00          9,966.78  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total      14,100.00       54,022.99     11,400.00       40,000.00       19,700.00        65,448.50  
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Music Funding Organization 1977 CD   1977 1978 CD    1978 1979 CD   1979 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      25,000.00        77,881.62       26,000.00         75,362.32       25,000.00        65,104.17  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis   
                     
-           1,000.00           2,898.55  
           
500.00          1,302.08  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds        1,722.00          5,364.49         4,500.00         13,043.48      
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society          13,500.00         39,130.43      
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)   
                     
-                            -        
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir 
           
500.00          1,557.63  
           
500.00           1,449.28  
           
500.00          1,302.08  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
           
200.00             623.05                          -    
           
200.00             520.83  
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)         3,000.00          9,345.79         3,000.00           8,695.65    
                     
-    
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        30,422.00        94,772.59       48,500.00       140,579.71       26,200.00        68,229.17  
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Music Funding Organization 1980 CD   1980 1981 CD   1981 1982 CD   1982 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      75,000.00     172,018.35       25,000.00        51,975.05       25,000.00        48,923.68  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis 
           
500.00          1,146.79  
           
500.00          1,039.50  
           
500.00             978.47  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc           16,667.00        34,650.73       16,667.00        32,616.44  
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra       
                     
-      
                     
-    
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir 
           
500.00          1,146.79             1,000.00          1,956.95  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
           
400.00             917.43      
           
200.00             391.39  
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)    
                     
-          
                     
-    
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        76,400.00     175,229.36       42,167.00        87,665.28       43,367.00        84,866.93  
 
  
      3
8
4
 
 
  
 
Music Funding Organization 1983 CD   1983 1984 CD   1984 1985 CD   1985 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      25,000.00        47,438.33       25,000.00        45,454.55       25,000.00        43,859.65  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis 
           
500.00             948.77  
           
500.00             909.09      
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc       16,666.00        31,624.29       25,000.00        45,454.55      
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra         
           
200.00             350.88  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
           
200.00             379.51  
           
400.00             727.27      
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        42,366.00        80,390.89       50,900.00        92,545.45       25,200.00        44,210.53  
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Music Funding Organization 1986 CD    1986 1987 CD   1987 1988 CD   1988 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO          25,000.00        41,597.34       25,000.00        39,936.10  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis 
           
500.00  
             
862.07         2,500.00          4,159.73    
                     
-    
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band            2,766.00          4,602.33      
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter             
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir 
           
200.00  
             
344.83  
           
200.00             332.78  
           
200.00             319.49  
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)       25,000.00         43,103.45          
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        25,700.00         44,310.34       30,466.00        50,692.18       25,200.00        40,255.59  
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Music Funding Organization 1989 CD   1989 1990 CD   1990 1991 CD   1991 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      50,000.00        76,219.51       25,000.00        36,127.17       30,000.00        41,608.88  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis        2,000.00          3,048.78             2,000.00          2,773.93  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc              
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis          30,000.00        43,352.60      
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association                3,000.00          4,160.89  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band             
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana 
Chapter      10,000.00        15,243.90         5,000.00          7,225.43      
Music Ensemble Music Society             
Music International Center of Indianapolis             
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
 Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir             
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner 
city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir             
Music Total        62,000.00        94,512.20       60,000.00        86,705.20       35,000.00        48,543.69  
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Music Funding Organization 1989 1992 CD   1992 1993 CD   1993 1994 CD   1994 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO        30,000.00        40,376.85       31,500.00        41,176.47       35,000.00        44,585.99  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis          2,000.00          2,691.79         2,000.00          2,614.38      
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds               
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society               
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band               
Music - Orchestra 
International Violin Competition of 
Indianapolis               
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association               
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra                  7,898.69        10,062.03  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band               
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band               
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)               
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central 
Indiana Chapter               
Music Ensemble Music Society              2,000.00          2,614.38      
Music International Center of Indianapolis               
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana               
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir          6,000.00          8,075.37         1,000.00          1,307.19         4,000.00          5,095.54  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir     
                     
-      
                     
-      
                     
-    
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-
church, inner city functions)      
                     
-      
                     
-         35,000.00        44,585.99  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir     
                     
-         16,500.00        21,568.63    
                     
-    
Music Total          38,000.00        51,144.01       53,000.00        69,281.05       81,898.69     104,329.54  
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Music Funding Organization 1995 CD   1995 1996 CD   1996 1997 CD   1997 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ 
Indianapolis State Symphony Society/ISO      35,000.00        43,370.51       35,000.00        42,117.93           45,000.00           52,941.18  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis        2,000.00          2,478.31         2,000.00          2,406.74             8,914.00           10,487.06  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds             
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society             
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                   40,000.00           47,058.82  
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra             
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band             
Music - Orchestra 
International Violin Competition of 
Indianapolis             
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association                  23,750.00           27,941.18  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra        4,000.00          4,956.63       20,000.00        24,067.39    
                        
-    
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band                    2,100.00             2,470.59  
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band             
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)             
Music 
American Theatre Organ Society/Central 
Indiana Chapter                  10,000.00           11,764.71  
Music Ensemble Music Society        2,000.00          2,478.31                 2,500.00             2,941.18  
Music International Center of Indianapolis            3,500.00          4,211.79      
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana             
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir        5,000.00          6,195.79               22,500.00           26,470.59  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir             
Music - Choral 
Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-
church, inner city functions)              
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir          10,000.00        12,033.69      
Music Total        48,000.00        59,479.55       70,500.00        84,837.55        154,764.00        182,075.29  
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Music Funding Organization 1998 CD   1998 
Total for all years in Constant 
Dollars 
Music - Orchestra 
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Assn./ Indianapolis State Symphony 
Society/ISO      40,000.00        46,349.94                            3,323,440.87  
Music - Orchestra Philharmonic Orchestra of Indianapolis                        -                                    96,258.91  
Music - Orchestra Music Performance Trust Funds                                     24,629.96  
Music - Orchestra Festival Music Society      50,000.00        57,937.43                                160,567.86  
Music - Orchestra Cathedral Arts, Inc                                    306,404.82  
Music - Orchestra New World Chamber Orchestra                                           550.88  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Municipal Band                                       7,368.33  
Music - Orchestra International Violin Competition of Indianapolis                                     73,352.60  
Music - Orchestra American Pianists Association      65,000.00        75,318.66                                199,170.72  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Chamber Orchestra      30,000.00        34,762.46                                135,747.19  
Music - Orchestra Indianapolis Symphonic Band                                       4,570.59  
Music - Orchestra New Horizons Band        2,500.00          2,896.87                                    5,396.87  
Music Summer Concert Series (City Parks)                                     52,552.94  
Music American Theatre Organ Society/Central Indiana Chapter                                     59,234.04  
Music Ensemble Music Society                                     14,533.87  
Music International Center of Indianapolis                                       7,711.79  
Music Earth Music Center of Indiana        2,500.00          2,896.87                                    5,396.87  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Symphonic Choir                                   104,470.44  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Community Choir                                     14,210.62  
Music - Choral Cathedral Arts, Inc. (Choir - For non-church, inner city functions)                                    212,718.23  
Music - Choral Indianapolis Children's Choir                                     60,102.32  
Music Total      190,000.00     220,162.22                            4,868,390.73  
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Doctoral Research Grants, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy 2006-2007 
Doctoral Research Grants, Central Indiana Community Foundation 2004-2006  
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
University of Notre Dame 
Adjunct Faculty - Master of Nonprofit Administration   2010 
Nonprofit management, develop and teach a graduate course on  
fund development.     
  
  
Butler University, Indianapolis, IN 
Associate Faculty - Philanthropy and the Arts    2008 
Conceived undergraduate honors course, developed syllabus,  
administered all grades. 
 
Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs,  
Indianapolis, IN 
Associate Faculty – Nonprofit Management 2007-2008  
Developed undergraduate syllabus and course structure, administered  
all grades.  
 
Indiana University School of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, IN  
Associate Faculty – Introduction to Public Speaking   2007-2008 
Developed undergraduate syllabus and course structure, administered  
all grades.  
 
Butler University College of Business Administration, Indianapolis, IN 
Associate Faculty – The Business of Doing Good; the Relationship  
Between the For-profit and Nonprofit Sectors    2007 
Conceived undergraduate course, developed syllabus, administered all  
grades. 
 
Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs,  
Indianapolis, IN 
Associate Faculty – The Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector   2005-2008  
Developed graduate and undergraduate syllabus and course structure,  
administered all grades.  
 
Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, IN 
Teaching Assistant – to Dwight Burlingame in The Nonprofit and  
Voluntary Sector        2005 
Collaborated on graduate curriculum and exams, graded all work  
including final essays. 
 
Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN 
Preparing Future Faculty Certification     2004 
  
  
NONPROFIT EXPERIENCE 
University of Notre Dame 
Director of Nonprofit Executive Programs    2008-Present 
Teach in the Master of Nonprofit Administration Program, Mendoza  
College of Business. Create, though partnerships with nonprofit  
associations and organizations, non-degree nonprofit management and  
leadership programs for executives and leaders already working in the  
philanthropic field. 
 
Butler University Institute for Research and Scholarship,  
Indianapolis, IN 
Associate director, grants       2005-2008 
Developed and presented training programs to improve faculty  
grant proposals. Provided assistance to faculty and staff with  
funding research and proposal writing. Established and developed  
funder relationships. Increased grant success by 200%.  
        
Indiana Theatre Association, Indianapolis, IN 
President, board of directors      2006-2008 
Convened a strategic planning retreat to avert dissolution. Increased  
donor support and improved grant success. Refocused mission and  
objectives, rewrote bylaws, and restructured board of directors. Served  
as committee chair for Indiana Theatre Works Conference, 2005, 2006,  
2007. 
 
Third Millennium Philanthropy and Leadership Initiative 
Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, IN 
Founding national advisory board member    2005-2007  
 
Philanthropic Studies Alumni Association 
Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN 
Board member        2005-2007  
 
The Arts Rock! Initiative 
Collaborative project of The Central Indiana Community Foundation,  
Arts Council of Indianapolis, and Indiana University – Purdue  
University, Indianapolis, IN 
Project co-creator/coordinator      2004-2005   
Worked with community organizations and individuals to create a  
website and student mailing list to engage college students in local  
cultural events. 
 
Indianapolis Arts Chorale, Indianapolis, IN 
Interim executive director       2002-2003   
Responsible for fundraising, marketing and promotion, and ticket sales.  
  
Beckmann Theatre, Indianapolis, IN 
Founding board member and artistic director    2001-2003   
Participated in the creation of mission, objective and bylaws. 
Secured start-up grants from Eli Lilly and Co. Foundation and the Arts  
Council of Indianapolis. 
 
Oakwood Christian Youth Summer Leadership Academy, Syracuse, IN 
Interim executive director       2000-2001   
Created new programming, camp rules and systems. 
Developed marketing strategy and materials. 
Presented leadership workshops to high school students.  
 
Elkhart Civic Theatre, Bristol, IN 
Board member and fundraising committee member   2000-2001   
 
National Speakers Association 
Chapter liaison for Indiana, Michigan and Ohio    1994  
Interviewed national chapter leaders on best practices for chapter  
development. Created and produced nationally distributed Chapter  
Liaison Audio Newsletter. 
 
The Fourth Freedom Forum, Goshen, IN 
Executive director and spokesperson     1986-1993   
Responsible for development and oversight of activist organization.  
Spoke nationally promoting international security through trade incentives  
and sanctions. Planned and facilitated national round table discussions  
with international experts. Created Inforum newsletter to communicate  
international security issues to the public. Supervised and hired staff.  
 
SPEAKING AND TRAINING EXPERIENCE 
The Business of Doing Good 
Keynote Speaker, Consultant and Trainer     2007-Present 
Present programs primarily related to the philanthropic sector and  
corporate giving. 
 
Marc Hardy & Assoc. 
Keynote speaker and seminar leader     1993-2002   
Presented over 200 motivational speeches on resilience and tenacity.  
Developed and presented nearly 200 seminars on interpersonal  
communications. Traveled nationally and internationally to speak at  
association and corporate conferences. 
  
  
Career Track  
Trainer         1994-1998  
Led workshops and seminars on management and customer service. 
 
National Speakers Association 
President – Indiana Chapter      1991 
 
Toastmaster‟s World Championship of Public Speaking 
Finalist          1991  
 
MEDIA EXPERIENCE  
WNIT Public Television, Elkhart, IN 
Co-host, Open Studio       2001-2002   
Conducted live interviews of regional artists, authors and musicians. 
Served as emcee for 9/11 on-air fundraiser.  
 
WTRC – AM Radio Station, Elkhart, IN 
Guest host         2001   
Produced and hosted daily 4 hour morning call-in show.  
 
WFRN – AM Radio Station, Elkhart, IN 
Host, Good News Michiana       1999-2000   
Produced and hosted daily 4 hour morning talk/music/news show. 
Conducted live interviews with guest personalities. 
 
National Speaker‟s Association 
Co-host, Voices of Experience      1996   
Produced monthly audio newsletter for national distribution. 
Conducted interviews with experts on authorship, ethics, and marketing. 
 
Independent PBS documentary series, 2000 Today 
On-air correspondent       1992   
Conducted interviews and edited segments on second millennium plans  
of various nonprofit and governmental organizations. 
 
Freelance voice-over talent       1986-2002 
Produced and performed in over 500 audio and video voice-overs for  
commercial and industrial clients.  
 
The Fourth Freedom Forum, Goshen, IN 
Executive director and spokesperson     1986-1993   
Granted over 60 television, radio and newspaper interviews. 
  
  
PUBLICATIONS 
Corporate Giving, Giving USA 2011, Center on Philanthropy. 
 
The Arts and Philanthropy, briefing paper for the Learning to Give  
project; Michigan Council on Foundations, 2004.  
 
Arts Patrons are Created; They Aren’t Born that Way, article for the  
Indianapolis Business Journal, April 14, 2003. 
 
Authored several articles on human resources management, for numerous  
publications including Bottom Line Business and Manage Magazine,  
1994 – 1999. 
 
Book co-author; Only the Best on Leadership, WIN Publications, 1996.  
 
Book co-author; Only the Best on Customer Service, WIN Publications, 1996. 
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
Association for Research of the Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action 
Conference 
Cleveland, OH, November, 2010 
The Role of Government in Creating Community Trusts: a Study of How Federal and 
Indiana State Law 
 Lead to the Creation of the Indianapolis Foundation  
 
3
rd
 Annual Ecumenical Conference 
Lviv, Ukraine, October, 2010 
Keynote Presentation 
Trust, Responsibility and Philanthropy  
 
American Humanics/Campus Compact Conference 
Indianapolis, January, 2009 
The Coming Boom in the Nonprofit Sector and its Demand for College Graduates 
 
Region IV National Council on University Research Administrators Conference 
Kansas City, Mo. May, 2008. 
Beginning Before You Begin: Building Relationships with Program Officers 
Teaching Faculty to Fish for Funding 
 
Benchmark III Conference 
Tempe, AZ. March, 2006.  
Historical Perspectives of Philanthropy and the Arts 
What Does an Interdisciplinary Ph.D. in Philanthropic Studies Mean?”  
  
Association for Research of the Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action 
Conference 
Washington, DC. November, 2005  
Justifying the Arts as a Community Need: The History of Funding of the Arts by the 
Indianapolis Foundation, 1916-2004 
Aids and Arts Advocacy: a Case History of the Spotlight Event in Indianapolis 
 
RESEARCH  
History of the Support of Temperance Plays in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Centuries 
 
Historiography of Government Support of the Arts in Great Britain in the 20
th
 Century 
 
The Relationship Between Arts Censorship and the Accepting of Public Money 
 
The Relationship Between Philanthropy and the Success of Pulitzer Prize Winning 
Playwrights 
 
The History of the Carpenter Science Theatre Company at the Science Museum of 
Virginia 
 
MEMBERSHIPS 
Americans for the Arts 
 
American Fundraising Professionals 
 
Association for Research of the Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action  
 
Indiana Theatre Association 
 
Indiana University Alumni Association; life member 
 
